Algebraic Geometry Of Perfect And Sequential Equilibrium, Sets Of Sequential And Perfect Equilibrium Strategy Profiles Are Identical For Almost All Assignments Of Payoffs To Outcomes, Competitive Equilibria In Semi-Algebraic Economies, Semi-Algebraic Corr

Abstract

Algebraic Geometry Of Perfect And Sequential Equilibrium, Sets Of Sequential And Perfect Equilibrium Strategy Profiles Are Identical For Almost All Assignments Of Payoffs To Outcomes, Competitive Equilibria In Semi-Algebraic Economies, Semi-Algebraic Correspondence That Maps Parameters To Positive Numbers, Multiplicity In Applied General Equilibrium, Algorithmic Approach Toward The Tracing Procedure For Bi-Matrix Games, Geometrical Approach To Two-Dimensional Conformal Field Theory, Consideration Of Topology Changing Amplitudes, Study Of Rational Models Is In Its Rigidity Very Analogous To Finite Group Theory, Global Nash Convergence Of Foster And Young's Regret Testing, Regret-Based Learning, Stochastic Dynamics; Random Search; Uncoupled Dynamics; Unknown Games; Global Convergence To Nash...

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