Intrastate Conflicts Influencing Human Rights Enforcement with Specific Reference to the Republic of Sudan, 1956 – 2011

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Abstract

The objective of this paper was to Asses strategies for managing intrastate conflicts and mitigating human rights violation in the Republic of Sudan. The study design adopted was descriptive research that incorporated both, document analysis, quantitative and qualitative techniques. The findings showed that ahigh proportion (77%) of the respondents rated CPA's contribution as a peace initiative to Republic of Sudan's internal conflicts as average and above. The findings further revealed that the CPA's contribution towards Republic of Sudan's internal conflict had a significant effect on human right enforcement in Republic of Sudan. CPA and Referendum are the most popular peace initiatives in Republic of Sudan that has led to reduction of internal conflicts in Sudan. According to the findings of this study. Not all peace initiatives were successfully in contributing significantly positive to resolving conflicts in the republic of Sudan. Initiatives such as ACPP and referendum did not significantly contribute to resolving conflicts according to the findings. The findings further revealed that strategies that were used to manage internal conflicts in Republic of Sudan were not successfull to some extent. More than half (61.7%) of respondents perceived that the strategies did less in uniting people of Southern Sudan. This is indicated by the current situation in South Sudan even after the secession; the intrastate conflicts have continued in South Sudan over resources and political interests. However, most strategies had positive influence on human rights enforcement in Republic of Sudan. However, there were many (61.3%) respondents who agreed that the strategies speeded the secession of Republic of Sudan and contributed to peace in Republic of Sudan. On the other hand the results showed that these strategies were significant towards human rights enforcement in Republic of Sudan through; preventing further conflicts in Republic of Sudan, leading to stability in Republic of Sudan, making Republic of Sudan be accepted by international community, positively influenced North, South Sudan relationships, reduced intrastate conflicts in Republic of Sudan, contributed to peace in Republic of Sudan among others. However, the strategies at the time were far from reaching a satisfactorily level. The study concluded that the strategies that were in place did not work out well to a sustainable course. The need for cooperative engagement comes from the conviction that no single association or entity that has the capacity of managing intrastate conflicts by itself. The study recommended that there is need for sober approaches to getting lasting solutions that could see conflicts reduction in Republic of Sudan. As per the findings an incredible need to deal with the root causes of conflicts and find the amicable solutions after the war is inevitable.

Keywords: Armed Conflict, Civil War, Intrastate Conflicts, Human Rights Enforcement

1. Introduction

After coming to power, the National Salvation government sought peace in Republic of Sudan from the first day of the June 1989 revolution (Mohammed, 2006). Within seven weeks of coming to power, General Omer al-Bashir organized a meeting with the Republic of Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), followed in October by a 45-day national dialogue conference – with broad political representation even though there were no political parties – to discuss the root causes and potential solutions of the conflict. The outcome of this conference was the basis for government policy towards the south. In particular, it was agreed that non-Muslims had the right not to be ruled by shari'a just as Muslims had the right to be ruled by shari'a. At that time self-determination was not on the cards (Mohammed, 2006). The SPLM/A was not ready to negotiate in 1989. It was in the military ascendancy, having captured much of southern Republic of Sudan and at the same time was struggling to manage the rivalries between the different southern militias and to build its international profile. However, Government forces responded with a major offensive in the summer of 1992 that recaptured even Torit, the SPLM/A's administrative centre, and forced the SPLM/A back to the negotiating table in Abuja in 1992-93 (Mohammed, 2006). Many studies have varied opinion as to whether the SPLM/A being not ready to negotiate with the government could have escalated conflict in the country and thus the escalation of human rights violations.

After a long period without progress in the talks between the Government of Republic of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), four factors came together from 1997 onwards to encourage the parties to return to the negotiating table. Firstly, people recognized that there was a stalemate following the major offensive operations of 1995-96. Secondly, there was a substantial change of personnel in

Khartoum; with few of the previous negotiators remaining, there was a knock at that door. Thirdly, mounting international pressure forced the door to be unlocked and finally came pressure from the US Congress, whose representatives sympathized with what they saw as Dr John Garang's struggle against the forceful spread of Islam (Cirino, 2006).

It was in this difficult environment that the 1994 Inter-governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) Declaration of Principles was presented to the government. It was rejected not because it referred to self-determination but because it was presented as an ultimatum related to the question of Republic of Sudan's secularization and as a precondition to formal talks.The really important document in the IGAD process was not so much the Declaration of Principles, which demonstrated little beyond the government's seriousness to engage with the SPLM/A, but the Machakos Protocol of July 2002 (Mohammed, 2006). It can be argued that the strategy of IGADD of forcing a solution and giving an ultimatum upon the Sudanese government would have a difficult time in uniting the Sudanese and hence reducing human rights violations.

The CPA also known as the Naivasha agreement which was a set of agreements culminating in January 2005 was signed between the SPLM and the Government of Republic of Sudan. It was meant to end the Second Civil war, develop democratic governance countrywide and share oil revenues. It further set a timetable by which Southern Republic of Sudan had a referendum on its independence. Despite the signing of the CPA, the South of Republic of Sudan has continued to witness serious violence and challenges in establishing the rule of law. A number of well-armed militias are also present in Southern Republic of Sudan, and armed conflicts have persisted in Jonglei, Lakes, Unity, Upper Nile, Warrap and Western Equatoria states (Brusset, 2005). With the continual of conflict even after the CPA, questions still lingered as to whether the needs of the conflicting parties where catered for or some felt shortchanged by the agreement.

As part of managing the conflicts in the Republic of Sudan, the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) funded in part four sets of activities in Republic of Sudan: the Joint Military Commission (JMC), in existence since February 2002; the Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT), in existence since April 2003; the Republic of Sudan Secretariat of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD); and seminars on peacekeeping. The ACPP activities in Republic of Sudan were part of a much wider international effort to resolve the principal conflicts in the country between the government and the Republic of Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). This resulted in July 2002 in the Machakos Protocol, which provided solutions to the two main issues (power sharing and ceasefire) confronting the peace negotiators (African Centre for Peace Studies, 2014).The ACPP activities in Republic of Sudan have covered a fundamental but narrow spectrum of the possible responses to end the conflicts in Republic of Sudan. The objective of structural and attitudinal change has not been addressed, pending a firm peace agreement; and since the ACPP did not adequately address the issue of wealth sharing and human rights, questions can be raised as to whether the two not being adequately addressed did not deter human rights violations and escalation of conflict in oil rich regions (African Centre for Peace Studies, 2014).

Small arms and light weapons (SALW) are widely available among civilians and armed groups in the Republic of Sudan especially in the southern part. As SALW are felt by many communities to be important tools for their security, livelihoods and survival, disarmament is proving very challenging. Much remains to be done to achieve the successful reintegration of thousands of ex-combatants and to professionalize the SPLA at an affordable size (Larry, 2010). With serious armed violence persisting in different areas of southern Republic of Sudan and the presence of regional neighbours and armed groups accustomed to using violence to achieve political objectives, a military is needed that is able to guard the people of southern Republic of Sudan effectively from serious security threats. Crucially, however, there is a need to address the issue of small arms and light weapons in the hands of the population (Larry, 2010). Few studies have been conducted on the effectiveness of disarming civilians in southern Republic of Sudan and if this would reduce the escalation of conflict and reduction of human rights violations.

In southern Republic of Sudan governance is a key issue. In 2005, almost all the infrastructure of a functional government, as well as skilled personnel, laws and procedures needed to be established from scratch. Needs were diverse and urgent, in a context where living standards were extremely low and little of the population could access health services, schools and clean water. At present, nascent government institutions remain 2centralized, with slowly developing institutions concentrated in Juba and the state capitals. With a proper governance structure, the southern Republic of Sudan area may be able to effectively manage the conflicts in that area (African Union Commission, 2009).

According to Peter and Mark (2006), most parts of Africa that have experienced one form of conflict, a key issue has been distribution of resources. In some conflict area of Republic of Sudan like the Abyei region, the question of oil resources has left the question of whether the conflict is as a result of the resource or other factors. The most important resource in Republic of Sudan is land: whether exploited for agriculture, cattle-herding or subterranean resources such as oil or water, land ownership is the key to wealth and power (Peter and Mark, 2006). Issues have been raised in many studies questioning if addressing land issue can be used as a

strategy of managing conflict in Republic of Sudan or this would further escalate conflict.

The realm of peace and security in Africa in the 1990s witnessed dramatic and profound changes throughout the continent. South Africa and Namibia installed democratically elected governments. Relative peace and stability were established in Mozambique after three decades of intrastate conflict between various parties. Several dozens of African countries held democratic elections. Unquestionably, all these are positive and significant signs toward peace, stability and development. However, while many parts of the world moved toward greater stability and political and economic cooperation, Africa remained one of the cauldrons of instability. Political insecurity and intrastate conflicts became increasingly persistent realities of the development scene in Africa. Internal conflicts with deep historical roots flared in many countries on the continent. Ironically, while the international community paid less and less attention to African security affairs, the continent's institutional and organizational capacity to manage its pervasive conflicts was not developing at the same pace as conflict escalations (Rugumamu, 2002). Against such a backdrop, managing intrastate conflict and mitigating human rights violations in Africa emerge as one of the critical issues of great importance in global politics.

Overcoming the legacy of decades of conflict in the Republic of Sudan will mean working over decades to meet needs and fulfill rights in every sector across the humanitarian and development spectrum. It will also require development of a culture of peace in a society deeply 3centralized by the experience of conflicts and accustomed to living in conflict. The task of setting up conflict management strategies is underpinned by significant will to succeed and manage difficulties. However, as in the North, governance challenges, centre – periphery tensions and bloody rebellions that are already visible in the South, outline the scale of the challenges ahead (Brusset, 2005).

Strategies such as negotiations between the government of Omar al-Bashir and SPLM/A, Inter-governmental Authority on Drought and Development declaration of principles, the Machakos protocol of July 2002 and the comprehensive peace agreement have all been employed to reach an amicable solution to managing the various intrastate conflicts and mitigating human rights violations in Republic of Sudan (Mohammed, 2006). These strategies although employed over a period of time, have never been totally successful in addressing the intrastate conflicts in Republic of Sudan. This study explored these strategies to help understand their weaknesses, how they can be improved, and how new strategies can be implemented to manage intrastate conflicts and mitigate human rights violations in the Republic of Sudan.

2. Methodology

The Study featured the Republic of Sudan, 1956-2011. The Study adopted descriptive survey design, and as recommended by Okoth (2012) and Brewer and Kuhn (2010). Descriptive research design, helped to find relationship between intrastate conflicts in the Republic of Sudan and how they undermine human rights enforcement in the region (Ombok, 2013). The study combined both the quantitative and the qualitative methods to collaborate each other, which have been referred to as 'triangulation' in the social sciences in order to validate results through more than one perspective and thus enhanced the study positively (Piccianno, 2004). Document analysis is a type of qualitative research that involves systematic reviewing or evaluating documents both printed and electronic was also utilized (Corbin & Strauss 2008).   To obtain the population of the study, the researcher obtained the list of population available from the institutions of interest as follows; 10 diplomats from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 diplomats from Embassy of the Republic of Sudan, 20 UNHCR officials, 80 University academicians from the Republic of Sudan who were taking academic courses related to conflict resolution in purposively selected Kenya universities, 30 experts in intrastate conflicts and 30 humanitarian experts from Directorate of Refugee Affairs (DRA) and Kenya Commission for Human Rights (KNCHR), and National Steering committee (NSC) and 330 Sudanese refugees living in Nairobi. This comprised a total population of 500 individuals. To determine the sample size of the study from a population of 500 individuals, a formula by Fisher *et al.*, (1998) was applied. A total sample of 230 respondents was interviewed. Probability and Non-Probability sampling was used. The non-probability technique was used to identify the institutions of interest while probability sampling was applied in to identify the number of respondents that were to be interviewed in each category. The Non-Probability techniques used were convenience sampling and Purposive sampling. These are types of non-probability sampling techniques based on the judgment of the researcher (Babbie, 2001). Convenience sampling was employed in selecting the institutions which are based in the Republic of Sudan for easiness of access. Purposive sampling was used in determining the departments within these institutions where the types of respondents suitable for interview were available and was used to select the Key informants and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) participants. A total of 7 key informants and 3 FGD were conducted. Probability Sampling techniques used were snow balling and simple random sampling. Snow balling technique was used to identify key informants for interview where one key informant would lead the researcher to the other Beauchemin and González-Ferrer (2011). Simple Random sampling was used to identify 230 respondents randomly according to their availability for interviews. Data collected was analyzed quantitatively and qualitatively in relation to the objective.

3. Results
3.1 CPA and other initiatives contribution on Republic of Sudan's intrastate conflicts

In regard to CPA's contribution to Republic of Sudan's internal conflict and human rights enforcement, 93; 40.4% of the respondents rated the contribution above average (very good and good at 23% and17.4%, respectively) with 51; 22.1% of the respondents rating it below average while 86; 37.4% of the respondents terming it average (Table1). Out of 93 respondents who had rated the CPA's contribution to Republic of Sudan's internal conflict as above average, three quarter (70; 75.3%) of the respondents said that CPA's contribution to the internal conflicts had influence on human rights enforcement as opposed to 23; 24.7% of the respondents. Out of 86 respondents who termed its contribution average on Republic of Sudan's internal conflict, majority (80; 93%) of the respondents said that its contribution had influence on human rights enforcement while 6; 7% of them said it had no effect. For 51 respondents who rated the CPA's contribution below average, a high proportion (45;88.2%) of the respondents said its contribution had effect on human rights enforcement while 6;11.8% of them said it did not have influence on human rights enforcement (Figure 1). On cross tabulating the results, there was significance difference to show that CPA's contribution in Republic of Sudan's internal conflicts had influence on human rights enforcement in Republic of Sudan, $x^2 = 11.522$, df=2 P=0.003 (Table 4).

Table 1 CPA and other initiatives contributing to the Republic of Sudan's intrastate conflict

| Contribution to Republic of Sudan internal conflict and Human rights enforcement is?	Frequency	Percentage
Very good	53	23.0
Good	40	17.4
Average	86	37.4
Below Average	18	7.8
Poor	33	14.3

Figure 1 CPA's contribution to Republic of Sudan's internal conflict in relation to Human rights enforcement

3.2 Other peace initiatives contributing to Republic of Sudan's internal conflict and human rights enforcement

Apart from CPA contribution towards peace in internal conflicts in the republic of Sudan, other peace initiatives have also contributed to resolving conflicts, almost same number agreed to disagree that they had contributed, 117; 50.9% and 113; 49.1%, respectively (Table 2). Out of 117 respondents who said that various initiatives have contributed to resolving conflicts in Republic of Sudan, slightly more than three quarters (91; 77.8%) of the respondents had perception that they had influence on human rights enforcement in Republic of Sudan while 26; 22.2% said it did no have the influence on human rights enforcement (Figure 2). For 113 respodents who said

various peace ibnitiative had not contributed in resolving conflicts in Republic of Sudan majority (104; 92%) of the respondents said they had influence on human enforcements in the Republic of Sudan while 9; 8.0% said it did not had any influence. On cross tabulating the results, there was significance difference between various initiative contribution in resolving conflicts with influence on human rights enforcement in Republic of Sudan, $x^2 = 9.057$, $df=1$ P=0.003 (Table 4).

Table 2 Other Peace Initiative contribution to Republic of Sudan's internal conflicts

| Various Peace initiative contributed to solving conflicts	Frequency	Percent
Yes	117	50.9
No	113	49.1
Total	230	100.0

Figure 2 various peace initiatives contribution in influence on to human rights enforcement

Various peace initiatives contributed to reduction of internal conflicts in the Republic of Sudan, More than half (129; 56.15) of the respondents mentioned CPA while 86; 37.4% respondents mentioned referendum and 15; 6.5% of the respondents mentioned ACPP (Table 3). Out of 129 respondents who mentioned CPA as one of the initiative that have led to reduction of internal conflicts in Republic of Sudan, a high proportion (105; 81. 4%) of the respondents said that peace initiative had influence on human rights enforcement in Republic of Sudan while 24; 18.6% said they had no effect. All (11; 100%) of respondents who had mentioned ACCP for peace initiative had perception that they had effect on human right enforcement. For 86 respondents who had mentioned referendum among the peace initiatives that have led to reduction of internal conflicts in Republic of Sudan, most (75; 87.2%) respondents said that it had influence on human rights enforcement in Republic of Sudan (Figure 3). However, there was no significant difference between other peace initiatives and influence on human rights enforcement in Republic of Sudan, $x^2 = 4.232$, $df=2$ P=0.121 (Table 4)

Table 3 Peace initiatives that have contributed to Reduction of internal conflict

| Peace initiatives	Frequency	Percent
CPA	129	56.1
ACPP	15	6.5
Referendum	86	37.4
Total	230	100.0

Figure 3 peace initiatives in relation to influence on human rights enforcement

Table 4 Peace initiatives contribution to Republic of Sudan's conflict in relation to human rights enforcement

	Influence on Human rights enforcement						
	Yes		**No**		x^2		
Variable	**n**		**n**	**%**		*Df*	P-Value
Contribution to Republic of Sudan internal conflict and Human rights enforcement is					11.522	2	0.003*
Above average	70	75.3	23	24.7			
Average	80	93.0	6	7.0			
Below Average	45	88.2	6	11.8			
Peace initiative that have led to reduction of internal conflicts in Republic of Sudan					4.232	2	0.121
CPA	105	81.4	24	18.6			
ACCP	15	100.0	0	0.0			
Referendum	75	87.2	11	12.8			
Has the various Peace initiative contributed to solving conflicts					9.057	1	**0.003***
Yes	91	77.8	26	22.2			
No	104	92.0	9	8.0			

*Significant at 0.05

3.3 Strategies of managing internal conflicts in the Republic of Sudan
On strategies of managing internal conflicts in Republic of Sudan. Less than a quarter (55; 23.9%) of the respondents agreed that the strategies in place have resolved conflict in Republic of Sudan with slightly more than a third (81; 35.2%) disagreed while 94; 40.9% of the respondents were neither agreed nor disagreed (Table 5). There was a similar pattern revealed by the findings where respondents were divided in their perception towards strategies that were used to manage internal conflicts in Republic of Sudan. However, a high proportion (141; 61.3%) of the respondents agreed that the strategies speeded the secession of Republic of Sudan while almost half (113; 49.1%) had perception that it contributed to peace in Republic of Sudan. On the other hand, a high proportion (142; 61.7%) of respondents disagreed that the strategies have united the people of Republic of Sudan. The rest of the summaries are presented in table 5. However, most strategies had influence on human rights enforcement in Republic of Sudan. The influence were as a result of preventing further conflicts in Republic of Sudan (x^2=7.96, *df*=2, P=0.021), leading to stability in Republic of Sudan (x^2=8.237, *df*=2, P=0.016), made Republic of Sudan be accepted by internal community (x^2=11.897, *df*=2, P=0.0003), positively influenced North, South Sudan relationships (x^2=10.196, *df*=2, P=0.0006), Reduced intrastate conflicts in

Republic of Sudan, (x^2=6.140, df=2, P=0.046), contributed peace in Republic of Sudan (x^2=16.723, df=2, P=0.00), Speeded the secession of Republic of Sudan (x^2=8.435, df=2, P=0.015), Has united people of southern Republic of Sudan (x^2=23.038, df=2, P=0.0.000) and contributed the return of refugees to Republic of Sudan (x^2=15.667, df=2, P=0.000) Table 6.

Table 5 Strategies of managing internal conflicts in the Republic of Sudan

Statement	Agree		Neutral		Disagree	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
Resolved conflict in Republic of Sudan	55	23.9	94	40.9	81	35.2
Prevented further Conflict in Republic of Sudan	63	27.4	70	30.4	97	42.2
Led to Stability in the Republic of Sudan	47	20.4	55	23.9	128	55.7
Made Republic of Sudan be accepted by international Community	60	26.1	91	39.6	79	34.3
Positively influenced North, South Sudan relationships	79	34.3	69	30.0	82	35.7
Forced Republic of Sudan to get involved in peace building initiatives	84	36.5	94	40.9	52	22.6
Reduced intrastate in Republic of Sudan	72	31.3	83	36.1	75	32.6
Contributed peace in Republic of Sudan	113	49.1	62	27.0	55	23.9
Speeded the secession of Republic of Sudan	141	61.3	50	21.7	39	17.0
Has not had impact in Republic of Sudan's Peace Initiative	54	23.5	74	32.2	102	44.3
Reduced the animosity between the Northern and Southern Republic of Sudan	88	38.3	79	34.3	63	27.4
Has escalated conflict in Republic of Sudan	53	23.0	78	33.9	99	43.0
Has united people of Southern Republic of Sudan	21	9.1	67	29.1	142	61.7
Contributed to return of refugees to the Republic of Sudan	78	33.9	81	35.2	71	30.9

Table 6 Strategies of managing internal conflicts contribution to peace in the Republic of Sudan in relation to Human rights enforcement

Statement	x^2	df	P-Value
Resolved conflict in Republic of Sudan	5.912	2	0.052
Prevented further Conflict in Republic of Sudan	7.696	2	**0.021***
Led to Stability in the Republic of Sudan	8.237	2	**0.016***
Made Republic of Sudan be accepted by international Community	11.897	2	**0.003***
Positively influenced North, South Sudan relationships	10.196	2	**0.006***
Forced Republic of Sudan to get involved in peace building initiatives	5.568	2	0.062
Reduced intrastate in Republic of Sudan	6.140	2	**0.046***
Contributed peace in Republic of Sudan	16.723	2	**0.000***
Speeded the secession of Republic of Sudan	8.435	2	**0.015***
Has not had impact in Republic of Sudan's Peace Initiative	14.839	2	**0.001***
Reduced the animosity between the Northern and Southern Republic of Sudan	0.679	2	0.712
Has escalated conflict in Republic of Sudan	2.680	2	0.262
Has united people of Southern Republic of Sudan	23.038	2	**0.000***
Contributed to return of refugees to the Republic of Sudan	15.667	2	**0.000***

*Significant at 0.05

4. Discussions

The CPA otherwise called the Naivasha assention which was an arrangement of understandings coming full circle in January 2005 was marked between the SPLM and the Legislature of Republic of Sudan. It was intended to end the Second Thoughtful war, create fair administration countrywide and offer oil incomes. It further set a timetable by which Southern Republic of Sudan had a choice on its freedom. In spite of the marking of the CPA, the South of Republic of Sudan has kept on seeing indisputable violence and difficulties in setting up the standard of law (Brusset, 2005).

From the findings, it's evident that the CPA was proclaimed as the last and the only opportunity for Republic of Sudan's reforms, yet it was submerged into ruins and divisions between the contentions over oil resource thus casting doubt on whether their motive was to bring peace. Their peace initiative started surrounding the interests on how these resources could be shared especially among the southerners to act as a motivating force for them to withdraw resistant that had started culminating. With a more drawn out term horizon, the National Congress Party (NCP) in government then, saw the need for putting central government monies in national activities to embrace equality, yet they did not buy that idea due to fear of the other side. Likewise, the SPLM on the other hand perceived that oil generated incomes would be for a long time taken away after the freedom. The intrigues that surrounded interest over oil resource impeded the peace initiative strategies.

The study established that Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was a national agreement negotiated by two parties, the Government of Republic of Sudan (GoS) and the Republic of Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) ending over 20 years of civil war. The first of its six protocols, the Machakos Protocol of July 2002, provided for a referendum on southern Sudanese secession. Despite the SPLM/A's stated national agenda, the protocol imposed a north-south solution to a problem of the marginalization of Republic of Sudan's peripheral regions. It used the contentious 1956 independence boundaries to demarcate the boundary of southern Republic of Sudan, excluding from the south three areas heavily represented in the SPLM/A that had been heavily influenced by the war. These areas were two of the SPLM/A's five 'administered regions' – the part of the state of Southern Kordofan known as the Nuba Mountains and the state of Southern Blue Nile and Abyei, an area defined geographically as ethnically has the nine chiefdoms of the Dinka-Ngok who transferred to Kordofan in 1905 (Afrcan Centre for Peace Studies, 2014).

As a component of dealing with the contentions in the Republic of Sudan, the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) financed to a limited extent four arrangements of exercises in Republic of Sudan: the Joint Military Commission (JMC), in presence since February 2002; the Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT), in presence since April 2003; the Republic of Sudan Secretariat of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD); and workshops on peacekeeping. The ACPP exercises in Republic of Sudan were a piece of a much more extensive universal push to determine the primary Conflict in the nation between the legislature and the Republic of Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). The respondents said that;

> The ACPP exercises in Republic of Sudan have secured an essential yet limited range of the conceivable reactions to end the contentions in Republic of Sudan. The target of auxiliary and attitudinal change has not been tended to, pending a firm peace assention; and since the ACPP did not sufficiently address the issue of riches sharing and human rights, inquiries can be raised concerning whether the two not being enough tended to not discourage human rights infringement but also heightening of contention in oil rich districts (FGD for African Republic of Sudanese, Nairobi, 20th August, 2014).

An indication that the peace initiative did not fulfill the high expectations that both Sudanese and international community's had for bring peace in Republic of Sudan. Moreover, the way they handled peace matters was suspicious over whether they were caught in the mix of great interest to rich oil resources like other parties involved.

The Study established that the measures put in place by the ACPP in Republic of Sudan played a key role in underpinning the peace process, particularly in the case of the JMC, which the respondents perceived as a good model for achieving peace. The ACPP activities in Republic of Sudan were part of a much wider international effort to resolve the principal conflicts in the country between the government and the Republic of Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). This resulted in the Machakos Protocol of july 2002, which provided solutions to the two main issues confronting the peace negotiators. The ACPP activities were relevant to one of the main obstacles to peace in Republic of Sudan: lack of trust among the parties and their unwillingness to honour agreements, and lack of reliable evidence that the agreements were being implemented. The study further found out that all of the ACPP activities strengthened the flow of information, and this in itself contributed to discipline in the chain of command of the forces of both parties. The focus on cessation of hostile acts for a defined period of time had been conducive to lowering of the numbers of casualties, primarily military, but also non-combatant. This was echoed by one expert in intrastate conflict who noted that:

> The objective of the JMC under the funding and monitoring of ACPP was to place the burden of proof of good faith in negotiations on the parties at war, by carrying out in an observable manner the phased implementation of a peace process in the Republic of Sudan. (FGD for experts on intrastate conflict, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nairobi, 7th July, 2015)

The ACPP activities were of relevance to solving conflicts in Republic of Sudan. Despite that, there was lack of trust among the parties and their unwillingness to honor agreements, and lack of reliable evidence that the agreements are being implemented.

The study established that the evidence collected and presented in the ACPP report led to the conclusion that the JMC and VMT had a certain degree of impact on popular attitudes on the ground, by creating

a sense of the possibility for change to the better. This had not influenced the attitudes of political leaders among the parties to the conflict to consider use of force: should the peace process have faltered there would rapidly be a return to the *status quo ante*. Rather, their ability to use force had been circumscribed, and control by the political leadership on both sides more clearly enforced. Generally available information shows a degree of continued mobilization of forces, and an antagonistic discourse was still present at all levels noted the intrastate expert during the FGD.

However during the FGD for intrastate experts, there was a unanimous agreement that the ACPP activities in Republic of Sudan had covered a fundamental but narrow spectrum of the possible responses to end the conflicts in Republic of Sudan. The objective of structural and attitudinal change had not been addressed, pending a firm peace agreement. One of the experts on intrastate conflicts lamented:

> UN agencies had been active in advocating the special concerns of women and children in Republic of Sudan's conflicts. UN Secretary General's Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflicts had worked with UNICEF and NGOs to ensure the inclusion of provisions ensuring the protection of children during the ongoing peace processes in the Republic of Sudan. Women for Peace, a non-partisan, grass-roots organisation, had been set up to advocate on their own account and on behalf of children influenced by the violent conflicts. Work relating to these 'unaccompanied minors' had been ongoing under the aegis of UNICEF and some NGOs since 1991. (Interview Schedule for intrastate conflict expert, UNHCR, 4th September, 2014).

This shows that the peace initiatives had a degree of impact on popular attitudes on the ground by creating a possibility of change to better.

Comparatively as indicated by Brusset (2005), defeating the legacy of many years of contention in the Republic of Sudan will mean working over decades to address issues and satisfy rights in each division over the supportive and development range. It will likewise contributed society's improvement in peace wise. The errand of setting up peace promotion methodologies is supported by critical will to succeed and oversee challenges. On the other hand, as in the North, administration difficulties focus – outskirts pressures and ridiculous uprisings that are as of noticeable in the South, diagram the challenges' size ahead. Without the difficulties and the contention coming about because of uprisings being tended to, human rights enforcement will keep on being influenced in the Republic of Sudan.

The referendum on the self-determination of Southern Republic of Sudan was described in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement as the final benchmark of the agreement, which was to end more than 20 years of civil conflict between the North and the South as noted by intrastate experts during a FGD. After more than 20 years of violent civil strife that displaced millions of Sudanese and resulted in the deaths of nearly 2 million people, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement brought hope for a transition from a state of conflict to development, democracy, and peace. Calling for democratic elections throughout Republic of Sudan, the agreement offered a more transparent, representative political structure for all Sudanese and a referendum there after the elections. It was confirmed during one of the FGD's who said that "the referendum called for by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Republic of Sudan and the Republic of Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), that it was expected to end more than 20 years of war".

The study established that Southern Republic of Sudan's self-determination referendum was the cornerstone and conclusion of the CPA, and probably the single nonnegotiable component of the agreement for southerners. The CPA ended the second of Republic of Sudan's two devastating civil wars and was the product of intense diplomacy on the part of the troika (as it was referred to) of international actors long engaged in conflict resolution in Republic of Sudan: the United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway and the east African regional organization known as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Those civil wars were driven by a complex array of factors, but at their core was the sense of exclusion, marginalization, and second-class citizenship felt by southerners, who deeply resented the political and economic dominance of the northern Sudanese elite, and the violence they perpetrated (UNMISS, 2007).

In 2005, the CPA established the semi-autonomous Government of Southern Republic of Sudan (GoSS), with its capital in Juba and led initially by John Garang, who served simultaneously as the president of the GoSS and the first vice president of all Republic of Sudan, under President Omar al-Bashir. Garang died in helicopter crash only weeks after the signing of the CPA and was replaced by his deputy, Salva Kiir. Crucially, the CPA allowed secession of south (UNMISS, 2007)

Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which led the southern rebellion during the second civil war and, during the CPA's interim period from 2005 to 2011, comprised roughly 150,000 soldiers. This was only one of the trappings of autonomy the south enjoyed during the interim period, during which it established its own ministries and representation abroad, issued travel documents, and inaugurated development projects. In important ways, the south was on its way to independence well before the January 2011 referendum (UNMIS, 2007).

According to Rugumamu, (2002), the domain of peace and security in Africa, the 1990s saw sensational

and significant changes across the continent. South Africa and Namibia being examples of countries in Africa continent that were said to have presented reasonably fair governments. Comparatively peace and robustness were built up in Mozambique after three decades of intrastate conflicts between different groups. All these were sure and critical signs toward progressing peace, unity and development in Africa. Despite many other parts of the world moving toward more prominent reliable, political and financial contribution, Africa remained one of the areas with instability. Political instability and intrastate Conflict turned out to be increasing persistent impeding development in Africa. Intrastate Conflict inherited from one to another country took centre stage in many nations around Africa. In spite of global community giving much consideration to African security undertakings, the continent institutional and hierarchical ability to deal with its pervasive conflicts was comparatively going hand in hand as these conflicts overtook them (Rugumamu, 2002). Alongside such background, administration of intrastate conflicts and checking of human rights violations in Africa rose as one of the eminent issues of significant development in international legislative laws. One of the high profile humanitarian experts said:

> The Republic of Sudan needs to carefully consider peace initiatives for the country to be able to manage intrastate conflicts affecting it through a wide array of peace initiatives. Initiatives led by the AU, UN, IGAD and the international community needs to be seriously followed through with all the concerned parties so that conflicts and human rights abuses can be contained. (Interview Schedule, UNHCR, 20th August, 2015)

Deng (2010) on referring to normative framework of sovereignty informs that the difficulties postured by intrastate and interstate conflicts have two perspectives. One is setting up and applying a successful arrangement of contention aversion, administration, and determination broadly, provincially, and all inclusive; the other is giving security and help to those influenced by conflict, whether through the violation of their central human rights or by being denied essential survival needs. In both cases, the state, the centerpiece of the global framework, is frequently not able or willing to give sufficient arrangements or cures, particularly as the administration is much of the time is to meet the contention and a chief focus of the requests for human rights assurance and compassionate help.

5. Conclusion

A functional structure made up of holons is called holarchy. The holons, in coordination with the local There are still up to present universal efforts to oversee intrastate conflicts checked especially where various international offices work with local organizations to avert the contentions surrounding ownership of resources and properties and post-struggle to prevent the re-occurrence of new conflicts. However the strategies that were in place did not work out well to a sustainable course. The need for cooperative engagement comes from the conviction that no single association or entity that has the capacity of managing intrastate conflicts by itself. Moreover, in nations with inter-cooperation of shared intercessions and coordination of efforts regularly develop more successful ways to deal with progress. The nations have good will to revive institutional, and reconstruct their legitimacy. The study therefore conclude that there is need for inventive examination on conflicts such as the ones experienced in Republic of Sudan that underscores the need to address the political economy of contention in enhancing conflict investigation and approach reactions. There is need for strategically culminating institutional recovery along social, financial, and political lines, and more important consideration regarding conflicts intervention and cooperation.

In managing intrastate conflicts and mitigating human rights violations in Republic of Sudan, there is need for sober approaches to getting lasting solutions that could see conflicts reduction in Republic of Sudan. As per the findings an incredible need to deal with the root causes of conflicts and find the amicable solutions after the war is inevitable. Therefore acceleration of efforts and honoring financial efforts to support various peace initiatives is mandatory to even foster building strong independent institutions within the country. Universal contribution in modifying the above frameworks is more than would normally be appropriate. For now, it is of extraordinary significance to help the influenced in Republic of Sudan either north or south, specifically, and Republic of Sudan, all in all. They gravely require security, medication and training. The Sudanese government and the radicals of the Republic of Sudan Individuals Freedom Development cannot bear to offer these fundamental administrations through solid institutions and financially support them. Worldwide help is required.

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