

Democracy and the Crisis of Legitimacy: Peace Formation and Failed State Building in Africa

ADEBISI, MOSES ADESOLA

Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ilorin, PMB 1515, Ilorin, Nigeria

E-mail: masbisi@yahoo.com

Abstract.

Advocates of democracy and democratically-governed societies believe that a country's state of development is a function of the extent to which individuals and groups are able to partake in the decision-making processes which determine their livelihood and humanity. Africa remains the last continent to be freed from the shackles of colonialism and imperialism. The partition of Africa into different states or countries in a manner that showed little or no regard for ethnic, religious, cultural and political differences embedded the destructive seeds of failure in these countries. The wave of political and social crises in the post-independence era reflects the inherent nature of these salient factors. The principal objective of this paper is to examine the causal nexus between historical antecedent of external influences on Africa's political, social and cultural structures, on one hand, and the failure of democratic state building in post independence Africa, on the other. The resilience of these pre-colonial differences and internecine conflicts clearly made state-building efforts in post colonial Africa complicated. Today, Africa is bedeviled with ethnic, religious and political crises in one country after the other on a perennial scale to the extent that a number of states in Africa had failed and are still failing. Democratic methods of state-building have failed and are failing in Africa. What factors are responsible? Who are chief actors, internal or external, responsible for this failure? What theoretical tools of analysis are available for understanding the situation and to what extent has political authority been eroded by crisis of legitimacy? This paper in its summation tries to identify possible leeway out of the complex state building problems facing African countries.

Keywords: democracy, state-building, legitimacy crisis, peace formation, institutions, actors.

INTRODUCTION.

Democratic development process in Africa since independence, mainly in the 1960s had been characterized by social upheavals generated by political cataracts. The failure of the colonial masters to forge the various ethnic and cultural groups into common national entities established the muddy foundations of political and social failure to the extent that discontentment here and there over power-sharing arrangements among the various ethnic groups truncated democratic governments a few years after independence. Similarly, pre-independence political parties were formed along cultural lines defined by ethnic group membership and religious affiliation. The failure of most African states to establish democratic societies through elections and party politics led to the resurgence of primordial allegiances and conflicts. Therefore, various attempts at state-building through peace formation have not achieved the desired results. The concern for the development of democracy based on strong institutions of governance across Africa locally and internationally resonates louder and louder in today's globalised world to the extent that autocratic leaders and non-democratic governments have become endangered. This led Hillary Clinton, former Secretary of State of the United States of America, USA, to declare at a meeting of the African Union in Addis Ababa, in 2010, that "many African leaders seem more concerned with staying eternally in power than with ably serving their people" (Joseph, 2010: 324). This position of Clinton was made a year after US President Barack Obama's declaration in Ghana that "Africa no longer needs strongmen- it needs strong institutions" (ibid.). The democratic credentials of most African leaders have been the source of various crises of legitimacy and the attendant conflicts and erosion of their authority and ultimately state failure. According to de Gucht (2009):

Legitimacy should be at the heart of any government. Government involves a contract between the rulers and the people that should be based on trust and respect, not a rule based on force and coercion.

The above statement by Karel de Gucht, Vice Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister of the Kingdom of Belgium, at an international seminar on Africa held in Brussels, Belgium, in 2009, underscores the global concern for democratic development in Africa against the backdrop of constant internal conflicts, peace formation and failure of state building processes.

CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT:

(a). State-Building:

According to Richmond (2011:13), “*statebuilding* is as an externalized process focused on the role of external actors, organizations, donors, IFIs, agencies, and INGOs and their key role in building liberal institutions for security, democracy, markets, and creating basic infrastructure”. He states further that the state-building process “tests on international technical expertise and capacity” (ibid.). Evidences from the various projects involving The EU, several donor agencies, and NGOs in the state-building processes in Africa point to the attempts to build peace platforms for democratic and institutional capacities for development. On the other hand, Richmond defines *peace formation* as a process where,

“indigenous (Mac Ginty, 2008) or local agents of peacebuilding, conflict resolution, development, or in customary, religious, cultural, social, or local political settings find ways of establishing peace processes and the dynamics of local forms of peace, which are also constitutive of state, regional or local hybrids” (ibid.).

(b). Democracy and legitimacy:

Democracy is usually described as a government of the people whereby majority rules. A system whereby the right of citizens to vote or be voted for cannot normally be alienated. As a system, it represents the best medium for societal development because it is based on mass participation in decision-making. Legitimacy on the contrary reflects the extent to which the authority exercised by the elected leaders of government popularly supported or accepted by the people. These twin concepts provide the basis for any meaningful development of the state. Invariably, performing and effective governments score high on the legitimacy scale and this makes them relatively stable and peaceful. However, the problem of poorly-rooted democracy in Africa has robbed it of needed pace and space for economic growth and development. According to *Freedom House’s* Arch Puddington (quoted in Joseph (ibid.) developments in Africa “show a continued pattern of volatility amidst overall freedom decline”. This pictures a scenario described by Joseph as “democratic backsliding exceeding advances”. That is the rate of democratic decline is faster than its developmental advances. This can be illustrated by Reverend Thomas Malthus’ arithmetic-geometric ratio and Vladimir Illyanov Lenin’s thesis of negative development (i.e., ‘one step forward, two steps backward).

THE DEMOCRATIC STATE: CRISES OF LEGITIMACY AND THE POLITICAL LOGJAM.

Democratic states are sovereign self-governing states in which authority is exercised on the basis of established social institutions and where the rule of law represents the basis of all social and political relationships in the society. Countries of Africa, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, are moving towards the democratic society against the backdrop of ethnic, religious and political problems. Legitimacy of authority in many of these countries, such as Nigeria, Guinea, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, the Congos (Democratic Republic of Congo and Congo Brazzaville) amongst others, has been affected by internecine struggles for power and control. Civil wars, separatist movements and religious conflicts such as the *Boko Haram* in Nigeria have pushed many of these states to the status of state failure and collapse. According to Williams (www.europaworld.com), any “discussions about state failure are essentially about the inter-relationships between patterns of authority, political control and institution-building.” That is, he is of the opinion that any attempt to figure out what constitutes state failure as far as Africa is concerned “requires a keen sense of shifting configurations of power on the continent and beyond” (ibid.). This is because both local and international actors are involved in state-building through peace formation as equally identified by Richmond (2011). Based on this, Paul Williams identified two dimensions of state failure: a). the failure to control and b).the failure to promote human flourishing.

In the first dimension, statehood failure is perceived “in terms of the inability of state institutions to control actors and processes within a given territory”. In substantiating this statement, he quotes Robert I. Rotberg in his position that:

failed states cannot control their peripheral regions, especially those regions that are occupied by out-groups...Plausibly, the extent of a state failure can be measured by the extent of its geographical expanse genuinely controlled (especially after dark) by the official government.

Paul Williams infers therefore, from this position that both control and failure should be seen as absolutes because, in the sense portrayed above, a country “might successfully control some of its territory but not all of it”. For instance, Sudan even before it lost South Sudan was already considered a failed state while it exercised effective control of most of its territory. The *Failed State Index 2013* prepared by the U.S.-based think-tank, classified both Sudan and South Sudan in its ‘Alert’ category. This category also includes countries like

Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea and Guinea Bissau, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, Republic of Congo, Iran, Kenya, and 67 other countries. The think tank also use other classifications to rate or assess the state of failability or stability of countries. Such classifications include: warning, stable and sustainable, based on some social, economic and political indicators. The failure of political leaders in countries such as Somalia to bring about effective control of state institutions and groups led to the loss of state authority as a result of the erosion of legitimacy of governance and the ultimate collapse of the state. Somali President, Mohammed Siad Barre, fled the country to Nigeria in 1991 as the country was divided into territories controlled by warlords and criminals driven into conflicts by ideological madness based on fundamentalist religious extremism. Menckhaus (2003), as quoted by Paul Williams (www.europaworld.com) states that:

Somalia has repeatedly shown that in some places and at some times communities, towns, and regions can enjoy relatively high levels of peace, reconciliation, security and lawfulness despite the absence of central authority.

Secondly, according to Paul Williams, a country might also fail if it fails to promote human flourishing. This happens, he believes when such a country, "either because of a lack of capacity or political will, fails to provide public goods to their entire population rather than favouring one or other particular segment of it". The state according to Williams has a historical responsibility to provide their citizens the basic rights which dates back to Jean Badin's 16th century notions of popular sovereignty. In most of the failed or failing states, the inability to provide the basic necessities of life for the citizens stems largely from poor economic status and more to corruption and internal conflicts among the various constituent ethnic groups. For instance, competition for power and control between the indigenous and settler populations in Liberia and Sierra Leone created conflicts that decapitated these countries' capacities for strong statehoods. Other places where internal competition for power and control had threatened statehood are: civil wars between the Hutu and Tutsi tribes in Rwanda and Burundi; Democratic Republic of Congo; The Sudan and South Sudan; the loss of legitimacy to govern in some north African countries: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and some political tension and unease in several countries such as Nigeria, where there are security challenges in the garb of militancy in Niger Delta; Boko Haram terrorist groups in the north of Nigeria; infrastructural decay, corruption and ineptitude in governance, etc. Most Nigerians of today are so apathetic to the extent that they feel less Nigerian than the generation of those Nigerians at independence in 1960.

THE PREDATORY STATES AND FAILURE OF STATEHOOD IN AFRICA.

The political and social problems of some states and which threatened their state building processes arose from the predatory nature of the emergent leaders who preyed and personalised state assets and natural resources for the benefits of certain ethnic groups and those perceived to be loyal them. According to Castells (2000: 99-114), Zaire (now D.R. Congo) by 1997 had become

the epitome of predatory politics, as well as a warning of the consequences of social and political disintegration, as well as of human catastrophes (epidemics, pillage, massacres, civil wars), resulting from these politics. (quoting Sandbrook, 1995).

The imposition of Mobutu Sese Seko, who was a sergeant in the Congolese army, happened at the time of the cold war, and he was supported by the western powers such as Belgium, France and the United States. The army and the bureaucratic staff, in concert with Mobutu, predated and plundered the vast resources of the country, including cannibalizing military aircrafts' spare parts that grounded most of Zairean air force planes. According to some estimates quoted by Castells (*ibid.*), Mobutu's fortunes estimated at about US\$4 billion in 1984 had risen to about US\$10 billion by 1993 (Kempster, 1993). This is the same way Houphouet-Boigny, former President or what Castells calls "the (god) father of the Ivory Coast" looted his country. Swiss banks was an attractive safe haven for those I call Africa's looter-leaders. According to Bayart (1989:101), Houphouet-Boigny was once quoted as saying in respect of his looting escapades: "Who in this world would not deposit part of his goods in Switzerland?" By the time he was dead, the favourable conditions for civil war was already well established. Electoral contest between Laurent Gbagbo and Alassan Outara plunged the country into a bloody civil war that necessitated external military intervention for the restoration of social order and political stability. Thanks to the French military forces.

Nigeria followed similar pattern of predatory state policies like that of Zaire. However, Lewis (1996) introduced what he calls *prebendalism* (*italics* Castells). Castells agrees with Lewis in his thesis of prebendalism that this concept "is not essentially different from political patronage and systematic corruption as practiced in most countries of the world." Meanwhile, some empirical information from some countries suggest that while the transition to predatory rule occurred much later in Africa's state-building process such as the 1980s and the

1990s (Castells,2000:98; Fatton, 1996a; Nzongola-Ntalaja,1993; Leys, 1994; Kaiser,1996; *The Economist, 1996a*), other scholars such as Bayart (1989) relies on his thesis of “historical reconstruction that affirms the continuity of Africa’s pillage by its own political elite from the pre-colonial period” (Castells, 200:98).

In Nigeria, factors such as oil boom, ethnicity and the military institution have become the bane of institutional development and state-building. Each ethnic group struggles to get a chunk of the “national cake” but the extent to which this is achievable depends on prebendal relations with the rulers of the day. According to Castells, the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida orchestrated the transition from *the politics of prebendalism to the politics of predation* (italics mine). The military in Nigeria is largely dominated and controlled by elements of the powerful northern oligarchy and its mafia organization, *Kaduna Mafia*. Most Nigerians are agreed that Babangida regime elevated corruption to the level of an art, thereby effectively institutionalizing it into the national psyche and social structure. He effectively used state resources derived mainly from oil revenues to promote blind loyalty and popularity to the extent that one of his brigade commanders, a highly respected officer, in a rare case of human fetishism and loyalty openly remarked that he was ready to do battle blind-folded if Babangida was in command.

With Nigeria’s position as Africa’s leading oil producing nation, it is pretty difficult and perplexing to see the country’s vast resources being poorly managed as a result of institutionalized corruption and managerial ineptitude. Majority of the oil marketers, contractors and bureaucratic managers of state-owned oil companies such as NNPC, are also appointees of the political parties in power. Therefore, they could easily get away with corrupt practices because as the transition from *prebendalism* (italic, Castells) to predatory military rule (Lewis, 1996:102-3), during the reigns of General Babangida and Sani Abacha, the country’s governing apparatuses and social institutions have been structurally weakened. Therefore, Castells, quoting from Lewis’s (1996:159) states that:

As for the Nigerian people, not despite but because of the oil boom and its political consequences, they were poorer in 1995 than at independence, their per capital income having declined by 22 percent between 1973 (date of increase in world oil prices) and 1987 (date of economic adjustment programme)

Hence, the consequences of military predatory rule cannot be anything than what Herbst (1996:159) described as “a legacy of weak central government, fractious ethnic competition, and centralized revenues that have sharply politicized economic management...” (quoted in Castells, 2000:104).

DEMOCRACY AND STATE-BUILDING IN AFRICA: BUILDING FROM THE OUTSIDE?

The failure of state-building in Africa by Africans has informed foreign interventions through support for democratic peace formation and state-building processes of various colourations. In the first place, state failure in Africa can be primarily attributed to colonialism in Africa which puts vast territories with large populations that differed along complex social, cultural, economic and political lines under one country, after the other. The *fait accompli* and *raison d’être* for formal colonial subjugation and control of African territories and their populations, were established at the Berlin Conference of 1884-5 in Germany. At this conference, specific and deliberate spheres of influence were established for various European powers such as Germany, Belgium, Italy, France, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. The basic conditions for state failure were established by territorial partitioning exercises that showed little or no regard for ethnic and cultural differences across Africa.

Meanwhile, the inherent problems associated with the manner of state establishment by the colonial masters were carried over to the post-independence era with other familiar problems: neo-colonialism and imperialism. The process of decolonization began some years after independence as many African countries that were formerly the colonial possessions of the European powers became free and self-governing entities, having elected their political leaders on the eve of the departure of the colonial masters. However, the problems of ethnic and cultural differences that were embedded into the political contraptions called independent countries reared their ugly heads soon after independence.

With ethnic and political upheavals here and there, how can statehood be sustained through peace formation? Internal machineries for peace formation failed in many cases. For example, The Congos, Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Ethiopia and many other cases. Do these failures at peace formation and development of sustainable statehood necessitate the importation of peace formulae from the outside? This I think represents Africa’s dilemma of developmentalism today.

EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS OF PEACE FORMATION IN AFRICA.

The externalization of peace building in Africa represents attempt at preventing state failure in Africa. The economic and political importance of Africa to the developed world cannot be over-emphasized. Political influence dating back to colonial period, sources of raw materials and basic mineral resources, cheap sources of labour supply, and markets where European manufactured goods could be dumped. These constitute the vital

reasons for external sourcing for peace architecture determined by the hegemonic power centres of Europe and Washington (Richmond, 2011). In fact, some scholars are of the opinion that there is a connection between globalization and democracy. Rudebeck (2011:18) believes that “several juridically sovereign states, not the least in the so-called third world, absolutely lack autonomy in the international system”, because according to him, even where there seems to be perfection in their internal structures of democracy, “their leaders and citizens would still be lacking the power to decide on matters of decisive importance for their own development, simply because those decisions are made and those functions performed beyond the reach of those single states”.

According to Richmond (2011), British educational curricula were designed in favour of support for colonialism. Oliver Richmond asserts that “One of the unwritten impacts of British colonialism on British education is that whole disciplines were created to support colonialism”. Such disciplines were taught at key universities such as Oxford and Cambridge.

The failure of external intervention in peace formation and state-building in Africa is attributable to a number of factors. The EU, UN and several state-supported organizations are involved in peace efforts in Africa but little success is achieved. According to Lurweg and Soderbaum (2011) based on their study of EU’s involvement in peace-building process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo(DRC), “the EU is more concerned with establishing symbolic presence and political representation rather than real achievements and genuineness due to its “bureaucratic and organizational complexity” (ibid.). In a similar vein, Davis (2011) examines EU’s post-conflicts interventions in the DRC in the area of peace and justice reforms and good governance especially in “fragile contexts such as the DRC in which violence was either ongoing or seemed likely to erupt, where peace deals have entrenched impunity for human rights violations within public institutions and particularly within the security system, and how and where they do so in practice” (ibid.). Makinda (2010:) in his submission states that many Africans see EU’s involvement in what he calls ‘democracy building in africa’ as a mixed blessing as perceptions vary from place to place depending on the following variables: “geographical region, countries’ stability and level of democratic development, and individuals’ gender and level of education” (Makinda, ibid., p.3). According to him, some African diplomats and politicians regard the notion of the EU as development partners as misleading because “The term ‘partnership’, which denotes equality, is inappropriate and tends to camouflage the disparity in power and influence between Africa and the EU”. Therefore, Professor Makinda appears to suggest that democracy building in the absence of infrastructural development is a half measure. For he concludes as follows:

democracy building must go beyond improving the structures, institutions, and mechanisms of governance to empower individuals and improve their communities politically, socially and economically. Combining support for democracy building and infrastructure development is consistent with this broader goal.

Writing on *European Democracy Promotion: Positive Policies, Poor Practice*, Thompson (2011) states that although the EU’s policies on democracy promotion are good on paper, they are however negated by poor practice due to structural ambiguity and failure to transform existing systems and structures. Thompson concludes in her paper that in spite of the positive promises of the EU’s policies on democracy promotion, its poor practice reflecting implementation, results and inefficient management, were its major drawbacks. In a similar vein, Bah (2011:22) concludes in his paper that the involvement of the international bodies on civil wars in Africa has been weak because of a number of factors: differential perceptions of the impact of Africa’s security problems on international security, funding and the fact that many western countries face some economic challenges which made them to be “reluctant to provide the necessary level of funding required for a successful state-building in Africa” (Bah, ibid.) Therefore, foreign intervention in state-building efforts in Africa has been a mixed bag of success and failure, as identified by the fore-going experts on Africa. Panizza (2011) in his paper on *Conflict Resolution and the United Nations: A Leadership Crisis?*, asserts that the general perceptions of peace-keeping in Africa in the last two decades is one of failure due to their inability to identify the key factors for success. These factors he identifies as follows: the mandate, international capacity, domestic capacity, the mission’s capacity, and the issue of time. To him, a proper articulation and understanding of these factors will determine the extent of successful missions as far as peace-keeping is concerned. He therefore concludes that most peace-keeping missions in the world are heavily criticized due to the legitimacy crisis they are facing. In general, it can be observed that in spite of the demonstrated commitment by western powers to democracy development, peace formation and state-building in Africa, political, economic and international security, among other factors represent debilitating factors against successful external intervention in Africa. Africa’s natural resources such as oil and gas, timber, base metals, etc, are key factors that define external involvement in peace efforts towards state-building in Africa.

Meanwhile, there is a growing tendency towards resistance to state-building through democratic

development: the scourge of ideology, fundamentalism and global terrorism. These represent the new socio-political realities of today's Africa.

RESISTANCE TO DEMOCRACY AND CHANGE: IDEOLOGY, FUNDAMENTALISM AND GLOBAL TERRORISM.

The conflict of interest between tradition and modernity represents a major source of failure of state-building in Africa. States founded on theocratic religious ideologies are often governed by one party or traditional dictatorial authority. The form of dictatorship could be civil or military, but highly sensitive to any form of change that calls for majority rule where elections determine the occupancy of positions of authority within the state. In North Africa and the Middle East, the familiar patterns of state authority are either monarchical (e.g., Morocco, Saudi Arabia,) or military (e.g., Egypt, Libya until Gaddafi's overthrow, etc). In sub-Saharan Africa, several countries had been governed by civilian dictatorships with sit tight rulers who perpetuate themselves in power *ad infinitum*.

(i). NIGERIA: KIDNAPPING, MILITANCY AND THE *BOKO HARAM* INSURGENCY.

Nigeria's socio-economic and political challenges have left many of its citizens frustrated, desperate and pushed to the edge of the precipice of negative and violent reactions against the state and society. With a mismanaged oil wealth and monumental corruption, high level of unemployment, poverty, and insecurity, things literally fell apart for Nigeria's body politic. Kidnapping and violent armed robberies have become common place in the Niger Delta which produces oil and gas that account for more than ninety per cent of the nation's revenue. Kidnappers now target prominent individuals such as expatriates, traditional rulers, bishops, lawyers, politicians, and ransoms are paid for their freedom.

In the north of the country, the rise of religious fundamentalism and terrorism was due largely to ignorance and widespread illiteracy, poverty and frustration with the generally unacceptable state of the nation. Religion therefore became an important tool for ideological indoctrination and mental enslavement. The rise of Boko Haram in the north east of the country has threatened the security of the nation to the extent that the federal government had to declare a state of emergency in the northern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa to stem the tide of religiously-motivated killings by the Boko Haram who tries to establish an Islamic state in the northern part of Nigeria. Between 2009 and today (2013), more than 4,000 lives have been wasted, mainly Christian and security forces. The threat of these wanton killings to national security forced President Goodluck Jonathan to declare a state of emergency in those three states mentioned above on the 14th of May, 2013. In fact, the failure of the military Joint Task Force, JTF, to deal effectively with Boko Haram insurgency led to the transformation of the JTF into a full army division, the 7th Division, with full military power, including air support. However, despite all these counter offensives, Boko Haram insurgency continues even as the military claims successes in dealing with it. All these security issues constitute major distractions for President Jonathan and they continue to degenerate further.

(ii). SOMALIA: AL-SABBAB WARLORDS AND THE ABSENCE OF CENTRALISED AUTHORITY.

From all indications, Somalia is a failed state as attempts are being made to restore its statehood and territorial integrity or sovereignty. Several warlords at a time carved out areas of military and ideological control with strict religious order. However, al-Shabab, an offshoot of a-l-Qaida, is the most dominant amongst them. As at today, they are still posing a threat to Somali and regional stability, with attacks on Western targets in Kenya and Tanzania. The recent attack on *Westgate Shopping Mall* in highbrow area of Nairobi, Kenya's capital city has claimed over 68 lives, including President Uhuru Kenyatta's cousin and his fiancée, American and other foreign nationals. In a reaction to the attack, the leader of al-Shabab claimed responsibility for the attacks as a retaliation for Kenya's involvement in the war on terror in Somalia. Therefore, al-Shabab does not only constitute a destabilizing factor in Somali, it is a major cause of regional instability and conflicts. In 1998, the twin attacks on American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were not unconnected with al-Shabab and its senior partner, al-Qaida. The involvement of Kenya in regional peace efforts, especially in Somalia is claimed by al-Shabab as the reason for the September 21, 2013 attack on the *Westgate Shopping Mall* in Nairobi, Kenya. The al-Shabab terror organization stated in a message on its twitter account that foreigners in Kenya represent legitimate targets of war.

(iii). MALI: THE REBELLION OF THE NORTHERN TUAREGS.

The recent elections in Mali that restores the democratic process back to the country did not come through a natural order. A recent coup generated confusion and crisis that provided a military and political caveat for the northern Tuareg rebels to seize the north of the country and promptly proclaimed an Islamic republic governed by sharia laws. The military and logistics support and intervention by regional and international forces made the restoration of democratic order possible. France, former colonial master led the multinational force that

comprised Nigeria, Niger, and the poorly trained and poorly equipped Malian armed forces. The British, Russian and some other countries provided logistics and financial support that led to the defeat and expulsion of the Tuareg Islamic rebels and their al-Qaida supporters.

(iv). DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC): CIVIL WAR AND THE M23 REBELS.

The civil war that eventually led to the overthrow of Colonel Mobutu Sese Seko by rebel leader Kabila, started a series of process of continuous civil wars that saw that saw the ouster of Kabila in a bloody coup that eventually pave way for his son, Joseph Kabila to succeed him. As at the moment the government of Joseph Kabila is embroiled in a bitter civil war with the *M23* rebels in a bloody civil war with catastrophic consequences for human sufferings, misery, deaths and war-induced migration, internally and internationally.

(v). KENYA: ELECTORAL VIOLENCE, KILLINGS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE AL-SHABAB.

Kenya's problems have both internal and external dimensions. On the one hand, violence over elections due to ethnic distrust and competition for power and power resources had threatened the stability of the Kenyan state as exemplified by the 2007 general elections and its violent aftermath. The disputed election results between the former President Kibaki and former Prime Minister Raila Odinga, led to wanton destruction of lives and property. The killings led to the indictment of Uhuru Kenyatta and some prominent political supporters and associates by the *International Criminal Court* (The ICC) at The Hague. Even as President of Kenya, having won the recent presidential election by about 51 percent, the tag of illegitimacy and criminality in terms the 2007 killings hangs on Mr. Uhuru Kenyatta today.

Secondly, the threat of terrorism from the al-Shabab in neighbouring Somalia represents the external dimension of security challenges faced by Kenya. Kenya has been attacked in the past by al-Qaida and al-Shabab terrorist groups. There is no guarantee for security for let off from attacks from these groups in the future. The study by Markussen and Mbuvi (2011) however shows that the main cause of ethnic conflicts may not necessarily be political competition or land matters. Rather, it shows that "the main triggers of ethnic violence were poverty, unemployment among young males, and deteriorating public services". Although these authors agree with the view expressed that "the 2007/8 post-election violence was widely perceived as a the result of long-standing ethnic antagonism (New York Times, 2007), they discovered in their study that ;

The outbreak of post-election violence was triggered by the *combined* (italic, authors) effect of ethnic polarization, a flawed election process and economic forces such as poverty, male youth unemployment and lack of access to public services. (Markussen and Mvubi).

Like the foregoing authors, Collier and Hoeffler (1998) identify potential sources of post-election violence and conflict in what they call greed and grievance conceptual framework. According to Markussen and Mvubi (ibid.), Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004) "argue that violent conflicts may either results from "grievances", for example related to economic inequality, discrimination, or political exclusion, or from "greed" of opportunistic, political entrepreneurs, who organize violence if this provides the shortest way to power and wealth". That is, post-election violence is seen to be more related to the "greed" factors rather than the "grievance" factors. This pattern of political crisis is akin to what is happening in Nigeria where those greedy and opportunistic politicians who felt sidelined in the power axis of the ruling *People's Democratic Party*, PDP, broke away to form the new PDP (*nPDP*). However, there is ethno-religious dimension to the crisis. For instance, all the seven PDP governors and party stalwarts that walked out of the national convention venue in Abuja were mostly from the north. The Hausa-Fulani northern oligarchy wants power shift from the south to the north but the incumbent, Dr Goodluck Jonathan wants to run for second term in 2015. In the Nigerian case, the *greed-grievances* thesis of Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004) explains the conflicts in Nigeria where ethnicity and poverty, economic mismanagement, inter-alia, represent the major causes of electoral violence and the rise of the *Boko Haram* insurgency and killings.

CONCLUSION.

The attempt in this paper has been to examine the crisis of legitimacy that affects democratic development in Africa. It observes that a number of complex factors are responsible for peace formation blues and the attendant failure of state-building in Africa. Evidence from literature on the problematic of failed state-building efforts coupled with empirical facts in many failed and troubled states in Africa shows that the seeds of institutional state failure were effectively planted by the colonial masters who created colonial entities with little or no regards for ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social and political differences. Sharp differences in ethnicity and religion exist amongst the people especially in places like Nigeria, The Sudan (including South Sudan), Mali, Cote d'ivoir, Rwanda, Burundi, The Congos, and many other places. Apart from the colonial factor, internal peace

efforts have been affected by *the greed and grievances* thesis (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998 & 2004), in which the grievances of the citizenry (unemployment, poverty, lack of access to land, political exclusion, economic inequality, discrimination, etc) and the “greed” of opportunistic political entrepreneurs who employ violence as a short cut to power and wealth.

Consequently, attempts to build and impose peace from outside have created new sources of social and political problems and conditions for state failure. The rise of extremist ideologies and terrorism in order to establish a new social order in reaction to and/or rejection of established or developing social order. Furthermore, the imposition of peace that has been ‘manufactured’ and ‘imported’ from the hegemonic power centres of Europe and America may not lead Africa to the promised land of political *Eldorado* of peace and development, if certain factors are not taken into proper focus.

Therefore, any effort at peace formation and state-building in Africa must in addition to peace formation recognize the need for infrastructural development, (Makinda, 2010), ability to properly identify the key factors for success (Panizza, 2011), poverty reduction, failure to control the state and promote human flourishing (Williams, www.europeworld.com and Rotberg, 2004), and above all, good governance. The rise of terrorist groups like al-Shabab, Boko Haram, al-Qaida in the Maghreb and other security challenges: kidnapping, armed robberies and political assassinations, are basic symptoms of failed states and legitimacy crisis. This is the dilemma of peace formation, state-building and development in Africa today.

REFERENCES.

- Bah, Abu Bakarr. (2011). Humanitarian Intervention and State-Building: New Humanitarianism in Theory and Practice. Third International Studies Conference, organized by World International Studies Committee, *International Studies Association*. Porto, Portugal. August 17-20.
- Bayart, Jean-Francois. (1989). *L'état en Afrique: la politique du ventre*, Paris : Librairie Arthème Fayard. (English trans., London: Longman, 1993).
- Castells, Manuel (2000). End of Millennium: The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Volume III, Second Edition. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Collier Paul and Anke Hoeffler. (2004). “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.” *Oxford Economic Papers* 56(4): 563-595.
- Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. (1998). “On Economic Causes of Civil War.” *Oxford Economic Papers* 50(4): 563-573.
- Davis, Laura (2011). The EU and post-conflicts interventions: supporting reform or business as usual? Paper presented at the international conference on “Globalization and Development: Rethinking Interventions and Governance”, at the Gothenburg Centre for Globalization and Development (GCGD), University of Gothenburg, Sweden. 22-23 November.
- De Gucht, Karel. (2009). An African Perspective on State Building-Institutional Capabilities and Legitimacy of the State. . Edited by Suvi Tuominen. A seminar organized jointly by the Crisis Management Initiative and the Institute for Security Studies, 19 February, Brussels, Belgium.
- Fatton Jr, Robert. (1992). *Predatory Rule: State and Civil Society in Africa*, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner.
- Fund for Peace. (2013). List of Countries by Failed States Index. Wikipedia. The Free Press.
- Herbst, Jeffery. (1996). “Is Nigeria a viable state?” *The Washington Quarterly* 19(2) : 151-72.
- Joseph, Richard. (2011). Democracy and Reconfigured Power in Africa. *CURRENT HISTORY*. November. pp.324-330.
- Kaiser, Paul. (1996). “Structural adjustment and the fragile nation: the demise of social unity in Tanzania”, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 34:2.
- Kempster, Norman. (1993). “US considers seizing vast wealth of Zaire’s Mobutu to force him out”, *Los Angeles Times*, March 3.
- Lewis, Peter. (1996). “From prebendalism to predation: the political economy of decline in Nigeria”, *Journal of Modern African Studies* 34 (1): 79-103.
- Leys, Colin. (1994). “Confronting the African tragedy”, *New Left Review*, 204: 33-47.
- List of Countries by Failed States Index. (2013). Retrieved from Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_Failed_States_Index. 8/13/2013.
- Lurweg, Mike & Soderbaum, Fredrik. (2011). ‘Building peace from the outside’: The role of the EU in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Paper presented at the international conference on “Globalization and Development: Rethinking Interventions and Governance”, at the Gothenburg Centre for Globalization and Development (GCGD), University of Gothenburg, Sweden. 22-23 November.
- Makinda, Samuel M. (2010). Perceptions of the EU’s Approach to Democracy Building in Africa. International Institute for Democracy and Election Assistance (*International IDEA*), SE-103 34 Stockholm, Sweden.
- Makussen, Thomas and Mbuvi, Kitavi. (2011). When Does Ethnic Diversity Lead to Violence? Evidence from the 2007 elections in Kenya. Paper presented at the international conference on “Globalization and Development:

- Rethinking Interventions and Governance”, at the Gothenburg Centre for Globalization and Development (GCGD), University of Gothenburg, Sweden. 22-23 November.
- Menkhaus, Kenneth. (2003) ‘State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts’ in *Review of African Political Economy*. No. 97, pp. 405-422.
- Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges. (1993). *Nation-building and State-building in Africa*, SAPES Trust Occasional Paper Series no. 3, Harare: Sapes Books.
- Panizza, Phillip (2011). Conflict Resolution and the United Nations: A Leadership Crisis? Paper presented at the international conference on “Globalization and Development: Rethinking Interventions and Governance”, at the Gothenburg Centre for Globalization and Development (GCGD), University of Gothenburg, Sweden. 22-23 November.
- Richmond, Oliver. (2011). Failed State Versus Peace Formation. A Paper presented at an Paper presented at the international conference on “Globalization and Development: Rethinking Interventions and Governance”, at the Gothenburg Centre for Globalization and Development (GCGD), University of Gothenburg, Sweden. 22-23 November.
- Rotberg, Robert I(Ed.). (2004). *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press.
- Rudebeck, Lars. (2011). Democracy, Development and Globalization. . A Paper presented at the international conference on “Globalization and Development: Rethinking Interventions and Governance”, at the Gothenburg Centre for Globalization and Development (GCGD), University of Gothenburg, Sweden. 22-23 November.
- Sandbrook, Richard. (1995). *The Politics of Africa’s Economic Stagnation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Scholte, Jan Aart. (2011). Reinventing Global Democracy. Paper presented at the international conference on “Globalization and Development: Rethinking Interventions and Governance”, at the Gothenburg Centre for Globalization and Development (GCGD), University of Gothenburg, Sweden. 22-23 November.
- The Economist*. (1993). “Let down again: a survey of Nigeria”, special supplement, August 21.
- Thompson, Darcy. (2011). European Democracy Promotion: Positive Policies, Poor Practice. Paper presented at the international conference on “Globalization and Development: Rethinking Interventions and Governance”, at the Gothenburg Centre for Globalization and Development (GCGD), University of Gothenburg, Sweden. 22-23 November.
- Tilly, Charles. (1975). *Western-State Making and Theories of Political Transformation*, in: *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Tilly, Charles. (2000). *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 900-1990*, Malden: Blackwell, ISBN 1-55786-067-X.
- Williams, Paul D. (Undated). *State Failure in Africa: Causes, Consequences and Responses*. www.europaworld.com[retrieved; 13/08/2013].