

Problematizing Neofunctionalism in the Search for a New Theory of African Integration: The Case of the Proposed Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-FTA) in Africa

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Abstract
The proposed Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-FTA) of the EAC-SADC-COMESA in eastern and southern Africa has been received with both optimism and pessimism in many quarters. The optimism concerning the prospects of the proposed T-FTA, though often exaggerated, is not totally unfounded as it could help African Economic Community (AEC) strengthen intra-RECs, and inter-RECs integration by reducing the incidence of multiple memberships and proliferation of regional economic groups and subgroups, among other things. With the use of qualitative method and some indices from the secondary sources, and by propounding a new theory of post-neo-functionalism, a combination or a synthesis of neo-nationalism and post-nationalism, this paper concludes that the proposed Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-FTA) would be confronted with some potential challenges capable of, not just overcoming, but torpedoing these prospects. The paper seeks to deconstruct and problematize neo-functionalism in Africa as well as rejects neo-functionalist, one-size-fits-all, state-centric or inter-governmental approach to integration in Africa, and rather recommends bottom-top, humanistic, people-centric or private-sector-driven approach to integration, or people-to-people integration. The study is essentially prognostic.
Keywords: Free trade area, regional integration, functionalism, neo-functionalism, post-neo-functionalism, Africa and Tripartite Summit

1. Introduction

The Lagos Plan of Action adopted by the OAU Extraordinary Summit in 1980 affirmed the commitment of Africa's political leaders to the promotion of the African economic integration to ultimately facilitate the gradual establishment of the African Economic Communities (AEC). This was reaffirmed and concretized in 1991 in Abuja by signing of the Abuja Treaty establishing African Economic Communities (AEC). The Abuja Treaty envisioned the economic integration of the whole Africa into a continental customs union by the year 2019 (Ezeanyika 2006). It was reckoned that one key strategy of achieving this is through the establishment of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) that will ultimately merge to establish the regional customs union. Although several RECs including EAC, COMESA and SADC were already formed when the Abuja Treaty was signed, the Treaty among other things, sought to strengthen the existing RECs and encourage establishment of new ones (Shayanowako 2011).

The Tripartite summit among other things, underscored the fact that the tripartite arrangement is a crucial building bloc towards achieving the AEC as outlined by the Abuja Treaty and resolved that the three RECs should immediately start working towards a merger into a single REC with the objective of fast-tracking the attainment of AEC. The EAC-SADC-COMESA Summit is considered historic because for the first time since the birth of the African Union (AU), several key building blocks of the African Economic Community (AEC) have met on how to integrate territories and move towards deepening and widening integration within the framework of the Abuja Treaty for the establishment of the African Economic Community (AEC). Furthermore, for the first time a truly continental union came into being ranging from the North to the South of the continent (Joshua 1989).

In the area of trade, customs and economic integration, the summit approved the immediate establishment of the FTA encompassing the member states of the three RECs with the ultimate goal of establishing a single customs union. The main objective therefore is to establish an FTA on tariff-free, quota-free and exemption-free bases by simply combining the existing FTAs of COMESA, EAC and SADC. Whilst the main benefit of the Tripartite FTA is that it will be a much larger market, with a single economic space than anyone of the three regional economic communities (RECs), and as such will be more attractive to investment and large scale production. Other benefits include higher economic growth, elimination of overlapping or multiple membership, increased FDI, increased industrialization, improved competitiveness of products and infrastructural development (Shayanowako 2011).

The three main pillars of tripartite strategy in southern and eastern Africa are market integration, infrastructural development and industrial development. The Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-FTA) has prioritized programmes addressing trade and transport facilitation challenges with the aim of lowering costs of doing business and improving the competitiveness of product from Eastern and Southern African region to facilitate cross-border movements of trade (Pearson 2011). The proposed T-FTA has since divided African scholars into two, namely the optimists and the pessimists. The optimists like Othieno and Shinyekwa (2011); Pearson (2011); and Shayanowako (2011) believe that the T-FTA has a lot of prospects and potential benefits, and therefore can overcome its challenges. Whilst, the pessimists such as Disenyanai (2009); Fundira (2012); and Woolfrey (2012) think that there are numerous challenges that may confront, mar or even preempt T-FTA. It is within this context that we contend that the challenges confronting the proposed Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-FTA) in Africa are capable of overcoming its prospects.

To achieve our purpose, we partition this paper into seven parts, namely, introduction; the neo-functional approaches to regional integration and free trade areas (FTAs) in Africa; the institutional arrangements of proposed Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-FTA) in Africa; the prospects of the proposed Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-FTA) in Africa; the challenges of the proposed Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-FTA) in Africa; problematizing neo-functionalism and the search for a new theory; and conclusion and recommendations.

2. The Neo-functional Approaches to Regional Integration and Free Trade Areas (FTAs) in Africa

Free trade area (FTA) is an area or a zone where there are no tariffs or other restrictions on movement of goods and services across borders usually representing the first stage in the economic integration. Other stages include customs union, common market, and economic and monetary union. States located within the free trade area, that is, the member states enjoy duty-free trade relations between/among themselves (Goldstein and Pevehouse 2008; Aniche 2009). According to Shayanowako (2011), “a FTA is established when two or more countries agree to eliminate duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce or substantially all trade in goods originating with these economies”. He also noted that “preferential rules of origin have to be devised and used in order to identify the originating goods, while the parties to a FTA retain the right to apply their trade policies on trade with third parties”.

A FTA in thus aimed at encouraging and enhancing trade among the participating member countries. Free trade area is, thus, part and parcel of regional economic integration, and in fact a stage or a phase in the strategies and aims of African Economic Community (AEC). This is perhaps what the heads of government and state of member states of East African Community (EAC), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Common Market for Eastern and Southern African (COMESA) had in mind when they, apparently worried by the dwindling prospects of regional economic integration in Africa, convened a tripartite summit in Kampala, Uganda on October 22, 2008 to float a free trade area to be known as Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-FTA).

The linear approach to regional integration of forming FTAs which are upgraded to customs unions, common markets and monetary union within predetermined timeframes is the preferred method which is deceptively successful, while member states are still at different levels of compliance. When measured in terms of trade growth, poverty alleviation and the establishment of effective collective governance structures; the results have been rather modest. This top-down approach to regional integration fails to prioritize appropriate solution for the causes which, in the first instance, prevent intra-regional trade from growing. Each next step in the linear process brings additional and costly burdens in that moving from an FTA to a customs union requires joint policies on tariffs, the harmonization and coordination of domestic legal instruments or requires collective governance as well as institutions to manage the common external tariff. This is difficult and costly given that some governments still rely on customs revenue thereby frequently invoking lack of capacity and sensitive national interests as justifications for derogations from legal obligations (Naumann 2011; Erasmus 2012).

A traditional regional integration process focused namely on lowering import duties on intra-regional trade would, at best address only the issue of low demand. It might do this through the creation of a large market triggering increased production by local manufacturers and in turn create greater demand for locally produced goods. These commodities may also be relatively cheaper due to lower tariffs on regional imports. But this approach will do little to directly address other potentially more debilitating supply-side constraints and hence would, in all likelihood, be unable to stimulate significant growth in the sector. The more comprehensive market access approach of the T-FTA integration process could also serve to remove or minimize constraints relating to accessing finance and investment capital and improving awareness of regional and global market opportunities (Lewis and Robinson 2001; Woolfrey 2012).

However the model of closed regionalism envisioned for the T-FTA, whereby discrimination is practised against non-members in the form of generally higher tariffs could result in trade diversion effects reducing or swallowing any benefits arising from trade creation. The potential for uneven benefits of the T-FTA could also arise through agglomeration effects unleashed by market integration. The tendency for industrial production to benefit from a clustering effect means that individual economies in the region which are already more industrially and economically developed such as South Africa and Egypt, may also see the greatest increases in investment in industrial activity arising from the T-FTA. This could then lead to an even greater disparity in development levels within the region resulting in significant tension among member states. The role of sub-regional hegemons like South Africa and Kenya in driving the T-FTA process and promoting industrial development may lead to further tension as other countries perceive them to be pushing their domestic interests at the expense of regional interests.

3. The Institutional Arrangements of the Proposed Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-FTA) in Africa

The T-FTA announced at the EAC-SADC-COMESA Summit is the realization of a dream that has been for more than hundred years in the making. A trade zone envisioned then to span the length and breadth of the African continent from Cape to Cairo; from North African Egypt all the way to the Southernmost tip of Africa, Cape Town in South Africa. The Cape to Cairo dream was envisioned by Cecil Rhodes and other British imperialists in the 1890s, and was expressed in different contexts and versions including, but not limited, to the following ideals: Cape to Cairo Road, Cape to Cairo Railway, Cape to Cairo Telegraph and Cape to Cairo Trade Union (Wikipedia 2009; Aniche and Ukaegbu 2014).

While other powers, notably Germany and Portugal that had colonies and/or spheres of influence in the Cape to Cairo trade zone, contemplated; the primary benefactor of the Cape to Cairo Union would have been the Great Britain and the British Empire. The difference in the idea of the initial Cape to Cairo zone and its current incarnation is that the T-FTA is the creation of African states for the mutual benefit and development of the T-FTA member states, their peoples and the whole of African continent rather than a trade zone for the benefit of Great Britain. Another important difference between the two is that the T-FTA encompasses an area greater than the one even Cecil Rhodes could have imagined. Cecil Rhodes' Cape to Cairo would have involved at most a dozen countries while the current Cape to Cairo zone under the T-FTA encompasses most of Africa, almost half of the African countries (i.e. 26 out of 54) representing more than half of the production, trade, population, landmass and resources of the entire African countries (Aniche 2009; Wikipedia 2009).

The proposed T-FTA is likely to be made up of 26 member states namely; Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Swaziland, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. All the aforementioned African countries are members of one, two or three of these following existing regional economic organizations, namely, East African Community (EAC), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and even other regional economic organization in Africa and beyond.

Three regional economic communities in Africa are expected to sign an agreement in 2014 to establish an enlarged market covering 26 countries in eastern and southern Africa. According to a roadmap adopted in June 2011, negotiations for a Tripartite FTA are being conducted in three different phases - preparatory phase, Phase One and Phase Two. To date, the Tripartite Trade Negotiation Forum (TTNF) has completed the preparatory phase which involved the exchange of relevant information, including applied national tariffs and trade data and measures. It was aimed at ensuring the adoption of the terms of reference and rules of procedure for the establishment of the TTNF. This phase began in December 2011 and lasted about 12 months. The tripartite negotiations are now concluding phase one which will cover core FTA issues of tariff liberalization, rules of origin, customs procedures and simplification of customs documentation, transit procedures, non-tariff barriers, trade remedies and other technical barriers to trade and dispute resolution. Facilitating movement of business persons within the region is being negotiated in parallel with the first phase (TRALAC 2014).

The Phase Two, the last stage of the negotiations, is expected to start soon and will cover trade in services and trade-related issues such as intellectual property rights, competition policy and trade development and competitiveness. According to the roadmap, all negotiations should be completed within 36 months. Thereafter, COMESA, EAC and SADC are expected launch a single FTA by 2016, building on the FTAs that are already in place (TRALAC 2014). The three main pillars of tripartite strategy are market integration, infrastructural development and industrial development. The Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-FTA) has prioritized programmes addressing trade and transport facilitation challenges with the aim of lowering costs of doing business and improving the competitiveness of product from Eastern and Southern African region to facilitate cross-border movements of trade (Pearson 2011). At this juncture we will make brief comments on the above regional economic organizations as part and parcel of the regional economic communities (RECs) of the African Economic Community (AEC). This will place our argument in a proper perspective.

The East African Community (EAC) is the regional intergovernmental organization of the republics of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania with it headquarters in Arusha, Tanzania. The treaty for the establishment of the East African Community (EAC) was signed on November 30, 1999 and entered into force on July 7, 2000 following its ratification by the original three members, *viz*, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania for its reestablishment. Rwanda and Burundi later acceded to the EAC treaty on June 18, 2007 and became full members of the Community with effect from July 1, 2007. The East African Community (EAC) was originally established in 1967, however, disagreement between the founding members led to its collapse. On its reestablishment on November 30, 1999, the new EAC established a customs union in 2005 and is working towards establishment of a common market by 2010; subsequently, a monetary union by 2012 and ultimately a political federation of the East African states (Aniche and Ukaegbu 2014). The East African Community (EAC) has a combined population of approximately 120 million people, land area of approximately 1.85million square kilometres and a combined gross domestic product of $466 billion in 2006. For details see Table 1 below.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was formed in Lusaka, Zambia on April 1, 1980 as a loose alliance of states in Southern Africa known then as Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) with the aim of coordinating development projects in order to lessen economic dependence on the then Apartheid South Africa. Subsequently, the then Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was transformed to Southern African Development Community (SADC) as part of post-Apartheid South Africa fall out on August 17, 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia when the Declaration and Treaty were signed at the Summit of Heads of State and Government, and is currently headquartered in Gaborone, Botswana (Aniche, Okeke and Ukaegbu 2009).

The SADC is currently made up of the following member states, viz, Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. It covers a combined population of approximately 248 million people, land area of approximately 9.88 million square kilometres and a combined gross domestic product of $379 billion in 2006. For details see Table 1 below.

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) was formed in December, 1994 replacing the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) which had existed since 1981. Currently, COMESA is headquartered in Lusaka, Zambia with 19 member states which include Burundi (December 21, 1981), the Comoros (December 21, 1981), Democratic Republic of Congo (December 21, 1981), Djibouti (21st December, 1981), Egypt (6th January, 1999), Eritrea (1994), Ethiopia (December 21, 1981) Kenya (December 21, 1981), Libya (June 3, 2005), Madagascar (December 21, 1981), Malawi (December 21, 1981), Mauritius (December 21, 1981), Rwanda (December 21, 1981), Seychelles (2001), Sudan (December 21, 1981), Swaziland (December 21, 1981), Uganda (December 21, 1981), Zambia (December 21, 1981) and Zimbabwe (Okeke and Aniche 2012).

Perhaps with the exception of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Tanzania, COMESA encompasses all other member states of EAC and SADC. It is, therefore, only seven of member states of EAC and SADC that are not COMESA members. The COMESA has a combined population of approximately 398 million people in a landmass of approximately 12.87 million square kilometres, and a combined gross domestic product of approximately $286.7 billion in 2006. For details see Table 1 below.

4. The Prospects of the Proposed Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-FTA) in Africa

With a possible combined population of approximately 527 million and a land area of approximately 18.47 million square kilometres, possibly a total of 26 member states, vast natural resources, huge market, and approximately a combined gross domestic product of US$ 625 billion; the T-FTA could rival any other regional economic community, the European Union (EU) included, if it actualizes its potentials and becomes a truly integrated economic bloc. This is because the T-FTA will, therefore, encompass most of Africa, almost half of the countries (i.e. 26 out of 54) more than half of the production, trade, population, land mass and resources. In addition, it will enlarge the market of member states, unlock their productive potentials, increase the levels or volumes of intra-African trade, and enhance developmental prospects.

The ‘Grand’ or Tripartite Free Trade Area with a combined population of some 600 million people and a Gross Domestic Product of about US$1 trillion covers half of the member states of the African Union and is intended to boost intra-regional trade, increase investment and promote the development of cross-regional infrastructure. The creation of an enlarged market would promote the movement of goods and services across borders, as well as allowing member countries to harmonize regional trade policies to promote equal competition. Removal of trade barriers such as huge export and import fees would enable countries to increase their earnings, penetrate new markets and contribute towards their national development (Citizen, August 14, 2014; TRALAC 2014).

For example, estimates indicate that exports among the 26 Tripartite countries increased from USD 7 billion in 2000 to USD 27 billion in 2008, and imports grew from USD 9 billion in 2000 to USD 32 billion in 2008. This phenomenal trade increase was in large measure spurred by the free trade area initiatives of the three organizations. Strong trade performance is expected from the promotion of small and medium scale enterprises that produce goods and services. Tripartite countries account for half of the membership of the AU with a Gross Domestic Product of $1.3 Trillion, a population of 565 million and a combined landmass of 17 million square kilometers. COMESA alone brings to the tripartite table 19 member states, a population of over 490 million, an annual import bill of around $150 billion and an export bill of $82 billion (TRALAC 2014). See Table 2 for comparison of EAC-SADC-COMESA with other regional economic blocs.

Almost half of the member states totaling twelve in number have dual membership with seven belonging to both COMESA and SADC, four to COMESA and EAC and one to SADC and EAC (Othieno and Shinyekwa 2011). In addition, SADC contains within it the long established five members Southern African

Customs Union (SACU). Dual or multiple membership has impeded economic integration in two ways. One, directly by generating inconsistencies and incompatibilities and inhibiting coordination and harmonization of activities like customs union, free trade, single market, monetary union and single/common currency. Two, indirectly, by forcing member countries to dissipate scarce human and financial resources in seeking to service different regional communities and implementing differing, contradicting and conflicting treaties. In addition multiple membership have also bedeviled the long running and still incomplete negotiations between several disparate groups of member states and the EU over the establishment of regional Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) (Othieno and Shinyekwa 2011).

Duplicative or overlapping membership to different trade regimes and instruments risk trade deflection, and dealing with them posed legal and administrative challenges to member states. Therefore, rationalizing and harmonizing the trade arrangements through FTA could minimize and eventually eliminate the contradictions of overlapping memberships furthering the vision of a united Africa. This would mean that countries would not have to choose one trading bloc over another. It is important that second and subsequent phases of these negotiations be used as a vehicle towards greater convergence in interfacing regionally and with the third parties (Disenyanai 2009; Zizhou 2009).

The T-FTA is, thus, likely to eliminate duplicative/multiple membership, proliferation of regional economic blocs, and sub-groupings. In other words, the T-FTA has the prospect of removing or resolving the problem arising from the participation of member states in two or more regional economic communities or even regional economic, political and security cooperation schemes that may compete with or undermine one another. The T-FTA will, therefore, reduce combined memberships of Tripartite EAC-SADC-COMESA from 40 memberships to 26 memberships as well as eliminating 13 duplicative memberships of its members in the three regional organizations. However, it is yet to be clear whether the T-FTA will be able to remove the existing subgroups or the possibility of forming future ones. Table 3 below shows the duplicative memberships of the EAC, SADC and COMESA.

The Table 3 demonstrates that half of the 26 member states of the Tripartite EAC, SADC and COMESA are members of any of the two of the three regional economic blocs, while the other half maintains single membership in the three regional economic organizations. None of them is a member of the three regional economic communities. The implication of the above is that the T-FTA is likely to strengthen or synergize its bargaining power when negotiating international deals with other regional bodies or part of it.

Analysts believe that the T-FTA agreement will increase intra-regional trade, boost economic growth, and raise development prospects of their members. How this will be achieved is yet to be known. The T-FTA is, also, considered as a major step in the implementation of the African Economic Community (AEC), and therefore, will strengthen and harmonize intra-RECs and inter-RECs through elimination of multiple or overlapping memberships, proliferation of regional economic groups and subgroups. It is pertinent to state here that most of the above prospects are projections and we are going to periscope them in the light of various challenges that may confront T-FTA in order to address the question we posed earlier.

The private sector therefore should play a crucial or vital role in successful regional arrangements as investors and industrialists in building cross-border supply chains and networks. Government can assist their efforts by facilitating trade through effective border procedures, harmonizing national laws, ensuring transparency and access to reliable information in implementing obligations and providing for legal remedies. Some of the impediments to FTAs include supply-side constraints, infrastructural bottlenecks, technical capacity constraints, non-implementation of agreements, poor monitoring, and lack of compliance with standards. The new Free Trade Area (FTA) must promote the free and effective movement of goods and services across borders, facilitate procedures which accommodate private sector needs, and incorporate comprehensive plan for trade and development. There are even suggestions to utilize COMESA-EAC-SADC FTA as the core building block for establishing an African-wide FTA. The parties to the Tripartite FTA Agreement will be member states of the three RECs, not the RECs to which they currently belong (McCarthy 2010; Woolfrey 2011; Erasmus 2012).

In many T-FTA countries, the contribution of manufacturing value added (MVA) to GDP continues to be negligible. Manufacturing in the region is also generally dominated by the production of low technology products such as clothing textiles, leather, footwear, and food stuffs; and very few of them have been able to participate significantly in the medium and high technology (MHT) segments of global manufacturing. Thus, most of the T-FTA countries remain heavily reliant on the production and export of a narrow range of agricultural, fuel and mining products. The regional approaches to promoting industrial development in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have largely failed to bring about significant industrialization demonstrating that optimism over the potential ability of the T-FTA to facilitate industrial development may be misguided. There are, however some good reasons why the approach adopted under T-FTA integration process may prove more successful than past initiatives in facilitating industrial development in the region. The most notable of this relate to the multi-pronged nature of the process envisaged for the T-FTA, which goes beyond a narrow form on the removal of tariffs and other barriers to intra-regional trade. The T-FTA integration process seeks to address these issues under the three pillars of market integration, infrastructural development and industrial development (Sandrey and Fundira 2012; Woolfrey 2012).

5. The Challenges of the Proposed Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-FTA) in Africa

Africa accounts for less than 2.5% of world trade, and non-oil exports account for about 1% since 1992 being half of their 1980 value. The level of intra-African trade is also low which was 10% compared to about 40% of North America and about 60% in Western Europe. Africa has the highest export product concentration coupled with a high export market concentration compared with other continents. This reflects continued reliance on primary product exports mainly to EU, US and China. Africa markets, thus, remain fragmented preventing the emergence of regionally integrated industries and supply chains. It is often more economical to export a raw material or a semi-processed raw material than to import the materials needed to process the material and then to export the processed good. Until the underlying causes of these high costs of transport are addressed, African countries will remain high-cost producers with no major direct investment in non-mineral sectors (Pearson 2012; Woolfrey 2012).

Thus, the T-FTA will be confronted with numerous challenges capable of dwindling, countering and torpedoing its prospects. To begin with, establishing a free trade by the name T-FTA in the Eastern and Southern African regions will be a set-back on some of the constituent regional economic communities like the East African Community (EAC) which has already surpassed a free trade arrangement by achieving customs union. Ditto with the case of Southern African Customs Union (SACU), a subgroup or sub-bloc of Southern African Development Community (SADC) that has transcended free trade area to achieve customs union. In other words, the proposed T-FTA may hinder, instead of jumpstarting regional economic integration in these regions. The implication of the above is that the prospects of setting up African Free Trade Area may eventually lose its appeal to EAC and SACU and their member states despite its prospects of huge market and burgeoning intra-regional trade.

The point is that challenges that have been met by the RECs individually may be magnified in the larger FTA if not dealt with effectively. Some of these challenges include economic polarization, fiscal challenges, negotiation with external parties, institutional weaknesses and political instability. For example, asymmetric product complementarities in the regions means that more developed economies of Kenya, Egypt and South Africa are in much better position to market their exports raising a concern over possible economic polarization and disparity as investment may be attracted towards these economies that can undermine the proposed integration effort (Musonda 2008; Disenyanai 2009; Kalaba 2009). The less prepared nations are at risk of being swallowed economically by more powerful nations, as their local industries would suffer from the stiff trade competition from more rival firms in an open market. This competition may subsequently allow the more organized and developed nations to push weaker local firms out of business (TRALAC 2014). For instance, Table 4 below demonstrates the level of economic disparity among the proposed T-FTA member countries.

A closer look at product-specific intra-industry trade (IIT) shows that (a) the bulk of the industrial sectors in these countries is primary resource-based concentrated in agro-processed and food processing product; (b) manufacturing value addition is generally low and activities are restricted to the first stage of processing or the final stage of blending; (c) South Africa is the only T-FTA country with a complex manufacturing base, while other countries such as Egypt, Kenya and Mauritius fair much better; (d) Zimbabwe, which before the political impasse used to be the second largest manufacturer in SADC after South Africa, has little left other than a collapsed industrial base that is slowly recovering from the decade-long economic crisis; and (e) an interesting case to note is the data for Swaziland which indicates a country with some level of industrialization based on the IIT indices, but much of it may well be that of South Africa (Musonda 1997; Viser 2001; Peterson 2005).

However the model of closed regionalism envisioned for the T-FTA, whereby discrimination is practised against non-members in the form of generally higher tariffs could result in trade diversion effects reducing or swallowing any benefits arising from trade creation. The potential for uneven benefits of the T-FTA could also arise through agglomeration effects unleashed by market integration. The tendency for industrial production to benefit from a clustering effect means that individual economies in the region which are already more industrially and economically developed such as South Africa and Egypt, may also see the greatest increases in investment in industrial activity arising from the T-FTA. This could then lead to an even greater disparity in development levels within the region resulting in significant tension among member states. The role of sub-regional hegemons like South Africa and Kenya in driving the T-FTA process and promoting industrial development may lead to further tension as other countries perceive them to be pushing their domestic interests at the expense of regional interests (Woolfrey 2012). For this see Table 5 below.

The lack of common policies among RECs will compromise their positions when dealing with external partners because of forces of three blocs' external trading partners. The fact that the countries in the three RECs, with the exception of South Africa and Egypt are dependent on tariff and other trade taxes for fiscal revenues will amount to a major obstacle for tariff liberalization, for example, in countries like Lesotho, Namibia and Switzerland, trade taxes account for over 80% of their total fiscal revenues which could lead to structural changes in their economies and possible contraction of previously import-substituting industries that were important revenue sources (Mlangeni 2008; Disenyanai 2009).

Another major challenge for the Tripartite FTA will be how to wind-up and phase-out the three RECs which may lead one to suggest that the Tripartite FTA would to co-exist with the existing RECs until such a time that all legal instruments have been dealt with so as not to create a vacuum. There has been also rhetoric of continental unity and regional integration which is not matched by practical action. There are also reasons to suspect that grand political pronouncements and agreements at the regional level may not be backed up by implementation and support at the national level ((Disenyanai 2009; Musonda 2009; Woolfrey 2012).

In addition, the proposed T-FTA may not be able to eliminate multiple or duplicative memberships and the proliferation of regional economic communities in Africa after-all. For instance, available data indicate that aside from memberships of these three regional economic groups, some members belong to other regional economic groups like Kenya, Eritrea and Djibouti belong to the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); Rwanda, Burundi, Angola and Democratic Republic of Congo belong to the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). Also, Uganda and Ethiopia belong to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Libya belongs to the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), and Egypt and the Comoros belong to the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). See Table 6 below for details.

From Table 6, it is only the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) that Tripartite EAC-SADC-COMESA or the proposed T-FTA member states do not belong to, but they belong to the other four regional economic communities (RECs). The implication is that Kenya's memberships of four RECs will be reduced to three memberships while Eritrea and Djibouti will retain their three memberships, Rwanda's, Burundi's, Democratic Republic of Congo's, and Uganda's memberships of three RECs will be reduced to two memberships. Other countries like Angola, Ethiopia, Libya, Comoros and Egypt will retain their two memberships. Thus, the reduction in the multiple memberships is not so significant given that many of the member states of the proposed T-FTA will still maintain double or triple memberships.

Another implication of the above is that the number of regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa will be reduced from eight to six which is still quite on the high side. Moreso, there is no guarantee that other ones will not spring up in the future either from the proposed T-FTA or other regional economic communities (RECs). There is, also, the possibility of one of the constituting regional economic blocs, of the proposed T-FTA, that is, EAC-SADC-COMESA, resurrecting or incarnating if there is discontent, after-all there is a precedent. For example, in spite of being members of the either of the SADC and COMESA; Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda went ahead and resurrected or re-established the East African Community (EAC) in 1999. Also, the undue influence of the past colonial masters and other neo-colonial factors which usually lead to sub-groupings within the regional economic communities (RECs) may not after all be overcome or subdued by the proposed T-FTA. Already within one of the constituting regional economic blocs, that is, SADC, there is a subgroup known as Southern African Customs Union (SACU) which members share the same colonial master and linguistic appellation. For illustration see Table 7 below.

From Table 7, Southern African Customs Union (SACU) draws all its memberships from either the former colonies of Britain or South Africa or both and they are all Anglophones and South Africa was colonized by Britain, although, there are other British colonized SADC member states are not in SACU, but there is no SADC member state that was colonized by either France or Portugal that is a member of SACU. So, if colonial legacy engendered from many years of historical ties both in economic and political spheres is responsible for forming SACU, there is possibility that SACU will co-exist with T-FTA or reincarnate in the future just like other subgroups may emerge from other constituting regional economic groups like EAC and COMESA or from within it among countries that share the same colonial experience and linguistics appellation. Thus, the proposed (T-FTA) may not entirely be able to prevent the emergence of sub-groupings from within it.

Many of the countries in the Tripartite have similar economic structures and thus produce, import and export similar products. Therefore, the scope of complementarities rather than competition in their trade relations is often very limited. This partially explains why they currently trade so little (usually less than 10%) with each other (OxResearch Daily Brief Service, April 5, 2011). Therefore, the proposed T-FTA will be unlikely to transform the vertical linkage and external dependence of economies of its members to a horizontal integration and interdependencies due to rentierism of most of its member states. Ditto, with the intra-regional dependencies in which some of the economies of the prospective members will be dependent on South Africa. Two major implications flow from this; one, member states will be trading more with industrialized countries of the West, and two, the trade relations between many of the member states and South Africa will be skewed in favour of the latter. As a result, member states would be unwittingly aiding developed countries in undermining African free trade area. The point being made is that the proposed T-FTA may not boost intra-regional trades as such, except in the case of trade between other member states and South Africa, because most of them are export-oriented primary producers whose primary products are in very little demand within the regional group or proposed T-FTA, and to remedy this will be very difficult (Ake 1981).

As corollary to the above, the weak economic structure of the member states and the attendant economic crises, stagnation and instability of some of the member states will pose a great challenge to T-FTA, and will continue to be a drawback to the prospects. For example, SADC has been ineffective in dealing with Zimbabwe owing to its high inflation. If SADC is not able to resolve the miserable situation in Zimbabwe what makes optimists think that the proposed T-FTA will be able to do so effectively. It has even been stated that the proposed roadmap for regional integration may be unrealistically ambitions given the diversity of economies involved and the long term requirements (Disenyanai 2009; Musonda 2009).

The proposed T-FTA would have to contend with several political differences which include the differences in the development ideologies of member states, and their fear of compromising their sovereignty or control over their territories (Ake 1981). For instance, within few days of the announcement of the T-FTA, Djibouti warned that it may be heading for war with Eritrea if Eritrea does not respect its territorial integrity. The import of this is that the proposed T-FTA may be encumbered by conflicts or disputes between members like wars, etc. Wars will in turn lead to the upsurge of refugees in the zone and worsen the economic crises in these countries. See Table 8 below for details.

More importantly, the proposed T-FTA would have to deal with the sub-national centrifugal tendencies like conflicts, crises, violence, ethnic nationalism, religious intolerance and ultimately civil wars. For example, the case of Somalia, that is, the only natural member of the proposed T-FTA left in the cold due to civil strife that has left most of Somalia without a functioning government since 1991. Consequently, the proposed T-FTA cannot integrate all its countries, many of whom are Somalia's neighbours, some of whom meddle in Somalia's crisis or are directly affected by Somalia's problems in terms of piracy and refugee, and leave Somalia behind. Somalia will therefore remain a great test to the proposed T-FTA. Political instability in some key member states including Sudan and the DRC renders the region risky for investment and counter the benefit of the envisaged Tripartite FTA (Disenyanai 2009; Musonda 2009).

The case of Zimbabwe and Darfur are also another big test to the proposed AFTZ. Zimbabwe with her perennial instability and mass exodus of people to neighbouring countries particularly South Africa threatens to destabilize SADC's very peaceful existence, and if it is not resolved will be carried over to the proposed T-FTA. In the same vein, with Sudan's possible memberships of the proposed T-FTA, full exploitation of Sudan's potential cannot be realized so long as Sudan has the cloud of Darfur over it. However, with the peaceful separation of South Sudan on July 9, 2011, it is expected that the problem may be overcome, at least for now.

Similarly, with its vast resources and possibly the largest unrealized potential in the world, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a power keg waiting to explode if not properly handled. Many possible members of the proposed T-FTA including Uganda, Rwanda, South Africa and Burundi have a history of involvement in the internal affairs of the DRC. For example, Nkunda is believed to be funded in part by Rwanda, and thus, DRC's stability will pose a great challenge to the proposed T-FTA, especially with the involvement of some of its members (Wikipedia, 2009; Okeke and Aniche 2012). For details of internal political crises and wars between African states see Table 8 below.

It is noteworthy to state here that the above lists is by no means exhaustive, however, with over fifty wars and conflicts as recorded in the table above, it suffices to say that the proposed T-FTA is a crisis region where internal centrifugal forces of sub-nationalism and other forms of conflicts are ravaging the region. It is obvious therefore that the internal centrifugal tendencies and wars between the proposed T-FTA member states are the greatest challenge, the proposed T-FTA would have to deal with, and it dwindles whatever prospects it has, and could indeed, preempt it.

This is exactly what Echezona (1998) is referring to when he avers that the intractable civil strife within the member states of ECOWAS and OAU (now AU) and the refugee crisis which they cause are the constant reminders that the African states are too fragile to engage in the pursuit of regional integration or as he puts it: "of system wide community formation". The point being made is that numerous challenges awaiting the proposed T-FTA are capable of overcoming its prospects or probably preempt its emergence.

6. Problematizing Neo-functionalism and the Search for a New Theory

Empirical studies on regional economic integration are usually anchored on liberal institutionalism - embodying various theories of integration like functionalism, neo-functionalism and others - which basically hold that in the midst of anarchy or in spite of absence of overarching/supranational institutions, there is cooperation in the international system, and that order is facilitated through international institutions, norms and regimes. As a fall-out of this, the liberal institutionalists believe that there would be upward shifting of sovereignty from state to regional or global level facilitated by merger of several states into single state or ultimately a single world government or a process by which supranational institutions replace national ones in the long-run (Burchill and Linklater 2005; Goldstein and Pevehouse 2008).

But the neo-functionalism of Ernst B. Hass unlike, the functionalism of David Mitrany is non-normative, and thus, describes or explains the process of regional integration based on empirical data. Aside being empirical, neo-functionalism, unlike functionalism, does not focus primarily on global integration or global supra-nationalism rather its primary concern is on regional integration or regional supra-nationalism (Echezona 1998; Burchill and Linklater 2005). Classical functionalism is, thus, based on the hope that more and more common task will be delegated to such specific functional organizations or agencies of the United Nations (UN), like World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO), etc, and that each of these organizations will become supranational, that is, superior to its member governments in power and authority. In this way the world's nations will gradually become integrated into a single community within which war will be impossible (Mitrany 1948; 1966).

Orthodox or classical functionalism, thus, envisaged the treatment of these international or supranational functions and services as technical matters, non-political in nature and well removed from the clamour and pressures of interest groups, nations and the masses of the population. Classical or orthodox functionalists like David Mitrany, thus, hoped that highly specific functional agencies would enter into direct contact with the people they serve in each country. Their services would somehow remain non-political, but they, would win through their performance, both by increasing elite acceptance and popular support (Deutch 1968; Echezona 1998).

Regarding highly sensitive matters such as trade terms, financial, economic and developmental issues which the above mentioned United Nations' functional agencies handle; and which constitute serious national economic interests of producing means of sustenance as non-political form of cooperation is the greatest flaw, defect and intellectual pitfall of the classical functionalism (Groom and Taylor 1975; Nweke 2000). Neo-functionalism on the other hand, is a theory of regional integration or regional supra-nationalism in which integration is considered to be a desirable state of affairs that could be introduced by the political or technocratic elites of the involved states. However, Akpuru-Aja (2001) notes that while functionalism of David Mitrany is evolutionary, neo-functionalism of Ernst B. Haas is behavioural, favouring the establishment of an institutional mechanism to promote more collaborative tendencies rather than take for granted a transition from nonpolitical forms of cooperation to political union.

There are, thus, three major principles of neo-functionalism; (i) the principle of positive spillover effects which states that integration between states in one sector, that is, economic sector will eventually ramify into integration or cooperation in other sectors, such as political, socio-cultural, security, etc; (ii) the mechanism of a transfer in domestic allegiance which assumes that as the process of integration gathers momentum in an increasingly pluralistic domestic society of each state; interest groups and other associations will transfer their allegiance or loyalty away from national institutions towards the supranational institution(s) when they begin to realize that their material interests or wellbeing can be better pursued through supranational institution(s) than the pre-existing national institutions; and (iii) principle of technocratic automaticity which states that as integration hastens the supranational institution(s) will take the lead in fostering further integration as they become more and more autonomous of the member states (Echezona 1998; Haas 1970; Aniche and Ukaegbu 2014).

These three main principles of neo-functionalism embody John Galtung's Staircase Hypothesis, which involves the process of beginning with limited domain (or memberships) and limited scope (or sectors or area of cooperation) and gradually deepening the scope before extending the domain. Deepening the scope means moving from the initial areas of cooperation to other areas of cooperation by bringing in new sectors, whereas, extending the domain means admitting new members or increasing memberships. But neo-functionalism has many defects and while assuming that regional integration is a gradual process its conception of integration as a linear process makes explanation of setbacks or shortcomings impossible. Another of its defects is that neo-functionalism assumes that integration of states is an integration of interdependence, and therefore, not adequate for explaining the incidence of dependence of African economies to Western economies and integration of dependence of the African state to another.

Neo-functionalism, thus, blames the failure of regional integration in Africa on the failure to follow its principles or more specifically the John Galtung's strategy like Europe did, even as Europe began to suffer some setbacks towards the end of 20th century resulting from the upsurge of nationalism. Neo-functionalism is Eurocentric, and thus, parochial (Aniche, Okeke and Ukaegbu 2009). Consequently, there is need for a paradigm shift in Africa, that is, a theory that will be appropriate or adequate in explaining the African predicament. To do this, we need to look for a theory, which transcends neo-functionalism, a post-neo-functional theory which will enable us to tell our own stories by ourselves. Neo-functionalism is an alien theory, which was propounded by the West to facilitate regional integration in Europe, and was as such tailored to suit Europe (Aniche 2009).

While classical functionalism of David Mitrany advocates for global supra-nationalism, neo-functionalism of Ernst B. Haas advocates for regional supra-nationalism. The point of departure of post-neo-functionalism, therefore, is national integration, nation-building and nationalism as a necessary step or starting point or take off point towards achieving stable and sustainable regional integration, and ultimately global integration (Aniche 2009). Most of the European states who kickstarted European integration have already achieved sufficient or satisfactory level of national integration, nation-building and national development. But this is not the case with African states which are still confronted by national question, battling with underdevelopment and devastated by centrifugal forces of sub-nationalism (Aniche 2009).

There is, therefore, in Africa tension between sub-national centrifugal forces (like ethnic nationalism, religious intolerance, etc) and supranational centripetal forces (like regional integration or cooperation, free trade area, customs union, common market, single market, monetary union, etc). As the balance tilts towards the former, the regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa are continuously threatened by the sub-nationalism or disintegrative nationalism, and are thus, confronted with the challenge of intervening to resolve disputes, conflicts and crises arising from or within it, and are thus, distracted from the primary task of achieving sub-regionalism let alone continent-wide community formation. It is under this disintegrative nationalism or sub-national centrifugal tendencies that T-FTA is proposed as a solution, an option or an alternative towards overcoming various problems of regional economic integration such as multiple memberships, proliferation of RECs, dependencies, etc, in the Eastern and Southern regions of Africa. It is our contention in this paper that these challenges will override, and indeed, swallow up whatever prospects that are attributed to the proposed T-FTA (Aniche 2009).

This is because so much effort is wasted and energy dissipated by African leaders and regional bodies in managing centrifugal forces of sub-nationalism to the extent that they are not able to harness the human resources of their people towards synergizing them in transforming the numerous mineral resources that abound within their territories into manufactured products, and thus, constituting a clog in the wheel of industrialization. It is this very fact that has confined African states to export-oriented primary producers whose primary products are in very little demand within the regional group and which must be exported to industrialized countries of the West in unequal exchange with manufactured goods imported from them. This has ensured that Africa with its enclave economy remains in the periphery of world politics and as well at the mercy of neo-colonialism thwarting all efforts towards regional integration in Africa, and the proposed T-FTA will not be an exception.

7. Conclusion and Recommendations

We have, in the course of this paper, arrived at the conclusion that the numerous challenges that would confront the proposed Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-FTA) in Africa are capable of hindering its prospects, or in the extreme, confounding it. In seeking for solution to the predicament of African integration or regionalism, we insist that the solution should not be sought in the existing Euro-centric strategies or theories, but in a new theory by Aniche (2009), a post-neo-functionalism or neo-nationalism propounded suitable for African situation and capable of solving its problems. We, also, noted that while classical functionalism and neo-functionalism reify global supra-nationalism and regional supra-nationalism, respectively, as a starting point of integration, post-neo-functionalism or post-neo-nationalism problematizes it and rather advocates that regional and global integration should proceed from national integration, thus, reifying nationalism as a step towards achieving regionalism and ultimately global integration or globalism.

For Aniche (2009), post-neo-functionalism follows more or less the following stages: national integration, sub-regional integration, regional integration, trans-regional integration and finally global integration. Post-neo-functionalism is as well humanistic or humane because it advocates people-centred or human-centric or bottom-up integration rather than top-down approach to integration, or state-centric or inter-governmental integration of classical functionalism and neo-functionalism. Therefore, integration should be people-driven or private-sector-led rather than state-driven or public-sector-led. The role of the state should be regulatory or facilitative (Aniche, 2009).

A number of recommendations flows from this (i) that African leaders should seriously commence with the task of national integration, nation-building and national development beyond rhetoric, and as such, as a strategy of eventually achieving regional integration in Africa (ii) as a corollary to the above, African leaders should desist from divisive politics of divide and rule or balkanization and disintegrative nationalism; and work towards unleashing and synergizing the collective energies of their people towards transforming the abundant and strategic mineral resources in their territories into manufactured goods necessary for diversifying their economies from the present rentierism needed for transforming their current dependency on the industrialized countries of the West and their neo-colonial influences into relations of interdependency, and (iii) if they must relate with themselves since they enjoy all the fanfare, pomp and pageantries that are associated with it, it will be better to float a regional security organization that will assist in the addressing the national questions that result to civil wars or strife and resolving inter-AFTA state wars.

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Table 1: Comparison of EAC, SADC and COMESA

Tripartite Summit	No of States	Area Km^2 (in million)	Population (in million)	GDP (US$ billion)
EAC	5	1.85	120	46.6
SADC	15[1]	9.88	248	379
COMESA	19	12.87	398	286.7
Total	26[2]	18.47[2]	527[2]	625[2]

[1]Madagascar was suspended after the coup *d'etat*.
[2]Subracted double or multiple memberships to avoid double or multiple counting
Source: Adapted from Wikipedia, 2009.

Table 2: Comparison of Tripartite EAC-SADC-COMESA with other African Regional Economic Communities

Pillars regional blocs (REC)	Area (Km^2)	Population	GDP (PPP) In million	($US) per capita	Member states
AEC	29,910,442	853,520,010	2,053,706	2,406	53
ECOWAS	5,112,903	251,646,263	342,519	1,361	15
ECCAS	6,667,421	121,245,958	175,928	1,451	11
SADC	9,882,959	233,944,179	737,335	3,152	15
EAC	1,817,945	124,858,568	104,239	1,065	5
COMESA	12,873,957	406,102,471	735,599	1,811	20
IGAD	5,233,604	187,969,775	225,049	1,197	7
Western Sahara [1]	266,000	273,008	?	?	N/A[2]
Other African blocs	Area (km2)	Population	GDP (PPP) In million	($ US) per capita	Member states
CEMAC [3]	3,020,142	34,970,529	85,136	2,435	6
SACU [3]	2,693,418	51,055,878	541,433	10,605	5
UEMOA [3]	3,505,375	80,865,222	101,640	1,257	8
UMA [4]	5,782,140	84,185,073	491,276	5,836	5
GAFTA [5]	5,876,960	166,259,603	635,450	3,822	5

[1]The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) is a signatory to the AEC, but not participating in any bloc yet.
[2]Majority under military occupation by Morocco; some territory administered by the SADR.
[3]Economic bloc inside a pillar REC.
[4]Proposed for pillar REC, but objecting participation.
[5]Non-African members of GAFTA are excluded from figures.
Source: Adapted from Wikipedia, 2004.

Table 3: Dual Memberships of EAC, SADC and COMESA

EAC	SADC	COMESA
	Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe
	Zambia	Zambia
	Malawi	Malawi
	Swaziland	Swaziland
Tanzania	Tanzania	
	Madagascar[1]	Madagascar
	Mauritius	Mauritius
	Demo. Rep. of Congo	Demo. Rep. of Congo
	Seychelles	Seychelles
Burundi		Burundi
Kenya		Kenya
Rwanda		Rwanda
Uganda		Uganda

[1]Madagascar was suspended after coup *d'etat.*
Source: Author's Compilation.

Table 4: Top Intra-regional Exporters among the T-FTA Countries

Exporters	2007	2008	2009	2010
World	191,306,137	231,712,922	193,463,101	230,774,620
Tripartite Countries Aggregation	18,795,138	23,042,154	19,318,283	23,456,885
South Africa	7,501,519	10,139,490	8,604,782	10,299,701
Egypt	-	1,690,659	2,002,752	2,728,802
Kenya	1,668,678	2,111,841	1,913,971	2,179,580
Zimbabwe	2,249,573	1,098,591	1,506,594	2,061,222
Zambia	1,341,404	1,436,748	1,090,687	1,430,631
Tanzania	640,534	962,396	700,865	1,344,119

Source: ITC UN TradeMap Data, cited in Fundira (2012).

Table 5: T-FTA Country Rankings in the Competitive Industrial Performance (CIP) Index

Country	CIP Rank (2009)*	CIP Rank (2000)**	CIP Index 2009	CIP Index 2000
Swaziland	48	58	0.186	0.243
South Africa	49	48	0.184	0.260
Egypt	62	50	0.157	0.259
Mauritius	70	55	0.144	0.247
Botswana	78	83	0.131	0.182
Rwanda	87	114	0.119	0.101
Madagascar	97	104	0.101	0.133
Uganda	98	116	0.100	0.094
Zimbabwe	99	77	0.100	0.200
Kenya	100	102	0.094	0.135
Eritrea	106	105	0.076	0.129
Tanzania	110	117	0.068	0.087
Ethiopia	111	122	0.068	0.044
Malawi	112	107	0.059	0.127
Sudan	118	100	0.035	0.139

Source: UNIDO, 2009; 2011 cited in Woolfrey (2012).
*The 2009 rankings covered 118 countries.
**The 2000 rankings covered 122 countries.

Table 6: Overlapping Memberships of the Proposed T-FTA Member States in other RECs

T-FTA	ECCAS	CEN-SAD	AMU	IGAD
Kenya		Kenya		Kenya
Eritrea		Eritrea		Eritrea
Djibouti		Djibouti		Djibouti
Rwanda	Rwanda			
Burundi	Burundi			
Angola	Angola			
Demo. Rep. of Congo	Demo. Rep. of Congo			
Uganda				Uganda
Ethiopia				Ethiopia
Libya			Libya	
Comoros		Comoros		
Egypt		Egypt		

Source: Author's Compilation.

Table 7: SADC and SACU Member States and their Past Colonial Rulers

SADC	SACU	Past Colonial Rulers
Angola		Portugal
Botswana	Botswana	Britain
Demo. Rep. of Congo		France
Lesotho	Lesotho	Britain
Madagascar[1]		France
Malawi		Britain
Mauritius[2]		Britain
Mozambique		Portugal
Namibia	Namibia	South Africa
Seychelles[2]		Britain
South Africa	South Africa[3]	Britain
Swaziland	Swaziland[4]	Britain and South Africa
Tanzania		Britain
Zambia		Britain
Zimbabwe		Britain

[1]Madagascar was suspended after the coup d'*etat.*
[2]Initially colonized by France and later by Britain.
[3]Initially colonized by Netherlands and later Britain.
[4]Jointly colonized by Britain and South Africa.
Source: Author's Compilation.

Table 8: Conflicts in the Proposed Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-FTA) in Africa

Proposed T-FTA States	Civil Wars	Wars Between AFTZ State	Other Forms of Violence
Angola	Angolan Civil Wars (a) Battle of Cuito Cuanavale and (b) Battle of Cassinger.		
Burundi	Burundi Civil War (a)Titanic Express Massacre (b)Itaba Massacre (c)Gatumba Massacre		
Comoros	Comorian Secession Crisis 2008 (Invasion of Anjouan)		
Democratic Republic of Congo	First Congo War Second Congo War (a) Ituri Conflict (b) Kivu Conflict.		Congo Crisis (a)Katangan Secession (b) South Kasai Secession, Simba Rebellion, Shaba Invasions
Djibouti	Djiboutian Civil War	2008 Djiboutian Eritrean Border Conflict	
Egypt	Mahdist War, Yom Kippur War, Present Islamic Terroism	Libyan-Egyptian War	1997 till date Islamic Insurgency in the Maghreb.
Eritrea		Eritrean War of Independence, Eritrean-Ethiopian War	Series of Massacres
Ethiopia	Ethiopian Civil War	Eritrean-Ethiopian War, Ethiopian-Adel War, Ogaden War	
Kenya	Shifta War (1963-1967)		Turbi Village Massacre (2005), 2007-2008 Kenyan Crisis.
Lesotho	Gun War	South African Intervention in Lesotho	
Libya		Chadian-Libyan Conflict[1], Libyan-Egyptian War.	
Madagascar			Madascar Revolt
Mauritius	Battle of Grand Port		
Mozambique	Mozambican Civil War		
Namibia	Maritz Rebellion, Rwandan Civil War		Rwandan Genocide
Sudan	First Sudanese Civil War, Darfur Conflict 2003 till date	Mahdist War (a) Battle of Abu Klea (b) Battle of Omdurman © Battle of Umm Diwaykarat, Chad-Sudan Conflict 2009[1], Isreali Bombing of Sudan[1]	
Tanzania	Zanzibar Revolution (1964)	Ugadan-Tanzania War (1978-1979)	Maji Maji Rebellion
Uganda	Uganda Civil War (1982-1986)	Operation Entebbe (1976), Ugandan-Tanzania War (1978-1979) (a) Fall of Kampala	Uganda National Rescue Front I (1980-1985), Ugandan's People's Democratic Army (1986-1988), Holy Spirit Movement (1986-1987), Lord's Resistance Army (1987-present), Allied Democratic Force (1996 till date), Uganda National Rescue Front II (1996-2002).
Zimbabwe	First Matabele War Zimbabwe Civil War Second Matabele War		

[1]Opponents not proposed AFTZ member states.
Source: Authors Compilation.