

Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) Reform

Fouad Khoury¹ Tarik Atan² Chadi Azoury^{3*} Dory Daw⁴

1. Faculty of Business, Lebanese German University (LGU), Beirut, Lebanon
2. Faculty of Business, Cyprus International University, Cyprus, Lebanon
3. Faculty of Business and Economics, Lebanese University (LU), Beirut, Lebanon
4. School of Business, Lebanese International University (LIU), Beirut, Lebanon

*E-mail of the corresponding author: chadiazoury@gmail.com

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to develop and implement a model of policing based on partnership with the community aimed at delivering effective policing and increasing trust in the Internal Security Forces of Lebanon (hereinafter ISF), in addition to identifying the challenges facing the reform inside ISF. The research methodology adopted in this study is the qualitative one. We conducted 10 semi-structured interview with 10 top ISF officers, the interviews were one to one interviews, recorded and transcribed. There are a few fundamental ideas that can be implemented that can, by their very nature, enforce ISF reform. The areas that need attention are officer training, personal characters, better hiring skills, scheduled reviews, monitoring, and an incentives program.

Keywords: ISF, Qualitative analysis, Reform, Police corruption, Leadership in Police

Introduction

Most Lebanese government institutions sustained extensive harm for the period of the war. During the post-war period, the internal security institutions were not effectively rebuilt, particularly in terms of moral principles, values and methods of examination, assessment, liability and responsibility. Accountability was not a main concern (Ipsos 2015).

The challenge going forward will be moving from this island of distinction to a center of distinction across Beirut and then all over Lebanon. A great deal of work must be done to strengthen and expand this new neighborhood policing viewpoint. Within security sector reform, it is important to recognize that human rights and community policing are not jointly exclusive. Counter violence measures need human rights standards to ensure that their achievement does not weaken their very purpose, which is to protect and maintain a democratic society. Essentially, security sector reform in Lebanon cannot resolve many of the deep gaps in political authority that lead to security deficits and to violence, but it can make an important contribution to changing the behavior and attitudes about the relationship between power and people. To do so, at its center, security sector reform must have principles of public legitimacy, accountability, and transparency. The aim now is to build on local measures—like those in Ras Beirut—that have already been proven successful. In spite of internal reorganization and external assistance efforts that deliver hundreds of millions of dollars into training and equipment, ex- police officers, trainers and analysts portray a force that is undersized, underfunded and challenged by politics, size and sectarianism (Ipsos, 2015). This is a major problem in a country as unstable as Lebanon. The country's fragile peace has been crushed, restored and crushed again since the brutal civil war ended in 1990. This is a nation in frantic need of policemen who can defend and serve. Nonetheless the police force, also known as the Internal Security Forces, can barely direct traffic. Officers are more likely to be seen speeding down the road in the wrong direction, chatting with friends or accepting a kickback than protecting and serving. "It's extremely difficult to reform or transform the security sector in Lebanon when it operates in a political arena that is so divided and polarized," says Yezid Sayigh, senior associate at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut. A "poor cousin" of the nation's multitude of security services is how Sayigh describes a force that has long been able to perform only the most basic of policing duties while having difficulty respecting human rights. Several of the problems are cultural: family and religious coalitions are intensely embedded and a heavy hand is something that goes back to the history. The organization is also tied in sectarian bonds. Each of Lebanon's major sects supports a portion of the ISF force, which it guards intensely and seldom shares with other groups. This system weakens talented officers in favor of political and religious equilibrium (Sayigh, 2016).

Literature review

There are many challenges that face the reform of Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF). This can best be

argued by reviewing and considering the key failings in the Lebanese security organization as a whole such as (NATO, 2010):

1. Monetary and organizational corruption;
2. Insufficient personnel growth and development;
3. Unsatisfactory and inappropriate apparatus and equipment;
4. Competition and lack of synchronization; and
5. Obsolete rules and organization.

Change will need to incorporate the demilitarization of law enforcement agencies and the implementation of answerability.

Most Lebanese government institutions sustained extensive harm for the period of the war. During the post-war period, the internal security institutions were not effectively rebuilt, particularly in terms of moral principles, values and methods of examination, assessment, liability and responsibility. Accountability was not a main concern (Rose-Ackerman, 1999).

Corruption is a foremost crisis (McCafferty FL & McCafferty MA, 1998). This includes bribery and conduct based on religious and sectarian affiliations and political or ideological associations. Additional obstacles incorporate the following:

- Internal Security Forces (ISF) officers require satisfactory training and are not expert in their line of employment. The needed skills are principally deficient in officers working in the prisons, on street patrols and in criminal investigation. Investigators are predisposed to use aggression, or the threat thereof, when interrogating suspects. On the whole, law enforcement training in Lebanon does not reach expert standards (ISF, 2017).
- The Internal Security Forces (ISF) and the General Security (GS) forces are missing essential, fundamental and sometimes elementary equipment. This results in militarization of the law enforcement apparatus. Police officers wear military uniform, the ISF uses large armed forces troop trucks and army machine guns, and they are ordered to assemble as an army battalion and provide tribute during ceremonial occasions (ISF, 2017).
- The Lebanese security organization remains to be identified by a range of security organizations, which promotes jealousy and diminishes accountability and harmonization. Bases of failure are more difficult to identify when several institutions are considered responsible of protection without unambiguous specialization. Security institutions are often in conflict while investigating the same crimes, resulting in poor administration of crime scenes, collection of evidence and information gathering (Nashabe O, 2009).
- Legal inadequacies include the reality that the new Penal Law gives the chief prosecutor exaggerated power over law enforcement, policing measures and practices. Law 17, which relates to the organization and task of the ISF, does not take account of a clear explanation of expert nonmilitary duties.
- Law enforcement must be demilitarized. The paramilitary character and the battalion distinctiveness of the Lebanese law enforcement institutions are restrictions to effective and proper police effort, particularly when dealing with the issues of everyday citizens such as traffic and minor contraventions. Professional managerial measures must be developed to smooth the progress of investigative work.
- Universal responsibility must be implemented. Scrutiny of law enforcement agencies should be thorough and habitual. Inspectors need to be autonomous from the inspected organization.
- Substitute motivations should be set up. The structure should prevent promotion when the new post to be held by the promoted officer is occupied. It is not suitable to have over seventy generals in the ISF for a force of 24,000.
- Officers selected to a position should continue in that post so as to develop professional capability. Specific ISF task squads, for example, could focus on crime scene administration, demonstrations, and hostage circumstances.
- Improved representation of women is also considered necessary, as the number of women involved in law enforcement is presently very inadequate in Lebanon. However, involving women in the police force will require modifications to Law 17.

INTERNAL SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: BRIGHT AND DARK SPOTS

Security sector reform pilot projects have proved to be a success at the local level, and more are needed in Lebanon at large (Debate, 2015).

Notwithstanding continuing changes in the state security structure, Lebanon has not engaged in an all-inclusive security sector reorganization and reform. The want of a functioning government has generated a number of foreign contributor initiatives instead, but many of these programs exaggerate their objectives and are motivated more by donor welfare than those of the beneficiaries they are meant to help (Sedra, 2010).

There are, however, symbols of hope. The introduction of an Internal Security Forces (ISF) Code of Conduct, based on the standards of the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), is a noteworthy improvement. So too is the founding of a community-policing model in Ras Beirut, which has allowed local cultural change and greater levels of honesty, ownership, and officer inventiveness. This is demonstrated by arrests of individuals who openly tried to bribe Ras Beirut officers.

The ISF has also introduced its first local policing analysis unit in Ras Beirut, created by neighborhood officers and supported by a donor who worked in collaboration with the officers to help generate ownership and satisfaction. For the first time in the ISF's history, formal selection and employment techniques were used to guarantee merit-based selection— supported by team-based officer training. The early outcomes have been very hopeful; in the first twelve months of the project, the local crime rate was reduced by 40 percent, traffic violations decreased by 20 percent, and there was a considerable reduction in levels of “unsociable behavior.” The analysis unit identified key areas of learning and areas of flaws and good practice, and for the first time there was real internal teamwork (Ipsos, 2015).

The challenge going forward will be moving from this island of distinction to a center of distinction across Beirut and then all over Lebanon. A great deal of work must be done to strengthen and expand this new neighborhood policing viewpoint.

Within security sector reform, it is important to recognize that human rights and community policing are not jointly exclusive. Counter violence measures need human rights standards to ensure that their achievement does not weaken their very purpose, which is to protect and maintain a democratic society. Essentially, security sector reform in Lebanon cannot resolve many of the deep gaps in political authority that lead to security deficits and to violence, but it can make an important contribution to changing the behavior and attitudes about the relationship between power and people. To do so, at its center, security sector reform must have principles of public legitimacy, accountability, and transparency. The aim now is to build on local measures—like those in Ras Beirut—that have already been proven successful (Ipsos, 2015).

In spite of internal reorganization and external assistance efforts that deliver hundreds of millions of dollars into training and equipment, ex- police officers, trainers and analysts portray a force that is undersized, underfunded and challenged by politics, size and sectarianism.

This is a major problem in a country as unstable as Lebanon. The country's fragile peace has been crushed, restored and crushed again since the brutal civil war ended in 1990.

This is a nation in frantic need of policemen who can defend and serve. Nonetheless the police force, also known as the Internal Security Forces, can barely direct traffic. Officers are more likely to be seen speeding down the road in the wrong direction, chatting with friends or accepting a kickback than protecting and serving. “It's extremely difficult to reform or transform the security sector in Lebanon when it operates in a political arena that is so divided and polarized,” says Yezid Sayigh, senior associate at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut. A “poor cousin” of the nation's multitude of security services is how Sayigh describes a force that has long been able to perform only the most basic of policing duties while having difficulty respecting human rights (Sayigh, 2016).

Several of the problems are cultural: family and religious coalitions are intensely embedded and a heavy hand is something that goes back to the history. The organization is also tied in sectarian bonds. Each of Lebanon's major sects supports a portion of the ISF force, which it guards intensely and seldom shares with other groups. This system weakens talented officers in favor of political and religious equilibrium.

Other problems are more contemporary and technical. When the police force's command was renewed over nine years ago, foreign donors gathered to help with the development process. An assemblage of generally western states, principally the European Union, United States and United Kingdom, contributed about \$70 million a year to improve the police and increase strength in the country. Its ranks more than doubled in size, growing from about 13,000 officers in 2005 to nearly 30,000 police today in a nation of around four million. Some employees are being hired faster than they can be trained as skilled officers.

Donors are in agreement that the large and rapid expansion has contributed to some of the police force's problems. “It's a relatively young agency, so it's understandable that there are some organizational challenges as

a result,” says a U.S. diplomatic source from the U.S. embassy in Beirut. “But given their new mandate, we have great confidence in their ability to expand and grow,” the source continues.

A few of the donor-sponsored programs have met with modest success. A forensics facility was built in the town of Aramoun and a country-wide police communications network was set up, at the generosity of the U.S. government. Comparable efforts from other nations consist of anti-torture training, redrafting codes of behavior and the development of specialized counter-terrorism branches. Some police patrols on the Beirut Corniche have given up their automatic weapons for batons and, in general, community-minded policing has improved around the country. Female officers can be seen patrolling the city in teams after women were integrated into the police force with backing from the U.S. Where political support exists, police have been able to make arrests in a number of high-profile cases, including a string of bank robberies and a case of fraudulent pharmaceuticals.

However, a public opinion study performed by the ISF in 2009 found that less than fifty percent of the population had any extent of trust in the police while only fourteen percent had total trust in the force. And in spite of the smooth Dodge Charger police cruisers that stalk the streets, the force is facing a weak budget shortage, according to former General and ISF officer, Amin Saliba. It has a yearly budget of around \$500 million, according to sources who work with the ISF. About \$70 million comes from external donors to be spent on training and new equipment, while the rest, \$430 million, comes from the central government (Ipsos, 2015).

That sum is hardly sufficient to cover essential costs such as salaries, according to advisers who work with the police force. “Hospitals are not accepting Internal Security Forces patients because we can’t pay our bills,” Saliba says. “We need to reconsider salaries and services.” Low and sometimes tardy salaries keep police officers dependent on other sources of income and indebted to other sources of power. A few kisses on the cheek and a small bribe to the local policeman are a more guaranteed way of seeing the law on your side rather than any notion of protecting and serving (ISF, 2017).

But to increase salaries and decrease dishonesty and political dependence, the police force is in double trouble. It would need around an additional \$100 million a year to cover costs, according to police analysts’ estimates. Adding to the challenge, raising salaries would require increasing the pay scale of other government employees, making the issue a political hopeless case (ROSE-ACKERMAN, 1999).

ISF officials acknowledge that more needs to be done to finance and develop the police. But they yet argue that the force is headed in the right direction taken as a whole. “The quality of our training has significantly improved, but it’s a continuous process,” says a police official of recent reforms.” The official credits former ISF head, General Ashraf Rifi, with upgrading the force. But given the current feeling of political paralysis, which is worsened by the deadlock over the Syrian uprising, a breakthrough seems improbable. And this means the nation may not get the force of law and order it so desperately needs in increasingly difficult times. “That doesn’t prevent a lot being done,” insists, Yezid Sayigh, before adding a word of caution. “Even with the best will in the world it must be very difficult for anyone in command.” (Sayigh, 2016)

In its 2013 World Report, Human Rights Watch reported that in spite of repeated promises by the Lebanese government to stop torture and ill-treatment, answerability remains vague. A number of former prisoners, including refugees, migrants, drug users, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBTQ) persons, and sex workers told Human Rights Watch that security force members mistreated them while taken into custody or while they were in imprisonment facilities, including the Ministry of Defense, the General Security detention facility in Adlieh, and the Hobeish police station in the capital, Beirut, which houses the Internal Security Forces’ (ISF) vice squad. Lebanon has not yet created a national protective mechanism to visit and check places of detention, as required under the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT), which it ratified in 2008 (HRW, 2013).

Research methodology

Qualitative Research is primarily exploratory research. It is used to gain an understanding of underlying reasons, opinions, and motivations. It provides insights into the problem or helps to develop ideas or hypotheses for potential quantitative research. Qualitative Research is also used to uncover trends in thought and opinions, and dive deeper into the problem. Qualitative data collection methods vary using unstructured or semi-structured techniques. Some common methods include focus groups (group discussions), individual interviews, and participation/observations. The sample size is typically small, and respondents are selected to fulfill a given quota (Miller C. , 1983).

Taking into account the exploratory nature of this first phase of the ongoing research, the approach followed by this thesis is a qualitative approach that consists of a survey strategy where data are collected through semi-structured interviews. According to (Miller C. , 1983) and (Kumar, 1999) semi-structured interviews provide the

advantage of comparing all individual responses to the core question and provide more in-depth information that cannot be collected through questionnaires.

A total of ten interviews were conducted with 10 top officers in the Lebanese Internal Security force, seven Generals and three Colonels. At an earlier stage, an interview guide inspired by the literature and comprising 15 different questions was prepared. Interviewees were then contacted for an appointment. Interviewees were told their rights and protocols pertaining to ensuring interviewer's objectivity and impartiality were observed and respected at all times. We met some at their offices while others were met at their own places. Each interview length was around one hour. The interviews were conducted from Monday to Friday after leaving my office after 4 pm.

The main sections that were addressed in these interviews were as follows:

Factors contributing to the level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction among the ISF officers.

The level of trust and the cause of distrust that the civilian community exhibited towards the ISF officers

Suggestions for improvement to the level of distrust.

See Appendix A for the semi-structured interview details and questions.

Here is the list of questions that was asked on top ISF officers:

1. Overall, how satisfied are you in the ISF?
2. What specific observations, if any, contributed to your level of satisfaction? Explain.
3. What are your recommendations to improve this level?
4. Overall, is your work experience at the ISF satisfying and rewarding? Explain.
5. Do you have any personal observations on the level of satisfaction for your colleagues or for the officers under your command? Explain.
6. Was/is there effective lateral communication among officers under your command? Explain.
7. Describe the level of trust that the civilian community exhibited towards the ISF officers.
8. How complaints are handled?
9. What are your suggestions for improving the level of distrust?
10. Please enter any comments you may have on management relations.
11. Do you feel rewarded when you go above and beyond what is expected in your job? Explain.
12. Does the ISF's total benefits program meet your needs? Explain.
13. Is the ISF's benefits program competitive with others in the field? Explain.
14. Do you have any observations on improving the ISF's benefits program?
15. Please enter any suggestions you may have on methods for increasing the integrity of ISF members.

The interviews were immediately transcribed and reviewed thoroughly before being analyzed.

Data analysis

The analysis was performed on MATLAB ® 2016 software. We used the technique of text mining. With few code lines, we were able to load all the documents from all officers into MATLAB ®. First, the text was cleaned and edited. Then, it is converted to lowercase, and then all symbols and punctuations are removed. Only then at this phase MATLAB ® can start the text mining phase. We focused on few words that are necessary for our analysis. We focused on the word co-occurrences and their frequencies among all documents (i.e. all the respondents' answers). Finally, among many analyses available, we decided to reveal results and percentages and create commonalities. MATLAB® provided us with lot of data and graphs that will be shown next.

Findings and analysis

MATLAB software contributed to a high extent in providing us with accurate and authentic results regarding our research questions. The respondents were positively answering our questions to an extent that the details and in-depth information were dispatched to our side. Following are the results generated by the text mining technique performed on MATLAB:

When asked how satisfied they were in the ISF, 10% were somewhat dissatisfied, 40% were neutral, 30% were

somewhat satisfied, and the remaining 20% were extremely satisfied (see Figure 1).




Figure 1

About the factors contributing in their level of satisfaction, 40% of the respondents said that political interventions play a negative role in their level of satisfaction, 40% stated that loyalty and having lots of missions contribute positively in their level of satisfaction and the remaining stated that good relationship with supervisors and legal enforcement are the main factors leading to job satisfaction (see Figure 2).




Figure 2

About the recommendations to increase the level of satisfaction, respondents didn't show a commonality but answers were varied; from stopping political interferences to putting the right person in the right place, to increasing salaries and fair remuneration, to increasing officers hiring (see Figure 3).




Figure 3

When asked if, overall, their work experience at the ISF is satisfying and rewarding, 20% were neutral, 40% were somewhat satisfied, and the remaining 40% were extremely satisfied (see Figure 4).




Figure 4

As for having any personal observations on the level of satisfaction for respondents' colleagues or for the officers under their command, 60% favored the idea to be loyal and ready to work under pressure if they are satisfied, 30% favored reducing political interventions, and the remaining said that they are seeing some kind of satisfaction among their peers (see Figure 5).




Figure 5

Regarding the effective lateral communication within the ranks of officers under respondents' command, 60% said that communication is good enough, and the remaining 40% considered that communication had a large positive impact (see Figure 6).




Figure 6

When asked to describe the level of trust that the civilian community exhibited towards the ISF officers, a staggering 80% said it is below average, that it must improve while only 20% said it is average (see Figure 7).




Figure 7

When the respondents were asked about their reaction on a certain complaint, 70% said they will make sure that the complaint is real while the remaining 30% replied that they will follow up on it (see Figure 8).




Figure 8

When asked about their suggestions for improving the level of distrust, they replied the following suggestions: increased accountability, better compensation, continuing education, mentoring, strict punishment, regular testing: substance abuse, financial irregularities, investigation of civilian complaints effectively, community outreach, civilian overview of complaint investigation mechanism, and implementation and enforcement of code of conduct.

Regarding the comments respondents had on management relations, the majority (70%) talked about the importance of e-government and few others highlighted the negative effect of administrative activities (see Figure 9).




Figure 9

Regarding the rewards, they might receive if they do an extra work; the large majority of the respondents stated that the impact on their satisfaction was below their expectations, 30% showed positive attitude, 60% were neutral, and 10% were dissatisfied (see Figure 10).




Figure 10

If the benefits programs met their needs, 40% showed positive reaction, 40% were neutral, and the remaining 20% showed a negative one (see Figure 11).




Figure 11

When asked if the ISF's benefits program is as good as others in the market, 70% replied negatively, while the rest showed little interest (see Figure 12).




Figure 12

About suggestions on improving the ISF's benefits program, 40% said the need for an enhancement, 30% proposed a salary adjustment, the rest asked for a general improvement (see Figure 13).




Figure 13

When they were asked about suggestions to improve the integrity and the image of ISF members, 40% favored accountability enforcement, 30% favored punishment-remuneration, 20% favored salary increase, 30% training, 20% favored stopping external interventions, 10% favored additional benefits, 10% favored putting the right person in the right place, 10% stressed on the importance of good leadership, 10% highlighted the seriousness at workplace, 10% pinpointed the integrity of top officers, and 10% focused on law enforcement (see Figure 14).




Figure 14

Conclusion and recommendations

The ISF is facing many problems that hinder its progress and development. Some of them are related to human behavior, while others are related to mismanagement and weakness in its structure. The research methodology adopted in this study is of a qualitative approach using semi-structured interview. According to (Miller C. , 1983) and (Kumar, 1999) semi-structured interviews provide the advantage of comparing all individual responses to the core question and provide more in-depth information that cannot be collected through questionnaires.

A total of ten interviews (each containing 15 questions) were conducted with 10 top officers in the Lebanese

Internal Security force, seven Generals and three Colonels. The main sections that were addressed in these interviews were as follows:

- 1) Factors contributing to the level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction among the ISF officers.
- 2) The level of trust and the cause of distrust that the civilian community exhibited towards the ISF officers
- 3) Suggestions for improvement to the level of distrust.

The data analysis was performed on MATLAB® 2016 software. We used the technique of text mining. In part 4, we revealed the findings and the results of our semi-structured interviews.

- 1) When asked how satisfied they were in the ISF, a low percentage was satisfied.
- 2) About the factors contributing in their level of satisfaction, 2 major answers were common; political interventions and the issue of loyalty and having lots of missions.
- 3) About the recommendations to increase the level of satisfaction, the respondents' answers were varied; from stopping political interferences to putting the right person in the right place, to increasing salaries and fair remuneration, to increasing officers hiring.
- 4) When asked if, overall, their work experience at the ISF is satisfying and rewarding, the minority was neutral, while the majority was divided into somewhat and extremely satisfied.
- 5) As for having any personal observations on the level of satisfaction for respondents' colleagues or for the officers under their command, more than half favored the idea to be loyal and ready to work under pressure if they are satisfied, and the majority of the rest favored reducing political interventions, and the remaining said that they are seeing some kind of satisfaction among their peers.
- 6) Regarding the effective lateral communication within the ranks of officers under respondents' command, more than half said that communication is good enough, and the rest considered that communication had a large positive impact.
- 7) When asked to describe the level of trust that the civilian community exhibited towards the ISF officers, the majority said it is below average.
- 8) When the respondents were asked about their reaction on a certain complaint, the vast majority said they will make sure that the complaint is real while the remaining replied that they will follow up on it.
- 9) When asked about their suggestions for improving the level of distrust, they replied the following suggestions: increased accountability, better compensation, continuing education, mentoring, strict punishment, regular testing: substance abuse, financial irregularities, investigation of civilian complaints effectively, community outreach, civilian overview of complaint investigation mechanism, and implementation and enforcement of code of conduct.
- 10) Regarding the comments respondents had on management relations, the majority talked about the importance of e-government.
- 11) Regarding the rewards, they might receive if they do an extra work; the large majority of the respondents stated that the impact on their satisfaction was below their expectations.
- 12) If the benefits programs met their needs, the majority were divided between having a positive reaction and having a neutral one, the rest showed a negative reaction.
- 13) When asked if the ISF's benefits program is as good as others in the market, the majority replied negatively.
- 14) About suggestions on improving the ISF's benefits program, all of them said the need for an enhancement.
- 15) When they were asked about suggestions to improve the integrity and the image of ISF members, these answers were mostly addressed: accountability enforcement, punishment-remuneration, salary increase, training, stopping external interventions, additional benefits, putting the right person in the right place, importance of good leadership, seriousness at workplace, integrity of top officers, and law enforcement.

Recommendations

Below is a list of recommendations that we can adopt in order to get rid of the above mentioned problems in the ISF:

- 1) A five-year plan that should be based upon strategy formulation, implementation, and strategy evaluation in order to guarantee that there is no deviation from the goal and in case there is any corrective action should be taken (ISFLebanon, 2017).

Liaising and bridging the gap between the public, the civic community, and the security forces is essential and should be enforced (ISFLebanon, 2017).

In order to avoid wrong selections, we recommend the creation of a HR department with a recruitment and selection unit formed of experts and specialists who will be responsible for scrutinizing applicants and choosing top members based on a deep personality assessment. Staffing process should be respected through putting the right person in the right place with no changes for whatever reason in order to no jeopardize the overall recruitment and selection process. Although there is a little shortage in the number of ISF members, what is more important is the mal-distribution of these members. For instance, we have thousands of police officers who are protecting political/religious/judicial bodies even top ISF members are protected. Even many ISF members seek to get an administrative position which creates a gap between those who are in function and those who are in the administration. Moreover, various types of integrity tests and background checks should take place, such as: polygraph test, drug test, home visits, intelligence checks on associates, character checking in recruit training and probationary programs, personal finance checking, and higher educational standards (Prenzler, 2009).

Conducting training sessions for the security forces staff is of a high value since it will enrich their knowledge and skills and it will instill in them the culture of caring and respecting citizens regardless of the situation they are facing. The enhancement of the current academy through integrating more specialized programs in different disciplines instead of having common courses for all the members. An important point worth mentioning, we recommend few special trainings such as: positive attitude of the ISF member when dealing with citizens, ensuring the implementation of the code of conduct that has been distributed to all ISF members and specially the section related to human rights, these trainings will strengthen the communication bond and bridge the gap between ISF members and citizens. More than that, a learning and development unit within the HR department should be created; that will ensure the continuous development and improvement of all members (Prenzler, 2009), (Quah, 2006).

Moving from paper system to paperless system through integrating technology and digitalization. Adopting an e-government system so that citizens will be able to access all the ISF public welfare applications and papers. Therefore, the percentage of corruption will be mitigated. This will facilitate the communication among different units and it will create an eco-friendly environment. Installing a software in the branches of the police department to help the police supervisors to monitor crime and criminal records (Muhammad Baqer Mollah, 2012).

Enhancing the investigation system through being equipped with new tools and machines; that will help in improving and accelerating the investigating process. Using technology to control and monitor all ISF members through installing cameras and the like in all departments (Kunze, 29-30 May 2007).

Political interventions are very critical in the security forces, therefore, the work on stopping such interferences is vital for the sake of ensuring ethical and proper practices. By rewarding ethical and independent officers or any other staff member, we promote and encourage such behavior. And from the other side, punishing unethical behaviors and abiding by political pressures can have a good impact on this issue. For instance: dismissal from the service, reduction in rank, stoppage or deferment of promotion, fine or reprimand, retirement in the public interest, posting to unpopular / unattractive positions (UNODC, 2011).

Operational management measures should be taken such as: making higher and middle-level police officers accountable for the practices of their subordinates, every decision should have another signature by a second officer, record all interviews with citizens, and installing cameras in police cars (Kunze, 29-30 May 2007).

Enhancing staff and officers' relationship which will lead to a healthy workplace environment which in turn results in a high level of motivation among staff members and thus their performance level will increase. Eventually, that will lead to citizens' satisfaction. (Quah, 2006)

Besides bringing satisfaction to officers and staff members, adjusting salaries scale among them will stop the

way against any attempts to give them a certain kind of bribes. Therefore, increasing their salaries is very crucial. Benefits programs should be amended to all ISF members as this will compensate their low salaries; in return this will decrease the level of corruption (Quah, 2006).

As for the bad reputation of the ISF among Lebanese citizens, (due to the Lebanese civil war that Lebanon has passed through, and low salaries scale that officers and staff receive, and political interventions that happened and is currently happening) a great deal of work is required. At first, these unethical behaviors of ISF members should be consistently and gradually stopped. In parallel, special and well-crafted ads on all medias (TV, Social media, radios, billboards, etc.) showing good and heroic performance of the ISF members must be executed. The marketing strategy is that of a repositioning and not positioning; because the ISF has already an image in the minds of Lebanese citizens. Note that the majority of the Lebanese media is continuously playing a negative role towards the ISF by showing the bad side of it. Therefore, a roundtable formed of media experts and journalists, and ISF top officers should take place in order to improve the image of ISF (USAID, 2007). On the other hand, the ISF should not be politically biased.

In order to increase trust between citizens and ISF members, we recommend a call for more female ISF police officers since it will increase trust and security (British Policing support team, 2017).

References

- British Policing support team. (2017). *British Policing support project, Strategic Project Management Committee, Strategic Overview of Progress*. Beirut.
- Ipsos. (2015). *Policing Pilot Project in Ras Beirut: Survey Comparison*. Beirut.
- ISFLebanon. (2017). *Strategic Plan*. Beirut.
- Kumar, R. (1999). *Research Methodology: A Step-By-Step Guide for Beginners*. London, UK: Sage Publications.
- Kunze, K. (29-30 May 2007). Preventing Corruption in the Federal Administration: Germany. *Conference on Public Integrity and Anticorruption in the Public Service*. Bucharest, Romania.
- McCafferty FL, & McCafferty MA. (1998). Corruption in law enforcement: a paradigm of occupational stress and deviancy. *Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law*, 57-65.
- Miller, C. (1983). *Guidelines and Notes on Method for a Project / Evaluation Research Methods - A Guide*. London.
- Miller, S. (2010). *The moral foundations of social institutions: A philosophical study*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Miller, S. (2011). *Corruption*. Retrieved from Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy: www.plato.stanford.edu.
- Miller, S., Roberts, P., & Spence, E. (2005). *Corruption and anti-corruption: A study in applied philosophy*. Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson.
- Muhammad Baqer Mollah, S. S. (2012). Proposed e-police system for enhancement of e-government services of Bangladesh. *Informatics, Electronics & Vision (ICIEV)*. Dhaka, Bangladesh.
- NATO. (2010). *Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption in Defence: A Compendium of Best practices*.
- Prenzler, T. (2009). *Police Corruption: Preventing Misconduct and Maintaining Integrity*. CRC Press.
- Quah, J. S. (2006). Preventing Police Corruption in Singapore: The Role of Recruitment, Training and Socialisation. *The Asia Pacific Journal Of Public Administration Vol 28, No. 1*, 59-75.
- Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). *Corruption and Government*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sayigh, Y. (2016). *The Carnegie Middle East Center*. Retrieved from <http://carnegie-mec.org/specialprojects/ArabSecuritySectorRestructuringandTransformationProject/?lang=en>
- UNODC. (2011). *Handbook on police accountability, oversight and integrity*. Vienna: United Nations Office On Drugs And Crime.
- USAID. (2007). *USAID Program Brief: Anticorruption and Police Integrity: Security sector reform program*. Burlington, VT.