

The Power of Budget Actors of Regional Election from the Perspective of Dahrendorf's Conflict Theory

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Abstract

The purpose of the research is to reveal the power of budget actors of the 2013 Bali regional election. The data were collected through the participant observations and dialogues with participants. Data analysis was conducted using Dahrendorf's conflict theory. Dahrendorf's conflict theory perceives regularities in society as a result of tensions of power from super-ordinates to sub-ordinates. Power is a rare resource. The conflicts of authority emerge to maintain the legitimacy of authority.

The research finds out that the practice of elections cannot be separated from conflicts. Conflicts linger in the executive, legislative, and regional election authorities in Bali province. One of the main resources of power is a budget. Organizations experiencing conflicts can make use of budget to maintain authority. The conflict of budget planning of regional elections ends with the excessive power of budgeting team to cut the budget actors' pay. The conflict of budget execution is shown by the power of the incumbent and commissioners. The conflict of budget accountability ends with the power of Financial Investigation Bureau of Indonesia to return the excess use of budget of regional elections to the local cash account.

The implications of this study are the changes in the regulation of budgetary resources of regional elections from local budget to state expenditure budget as well as the changes in the regulation of commissioners' authority to replace the structural officials of the General Election Commission.

Keywords: power, budget, and power conflict.

1. Introduction

State budget is an instrument highly potential for government to implement policies based on the applicable law. The scope of budget depends on the government activities, but in the form that allows legislative and public to carefully review the government policies so that its accountability must be implicated in budget management because the government is directly controlled by parliaments and people.

Budget is a tool to reach objectives because it contains planning, goals and objectives. The budgeting system may fulfill many objectives that are more than just a control, such as that budget is a form as well as a resource of power, and that budget can serve to fulfill the needs as authorities' interest against scarce resources as well as serve those from business unit of which its finance is subject to the made budget (Wildavsky, 2004). The most prominent factors in budgeting system are personal interests, power changes, and internal politics (Hackman, 1985 in Covaleski *et al.*, 1996; Wildavsky, 2004).

The drafting process of budget policies is influenced by the transformations in political environment and many interests that must be allocated according to certain parties' desires to be prioritized (Brown and Jackson, 1986). Political parties try to ensure that fiscal policies and other programs can be accepted. The bureaucrats are also the key players in the budgeting process (Shafer *et al.*, 2001). Budget is a 'struggle for power'. The power in industrialized society may be defined as an authority. When an authority is a mutual tension, the coordinated parties will keep it legitimate with normative rights to make decision about or treat others (Turner, 1991). The redistribution of power and authority is the institutionalization of super-ordinates with

sub-ordinates (Dahrendorf, 1959). Budget policies are decisions about authority: who holds it, who benefits and does not (Wildavsky, 2004). Budget as both substance and result of political bargaining process is useful for legitimating and maintaining the system of authority and control in organizations (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1986).

The budgets for legislative and presidential elections are sourced from national expenditure budget. The execution of legislative elections in Indonesia absorbed up to IDR 55 trillion of budgets in 2004 and 47 trillion in 2009. Meanwhile, the budget for regional elections is sourced from local expenditure budget. Bali regional election used up to IDR 43 billion of budget in 2008 and 132 billion in 2013. The increase in budget for mayoral elections is due to increasing number of officer organizers on village-level, and in the second and repeated round of election. The amount of budget for the execution of regional elections requires local government to reserve the budget for 3 years in advance.

The proposal of budget for regional elections was discussed by Commissioner I of Bali Provincial Legislative Council who comes as a result of legislative elections. Based on the results of legislative elections in 1999, 2004, and in 2009, PDI Perjuangan party was dominant in Bali Provincial Legislative Council. This domination led PDI Perjuangan to have a position as the head of Bali Provincial Legislative Council since the 1999, 2004, and 2009 elections. In the 2004 election, however, the total of votes for PDI Perjuangan made up for only 51.34% (KPU Bali, 2004), thus PDI Perjuangan has the right to submit one pair of candidates in the 2008 Bali regional election. PDI Perjuangan won the victory for 55.01% of votes (KPU Bali, 2008).

The PDI Perjuangan of Bali province also dominated the vote of the 2009 legislative election of 40.94% (KPU Bali, 2009). However, at the end the office term, there was a cleavage between the current governor and vice governor. This cleavage caused the incumbent governor to be nominated by the coalition of nine political parties and the incumbent vice governor remained nominated by PDI Perjuangan as a regional head was.

The nomination of the two incumbents as a regional head candidate in Bali regional election made the competition tough. The incumbent governor had a strength as an individual figure in society while the incumbent vice governor had the strongest power of political party in Bali.

The Bali Provincial General Elections Commission as the organizer of the regional election needed a huge amount of budget. The proposal of budget for regional elections is discussed by Commissioner I of Bali Provincial Legislative Council that came as a result of the 2009 legislative elections where PDI Perjuangan was the dominant party. In the practice of regional election, the Bali Provincial General Elections Commission also had to hand over the accountability reports to Provincial Legislative Council. This indicates the existence of interests in the political power in the practice of regional elections. The budgeting team is a team formed by the authority. As a result, the discussion of regional elections is very sensitive and heavily contains interests of executive and legislative power (Wildavsky, 2004) and conflicts of authority (Dahrendorf, 1959).

The budget conflict of Bali regional election occurred in Jembrana regency in 2010. The conflict resulted in the postponement of stages of the election schedule since there was no approval on budgets from the regional head and the head of financial bureau (KPU Jembrana, 2010). The postponement of election stages schedule prompted a warning by Ministry of Interior that Jembrana general election commission did not work according to the working regulations that the voting ballot should be held no less than one month before the end of the official term of the regional head. The postponement of election stages schedule happened because the regional head had political interests in the form of judicial review submitted to the Constitutional Court to enable e-voting in the voting process. The Constitutional Court signed an agreement about the use of e-voting, but the General Elections Commission could not yet employ e-voting because such regulation changes should be done by People's Representative Council. Another conflict of regional head's interest was that his son also applied to become a regional head.

The budget conflict of regional election also occurred to the practice of 2013 Bali regional election. The internal conflict occurred due to the commissioner's power to replace two structural officials, namely the secretary and the head of finance section (KPU Bali, 2012). Those two structural officials hold authority and responsibility for regional election budgets. On the other hand, the stages of Bali regional election had started since November 2012. The replacement of those two structural officials of the Bali Provincial General Elections Commission was not done in accordance with the existing regulations and so it led to internal conflict of authority (Dahrendorf, 1959) and resulted in the disruption of the Bali Provincial General Elections Commission as a whole.

The external conflict of Bali regional election occurred due to the power of the incumbent to rescues the ballot paper. Political conflict happened between the incumbent executive and legislative (Solthan, 2011).

Negotiation between actors is performed by utilizing the power base (Djafar, 2006). Organizations experiencing conflicts can use the budgets to form and maintain power relations (Wildavsky, 2004).

2. Method

The study employs qualitative approach by using critical paradigm. The objective of this study is to reveal the power of budget actors of the 2013 Bali regional election. The data were collected through participant observations and dialogues with participants (Gadamer, 1976). The observer was truly engaged in respondents' everyday lives (Bungin, 2001) and they play double roles in this study: to observe or to be observed (Rahayu and Ardani, 2004). The observer also served as the commissioner of finance and logistic division. She participated in all of the regional elections budgeting activities from planning, discussion, practice, and accountability of regional elections budgets. The dialogues were conducted with people with knowledge about the budgeting process of regional elections, namely the head of the Bali Provincial General Elections Commission, Governor of Bali, and Financial Investigation Bureau of Bali Province.

The study is analyzed using Dahrendorf's conflict theory (1959). Dahrendorf views that society is in the continuing process of changes that is marked by constant conflicts among its elements. The regularity in society is a result of tensions or coercion from higher power and authority. When an authority is a mutual tension, the coordinated parties will keep it legitimate and authority relations. In authority, some positions have normative rights to make decision about or treat others (Turner, 1991). Power and authority are scarce sources that make each parties competing (Dahrendorf, 1959). The redistribution of power and authority is the institutionalization from ruling roles to ruled roles. The conflict among parties occurs in relation to the legitimacy of the existing power (Laurer, 1993). The power and authority of a regional head is limited to 5 year period. Conflicts of authority occur around the authority structure between super-ordinates and sub-ordinates.

3. Results and Findings

Regional elections will result in a better and more qualified regional head that has high acceptability rate and strong legitimacy degree (Suparman, 2010). The power seizing through regional elections leads to a new class of politics, namely the middle-class. Middle-class exists around executive and legislative power. The position of regional head still has a great appeal so the practice of regional elections cannot be separated from conflicts (Kemendagri, 2010; Nurhasim *et al.* (ed), 2005). The conflict of budgets for regional elections happened in Bali province election in 2013 between super-ordinates and sub-ordinates.

The conflict of budget planning of regional elections happened due to the honorarium of organizers of the regional elections. The budgeting team focused on the discussion of organizers' honorarium because it absorbed up to 44% of total budgets. Bali general election commissions as the sub-ordinates insisted the organizers' honorarium on village-level and in voting place were not decreased to facilitate the recruitment of qualified organizers. The conflict of honorarium was ended by budgeting team as super-ordinates to decrease the honorarium on province-level and increase the honorarium on city-level. The decision was made because, according to the budgeting team, the hardest work is in cities, while in province-level the work is only supervising.

The internal conflict about organizers' honorarium originated from the secretariats of nine cities. There were striking differences in between secretariat's honorarium on province-level and that on city-level. This was because the hardest work is in cities because of the coordination that must be done all the way to the voting places. Thus, it is natural if the organizers in secretariats on city-level must be proportionally reevaluated. The conflict was ended by provincial secretariat as the super-ordinate to decrease the honorarium on province-level and increase the honorarium on city level.

The formation of working teams of governmental procurement of goods or services led to an internal conflict because there were 28 persons with legitimate certificates refusing to be a member of the procurement of goods or services team. This refusal was done due to the lack of experience in the simple auction field and mental unpreparedness. Procurement of goods for regional elections is associated with politics. Ultimately, the conflict was ended by asking for help from Bali Procurement Services Unit to auction goods or services.

The internal conflict of budgeting practice for regional elections has happened during the formation of survey team of self-price estimation by provincial secretariat. This survey team involved the commissioner of finance and logistic division to oversee the work. The commissioners had certificate of expertise in computer-based governmental procurement of goods or services and also served as director of logistics working group. Survey team served to conduct a survey on the price of logistics needs. Self-price estimate was prepared by Official Commitment Maker that was held by secretary of Provincial General Elections Commission. The conflict happened because all of the commissioners wanted to get involved in the survey of self-price estimation.

Some of the commissioners (sub-ordinate) opted that price survey was merely for fun. The mistake in determining price survey would result in the error in determining the fair value in the simple and direct auction. This mistake of price survey would have an impact on the investigation by Financial Investigation Bureau that could end in legal court.

The conflict continued with the procurement of guidebook for voting. The budget ceiling of procurement of all books of regional elections was as much as IDR 996 million and must be done through a simple auction. The commissioner of socialization division (super-ordinate) demanded that the procurement of guidebooks for voting must be done immediately because the stages of election would begin very soon. If the simple auction was undertaken then it would take 28 working days until there was an auction winner. Another alternative for procurement of guidebooks was through direct procurement. To do this, secretariat of Bali province (sub-ordinate), also as the budget users, asked the plenary command of commissioners to give official comment for direct procurement. The commissioners of finance and logistics division refused it because the authority for procurement of goods or services in accordance with regulations in provincial secretariat. The commissioner of socialization division became emotional and stated that Bali provincial secretariat could not facilitate the commissioners' policies. The commissioners of socialization also disapproved the providers of goods appointed by provincial secretariat because their work was not considered maximal. The other three commissioners also refused to attend plenary meetings. The conflict was finally ended by the decision of provincial secretariat to undertake direct procurement of guidebooks on one condition that the risks were borne by Bali provincial secretariat.

The conflict continued when four commissioners silently held closed-meeting which produced a decision to replace the provincial secretary as well as the head of the finance and general section. The commissioners of the finance and logistics division (sub-ordinate) were not involved in the replacement of the provincial secretary because it was clear they would not approve the replacement of the two structural officials. The tensions began to emerge between the provincial secretariat and commissioners. Based on the information obtained by the Local Staffing Agency, the governor of Bali (super-ordinate) disposed to review the proposed replacement of the structural officials happening in the Bali Provincial General Elections Commission. The suggestion of replacement violated the existing regulations. The commissioners only had the authority to suggest the replacement of secretary and after coordinating with the regional government.

The internal conflict got more intense as the four commissioners already had internal candidate to replace the provincial secretary namely the head of technical section. The head of technical section was very close to the four commissioners and became their confidant. This internal candidate led the provincial secretariat to part into two groups: pro with the head of technical section and pro with the secretary. The internal conflict of secretariat impacted the organization as a whole. The working environment became inconvenient due to the mutual suspicion among employees that reported each other and hence, team works got distracted.

The internal conflict was reported to the governor of Bali. Commissioners of finance and logistics division (sub-ordinate) as well as the secretary of Bali Provincial General Elections Commission (sub-ordinate) made a report to the governor of Bali. During the dialogue, commissioners of finance and logistics division stated:

...“the secretary of Bali Provincial General Elections Commission plays a very important role in supporting the success of the regional election. The grant budget of IDR 132 billion must be accounted correctly and accurately. The replacement of provincial secretary is a strategic policy so it must be done through plenary meeting. The replacement of provincial secretary by reason of retirement is not appropriate at the moment. The secretary has given confirmation to become the central civil servant since 2011 and this condition still in the process.”

The secretary of Bali Provincial General Elections Commission is a structural official of level IIa with the age limit of 60 years, while when the conflict happened, the secretary's age was only 55 years old. Since its establishment in 2003, Bali Provincial General Elections Commission had replaced its secretarial position three times. The replacement had never led to an internal conflict permanently. It is not appropriate to replace the secretary position when the stage of regional election has started. The new secretary will not have enough time to learn because the activities of regional election practice are different from other organizational routines.

The secretary of Bali Provincial General Elections Commission stated:

...“the internal conflict of Bali Provincial General Elections Commission is caused by temporary emotional factors. The governor of Bali as a supervisor in the regional government has the authority to perform mutation of civil servants. The secretary of Bali Provincial General Elections Commission will

accept every decision made by the governor of Bali and be willing to be relocated immediately in any institution around the Bali local government.”

Then the governor of Bali stated:

...”The performance of the secretary of Bali Provincial General Elections Commission has so far been very outstanding. Who does not know him? Let’s wait the study results of Local Staffing Agency.”

The statement by the governor above shows that the performance of the provincial secretary was still so excellent. The government also stated that the disposition of Local Staffing Agency had been done to review the suggestion by the head of Bali general election commission.

This organizational internal conflict started to spread to public and mass media. Mass media (super-ordinate) started to make a headline about it. The conflict got more intense with the war of words on the mass media. The Supervisory Committee of Election regretted such internal conflict of Bali Provincial General Elections Commission and stated that the conflict should be resolved in a month. If the conflict continued, the Supervisory Committee of Election would take over so that the election stages would not get stuck.

The internal conflict of organization was brought to Central General Election Commission. The four commissioners (super-ordinate) and the head of technical section brought the letter of replacement including documents of mutation of civil servants in the secretariat. The mutation of civil servants became the secretary’s authority (sub-ordinate). These four commissioners had tried to influence Central General Election Commission so that the proposed replacement of the secretary was immediately followed up. The general secretary of Central General Election Commission (super-ordinate) finally sent a clarification team to evaluate the performance of the provincial secretariat. The conflict was ended by the decision by general secretary of Central Election Commission to set the secretary as the secretary of General Elections Commission and extend the age of retirement by October 31, 2013 as the secretary of Bali General Election Commission.

The internal conflict happened due to the budgets for voting places. According to the commissioner of Bali Provincial General Elections Commission (super-ordinate), voting places proposed by nine city-level General Elections Commissions still had to be revised since the sum of voters had to be optimized up to 575 persons per voting place. The optimization was intended for an efficiency of voting place budgets. There was an exception for voting place with special condition such as those experiencing conflicts and those hard to reach due to geographical condition. The conflict of voting place was ended through the willingness of nine city-level General Elections Commissions (sub-ordinate) to decrease the total number of voting places.

The conflict of regional election budgets increasingly got chaotic with the full authority of commissioner of socialization division (super-ordinate) to set the budget for socialization. The commissioner of socialization division began to directly appoint providers of goods or services by ignoring the authorities of procurement officials and budget users or official commitment maker of Bali General Election Commission (sub-ordinate). Technical and price negotiations could not be undertaken by procurement officials. Such direct appointment of providers of goods or services was not in accordance with the procedures of governmental procurement of goods or services. The commissioner also set a budget ceiling to providers of goods or services. After the work was done, the payment must be made immediately. The late payment resulted in the budget users or official commitment maker receiving threats from providers of goods or services that they would report it to the mass media. The conflict was finally ended by accelerating the administrative process and making payment.

The conflict of regional election budgets also occurred in the branding of two provincial official cars and the cars in nine cities. The head of Bali Provincial General Elections Commission (super-ordinate) and socialization division (super-ordinate) directly appointed providers of goods or services of the General Election Commission car branding. The budget of official car branding was not included in the socialization budgets. The conflict of official car branding was ultimately ended by revising the regional election budgets by the provincial secretary (sub-ordinate).

The peak of the conflict was reached against the ballot design. This conflict was internal and external. The logistics working group (sub-ordinate) in a meeting about internal coordination explained that the ballot designs have been changed three times by the campaign team (super-ordinate) of the pairs of candidates. The task force employed the regulations of ballot designs in the Election Commission Rules Number 66 Year 2009 and Election Commission Rules Number 17 Year 2010 as the basis. The election commission rules had never issued a regulation that the ballot designs must be in a visual form. Since the first regional election in 2005, there had been no rules about ballot design image issued by of Central General Elections Commission. The approval of ballot designs must be given by the campaign team of each candidate. The campaign team that has the authority to approve the ballot designs is the head and secretary of the campaign team. The Bali Provincial

General Elections Commission had received the approval of ballot designs on stamp duty of IDR 6,000 on April 11, 2013 given by both campaign team members.

The production process of ballots had already been done since April 15, 2013 by PT. Pura Barutama Kudus. PT. Pura Barutama Kudus only had one week to produce the ballots and another week to distribute the ballots directly to cities. However, a problem had started to arise since April 20, 2013 when the package of "Pasti Kerta" perceived that the ballot designs violated the election commission rules because it contained a logo of a political party in between the image package of "PAS". The Bali Provincial Supervisory Committee (super-ordinate) that was present in PT. Pura Barutama Kudus on April 18, 2013 thought that the existence of the political party logo of candidate number one violated the Election Commission Rules Number 66 Year 2009 Article 6 Paragraph 2: "the ballots as explained in paragraph 1 must contain number, image, or name of candidates". The Bali Provincial Supervisory Committee at that time ordered PT. Pura Barutama Kudus (sub-ordinate) to stop the production process. The logistic teams held the terms and conditions that had been agreed on April 11, 2013 by campaign team and focused on the limited provision time and distribution of ballots to the voting places. The production process of ballots continued because the Bali Provincial Supervisory Committee had no authority to stop the production process.

The Bali Provincial Supervisory Committee (super-ordinate) called the commissioners of finance and logistics (sub-ordinate) on April 21, 2013 to give a clarification. The commissioners of finance and logistics division explained that the ballot designs had changed three times. Those changes of ballot designs had been noted by campaign team of "PAS" package since March 30, 2013. The election commission rules did not regulate the background and foreground of the image in ballots. Ballots designs had been agreed as a complete unity by the campaign teams of candidate pair. The commissioners of finance and logistics division showed the evidence held over the three time change of ballot designs. The recommendation of Bali Provincial Supervisory Committee contained: firstly, to ask the Bali Provincial General Elections Commission to make improvements to the ballots or take strategic steps which are believed to guarantee the absence of a lawsuit against the existence of ballots of post-regional elections results; secondly, to ask the plenary Bali Provincial General Elections Commission to provide the head of logistics supervisory community with some guidance in order to be more careful in coordinating and making a decision.

The internal conflict of ballot designs continued. The meeting of internal coordination between five commissioners and the secretary of the Bali Provincial General Elections Commission was held dead-lock. The four commissioners (super-ordinate) kept blaming the commissioners of finance and logistics division (sub-ordinate) for ballot designs. Previously at 7 o'clock, the secretary of the Bali Provincial General Elections Commission was called by Bali Provincial Secretariat to give explanation about ballot designs. The secretariat was also asked to change the ballot design by using the remaining logistics budget. The commissioners of finance and logistics division refused to re-print the ballots because it had been agreed by the two campaign teams on a stamp duty of IDR 6000. There were no election commission rules violated in the ballot designs and all of the terms and conditions on the ballot designs had been fulfilled and stamped as well by the two campaign teams as a complete unity. The commissioners of finance and logistics division stated that re-procurement of ballots must be done through simple auction and that would take almost six months. On the other hand, the budget for re-printing ballots was very huge, that was IDR 1 billion. The risk of re-printing ballots was also very high because it could be considered a crime committed because of doing excessive spending. Commissioners of finance and logistics division firmly stated that they were not able to reprint the ballots and resigned instead.

The tension persisted in the internal organization of Bali Provincial General Elections Commission. The head and three commissioners of Bali Provincial General Elections Commission (super-ordinate) prohibited commissioners of finance and logistics division (sub-ordinate) to attend any meetings held by Bali Provincial General Elections Commission. The four commissioners asked the commissioners of finance and logistics division to immediately prepare the chronology of ballot designs if there was any lawsuit by the logistics of regional elections.

The head of Bali Provincial General Elections Commission coordinated with the head of Central General Elections Commission (super-ordinate) concerning the chronology of ballots. Ultimately the head of Central General Elections Commission, with a form letter, stated that "ballots that contain the image of a candidate and a logo of his political party are a part of the image, and it does not violate the Election Commission Rules Number 66 Year 2009 Article 6 Paragraph 2". The Bali Provincial General Elections Commission could use the ballots which had already been printed and distribute them to cities so it would not disturb the day of regional election. The conflict of ballots designs ultimately ended.

The four commissioners (super-ordinate) attended plenary meetings without inviting commissioners of finance and logistics division (sub-ordinate) as well as the secretary of Bali Provincial General Elections Commission. In the minutes about the plenary meeting, the four commissioners decided to “dismiss the commissioners of finance and logistics division from duty”. The duties of commissioners of finance and logistics division were given to the division of socialization. The commissioners of finance and logistics division gave objections and made written report about the chronology of logistics of regional election to Central General Elections Commission.

The conflicts of regional elections budgets continued to the case about the monitoring of election voting and counting. The socialization division (super-ordinate) prohibited the working team of election voting and counting (sub-ordinate) to do the monitoring for nine cities. Instead, the socialization division financially supported the Indonesian Journalists Union in monitoring the regional election by providing some money for regional tour of duty for 24 persons of IDR 3 million each and 40 liters of fuel of IDR 420,000.

The conflicts of budget continued with the case directly presenting public service ads on two private TV channels in public debates show. The show was done by the commissioner of socialization division (super-ordinate). The order of public service ads was proved by a memo to provincial secretariat (sub-ordinate) to help facilitate the financial administration. The total cost of public debates show was IDR 469 million. In accordance with the regulation, the cost of public debates should be expensed through simple auction.

The external conflict of Bali Provincial General Elections Commission began at the time of registration of candidates supported political parties. Initially, the “Pasti Kerta” package registered to the General Elections Commission and was supported by nine political parties with a total of valid votes of 44.26%. The registration of “Pasti Kerta” package brought the mass all wearing white traditional clothes.

The “PAS” package registered to the General Elections Commission supported by the biggest political party namely PDI Perjuangan with a total of valid votes of 40.94%. It brought a large-scale mass all wearing red clothes. The Bali Provincial General Elections Commission rumbled with the traditional show brought by the supporters of PDI Perjuangan.

The last seconds before the closing of registration of candidates, the “WIDI” package registered to the Bali Provincial General Elections Commission and was supported 28 political parties with total valid votes of 18.44%. It only brought a few number of people.

The registration of the three candidates of governor and vice governor supported by political parties provoked a new question. If all of the valid votes were totaled, then the result would be 103.64%. In conclusion, there had been double votes. Double votes of political parties were in the “Pasti Kerta” and “WIDHI” package. Such double votes required the Bali Provincial General Elections Commission to work extra hard as it would be difficult to trace the existence of the office and the staff of the political parties with small votes. Many supporting parties have not become the participants anymore in the 2014 election. In addition, the internal conflict of small parties made the duties of Bali Provincial General Elections Commission more difficult.

A factual verification was also done to local government supporting the “WIDHI” package. The factual verification of supports for political parties caused a bigger budget for regional and non-regional tour of duty. The conflict of double votes of political parties was ended in an open plenary meeting in which Bali Provincial General Elections Commission (super-ordinate) decided that the “WIDHI” package (sub-ordinate) did not meet the requirements of minimal 15% of political party supports. Packages that met the requirement were “Pasti Kerta” which was supported by eight political parties and “PAS” which was supported by one political party.

The external conflict got more severe as the Bali Provincial General Elections Commission invited the candidates and Bali Provincial Supervisory Committee over to discuss the ballot designs. The open meeting about ballot designs was running intensely making them hit the tables and ended in dead-lock. The ballots must be reprinted. The campaign teams of “Pasti Kerta” asked all parties to comply with the existing regulations. However, they argued that during the approval signing of ballot designs, the ballot design of “PAS” package was not observed thoroughly. After there was an objection from some people and supporting statement of Bali Provincial Supervisory Committee that such thing was not right and appropriate, the case was reported to the Bali Provincial General Elections Commission in the hope that the regional election ran fair and square (Channelsatu, 2013).

The campaign teams of “PAS” rejected the change of ballot designs. During the registration in the Bali Provincial General Elections Commission, there was an initial image and it continued to change. There was a signed agreement of the end results on stamp duty, making it contain a legal force. The symbol of political parties in ballot designs was a principle thing for PDI Perjuangan without compromise. There was no reason

prohibiting the symbol use of political parties. Besides, previously there was a signed agreement between both teams about the ballot designs. Safe and secure Bali regional election was something that PDI Perjuangan wanted without compromise. They also would not hesitate to make objection if their principles were messed by eliminating their logo in the ballot designs. It was inappropriate by ethics (Chanelatsu, 2013). Red is identical with PDI Perjuangan. The “PAS” package would not be firm in the decisions by PDI Perjuangan. Both campaign teams of “PAS” invited the mass media to enter the meeting room and gave a statement about the ballot designs. The head of campaign team of “PAS” was also the head of Bali Provincial Parliament and the head of Provincial PDI Perjuangan.

The mass media (super-ordinate) started to spread the news about ballot designs in the headline. The resignation of commissioners of finance and logistics division (sub-ordinate) was in the headline news. Both local and national TV media also highlighted the ballot designs and the resignation of the commissioner. At that time, the head of Bali Provincial General Elections Commission (sub-ordinate) started to receive pressures from the incumbent head of region (super-ordinate). The pressures received would discontinue the budgets of grants for Bali regional election.

The pressures to stop the budgets for Bali regional election was also approved by the head of Bali Provincial General Elections Commission as stated at the time the public debates show on TV One would start. The dialogues with the head of Bali Provincial General Elections Commission concerning the ballot design were as follows:

...”that the incumbent (super-ordinate) as the head of region will discontinue the grant budgets for regional election if the logo of PDI Perjuangan remains to be put in the ballot designs. The head of the Bali Provincial General Elections Commission is currently in a very difficult situation.”

It was confirmed again with the dialogue with the secretary of Bali Provincial General Elections Commission stating:

“...before the public debates show on TV One got started, the incumbent head of region declared that unless in the form of grant then the budgets for regional election will be discontinued.”

This statement expresses the pressures received by the Bali Provincial General Elections Commission from the incumbent who held power.

The conflict of logistics continued to the designs of the list of candidates that would be posted on the entrance of the voting places. The list of candidates was the socialization materials of the Bali Provincial General Elections Commission. The “Pasti Kerta” package questioned the red color in the background of the candidates list that was not the same as the red color in the background of the ballot. The red color in the background of the ballot was changed by the campaign team secretary of “Pasti Kerta”. The Bali Provincial General Elections Commission confirmed that the list designs of candidates had been approved by the campaign team secretary on April 3, 2013.

The external conflict reached its peak during the recapitulation of the voting from the level of sub-district to province. The spreading issue was that both candidates would sue the Bali Provincial General Elections Commission. The witness from the package of “PAS” (super-ordinate) refused to sign the recapitulation from sub-district, city, to province level (Derap, 2013). The conflict of voting recapitulation heated up during the recapitulation of the voting on a province-level on May 26, 2013. The package of “PAS” demanded that the assistant team of nine persons could attend the meeting and helped the witness from “PAS” do the recapitulate. The head of Bali Provincial General Elections Commission (super-ordinate) refused because it was not in accordance with the rules. Only two witnesses were allowed to attend the meeting. There were mutual interruptions between the witnesses from “PAS” and “Pasti Kerta”.

The security was very tight. The recapitulation process was running very tensely. The head of Bali Provincial General Elections Commission was badly attacked by the witnesses from “PAS”. The recapitulation on a province-level could be resolved but the witnesses from “PAS” refused to sign the report. The package of “PAS” raised objections over the recapitulation in Denpasar, Badung, Tabanan, Jembrana, Buleleng, and Karangasem. The recapitulation results of the voting on a province-level showed that “PAS” gained 1,062,738 (49,98%) votes and “Pasti Kerta” gained 1,063,734 (50,02%) votes. The recapitulation process was broadcast live on national and local TV channels so people were aware of the conflicts of regional election. The recapitulation of the voting on a province level had impact on the increasing spending budgets.

The package of “PAS” brought the province-level recapitulation results to the Constitutional Court. They accused the Bali Provincial General Elections Commission (sub-ordinate) of the structural, systematic, and

massive violation that significantly affected the total of votes gained. The Constitutional Court (super-ordinate), on June 18, 2013, stated in a decree that they entirely rejected the request by the petitioner (sub-ordinate).

The package of “PAS”, through their lawyer, also reported to the honorary election council over the violation by the Bali Provincial General Elections Commission (sub-ordinate) as well as their persons including the five commissioners of General Election Commission of Badung, Tabanan, Buleleng, Karangasem, and Bali Province. The verdict trial of The Honorary Election Council (super-ordinate) concluded that it was evident that there was a violation of the code of ethics done by General Election Commission of Buleleng (sub-ordinate), Karangasem (sub-ordinate), and Bali Province (sub-ordinate) concerning the less provision of access and inconvenient treatment to the witnesses and data assistant team. The Honorary Election Council gave a written mild warning to the head and four commissioners of General Election Commission of Bali Province, the head and three commissioners of Buleleng, and head and four commissioners of Karangasem. The Honorary Election Council rehabilitated the reputation of the five commissioners of Badung and four commissioners of Tabanan. They also ordered Central General Elections Commission and Election Supervisory Board to oversee the implementation of the decision. The conflict of regional elections led to the increase in the budgets for attorneys and tour of duty. There were many witnesses that must be brought to Jakarta especially those from sub-district level as well as the sued commissioners.

The inauguration of governor and vice governor of Bali province marked the completion of the practice of regional election. The Bali Provincial General Elections Commission prepared the accountability report of budgets to the governor as the grantor. The Financial Investigation Bureau of Indonesia started to investigate the budget of grants for regional election. There was a different perception between the Bali Provincial General Elections Commission and the investigators of The Financial Investigation Bureau. According to the Bali Provincial General Elections Commission (sub-ordinate), all of the costs of tour of duty were paid on a lump sum basis except for the tour of duty of semester 2 in 2013. However, according to the investigators of The Financial Investigation Bureau (super-ordinate), all of the costs of tour of duty were paid on at cost basis. The dialogues done with the investigators of The Financial Investigation Bureau stated that:

...”Based on the regulation of financial minister, all of the costs of tour of duty either from state budget or regional budget were paid on at cost basis.”

Meanwhile, the secretary of the Bali Provincial General Elections Commission stated in the dialogue that:

...”Based on our understanding, all of the activities financed from state budget are paid on at cost basis, while the costs of tour of duty for regional elections budget are paid on a lump sum basis except for the tour of duty of semester 2 in 2013 that was paid at cost. Our treasurers were gathered by local government in April 2013.”

Likewise, there was a conflict of honorarium payment for the organizers of the regional election. The Financial Investigation Bureau investigated whether there was any duplication of honorarium payment for the organizers of the regional election sourced from local budget with the routine honorarium sourced from state budget. The dialogues undertaken by investigators of The Financial Investigation Bureau stated that:

...”The Rules of Interior Minister Number 57 Year 2009 mentions that the honorarium of regional election could be paid as long as there is no duplication. The investigation results of The Financial Investigation Bureau in the entire Indonesia gave notes to the honorarium payment for the organizers especially in the province-level and city-level General Election Commission.

The secretary of the Bali Provincial General Elections Commission stated in the dialogue:

...”In the entire Indonesia, the honorarium for the organizers of regional election has been paid since 2005. The honorarium payment was adjusted to the honorarium of the last election and the financial condition of the region. The payment is also supported by the regulation of the governor. So there is no duplication in the honorarium payment for the organizers of regional election.”

The conflict of honorarium for the working groups also happened over the different perception of the Rules of Interior Minister Number 57 Year 2009 between the Bali Provincial General Elections Commission and the Financial Investigation Bureau of Indonesia. Based on the perception by the Financial Investigation Bureau of Indonesia, the honorarium for working groups was intended only for the members. Meanwhile, the Bali Provincial General Elections Commission divided the honorarium based on the classification of Central General Election Commission, namely the supervisor, chief, secretary, and member. If the classification of Central General Election Commission was implemented, then there was efficiency in the honorarium payment for working groups. The conflict of the accountability of grant budgets for regional election was resolved by the

release of the report of the investigation results by the Financial Investigation Bureau of Bali Province (super-ordinate) with the finding of excessive cost of tour of duty of IDR 72,861,870 that the Bali Provincial General Elections Commission (sub-ordinate) must return to the local cash account.

4. Conclusion, implication and limitation

Direct general election has started since 2004. The election caused PDI Perjuangan to be dominant in the House of Representatives. The dominating power of PDI P also applied in the Bali legislature from 2004 to 2009. PDI Perjuangan dominance in legislature allowed them to nominate a pair of candidate to be the governor and vice governor of the region in regional election and it had been done since 2005. However in the power structure of PDI Perjuangan, a cleavage started to emerge between the governor and vice governor as the incumbent. Ultimately, the cleavage was shown in the 2013 Bali regional election. PDI Perjuangan nominated the incumbent vice governor as a governor, while the incumbent governor was nominated again as a governor by the coalition of nine political parties. There was a tough competition between PDI Perjuangan and the figure of the incumbent governor in the 2013 Bali regional election. The competition led to many conflicts of regional election.

Conflicts became an inseparable part of politics. Politics contains elements that can trigger conflicts such as conflict of interest and constraints of resources and power (Ranney, 1987). The power of the regional head is limited to five-year period. Conflicts of regional elections occur due to limited budget. Budgets are the form of power as well as the source of power (Wildavsky, 2004). Budgets serve as a political tool and are a commitment form of executives as well as the legislative agreement over the use of public funds for particular interest (Mardiasmo, 2009; Setiyono, 2007).

The budget proposal for 2013 Bali regional election absorbed up to IDR 132 billion. Such huge amount of budgets for the regional election led to conflicts of budgets. The conflicts began in the budget planning process, from its practice to its accountability. If illustrated in the table then the conflicts of budget for regional election are seen as in Table 1.1. The conflicts of budgets for Bali regional election occurred due to the excessive individual power from commissioners of the General Elections Commission to the incumbent. The excessive power of commissioners of the Bali Provincial General Elections Commission to replace two structural officials led to the disruption of the Bali Provincial General Elections Commission as a whole. To avoid the conflicts from continuing, some regulations must be change, especially concerning the authority of commissioners of provincial General Election Commission to suggest a replacement of secretary of provincial. The replacement of secretaries of provincial was changed to become the authority of the General Secretary of Central General Election Commission as a direct super-ordinate to the secretary of provincial by paying attention to the Employment Law.

The budgets for regional election sourced from local budget caused conflict of interest especially at the time the incumbent became the candidates of head and deputy head of the region. The incumbent head of region will suppress the organizers of regional election for his sake to win the regional election. The power owned by the incumbent interfered with the independence of the Bali Provincial General Elections Commission. To maintain this independence, the costs of the regional election are financed from national budgets. From the perspective of financial administration, the Central General Elections Commission made some changes in a form of technical guidance of the budget of grants of regional election in the budget. The budget of regional election would then be distributed to each Provincial General Elections Commission that would hold a regional election. That would give the Central General Elections Commission the authority to control the costs of a regional election that could not be done all of those times. The regulation changes over the source of budgets for regional elections and the additional authorities of the General Secretary of the General Elections Commission must be followed by regulators and finance ministers so there are some consistencies with all of the laws and regulations that monitor the regional elections.

This research is limited to the practice of local regional elections in the province of Bali. Although the activities in the practice of general election are almost the same all over Indonesia, each region has different cultures. Therefore, the next research can be expanded by considering the cultures of each region in the regional elections.

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Table 1.1
The Conflicts of Power and Authority of Bali Regional Election Budgets

	Explanation	Super-ordinate	Sub-ordinate
Budget Planning	Budget discussion	Budgeting team of local government	GEC Bali Province
	Honorarium of organizers	GEC Bali Province	City GEC
	Budget of grants approval	Bali Legislative Council	GEC Bali Province
Budget Practice	Signing of DPA	Head of GEC Bali Province	Secretary of GEC Bali Province
	HPS survey team formation	Secretary of GEC Bali Province	Commissioner of GEC Bali Province
	Simple auction	Bali Governmental Procurement	GEC Bali Province
	Structural official replacement	Commissioner of GEC Bali Province; Governor; General Secretary of Central GEC	Secretary of GEC Bali Province
	Procurement of guidebooks	Commissioner of GEC Bali Province	Secretary of GEC Bali Province
	Issues in media	Mass media	GEC Bali Province
	TPS formation	GEC Bali Province	GEC City
	Direct procurement of socialization budgets	Commissioner of socialization division	Secretary of GEC Bali Province
	Cars branding	Head of GEC Bali Province	GEC City
	Ballot designs	4 Commissioners of GEC Bali Province; Central GEC; candidates	Commissioners of finance and logistics division
	Discontinuation of ballots production process	GEC Bali Province	Bali Supervisory Committee
	Public debates	Commissioner of socialization division	Secretary of GEC Bali Province
	Monitoring of voting	Commissioner of socialization division	Secretary of GEC Bali Province
	Registration of candidates	GEC Bali Province	Candidates
	Recapitulation of voting	GEC Bali Province	Candidates
Regional election dispute	Candidates; Constitutional Court; Honorary Election Council	GEC Bali Province	
Budget accountability	Budget of grants investigation	Bali Financial Investigation Bureau	GEC Bali Province

Note. GEC = General Election Commission

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