

The Politicization of Terror in Nigeria: A Reflection on the Niger Delta Militancy and the Boko Haram Terrorism

Chijioko Egwu EKUMAOKO Michael Isu IREMOKO

Abstract

Historical events since the colonial days have built up severe suspicion, sentiment, hatred and anger among the dominant ethnic groups in Nigeria. This has culminated into violence in different forms such as separatist agitations, ethnic cleansing, terrorism, militancy, insurgency, and even kidnapping. This study examines how terror has been politicized in Nigeria, with special reference to the Niger Delta militancy and the Boko Haram terrorism. It uses the Conspiracy Theory and the Stakeholder Theory to portray how violence has been orchestrated and manipulated by political elites to achieve their egoistic political goals. It reveals that for the Delta Niger conflict, the host communities are not seen as stakeholders, their real interests and needs are politicized while there are no coherent strategies to curb the conflict. For the Boko Haram terrorism, it found that, the terrorism is an eternal sectarian, fanatical and fundamentalist conspired movement which has existed before with different names and methods of operation, like the “*Maitatsine*” and can take another nomenclature in the future, having overt religious and covert political colourization. It suggests pragmatic strategies to help put an end to politicization of terror in Nigeria.

Keywords: Boko Haram, Conspiracy, Militancy, Politics, Terrorism

1. Introduction

The Biblical tale of the elephant and the blind men led to various descriptions of the elephant by the blind men. Nigeria because of its hugeness and size makes so many people to have different notions, opinions, assumptions and descriptions concerning her. Sometime ago, a foremost nationalist had described the country as a mere geographical expression. Some other people have the notion that Nigeria is a union of forced marriage between different ethnic groups that do not share cultural traits. Some historically minded, assume that it is one of the evil products and heritages of colonialism that needs urgent visitation or devolution. Others have their own opinion and perception about the country, depending on the side and area they touched and felt it. Apparently, Nigeria as a nation-state since 1960, has woefully failed to develop a deep sense of nationality and statehood among the citizenry. Alas divisive sentiments are deep rooted on different sections, regions and ideologies.

No doubt, Nigeria emanating from colonialism, as an artificial creation which came out of the amalgamation of diverse ethnic nationalities by the British colonialists in 1914, the Nigerian state has faced serious challenges of becoming a stable polity where equity, unity, fairness and justice will characterize the relationships between the disparate groups. Several studies and scholars such as Post (1973), Ekeh (1975), Nnoli (1978), Ayoade (2010) and many others have recorded how the politicization of ethnicity, manipulation of primordial sentiments and such other negative tendencies were exploited by different vested interests particularly during colonial rule and in the immediate post-colonial period. Notably, a common line of argument on most of these studies is that the negative tendencies of marginalization and exclusion by one group against the other, which were continuously manipulated, also compounded the problem of lack of legitimating ideals that has bedeviled Nigeria since its existence. While manipulating and politicizing these negative tendencies of marginalization and exclusion, violence have been a tool and recently surfacing in the forms of insurgency, militancy and terrorism.

Before independence, violence in Nigeria took predominantly ethnic and religious colouration. After 1960, some violence started to have political undertone culminating into terms such as ethno-political violence. The violence that followed the annulment of the 1993 presidential election is significantly ethno-political. However, being ethno-political posits that ethnic sentiment is a major cause of violence in Nigeria and as such almost every violence political or religious is often attached to ethnocentrism. Sometimes, especially in the Northern region, violence result on a tripod of ethnic, religious and political reasons. Often too, in the north, ethno-religious violence is too devastating than politically motivated violence.

Since 1999, with the return of civilian democratic rule in Nigeria, insecurity and violence have become a big challenge. Traceably insecurity in present Nigeria is a colonial heritage of manipulation of primordial ethnic sentiments. The inability of Nigerian state to skew system that ensures justice, equity and inclusiveness coupled with the politicization of terror provides a favourable ground for violence. The Niger Delta militancy is a product of these feelings of marginalization and exclusion from a common national wealth deposited at their back yard. The idea of being a minority and being marginally represented in governmental affairs has been unduly politicized with violence as a tool. For the same unsafe political sentiments, the Boko Haram terrorism sprang as a result of a misperception of some Northern elders who feel that they have been out-schemed politically *vis-à-vis* enjoying and controlling the state proceeds from the Niger Delta oil. Terrible killings and violence became a

political tool to regain power back to the North.

2. Theoretical Underpinning

2.1 Conspiracy Theory

Conspiracy theory remains one of the vaguest concepts to define within the academia. Even though historians, philosophers, cultural theorists and political scientists have theorized about the phenomenon conspiracy theory, they have achieved little consensus. Scholars differ significantly about the shape and extent of conspiracy theories, as well as their relationship to clinical paranoia and criminal conspiracy. The term “conspiracy theory” was first used in the 1920s (Knight 2000: 16) but did not enter common usage until after the second world war, when philosopher Karl Popper used the phrase to describe what he felt was a particularly dangerous pitfall for the social sciences. By late 1950s and early 1960s, conspiracy theory had gained the full attention of the American scholarly community.

Indeed, the academic literature on conspiracy theory is thin, and most of it falls into one of two classes. First the work by analytic philosophers, especially in epistemology and the philosophy of science, that asks what counts as a “conspiracy theory” and whether such theories are methodologically suspect (Coady 2006; Graumann and Moscovici 1987). The second class is a smattering of work in sociology and Freudian psychology on the causes of conspiracy theorizing (Barkun 2003; Pipes 1997). Both approaches have received criticism, the former because the conceptual questions are both less tractable and less interesting than the social and institutional ones, the latter because it neglects newer work in social psychology and behavioural economics, both of which shed light on the causes of conspiracy theorizing.

Conspiracy theory are political or cultural narratives that describe a group or an institution as secretly plotting to assume or exercise illegitimate power over a larger group of people, using covert methods and pursuing goals that are presented as detrimental to the victim group. Typically, but not necessarily, the alleged conspirators operate behind a cover of legitimacy or benevolence, they target a nation, a state, a culture, a religion or even the entire world as their victims. It involves multiple agents, working together in secret in order to realize hidden goals that are malevolent or unlawful (Zonis & Joseph, 1994). However, most conspiracy theories could have serious negative societal consequences. Belief in conspiracy theories appears to be a “slippery slope” where belief in one theory often leads to espousal of other conspiracy theories, irrespective of their consistency with one another. This is characteristics of a “monological” or self-supporting belief system in which explanations about world events are processed not according to rational deliberation of the evidence but rather in terms of their consistency with a larger conspiratorial worldview (Dagnall, Drinkwater, Parker, Denovan, & Parton, 2015; Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Vaughan, 2013; Wood, Douglas & Sutton 2012).

Goertzel (1994) reported that belief in conspiracies was associated with low levels of trust and high levels of anomie, and such beliefs enabled people to externalize their negative/angry feelings and provide them with “enemies” on which to vent such feelings. For the conspirators, their goals range from personal gain to controlling the course of history, and their methods might include everything from the dismantling of individual liberties to the assassination of dissidents and from the assumption of political or economic power all the way to mind-control and genocide. Terrorism-related theories are thus a crucial testing ground for the significance, causes and policy implications of widespread conspiracy theorizing.

Conspiracy theories serve a number of functions. In some cases, it can be used to express suspicion and anger toward a dominant group or to express frustration with perceived powerlessness within society. This is typical of the Nigerian situation. Historical events since the colonial days have built up severe suspicion and anger among the dominant ethnic groups in the country. The January, 1966 coup d’etat added fervour to the conspiracy as the coup was termed an Igbo coup and the July, 1966 coup is considered nothing but a counter coup and obviously a conspiracy of the north. The annulment of the 1993 presidential election has been perceived as a calculated conspiratorial effort of the north to perpetuate the northern oligarchic agenda in Nigeria. This perception is especially expressed by the south western region. Following the circumstance that ushered in Goodluck Jonathan to ascend the presidency, his recalcitrant refusal to relinquish power to the north in 2011, the security challenges of Boko Haram in the north east, his obstinate insistence of contesting the 2015 elections and his eventual defeat in the election have received no valid explanation other than a well schemed conspiracy of the north. In this paper, conspiracy theory is used to explain the politics of Boko Haram phenomenon in Nigeria.

2.2 Stakeholder Theory

Stakeholder theory is used to offer explanation for the continued lingering conflict and agitation in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The stakeholder theory is a theory of organizational management and business ethics that addresses morals and values in managing an organization. Apart from the organizational businesses, it can be used to sufficiently explain conflict situations between and among stakeholders in conflict especially when the conflict pertains to allocation of values (economic, social or political) and the justification of such allocations (the ethical moral stance). According to Richard Edward Freeman who is regarded as the father of stakeholder

theory (Laplume, Sonpar & Litz 2008), the purpose of a business is to create as much value as possible for stakeholders in order to succeed and be sustained in the business over a long time. Freeman (1984: 46) defines a stakeholder in an organization as any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives. He credited Standard Research Institute (SRI) as the first to mention the term stakeholder in an internal memo in 1963. SRI defined stakeholder as those groups without whose support the organization would cease to exist (Freeman 1984).

In the traditional view of a company, the shareholder view, only the owners or shareholders of the company are important, and the company has a binding fiduciary duty to put their needs first, to increase value for them. Stakeholder theory instead argues that there are other parties involved, including employees, customers, suppliers, financiers, host communities, governmental bodies, political groups, trade associations and trade unions. Even competitors are sometimes counted as stakeholders because they are capable to affect the firm and its stakeholders. The introduction of stakeholder theory wraps up the progress from ethics in general, via ethics in business and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) to a management strategy. Donaldson and Preston (1995) point out that no priority of one set of interest prevails over another that is the company's interest are not more important than an individual stakeholder group's.

Stakeholder theory looks at the relationships between an organization and others in its internal and external environment. It also looks at these connections that influence how the business conducts its activities. The core idea of stakeholder theory is that organizations that manage their stakeholder relationships effectively will survive longer and perform better than organizations that don't. Freeman suggests that organizations should develop certain stakeholder competencies such as making a commitment to monitor stakeholder interests; developing strategies to effectively deal with stakeholders and their concerns; dividing and categorizing interests into manageable segments and ensuring that organizational functions address the needs of stakeholders. If these competencies are not met, there is bound to be conflict among the stakeholders or between stakeholder(s) and the organization. Without these competencies also, the organization may not perform efficiently and effectively thus may not endure the competitive environment of business world.

Stakeholder theory focuses on the jointness of stakeholder interest rather than solely on the trade-offs that sometimes have to be made. It does not deny that such trade-offs are necessary, but suggests that they also represent opportunities to think beyond trade-offs to a question of value creation. In a stakeholder model, therefore, the theory of value creation implies that all those who create or capture value, or who in their relationship with the organization assume risks, either inside or outside; directly or indirectly, or those who suffer the impact of the organization's externalities or misinformation (host community, environment, future generation, or society at large), must be considered as stakeholders at least for the purpose of value distribution. If this be the case, the following questions become pertinent viz:

- a. Do oil companies within the Niger Delta recognize and accord Niger Delta communities the status of stakeholder in their business activities?
- b. Is there enough commitment by the oil companies and the Federal Government to monitor and ascertain the interests and needs of the Niger Delta communities as stakeholders?
- c. What plans and strategies do the oil companies have to effectively deal with the concerns, needs and interests of the Niger Delta communities as stakeholders?
- d. Is there any forum uniting all the stakeholders that serves or can serve as a platform for communication, discussion and dialogue of issues of common interest and value?

3. A Prevue of the Niger Delta Militancy in Nigeria

Militancy in the Niger Delta region precedes formal colonialism, crude oil discovery and Nigerian independence. Historians (Ayodele 1999; Hargreaves 1996, Tamuno 1999) have traced the era of militancy in the Niger Delta to the time of Jaja of Opobo, Ovonramwem N'Ogbaisi of Benin establishing that the British interest in the Niger Delta or Oil Rivers goes back to 1851 earlier before the 1885 proclamation of the region as a British protectorate. The militancy at this era emanated from the struggle for wealth control especially control of the trade in oil palm and other commodities.

From the demand of oil palm to the discovery of crude oil in August 1956 at Oloibiri, Bayelsa State led to new events and new context of militancy. By 1967 there were already twenty-four oil fields as Faleti (2013:44) states that oil and gas is the mainstay of Nigeria's economy contributing approximately 40% of GDP, about 90% of total earnings and about 80% of the gross national income of the Nigerian state. The inception of oil exploration created new hopes for massive development both for the region and the entire country. Unfortunately, the joy has become dysphoria as the natural endowed blessing has turned into a curse causing poverty and agony to the people. The Niger Delta's natural habitat (land and water) has been polluted and depleted that it cannot support the livelihood of the local population. Because of these misgivings, the Niger Deltans have employed a plethora of means to decry their plight which include dialogue, petition, civil litigations and now militant agitation.

In the 1990s, the conflict went international with the emergence of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the activities of his group, Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP). For Ken Saro-Wiwa, it was a struggle and quest for self-determination as Naanen (1995) and Osaghae (1997) argue in similar view that the crisis is a struggle against colonialism and minority agitation for a fair deal in a negatively skewed federalism. The arrest and death of the activist Ken Saro-Wiwa gave the Niger Delta struggle more fervour and enthusiastic feelings which propelled vast reactions leading to springing up of many militant groups. According to Ikelegbe (2010:32)

The turning point in the transformation of demands into political and volatile ones and in the militant agitation for the demands was the Kaiama Declaration of December 1998 made by Ijaw youths. It was this declaration that put resource control in the front burner. It also was the commencement point of militant agitation and militia formation and engagements.

In vituperation and vociferation of their grievances, the Niger Delta people have utilized both non-violent and violent measures. Non-violent strategies appear in the form of dialogue, litigation and protests. Ogbogbo (2005:174) recorded instances of cases where individuals and even some Ogoni communities went to court to claim adequate compensation from Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) in respect of damages resulting from an oil spill from Shell. Non-violent protests, boycotts and stoppages have also been used by the people to demand for their right. Sometimes these protests have received violent response from the government leading to destruction of property and loss of lives. Having not achieved much, the peaceful strategies were seen as useless thereby paving the way for violence and militancy in the area.

The government on its part has also responded in non-violent and violent ways in addressing the Niger Delta issue. Unfortunately both measures have achieved very little in addressing the underlying root causes of the conflict hence making it protracted and intractable. Non-violent responses from the government include setting up of committees and commissions, creation of ministry of the Niger Delta and the Amnesty programme. Such commissions include Niger Delta Development Board (NDDDB) in 1961, Niger Delta Basin Development Authority in 1976, Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Fund Committee in 1986, Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1992, and Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000. Apart from these commissions different committees have been set up to fathom durable solutions to the Niger Delta Problem. They include Belgore Report 1992, Don Etiebet Report 1994, Popoola Report 1998, Ogomudia Report 2001 and the Report of the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta headed by Barr. Ledum Mitee, in November, 2008 among other reports relating to the Niger Delta published by the United Nations and some non-governmental organizations. The ministry of Niger Delta was created in 2008 to work hand in hand with the NDDC in developing the area.

Violent responses include the use of military in attacking the people. Such military actions include the military clampdown of Isaac Adaka Boro revolt in 1966 (Faleti, 2013:44); the Umuechem Massacre of 1990 (Suber, 1996); the Ogoni Genocide (The News, May 1993; Suberu 1996); the Odi Massacre of 1999 (Aghalino 2009); Odioma Destruction of 2005 (Faleti 2013:50) and Gbaramatu Massacre of 2009 (Adebayo 2009) which has generally been nicknamed total crackdown. In these murderous military expeditions worthy of International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecution, properties and lives were not only lost but many were raped, maimed, defaced, mutilated, displaced or forced into exile. Moreover the federal government has constituted Joint Task Force (JTF) of the military, police and other security agencies branded with different names to unleash untold terror on the people. Some of the Joint Task Force (JTF) Operations include Operation HAKURI II for Ijaw Kaiama Declaration, December 1998 – January 1999; Operation RESTORE HOPE 2003 – 2009; Operation FLUSHOUT III 2004 – 2009; Operation RESTORE HOPE II 2009 – 2011 (Ogbogbo 2012: 351-354).

These military operations have not achieved any tangible objective towards assuaging the miseries of the people. Unfortunately the Nigerian state sees the Niger Delta crisis as a security problem and not underdevelopment and marginal representation issue. This explains why the response of the government and the TNOCs led by Shell to the crisis is severe repression, suppression, subjugation and inhumane. Even the present Amnesty programme does not seem to achieve the desired result. After his analysis, Ekumaoko (2013a: 8) subtly submits, “the truth is that amnesty has failed to address the core root causes of the Niger Delta grievances”. Alas the amnesty is on-going but the grievances are still taunting and hunting the people without any solution in view. The unaddressed plight of the Niger Delta people is aptly described in the words of Ikelegbe (2010) *inter alia*:

The grievances of the region have been numerous. These have included disinheritance by federal government laws, loss of control over their resources, marginalization in the oil economy, marginality within the Nigerian federation and militarization and repression through the military and security agencies. In relation to the TNOCs, the region complains of environmental pollution, mistreatment, poor compensation practices, poor benefits, unfulfilled promises, failures to implement memoranda of understanding and inadequate employment and representation. Other grievances are the poverty, deprivation, high youth unemployment and hopelessness,

the location of head offices of TNOCs outside the region and the takeover of oil benefits and oil blocks by non-indigenes of the region (p. 31).

4. A Synopsis of Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria

Almost everything about Boko Haram is cloaked in controversy ranging from its name, its origin, ideology and philosophy, its operations and even leadership composition. Some believe its first name was Sahaba, some called it Yusufiyya sect, some Khawaarji sect and yet others called them Jama'atul Takful Wal Hyra Ahlus Sunna. Officially the sect identifies themselves as *Jama'atul Ahlis Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal-Jihad* "..... جماعة أهل نة - "والجه .. لل اد الس دعوة Jihad". However the term "Boko Haram" comes from the Hausa word "boko" meaning "western education" and the Arabic word "haram" figuratively meaning "sin" literally "forbidden". The name translated from Hausa means "western education is forbidden" which the group earned because of their strong aversion to western ways and culture.

The Boko Haram violence started in July, 2009 but they are attacks associated to them as far back as 2003. Its origin has been traced to several decades back and even beyond going to centuries. Raheem (2012:36) argues that the roots of Boko Haram lie in the Islamic history of northern Nigeria, in which for some 800 years powerful sultanates centred round the Hausa cities close to Kano and the sultanate of Borno...constituted high Muslim civilization. In a more recent date, the origin of Boko Haram goes back to some four decades before its attacks in 2009 that ravaged six northern states. Danjibo (2009) tracing the origin of Boko Haram concluded that it is the product of "Maitatsine" doctrine or a brand of Islamic zealots and fundamentalists introduced to northern Nigeria in 1945 and that Maitatsine riot of 1980 and Boko Haram of 2009 were linked to the failure of governance in Nigeria. Similarly, Ousman (2004) pointed out that Boko Haram is a worldwide Islamic movement and militancy which resurgence in 1999 in Nigeria occurred when power shifted from Muslim military rulers of the north to Christian civilian rulers in the south. To understand the political and economic dimension of Boko Haram lies in exploring the nexus between the "Maitatsine" and "Boko Haram" sects (see Danjibo 2009; Tamuno 1991; Isichei 1987). Whatever be the remote origin of Boko Haram, its origin to this present era is aligned to 2009 the time it got prominence with its violent activities against the government and its facilities.

The philosophy and ideology of Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf and his sect are inherent in their notorious nickname "Boko Haram" which they earned due to their activities informed by their beliefs. Basically the idea and belief of the group is to purify Islam which they so much believe has been corrupted by western culture and civilization. The group considers anything western as an aberration and completely unislamic. Danjibo (2009:7) succinctly says "the ideology and philosophy of the movement can best be understood by explicating the two words 'boko' and 'haram'...the intent is to replace modern state with Islamic values". The sect's belief is that ills and problems in the society today emanate from the practice of worthless western cultures and the only panacea for the society is the establishment of an Islamic society. To this end, the philosophical ideology is the entrenchment of the Shari'a law in Nigeria. Ekumaoko (2013b) contends that ideologically Boko Haram teaches their members that anybody who fought and died for the cause of an Islamic/Shari'a state by destroying modern state formation and government establishment would automatically gain "Aljanna" (paradise or heaven). He further asserts that the philosophical belief of Boko Haram is too deep rooted that their killings and bombings are not perceived as wrong doing. This explains the reason why security formations and government properties became the target of destruction by the sect. Tell Magazine aptly captured their ideology and philosophy in the following words:


The mission of the sect was to establish an Islamic state where 'orthodox Islam' is practiced. Orthodox Islam according to him (Mohammed Yusuf, leader of the sect) frowns at western education and working in the civil service because it is sinful. Hence, for their aim to be achieved, all institutions represented by government including security agencies like police, military and other uniform personnel should be crushed (Tell, August 10, 2009, p.34).

The philosophical ideology of Boko Haram to an extent impacts on their modes and methods of operation. This is evident first in the targets of their destruction and secondly in the strategies applied in the attacks. The method of operation of Boko Haram has shaped its identity and made it to stand out among other Nigerian Islamic radical groups. Raheem (2012:46) posits that the group conducted its operations more or less peacefully during the first seven years of its existence. However the situation changed in 2009 when the Nigerian government decided to investigate the group's activities following alleged reports of the group's involvement in arm's deal. Okpaga, Ugwu and Eme (2012:83) aver that "at first Boko Haram was involved mostly in fermenting sectarian violence. Its adherents participated in simple attacks on Christians using clubs, machetes and small arms". Their method of attack within this era however was simple and on soft targets.

However the violence became deadly as a result of the controversy between Boko Haram and the Nigeria security forces on who launched attack against the other first. Also the extra-judicial killing of the sect's leader

Mohammed Yusuf prompted senseless and rash violence. Since then Boko Haram appears to have neither a clear operational base nor a clearly defined leader representing the interest of the whole sect. by late 2010, following more repressive initiatives by the government, Boko Haram added Molotov cocktails, and simple Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) to its tactical repertoire. This operational advancement was tested in the series of small IEDs deployed against Christian targets in Jos, Plateau state, on Christmas Eve 2010 and afterwards. According to Human Rights Watch Report cited in Adetunmbi (2014), more than 700 people have been killed in 40 separate attacks by the Boko Haram insurgents in 2014 alone. Their operational mode deepened including the employment of suicide bombers, suicide Vehicle-Born Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) which the group used to assault the military barracks. This operational advancement drew international attention to the group making many analysts (Stewart, 2012; Adeyemi, 2012; Adesoji, 2010; Alao and Uwom, 2012) to presume and believe that Boko Haram has link with al Qarda in the Islamic Maghreb in northern Africa, Ansar Dine in Mali or from Al Shabaab in Somalia or other places.

Reported civilian deaths by Boko Haram, Sept 2010-Jan 2015



Note: Fatalities up to 10 Jan, includes provisional 150 deaths for attack on Baga

Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, created by Prof Clionadh Raleigh, Uni of Sussex

Fig.1. Report of killing by Boko Haram

5. The Terror and Politics of Shari'a Law and President Obasanjo's Second Term Bid

Shari'a is a system of Islamic law based on four main sources: the Qur'an (God's revelation to the Prophet Mohammed); the *Sunna*, or actions of the prophet, described in the *Hadith*, the *Qiyas* or process of analogical reasoning based on understanding of the principles of the *Qur'an* or the *Hadith*, and the *Ijma*, or consensus of opinion among Islamic scholars. Islam has been practiced in Nigeria since around the eleventh century, and *Shari'a* has been applied in the northern part of the country before, during and since the colonial period (Ostien, 2003). It has been in force at least since the Islamic *jihad* led by Shehu Uthman Dan Fodio and the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate in 1804. However, some studies have argued that it was established even earlier in Kanem Borno (in the present day northeastern Nigeria and southern Chad). Although according to Kukah (2003), it was in 1979 that non-Muslims outside the north appeared to have heard of the Shari'a for the first time. Starting in 1999, after Nigeria returned to civilian multi-party rule, northern Nigerian states began to implement what politicians called "full" Shari'a, or Islamic law. New penal codes included corporal punishments for crimes mentioned in the *Qur'an*. The codes also drew on centuries of Muslim legal scholarship, especially from a particular Islamic perspective. However, the extension to criminal law has had wide-ranging consequences and has opened up complex political and religious debates.

In October 1999, Governor Ahmed Yerima Sani took Nigeria by storm when he declared that Zamfara State, to the leadership of which he had been sworn in on 29 May that year, was an Islamic state and would henceforth apply Shari'a law, not just for personal matters, but in criminal and social matters as well. The circumstances that led to this declaration have become swiftly overlaid with myth and counter-myth but particularly the

political undertone is no myth. While the governor insists that it was part of his campaign manifesto, other contends that it would have been illegal to campaign on a religious platform under Nigeria's electoral rules. Unfortunately the wave of popular support that this unleashed made it impossible for Governor Yarima to turn back, even if he wanted to, and the politician who can resist riding the crest of popularity is a rare animal indeed. This was vindicated by the way that one after the other, the Governors of other northern states with majority Muslim populations also embraced the extension of Shari'a. Even the religiously lukewarm could see the political advantage and popular support positioning themselves as champions of Islam at a time when Olusegun Obasanjo, a southerner claiming to be "born again Christian" was ruling Nigeria after twenty years' rule by northern Muslim soldiers. By the end of 2001, criminal Shari'a law had been introduced in Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto and Yobe States. *Shari'a* implementation caused conflict resulting to violence in Kano, Kaduna and some other places.

The hitherto existing tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims became suddenly aggravated by the introduction of Shari'a and its perceived political significance. The most dramatic violent events were the explosion of violence between Muslims and Christians in Kaduna state in February and April 2000. More than 2,000 people are said to have died in the attack, following a debate around the proposed introduction of Shari'a into Kaduna State. The 2000 Kaduna riots shocked Nigerians of all faiths and prompted the federal government to hold talks with northern state governors to seek ways of averting further religious violence. Atubi (2007) avers that:

The anti-Shari'a demonstration by Christians on 21st February, 2000 led to a major conflict between the two groups, resulting in massive killings of people on both sides, the destruction of religious buildings, general arson, and destruction of property. The scale of the massacre and destruction was very high and thousands of people were reported to have been slaughtered like rams. The Kaduna conflict demonstrated the fundamental problem created by the adoption of the Shari'a legal system. There was insecurity of life among Christian minority groups in the state. Many people, on both sides, called for partition of Nigeria, rather than adoption and abandonment of the Shari'a system. The Kaduna religious crisis led to retaliatory killings and burning of mosques in Abia and Owerri, in which Igbo youth targeted northerners who they accused of killing their kith in the North.

The controversies of implementing Shari'a raged on and took violent dimensions again in 2002 prelude to the 2003 general elections. Just like since the beginning, the federal government has adopted a passive attitude towards the introduction of Shari'a. Even at the height of controversy surrounding the issue, it has opted to look the other way, hoping the issue would one day wither away. The federal government has also refrained from taking a position on whether the extension of Shari'a to criminal law is compatible with the Nigerian constitution. The federal government's unwillingness to intervene can be explained principally by political considerations: in 1999, President Olusegun Obasanjo, a Yoruba Christian from the southwest of Nigeria, was elected in large part thanks to the northern, predominantly Muslim vote, and he remains unwilling to openly antagonize northern politicians or alienate public opinion in the north. Moreover, the general elections were close by, and the president cautious not to attract the anger of the northern political elites against his second term bid remained more adamant than before. The president, however, anxious not to offend Muslim sensitivities, refused to be "stampeded" into hasty condemnation, as he continued to pursue his political agenda in the face of Shari'a terrorism. Danjibo (2012: 313) captured the terror and politics of Shari'a under Obasanjo's presidency thus:

The point to note here is that the Nigerian state under Obasanjo would not have folded its arms and watched a minority group declare state laws that run contrary to the Nigerian constitution without paying heavily for it even if by force of arms. Obasanjo deliberately refused to constitutionally and politically take any action for the fear that he would lose support of the Muslims and Hausa-Fulani in the north since he nursed the ambition to run again as President during 2003 general elections. But in order to curry favour from the Muslims and Hausa-Fulani in northern Nigeria, Obasanjo turned a blind eye as thousands of Nigerians lost their lives and property during the Shari'a crisis.

6. Niger Delta Militancy and the Stakeholder Politics

In peace and conflict studies, stakeholder analysis is categorized into three types which are primary stakeholders, secondary stakeholders and shadow party stakeholders. The primary stakeholders are those physically identified with a problem. They are directly involved in the conflict and are affected directly whether positively or negatively by the conflict. The secondary stakeholders are the persons or groups that have a relationship with the primary stakeholders. The relationship between primary and secondary stakeholders is the transaction and their interests, which in most cases are not usually the same. Shadow party stakeholders are somewhat like secondary

stakeholders having their relationship also with the primary stakeholders as well as different interests. The difference lies that shadow party stakeholders operate covertly or behind the scene. They do not want their faces to be seen and can be at anywhere using resources and power to mobilize and instigate conflict.


Within the Niger Delta conflict context, the primary stakeholders are however, the federal and state governments in Nigeria, the Trans-National Oil Companies (TNOCs) in the region and the host communities. Apart from shadow party stakeholders whose operations are clandestine, other stakeholders are secondary such the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), International Organizations and Development Partners, the media, environmental and human rights activists, the academia, political elites and other international personalities. However, using the stakeholder theory shows that the interest of these stakeholders vary and no effort has been made to jointly discuss, agree and reach consensus on the differing stakeholder interests and needs.

Considering the interest and position of the different stakeholders considering security in the Niger Delta region, there are varying positions. Ibeanu described this situation as “a contradiction of securities” and attempted to explain that the perception of what constitutes security to the state and the oil companies is markedly different from the perception that the people of the oil producing communities have. While the state and the oil companies perceive security in terms of carrying out the oil exploration activities without being interrupted in any form; not minding the effects of their operations on the inhabitants of the communities in which they operate and the environment, the people of the oil-producing communities view security as the possibility and capacity that their livelihood and environment are not threatened or impoverished as a consequence of oil exploration activities in their area (Ibeanu, 2005).

Within this same vein, Ukeje also stated that the most fundamental basis of the conflict between the Nigerian state and communities in the Delta is the contradictory condition of security they project. For the forces that control the Nigerian state (state officials and petro-business) national security, which they say takes precedence over everything else, means an uninterrupted production of crude oil at ‘competitive prices’. This is their paramount concern irrespective of impacts on local inhabitants and environment. On the part of the local people, in the Niger Delta and their organizations the condition for security is the maintenance of the carrying capacity of the environment. Security for them is the recognition that an unsustainable exploitation of crude oil with its devastation of farmland and fishing waters threatens resource flows and livelihoods. The people in the host oil communities of the Niger Delta region, who largely survive on agriculture, want the protection of their lands for this is their major source of live livelihood.

The Niger Delta conflict has lingered because some traditional primary stakeholders in the conflict have not been accorded their right place. While some categories of stakeholders require special attention in mediating resource conflicts due to their vulnerabilities linked to natural resource exploitation or capacity to influence a wider group, observations show that certain stakeholders are not traditionally included in decision-making concerning their affairs (United Nations Department of Political Affairs and United Nations Environment Programme, 2015). The failure by all stakeholders to address the underlying causes of the conflict and to opt for long term solutions has pushed the Niger Delta to the brink of an internationally important conflict. The response to this mounting conflict to date has been buying off the leaders of violence at a local and regional level. Unfortunately, this approach has failed and will continue to fail because for every individual that is bought off there are 50 others ready to take his place and commit a greater level of violence in order to justify their own pay off. This cannot continue if thousands of lives are not to be lost.

Therefore, violence seems to be a more attractive and acceptable option for many of today's disengaged and disenchanted youths. The increasing demand from the Niger Delta communities to achieve greater social, economic and political equality will assist to rebalance the asymmetry of negotiating power and to ensure that the communities within the Niger Delta get a better deal from the investments and operations that affect their lives, livelihoods and environment. As have been argued elsewhere, the amnesty programme failed to address the root causes of the conflict and the scheme became a venture to buy off militant leaders with huge sums of money and juicy contracts (see Ekumaoko, 2013a). The resurgence of the militancy after the 2015 elections which produced a northerner as Nigeria's president shows that the conflict has once again become a political tool. Many of the region's elites who feel aggrieved and short changed by the new government have leaned on conflict to multiply violence thereby politicizing terror.



Source: Adams (2014: 15)

Fig.2. The chart above shows that between 2006 and 2014, oil production activities led to violence in the Niger Delta with over 1,550 recorded deaths.

7. Boko Haram and the Northern Conspiracy against Southern Presidency

The turning of Boko Haram into a violent sect in 2009 underscores the explanation of northern conspiracy against southern Presidency. Many reasons are attributed to this as have been analysed by some scholars (Adibe 2012; 2014; Hassan 2013). While some scholars have politically analysed the Boko Haram insurgency attributing it to the conspiracy of the northern politicians in their effort to return power to the north others have denied such possibility. However it is the position of this paper to align itself with scholars that see Boko Haram emergence as a political calculation and conspiracy of the northern political elements to restore power back to the north as some explanations are made hereunder.

For the advocates of northern conspiracy as the explanation for the emergence of Boko Haram, historical events have been valuably utilized. They posit that during the long notorious absent of President Umaro Yar’Adua, the Vice President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan was ostensibly prevented to access power in the capacity of acting President by some northern cabals. Despite the provisions of section 145 of the 1999 constitution which mandates that for the President to proceed on leave for whatever reasons, he or she must transmit a letter to that effect to the National Assembly to enable the Vice President assume office as Acting President; this provision became politicized resulting to a legal quagmire. It was not until it became obvious that Senate President David Mark and his loyalists in the senate had lost control over the majority that he decided to act by invoking the “Doctrine of Necessity” to make Vice President Goodluck Jonathan an Acting President on 9 February, 2010. Following the People’s Democratic Party’s zoning formula, the northern politicians argued vehemently that they still have the right to occupy Aso Rock for more four years. The decision of President Goodluck Jonathan to run for the election in 2011 created ill-feelings and enormous animosity among the northern political elites who felt they have been short-changed in the scheme of things. In their ploy to discredit President Jonathan and bring power back to the north, the Boko Haram was infused and instilled to mastermind violent actions.

However, some scholars (Jibrin 2014; Muhammed 2014; Nda-Isaish 2014, Haruna 2014) who do not share the same opinion have argued that the Boko Haram sect have been in existence long before the President

Jonathan's administration. They further posit that their presence have been known during President Olusegun Obasanjo's time in 2002. They also think it irrational for politicians to inflict violence on their constituencies in order to merely discredit a government at the centre and seize political power. In fact, some of them have subtly alleged that the President Jonathan's government is the sponsor of the sect which it does with the hope of pointing accusing finger on his perceived enemies from the north and gaining sympathy from his southern brothers.

Considering their arguments, the fact remains that the Boko Haram sect is a child brain of the northern political elites. It is true that Boko Haram precedes President Jonathan's government but it only became violent in June, 2009 and murderously deadly in May, 2010 after he became the substantive President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. In 2011 and 2012, the violent activities of the sect was at its apogee as an expression of annoyance and misgiving of the northern politicians against a southern Presidency headed by Jonathan, a mere southerner from Ijaw minority ethnic group. Therefore, the post-2011 election violence in parts of the north, did not only symbolize a rejection of the polls result and/or Goodluck Jonathan/a Christian southerner's Presidency, but was also a precursor to the dastardly bombings and mayhem unleashed by the sect. The campaign of violence by the Boko Haram is the corresponding in intensity which marked the grievance of northern political elites after the 2011 general elections in Nigeria. Apart from anger against President Jonathan for violating his party's power rotation arrangement, while international observers viewed the April 2011 general polls in which President Jonathan emerged victorious as credible, many Nigerians, especially in the north, did not.

To interpret the terror attacks as orchestrated attempts to undermine President Jonathan is to say the least, and thus qualifies them as political violence intended for the "transformations either within structures of political authority or within economic and/or social system" (Midlarsky 1975). There remains a need, however, to examine the Boko Haram crisis in terms of its implications for the 2015 presidential election in historical and contemporary context, considering the bickering conspiratorial agenda of the north. The intensity of violence rose as the election approached that the election dates had to be shifted in line with intelligence report about an imminent security breaches by the Boko Haaram. However by April 2015, the bombings of the sect drastically waned because they were now sure that the "Ijaw Boy" has lost the election and their Fulani brother was warming up to occupy the "looters' chair". Boko Haram has vanished because the purpose it was to serve has been achieved. The questions to ask are: did the Federal Government under President Muhammadu Buhari acquire new sophisticated weapons that Nigeria never had? How many people were enlisted into the Nigerian army that they subdued Boko Haram in less than two months? How many Boko Haram insurgents have been killed since President Buhari arrived that their power has waned and collapsed so quickly? What are the magical counter-insurgency strategies and methods that the Nigerian army used to win Boko Haram in two months that they did not have since 2009?

As many as the questions prod their heads, some vituperations of some northern politicians like Adam Ciroma, Atiku Abubakar and Muhammadu Buhari and their supporters during the 2011 presidential campaign were crystal clear that they politicized terror and violence as a means to clinch on to power. It was these speeches that made many believe that these men were the sponsors, cohorts and architects behind Boko Haram terrorism. For instance, Adamu Ciroma, chairman of the Northern Political Leaders Forum stated thus, "we are extremely worried at our party's failure to deliver justice (stop Jonathan) may ignite a series of events, the scope and magnitude of which we can neither proximate nor contain (The Guardian, September 17, 2010). The north seemed united to fight for what they regarded as "tenure robbery" as ambiguous and inciting statements were coming from different quarters from the north. The supporters of former Vice President Atiku Abubakar made a questionable statement which the law enforcement agency till today has paid deaf ears and failed to interrogate. They vituperated:

Nigerians do not want a peaceful change. We wish to state that we support the position of our mentor, Turaki Atiku Abubakar, that what Nigeria needs is not a peaceful change. This is no threat. Boko Haram will be a child's play compared with the action our members can take. We have been patient enough. And enough, they say, is enough (The Guardian, 15 Dec, 2010).

Of course, Boko Haram menace described as a child's play after the 2011 elections mature into "adult play" as it quadrupled in intensity of violence, who knows if these supporters of Atiku Abubakar got enlisted into the sect all in order to achieve the whims of their mentor. Despite his zealous campaigns, Mohammadu Buhari never visited the south-east, in one of his campaign rallies in the north, he once advised his supporters "you should not leave the polling centres until votes are counted and the winner declared and you should lynch anybody that tries to tinker with the votes (The Guardian, 3 March, 2011). Another northern group incisively posited that "anything short of a Northern president is tantamount to stealing our presidency. Jonathan has to go and he will go. If he uses the incumbency power to get his nomination on the PDP, he would be frustrated out. If he emerges president... the north is determined... to make the country ungovernable for Jonathan or any other southerner who finds his way to the seat of power (The Guardian, October, 2010). There were many instances pointing to

the northern political elite's conspiracy against a southern Presidency at this time that the media became a podium of campaign threats, abusive, intemperate and slanderous insinuations, innuendoes and warnings. Pastor Tunde Bakare being agitated by threats from northerner politicians warned that "there would be 'Wild Wild North' if the elections were rigged" (The Guardian, March 2011).

Considering these, one cannot but agree that Boko Haram is a well calculated and politicized terror to wrestle power from the south. The Presidency is back to the north and Boko Haram has headed towards hibernation into its shells awaiting any moment a southerner may become a President again. There is no stringent effort President Buhari has made that is capable of wiping Boko Haram within the short time and in the manner it has wended away. All these point to one fact that since a north President is here, therefore, there is no need to fight for the course of the fight has been achieved.

8. Looking Ahead and What Hope for the Future

Nigeria apparently seems to be at a cross road, with deep dilemma on the right path to tow. This situation is exacerbated by wounds after wounds the country has experienced since 1960. The two coup d'état of 1966; the pogrom and the civil war of 1967 to 1970; the subsequent coups; the annulment of the 1993 presidential election and many other ugly political developments have negatively been perceived by one ethnic group as a ploy by the other group(s) to marginalize, subdue, suppress, and dominate the rest of the country. Unfortunately nobody can claim that these ill-feelings are unfounded because violence in Nigeria is a trading commodity between and among different ethnic groups. Consequently, Nigeria has remained divided, underdeveloped, impoverished and chairs the comity of beggar nation-states at the international arena.

These sentiments are too deep rooted and the dividing lines are too strong cutting across religion, ethnicity, tribal and political spheres. The discord between and among ethnic nationalities of Nigeria is a factor that breeds suspicion, intolerance, feelings of fear and subjugation which triggers violence at the slightest provocation. The situation in Nigeria is attributable to a keg of gun powder waiting for the slightest spark of light to be ignited for explosion. This level of poverty is increasingly growing on daily basis while the government of the day is demonstrating adequate evidence of ineptness, inefficacy and recklessness. Without mincing words, the future of Nigeria is starkly dark with uncertainty lurking about. There is need for urgent intervention by every stakeholder in order to salvage the situation.

Nigeria needs a review of her constitution to reflect and accommodate the wishes and aspirations of the diverse ethnic people. This will be with effort towards reconstituting the arrangement of the provisions of federalism.

Poverty, hunger, poor standard of living and corruption are all issues that provide a fertile ground for conflict and violence. This is very true when it comes to the youths who the economy has not engaged meaningfully and is readily available for exploitation.

For the Niger Delta conflict, the passage of Petroleum Industry Bill will make the oil communities stakeholders in the oil economy and will increase their participation and decision making in the oil economy. Importantly, the PIB will address environmental challenges associated with exploration and drilling of oil as well as separate the NNPC as a business and regulator.

Lastly, there is the need to have a social reengineering of the Niger Delta and the North East Region of Nigeria. So many abuses have been committed by the militants, terrorists, insurgents as well as the Nigerian security forces, loss of lives, properties, detentions, torture, rape and other social vices. Many communities have experienced total crackdown and some militants and terrorists are behind bars waiting to be tried in law courts. Families and communities should be rehabilitated and compensated to socially stabilize and reintegrate them back to the society.

Reference

- Adams, Adeola (2014). Patterns and Trend Analysis of Violence in Oil Production and Oil Distribution in Nigeria, from 2006-2014. Nigeria Watch Project, IFRA-Nigeria E-Papers Series, No 36, November: pp 1-28.
- Adebayo, S (2009) Niger Delta: We Have Lost Over 2,000 Persons – Gbaramatu Kingdom. Punch. Retrieved August 28, 2012 from <http://archive.punchng.com/articl.aspx?theartic=Art20090523643265>
- Adesoji, A (2010) The Boko haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria. African Spectrum, 45(2), pp. 95-108.
- Adeyemi, A (2012) Terrorism: Lessons from Other Lands. Tell Magazine, Feb 6, p.44.
- Adetunmbi, O (2014) Time to Halt the Fiddling, The Guardian, April 7, p.16.
- Adibe, J (2014) A Nation at War with Itself. Daily Trust, April 17: Back Page.
- Adibe, J (2012) Boko Haram: One Sect, Conflicting Narratives. African Renaissance, 9(1).
- Aghalino, S.O (2009) The Olusegun Obasanjo Administration and the Niger Delta Question 1999-2007. Stud. Tribes Tribals, 7(1)

- Alao, D and Uwom, O (2012) Terrorism in Nigeria: An Analysis of North/South media Coverage of Boko Haram (November 2011 to March 2012). *International Review of Business and Social Sciences*, Vol I, No. 8. July pp. 49-62
- Atubi, N.O (2007) Historical Perspective of Islamic Religious Crisis and Political Development in Nigeria. In E.E. Udoye (ed) *Environment and Conflict in Africa: Issues and Problems*. Enugu: Prefabag Investment Limited. Pp. 253-264.
- Ayodele, C.O (1999) *Topics on Economic History of Nigeria*. Akure: Blessing Press Limited.
- Dagnall, N., Drinkwater, K., Parker, A., Denovan, A., & Parton, M. (2015). Conspiracy Theory and Cognitive Style: A Worldview. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 6(206) <http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00206>.
- Danjibo, N.D (2009) Islam Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence: The “Maitatsine” and “Boko Haram” Crises in Northern Nigeria. *Peace and Conflict Studies Paper Series*, Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, IFRA.
- Danjibo, N.D (2012) Democracy and the Minority Question in Nigeria: Evaluating Crisis Events, 1999-2007. In Albert, I.O (ed) *A History of Social Conflict and Conflict Management in Nigeria*, A Festschrift for Professor Biodun Adediran. Ibadan; John Archers (Publishers) Limited. Pp.300-315.
- Ekumaoko, C.E (2013a). The Amnesty Question in Post Conflict Niger Delta and Peace-Building. In *Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review (OMAN Chapter)* Vol. 2. No.10 pp 1-12.
- Ekumaoko, C.E (2013b). The Influence of Television Broadcasting of Boko Haram Insurgency Activities on the Residents of Abakaliki, Ebonyi State Nigeria, An M.A Thesis Submitted to Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, Ibadan.
- Freeman, R.E (1984) *Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach*. Pitman, Boston. Academy of Management Review, Vol. 20, p. 65.
- Goertzel, T (1994) Belief in Conspiracy Theories. *Political Psychology*, 15, pp. 731-742.
- Hargreaves, J.D (1996) *Decolonization in Africa*. London and New York: Addison Wesley Longman Ltd.
- Haruna, M (2014a) A President Playing Dangerous Politics with Boko Haram. *Daily Trust*, April 2: Back Paper.
- Hassan, M.B (2013) Democratization in Diversity: The Challenges of Nation Building in Nigeria, *Lapai International Journal of Politics (LIJOPOL)*, Vol. I, No.I, pp. 40-60.
- Ibeanu, O (2005) “Oiling the Friction: Environmental Conflict Management in the Niger Delta, Nigeria’s”, in *Environment Change and Security Project Report: Issue No. 6*, The Woodrow Wilson Centre, Summer.
- Ikelegbe, A (2010) Oil, Resource Conflicts and the Post Conflict Transition in the Niger Delta Region: Beyond Amnesty. Centre for Population and Environmental Development (CPED) Benin City: Ambik Press.
- Isichei, E (1987) Assessment of the Maitatsine Religious Crisis 1980. In *Journal of Religions in Africa*, Vol. XII.
- Jibrin, I (2014) Deepening Democracy: Let’s Work Together to Stop them Killing our Children. *Daily Trust*, April 21, p.51
- Kukah, M.H (2003) *Human Rights in Nigeria. Hopes and Hindrances*. Aachen: Missio. Retrived from http://www.missioaachen.de/images/MR%20Nigeria%20englisch_tcm14-12285.pdf December 07, 2007.
- Laplume, Andre.; Sonpar, Karan.; & Litz, Reginald (2008). Stakeholder Theory: Reviewing a Theory that Moves Us. *Journal of Management* 34(6): 1152-1189. doi:10.1177/0149206308324322
- Lewandowsky, S., Gignac, G.E., & Vaughan, S (2013). The Pivotal Role of Perceived Scientific Consensus in Acceptance of Science. *Nature Climate Change*, 3(4), pp. 399-404.
- Midlarsky, I.M (1975) *On War, Political Violence in the International System*. New York: The Free Press.
- Muhammed, A (2014) Boko Haram in the Mind of Conspirators. *Daily Trust*, June 3, p.52.
- Naanen, B (1995) Oil Producing Minorities and the Structure of the Nigerian Federalism: The Case of Ogoni People. In *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*. Vol. M, No. 1.
- Nda-Isaiah, S (2014) The Buck still Stops at the President’s Table, *Leadership*, April 28: Back Paper.
- Okpaga, A.; Ugwu, S.C and Eme, O.I (2012) Activities of Boko Haram and Insurgency Question in Nigeria. *Arabian Journal of Business Management Review (OMAN Chapter)* Vol I, No. 9. April, pp. 77-99.
- Osaghae, E (1997) The Ogoni Uprising, Oil Politics, Minority Agitation and the Future of the Nigerian State. In *Journal of Modern African Studies*.
- Ostien, P (2003) An Opportunity Missed by Nigeria’s Christians. A Paper Presented at a Conference on The Shari’a debate and the Shaping of Muslim and Christian Identities in Northern Nigeria, University of Bayreuth, July 11-12.
- Ousman, A (2004) The Potential of Islamist Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa, *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*. Vol 18, No. ½ (Winter).
- Raheem, S.O (2012) Boko Haram Activities and their Implications for National integration and Development in Nigeria (M.A Thesis Submitted to the Institute of african Studies, University of Ibadan).
- Stewart, S.C (2012) Nigeria’s Boko Haram Militants Remains a Regional Threat. *Strat for Global Intelligence*.
- Suberu, R.T (1996) *Ethnic Minority Conflicts and Governance in Nigeria*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd.
- Tamuno, T.N (1999) british Colonial Administration in Nigeria in the Twentieth Century. In Obara Ikime (ed)

- Groundwork of Nigerian History. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books.
- Tamuno, N.T (1991) Peace and Violence in Nigeria. Ibadan: The Panel on Nigeria Since Independence History Project.
- Tell Magazine, August 10, 2009, p. 34.
- The Guardian, Dec. 15 2010. P. 22
- The Guardian, March, 2011. P.51
- The Guardian, September 17, 2010. P. 22
- The Guardian, October 5, 2010. P. 22
- The Guardian, March 3, 2011. P. 22.
- The News Magazine (1993, May 17) pp. 18-20.
- United Nations Department of Political Affairs and United Nations Environment Programme (2015) Natural Resources and Conflict: A Guide for Mediation Practitioners. Nairobi.
http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNDPA_UNEP_NRC_Mediation_full.pdf
- Wood, M.J., Douglas, K.M., & Sutton, R.M (2012). Dead and Alive: Beliefs in Contradictory Conspiracy Theories. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 3(6), pp. 767-773.