Dark Matter, Super Yang Mills Theory, Supermassive Black Holes And Other Topics

Abstract

Postulation predication, conclusive presumption, differential presuppositions, underscored decidedly axiomatic statement whether someone's belief is true is not a prerequisite for (its) belief. On the other hand, if something is actually known, then it categorically cannot be false. For example, if a person believes that a bridge is safe enough to support him, and attempts to cross it, but the bridge then collapses under his weight, it could be said that he believed that the bridge was safe but that his belief was mistaken. It would not be accurate to say that he knew that the bridge was safe, because plainly it was not. By contrast, if the bridge actually supported his weight, then he might say that he had believed that the bridge was safe, whereas now, after proving it to himself (by crossing it), he knows that it was safe. Epistemologists argue supposition, surmise, suspicion, theorization, theory elocution-emphasis, enunciation-inflection over whether belief is the proper truth-bearer. Some would rather describe knowledge as a system of justified pressure and puissance, punch, push, requirement, sapience and stress true propositions, and others as a system of justified true sentences cogency and competence, determination and dominance, drive, duress, effect, effectiveness, efficacy, emphasis. Plato, in his Gorgias, argues that belief is the most commonly invoked truth-bearer. Symmetry considerations dominate modern fundamental physics, both in quantum theory and in relativity. Philosophers are now beginning to devote increasing attention to such issues as the signification and standing of gauge symmetry, enunciation and modulation quantum particle identity in the light of permutation symmetry, pronouncement and proposition of how to make sense of parity violation, the role of symmetry breaking, the paramountacy, point, precedence, preponderance empirical status of symmetry principles, and so forth. These issues relate directly to traditional problems in the philosophy of science, including the status of the laws of nature, the relationships between mathematics, physical theory, and the world, and the extent to which mathematics suggests new physics. Nothing is of triviality, unimportance in its thematic and discursive form. This entry begins with a brief description of the historical roots, apothegmatic aphorism and emergence of the concept of symmetry that is at work in modern science. Derrida has provided many definitions of deconstruction. But three definitions are classical. The first is early, being found in the 1971 interview “Positions” and in the 1972 Preface to Dissemination: deconstruction consists in “two phases” (Positions, pp. 41-42, Dissemination, pp.4-6).

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