Nuclear Deterrence: A complete failure at Kargil

Abstract

There is a perception since long that the nuclear weapon states cannot opt for war against each other. The proponents of nuclear deterrence quote the example of the United States and Soviet Union to strengthen their view point that the two major world powers didn’t opt for direct confrontation during the cold war era. This concept failed to get its legitimacy after a limited war between the two South Asian nuclear weapon states in 1999. Kargil war directly challenged the proliferation optimists and forced them to change their perceptions on the nuclear deterrence theory. This article looks at the role of nuclear deterrence in averting war between India and Pakistan at Kargil. It finds that nuclear deterrence failed to avert Kargil war and the nuclearization of South Asia further contributed in the worsening of the crisis due to different understandings of the nuclear deterrence theory on the two sides. It also finds that it was international community’s pressure which forced the two states to bring their forces to normal positions.