

The Indigenous Aliens: The Case of the Igbo in Nigeria, 1953 – 2013

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Abstract

There exist commendable great strides in the studies of the Igbo especially since the end of the Nigerian Biafran War in 1970. In spite of this plethora of literature on Igbo studies, there exist yet vistas awaiting historical interrogation and or re-interpretations. Since the end of the ill-fated Biafran experiment, Ndigbo have continued to be seen and treated as indigenous-foreigners in Nigeria especially in some parts of the North. This brings about the relative deprivation theory where the Igbo successes in business and other endeavours are believed to be occasioned by deprivation suffered by their host community. The relative deprivation theory has engendered dispossessionist tendency in the psyche of some individuals who forment ethno-religious crises in order to appropriate immovable investments of Ndigbo outside Igboland. In other words, this feeling of deprivation has characterized the relationship between Ndigbo and their host community; a development which is everything but cordial. The paper avers that the experiences of Ndigbo in the larger Nigerian society especially in the North have remained more or less the same with those of the pre-war years. It also affirms that the vicious and unprovoked attacks on the Igbo and their property are but a subtle way of continued persecution of those regarded as indigenous aliens in their fatherland.

Keywords: Indigenous Aliens, Deprivation, Citizenship, Domination and Aggression

Introduction

The Igbo can be said to have developed a more federation consciousness than perhaps any of the over 250 ethnic components of the Nigerian nation. This explains why they were successfully engaged in pre-colonial long distance trade that transcended the boundaries of Igboland as exemplified by the Aro and Awka traders and blacksmiths, respectively. Colonial rule introduced by the British opened farther fields that were hitherto unknown to the Igbo. As was to be expected, “believing in a nation of presumed common belonging, they fanned out from their base in the East to all parts of the Nigerian federation...they were involved in commerce, industries and government establishments anywhere they settled”¹. This development prompted the relative deprivation theory which had always incensed the hitherto friendly host community against the Igbo. It is against this backdrop that people of Igbo extraction have continued to be seen and treated as foreigners in a country they had played frontal role in building. In recent years, they have been targets of vicious and unwarranted attacks in various cities in the North as indigenous aliens.

The Igbo In The Pre-Independence Nigeria

Indeed, “Nigeria is a multi-cultural state with about 250 ethnic nationalities. Of the nationalities, three are the largest – the Hausa/Fulani in the North, the Igbo in the East and the Yoruba in the West”². Certainly, the Igbo were not the first to come into contact with the British culture and civilization and therefore had to rely on their enterprising spirit for survival. The Igbo survival instinct inspired their fervid propensity to move outside the Igbo enclave to other parts of Nigeria. It is instructive to observe that in the towns where they found themselves, “they have demonstrated a remarkable degree of resilience and success as rubber tapers, tillers of the soil, fishermen, drivers and astute traders and have incurred in the process, the envy and jealousy of their hitherto friendly hosts”³. It is plausible to state that the Igbo not only made enormous sacrifices and contributions to the socio-economic development of their host communities but also engendered integration through personal names of their children such as Angulu, Kaduna, Bamedele etc. to depict their place of birth.

In his contribution, V.O Ukaogo has contended that “wherever the Igbo dwell or reside bears the imprint of the people on development. They have probably contributed more to the development of some areas than the indigenes”⁴. Back in time, the Igbo have deployed their resources, skills and enterprises to buoy up the economy of their host state. It seems dubious and strange that a people who had shoehorned themselves into their new-found-homes were still referred to as foreigners. It is rather in Igboland that they were foreigners because they sometimes never visited there in a year and much less their children. One cannot but agree with Margery Perham who has forcefully argued that “no Nigerian group has been more pan-Nigerian than the Igbo”⁵. It would seem quite plausible to note that the Igbo established some kind of bond and also “nurtured the idea of common citizenship with all the people among whom they lived”⁶. It may not be unreasonable to surmise that the entrepreneurship of the Igbo as well as their sense of adaptation have created Igbophobia amongst the elite of their host community who felt their position threatened by these indigenous foreigners.

The unfounded fear of domination of the Northerners by their Southern brothers has been the bottom-

line of the frosty relationship between Ndigbo and their Northern host communities. The May 14, 1953 attack on the Igbo resident in Kano can best be understood in the context of this fear. This was against the backdrop of the fact that “in 1953, a motion was introduced in the Central Legislature, (by Anthony Enahoro, a non-Igbo) advocating self government by 1956”⁷. The motion which enjoyed the support of Southern legislators would appear to have incensed the North against the Igbo in Kano. Chief Obafemi Awolowo’s ill-advised tour of the North which was probably intended to solicit support for the motion at the grass-root provided the Northerners with the *cassus belli* to unleash mayhem on the Igbo and their property in Kano. All told, neither Enahoro nor Awolowo was an Igbo yet “the Igbo bore the wrath of the anger and disapproval of the north”⁸.

The import of the Kano bloodbath does not necessarily lie in the number of the Igbo killed and their property destroyed in the incident but in the recurring attacks on the people of Igbo extraction ever since. Reacting to this anti-Igbo disposition, O.N Njoku posited that “in the North, the Igbo have, since the late 1940s, been the target of attacks from the Hausa/Fulani, the high point coming in the massive pogroms of 1966 – 1967”⁹. This feeling of misguided aggression is also shared by Mudi Sipikin, a fair-minded and forthright northerner, who once argued that “the actual target were the Yorubas (sic) that had derided the Hausa/Fulani in the Media as cattle rearing-legislators, leading to the booing of Hausa/Fulani law makers in Lagos”¹⁰. This anti-Igbo plot would appear to have been orchestrated by the human functionaries of the Northern Regional Government as well as the regional parliament. The morbid hatred for the only strangers in the North ranged from the demand for the revocation of Certificate of Occupancy issued to the Igbo people in respect of their landed property, their disengagement from the service of some Native Authorities to their brutal massacre¹¹. Given the seeming tacit support the anti-Igbo received by the leaders of the region, the ploy to flush out the Igbo foreigners in the North became a *fait accompli*.

The Igbo And The Aftermath Of The 1966 Coup In Inigeria

The immediate and remote causes of the 1966 coup such as the Tiv and Yoruba riots of 1964 and 1965, respectively had no direct link with the Igbo people. Although some but not all the army officers that planned and executed the 1966 coup were of Igbo extraction, it is also permissible to observe that the coup was foiled by J.T.U Aguiyi Ironsi and E. Ojukwu (both Igbo). According to E. Isichei, “Major-General Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi...who had risen from the ranks and had once been a storeman, intervened. With the help of Ojukwu, stationed at Kano, the coup was put down and its leaders imprisoned”¹². The fact that no Igbo politician was killed (probably as a result of implementation failure) gave the putsch an unintended image of an Igbo agenda. Also the fact that Aguiyi Ironsi became (by merit) the new Head of State exacerbated this misconception and misinterpretation. This development would appear to have provided the northerners an alibi to embark on massive killing of the Igbo, seen as foreigners in their own country.

In the counter-coup of July 1966, Aguiyi Ironsi was killed along with his host the then Governor of Western Region – Col. Adekunle Fajuyi. Those officers who killed Ironsi were not only free but were rewarded with promotion not because of their defence of democracy but for doing away with the ‘foreigner’ at the seat of government in Lagos. It is no wonder “the sadistic behaviours of Northern officers were not reprimanded much less punished; they got a nod from Gowon who they had helped to power”¹³. It may be necessary to state that apart from Ironsi, no less than 214 officers of Igbo extraction were slain at various points in Nigeria. This was in utter disregard to the entreaty by Ironsi to the northern leaders especially the Sultan of Sokoto. In fact, it is pertinent to note that “the Ironsi administration saw the strength of the traditional institution, and as such had to summon the Sultan of Sokoto, Abubakar Sadiq III to Lagos to address northern troops on the need for them to co-operate with the new arrangement”¹⁴. There is hardly any doubt that the counter-coup represented an anti-Igbo agenda to reclaim political power believed to be the preserve of the North.

In his reaction to the counter-coup masterminded by northern officers, R.A Adebayo persuasively argued that “many of us at the time felt that the counter-coup was not necessary as the process of national reconciliation was already in place”¹⁵. Given the above development, it can further be said that the installation of Yakubu Gowon as the new Head of State after the death of Ironsi was a wrong step at a wrong time and for a wrong reason. This is because the concept of seniority as practised in the military did not favour Gowon’s new position except for his region of origin. In other words, the counter-coup plotters, without paying regard the seniority, preferred Gowon as the new Head of State over and above B. Ogundipe, David Ejoor and E. Ojukwu who, as it were, were his senior in the military hierarchy, but were Southerners. What was more, the massive pogrom in the North which produced over 80,000 casualties (both the dead and the wounded) and displaced about 1,800,000 Igbo people¹⁶ without any condemnation from both Regional and Federal governments showed graphically their anti-Igbo posture. Similar, Ahmadu Kurfi is in agreement with the spiral attacks on the people when he observed among other things that on May 29, 1966, “disturbances erupted all over the North, during which several hundreds of people, mostly Igbos (sic) Ironsi’s tribe (sic) were killed”¹⁷. If the first coup of 1966 produced this orgy of violence and bloodshed amongst the Igbo, how many Hausa/Fulani, or Angas or Jukun or Tarok casualties attended the counter-coup? This was probably because they (the Igbo) were regarded as

dispensable foreigners in their fatherland.

The pogrom meted out on the Igbo in the various parts of the North can best be understood in the context of relative deprivation theory. Sir Ahmadu Bello's assertion appears to be a tacit expression of this fear. In his words, "it is my most earnest desire that every post in the region, however small it is, to be filled by a Northerner"¹⁸. It seems clear that Ahmadu Bello was not alone in this view as it represented that of later leaders of the North. The submission of the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) to the Justice C. Oputa Panel is instructive here. For instance, the ACF opined that "they (Igbo) are unduly aggressive, and ethnocentric...they are perceived as ruthless and intensely inward-looking, living everywhere without making adjustments to any local conditions"¹⁹. Emeffena Ezeani's argument appears nearer the truth than that of the ACF. In his words "the Igbo people... more than any other ethnic group in Nigeria invest a greater percentage of their fortune in other parts of Nigeria, they mix well with others, eating their food, wearing their clothes, learning and speaking their languages"²⁰ The submission of the ACF is, therefore, a thinly veiled justification of a wrong i.e. the systemic gang violent attacks on the people of Igbo extraction living in the North.

The explanation rather lies in the fact that the Igbo were regarded as foreigners whose capacity and entrepreneurship were misleadingly believed to pose a challenge to those who stirred up anti-Igbo sentiments. It is not difficult to see the organic linkage between this fear and that elicited by the January 15, 1966 coup which was euphemistically dubbed the Igbo coup. The post-January 15, 1966 pogrom can be said to be an unjustifiable crime against Ndigbo in Northern Nigeria as those victims had played no role in the coup. One can safely say that "it is mischievous and inherently contradictory to confuse their (Igbo) readiness to become Nigerian with a 'tribalistic' (sic) desire to dominate Nigeria"²¹ The pogrom was driven by sheer resentment of the Igbo success in commerce and therefore intended to forestall what was perceived as an Igbo conspiracy to dominate Nigerian commercial and political spheres. In point of fact, the pogrom was no more than an expression of Igbo-phobia in a country they had deployed their skills, resources and enterprises to build.

The treatments meted to Ndigbo in the North in which they lost their lives and property as though they were foreigners, without any condemnation and/or remorse from the northern leaders, steeled their resolve to experiment on the Biafran Republic. In O.N Njoku's argument, "the abortive Biafran secession was in a sense a rebellion against Northern domination"²². The Biafran experiment turned the Igbo into a cannon fodder as the belligerent federal troops prodded by the bellicose North declared full scale war on a people dislodged from other parts of Nigeria than Igboland. The magnitude of violence, genocide and destruction that took place in Igboland between July 6, 1967 and January 12, 1970 when the war lasted were unprecedented in Africa. The moral justification of this war against a people who had been a target of vicious attacks elsewhere other than their homeland is rather dubious. If Ndigbo were foreigners or strangers in all other places, definitely they were not in Igboland and therefore should have been allowed a space under the sun there.

The Igbo Experience In The Post-War Years

On January 12, 1970, the Biafran Republic collapsed as her leaders capitulated to the Federal Government of Nigeria thereby bringing to an abrupt end the physical destruction of the Igbo and their homeland. The Federal Government claiming to be magnanimous came up with policy programme of reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction – the three (3) Rs. Given the manner in which the 3Rs were implemented, it seems reasonable to surmise that the Federal Government was talking from the two sides of her mouth. For instance, the policy of giving twenty pounds (£20) to every adult Igbo, irrespective of his deposits in the bank, was another form of prosecuting the war. In the words of Ezeonu et al "...at the end of the war,...millions of Igbos(sic) and other ethnic groups whose fiscal assets were denominated in the Biafran currency were forced to exchange them for twenty naira (N20), a minuscule amount in Nigerian currency"²³

The façade indifference of the Federal Government to the forceful confiscation of landed-property owned by Ndigbo in the North and Port Harcourt smacks of treatment given to foreigners. Reacting to this, Philip Effiong, the Deputy Head of State of the defunct Biafra observed that "another issue that soured post-war relationships between the victor and the vanquished was the maliciously orchestrated issue of abandoned property....In any case, how does one abandon his property in a country to which he belongs?"²⁴. It appears the Government-appointed Abandoned Properties Implementation Committee headed by David Mark was put in place to supervise the appropriation of properties of Igbo aliens in Nigeria. Rather than address the Igbo question, this development created a 'divided-self' between and amongst Ndigbo found in Rivers in other South Eastern States.

The way the Gowonian 3R mechanism was implemented created doubt about the genuineness and sincerity of the programme. With respect to ex-Biafran soldiers, they were treated as traitors or stragglers. It has been noted that

...many key actors (on the side of Biafra) were detained for up to ten years without trial. Well known ones like Col. Achuzie (Hannibal) and the Late Major Ademoyega, the only survivor among the five

Majors, suffered that fate. And, of course, General Ojukwu became a pawn for politicians pardoned by ex-President Shehu Shagari in 1982 for enhanced political interests of the ruling National Party of Nigeria in Anambra State for the 1983 elections²⁵.

This treatment was clearly at variance with the spirit and tenet of reconciliation of the Gowonian regime. Understandably and in the spirit of the 3Rs, many soldiers of Igbo extraction had expected to be reabsorbed at the end of the war but that was never to be. Quite unjustifiably, they were either detained for their complicity during the war or were relieved of their services in the Nigerian Army. Chris Alli seems to affirm that the injustice meted out to the Igbo after the war was deliberately contrived to hold them down for their Biafran experiment. In his words, “unfortunately for the Igbos,(sic) the Yoruba and the Hausa/Fulani contrived at the end of the war to consign them (Igbo) to neglect...The nation indeed, has been dishonest to judgments on the cause of the reconciliation tenets of the post-war philosophy”²⁶.

On the political scene, the Igbo man was only required to discharge the biddings of the power brokers. For instance, they (Igbo) were a veritable tool in the hands of the military to thwart popular opinion. During the heyday of military dictatorship, information portfolio appeared ostensibly reserved for the Igbo to use their power of oratory to (mis)inform Nigerians and the world. In point of fact, it would seem quite clear that the Igbo constituted a propaganda machinery for the military especially during the epileptic and unending transitional programme of the I.B. Babangida’s regime. It may be permissible to state that the Arthur Nzeribe-led Association for Better Nigeria (ABN) was readily and easily used to scuttle the June 12, 1993 Presidential Elections won by late Chief M.K.O Abiola with “8,323,305 votes against the NRC’s 6,073,612”²⁷.

In the same way, through conspiracy and selfishness, some Igbo men were used to frustrate Dr. Alex Ekwueme’s ambition of becoming the Presidential Flagbearer of the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in 1999. The anti-Ekwueme politicians who ignobly addressed the Jos Convention in Hausa language to dissuade the northern delegates against Ekwueme candidature would appear to have been compromised. It is hardly open to doubt that they jettisoned the Igbo onye aghana nwa nneya spirit, meaning a sense of shared destiny to exhibit the ‘I before others’ (Ibo) philosophy; a self-destructive instinct which made them a pawn in the hands of the other two major ethnic groups to advance their well-orchestrated anti-Igbo agenda. This was probably one way “the Yoruba and the Hausa/Fulani...have ensured the weakening of the Igbo voice”²⁸. This anti-Igbo conspiracy has been corroborated by Sanusi L. Sanusi when he observed amongst other things that:

The Northern Bourgeoisie and the Yoruba Bourgeoisie have conspired to keep the Igbo out of the scheme of things. In the recent transition when the Igbo supported the PDP in the hope of an Ekwueme presidency, the North and (the) South West treated this as a Biafra agenda. Every rule set for the primaries, every gentleman’s agreement was set aside to ensure that Obasanjo, not Ekwueme emerged as the candidate²⁹.

This was in spite of Ekwueme’s powerful credentials and pedigree as a one-time Vice President of Nigeria (1979-1983); and a frontline member of the G34 that formed the PDP. This was a clear case of the proverbial vulture whose feather was used to administer oral drugs but its carcass was not meat. All told, this was to further demonstrate that Ekwueme belonged to the yet-to-be reintegrated stranger group in Nigeria. It was another way of getting back at the Igbo people because a Nigerian President of Igbo extraction was likely “to invalidate several anti-Igbo policies that hamper the progress of the Igbos”³⁰ (sic). Given the above experiences, it can be said that the Gowonian 3Rs were at best a mere propaganda as they have failed to erase the recurring scars and memories of the civil war. This was all the more to imbue the Igbo with the defeat syndrome so as to play a shadow role in Nigerian politics.

The Indigenous Aliens In The Era Of Religious Bigotry

Two distinct factors prodded the Igbo out of their homeland soon after the war in 1970. One was their unwavering faith in the Nigeria project while the other was the survival instinct. Convinced of the sincerity of the reconciliation philosophy of the Gowon regime, the Igbo fanned out to nearly all the major cities of Nigeria and through ingenuity and resilience, they once again established flourishing business outfits. Jibril Aminu appears to echo this assertion that they “spread all over the country and even the occasional elite manipulated ethnic clashes did not deter them from spreading in the pursuit of enterprise”³¹. The relative deprivation theory under the cover of religion has been employed to occasion harm or murder of the Igbo aliens in some parts of the country. For instance, the north had had to resort to a bellicose religion to veil the deep-seated disapproval of Igbo presence there.

In the opinion of O.N Njoku, “since the 1970s, an intolerant strain of Islam has been growing in strength and attracting ever-swelling cohorts of youth with various grievances”³². The relative deprivation theory when interwoven with emotive issue of religion has always provided such misguided youths with the impetus to unleash spiral attacks on non-Muslims who in most cases were Igbo. It may be pertinent here to

observe that in 1996 in Kano, the Akalukas who were alleged to have abused a leaflet of the Qu'ran were murdered in cold blood. Quite surprisingly the police, into whose custody Akaluka ran for security, succumbed to intimidation and released him to bloodthirsty youths who not only beheaded but also displayed his head while chanting songs of victory. It is ironical that the person who tore the Qu'ran (Holy Book) went scot-free but for the Akalukas no; probably because they were Igbo foreigners in Kano. Ever since the end of the war, the Igbo have had to contend with systemic gang violent attacks and destruction of their investments or appropriation of same believing, as it were, that the wealth was acquired there. In the opinion of Chuba Okadigbo "...Destruction of property of strangers wherever it may be in Nigeria, be it in Lagos, Kano or elsewhere is a continuation of the war..."³³.

In recent years, the orgy of massacre on the Igbo in the north has assumed another dimension in which religion is employed as a cover. The restoration of civilian rule in Nigeria in 1999 would seem to have provided the fanatical Muslim fundamentalists with the impetus to unleash unbridled attacks on southern Christian (dominated by the Igbo) in their places of worship in the north. It needs to be added that "the crisis is usually (regarded as) ethno ... (religious) since the crisis is often between the Christians Igbos (sic) and the Muslim Hausas/Fulanis (sic) and as a result lives and properties have severally been lost during religious crisis"³⁴ It seems the crises were fomented either to flush out or dislocate the Igbo and thereby create another abandoned property scenario. In reaction to the tempo and tenor of gang violent attacks against the people of Igbo extraction, General Philip Effiong observes that "outside Igboland, their (Igbo) market stalls, houses and churches have been destroyed with endless excuses and subterfuges"³⁵.

When and where Christians and southerners form the targets of attacks, the Igbo are almost entirely the victims given their heavy presence in every part of the country. For example, of the 88 identified casualty list of the Boko Haram attack on worshippers at St. Theresa's Catholic Church in Madalla, Niger State on December 25, 2011 as many as 72 were of Igbo extraction³⁵ The South East caucus in the House of Representatives through its Chairman, Ogbuefi Ozomgbachi in reaction to the development, has noted that:

the recent shift in focus from random shoot-and-run and bomb attacks by suspected Boko Haram, to selected and targeted hits against the Igbo is a trend difficult to fathom, thereby provoking reasonable grounds for growing suspicion and speculation among many Nigerians that the attacks could be construed as a smokescreen for ethnic cleansing³⁷

Given the above development, it seems the Igbo are precluded from Nigeria's 1999 Constitutional Provisions in Chapter IV Section 41(1) and 43 which recognize the right to freedom of movement and the right to acquire and own immovable property any where in Nigeria, respectively.

In less than a month after the Madalla experience, the brawls were to return to Kano where on January 20, 2012, the hit-and-run Boko Haram sect killed Chris Precious Anyanwu and his uncle Chimaobi Anyanwu in cold blood.³⁸ The spate of selected and targeted hits spread from Kano to other States like Gombe, Yobe and Borno where many people of Igbo extraction were mowed down in a staggering number. For instance, on November 9, 2012, Innocent Eze and five other Igbo men were murdered in their residence in Gaidam Village of Yobe State in a circumstance that defies explanation³⁹. It is doubtful whether all the selected attacks against the Igbo such as this can rightly be ascribed to Boko Haram as some youths have taken advantage of the insurgence to attack the Igbo and their investments. In the wake of these vicious attacks on the Igbo people and their business outfits, "all the sect gets from the region's indulgent elite is a mild rebuke, more out of a public relations consideration and appeasement of the South than a determined effort to deter a senseless agitation"⁴⁰. All considered, it appears Kano is the hotbed of the Boko Haram attacks on the Igbo. Although people of other ethnic groups have had gory experiences of the insurgence, on the balance, it weighs heavier against the Igbo probably because of their propensity to live outside their homeland and also because they are treated with suspect especially in the North.

On Monday, March 18, 2013, there was yet another bomb blast at a Luxury Bus Park mostly used by Ndigbo in Kano. As was to be expected, the Police announced the number of casualties to be twenty-two (22) while the wounded numbered sixty-five (65). In the opinion of Chief Michael Tobias Idika, the President Ohanaeze Ndigbo in the State, the death toll was no less than 60⁴¹ as any figure short of that was an underestimation. According to him, "the Igbo race is facing its worst situation in Kano State presently"⁴². It is instructive to observe that in recent years major cities in the North have been littered with the dead and the dying following the Boko Haram's unprovoked attacks on Christians and indeed people of Igbo extraction for no other offence than being indigenous aliens in their united-divided country. Northern political elites have tended to blame the insurgence on unemployment, hardship and bad governance which, of course, were not occasioned by the Ndigbo who, as it were, have been victims of politics of exclusion at the national level in recent years. The table below graphically represents some but not all the cases of anti-Igbo attacks as the list is not exhaustive.

Date	14/5/53	July 1966	1967-70	1996	25/12/12	20/1/12	9/11/12	18/3/13
Place	Kano	Northern Region	Igboland	Kano	Madalla	Kano	Gaidem	Kano
No. of casualties	36	214 officers & 80,000 others	Over 3m	Akalukas & others	72	02	06	60

Conclusion

From the foregoing, it is clear that no other ethnic group in Nigeria has sacrificed as much as the Igbo towards the national integration of the country. Their unwavering faith in one Nigeria has prodded them to move out of Igboland and to reside among the other ethnic groups in pursuit of enterprise. But owing to their ingenuity and resilience, they have had to contend with envy, jealousy and sometimes brutal murder occasioned by feeling of deprivation by their host community which has developed a dispossessionist tendency in the latter. In other words, with scant regard for the sanctity of human life, some members of their host community have for spurious excuses killed and destroyed or appropriated their investments believed to have been acquired there. According to Okoro Ijoma, “they have suffered discrimination and untold injustice in their country, but they have refused to lose hope in themselves and in their country”⁴³.

The violent gang attacks on the Igbo in 1953 in Kano have reeled off to other major cities in the North and have continued to be a recurring experience up to 2013. What it all portends is that the Igbo have continued to be seen as indigenous aliens in the same country they belong and have expended their wit, energy and resources to build. The import of this development is that the Igbo have not been allowed to reconcile and re-integrate themselves with the other constituent units of the Nigerian nation. This disapproval belies the post-war 3Rs philosophy of the Gowonian Government. It is expected that the Federal Government should re-examine the policy of indigene-settlers saga in order to bring to a richly deserved end the pervasive ethno-religious conflicts that have remained the bane of national integration and Nigerian unity.

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