

Ideological Factors and Indonesia-Malaysia Political Relations 1961-1971

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Abstract

This article discusses the ideological factors and their impact upon Indonesia-Malaysia's political relations during the period 1961-1971. The ideological factors i.e. the democracy-capitalist and communist-socialist, greatly influenced the political relations between the two Southeast Asian countries during the bipolarity era. The ideological factors had a close relationship with the hegemonic powers' (the United States and the Soviet Union) activities in Malaysia and Indonesia. The nature of political relations between Malaysia and Indonesia was based upon ideological factors. The changes in political relations between Indonesia and Malaysia after 1965 were dominated by the changes of political ideology in Indonesia (i.e. from communist-socialist to democracy-capitalist). Indonesia after 1965 under Suharto's regime was a pro-capitalist state. The similar political ideology after 1965 between both countries influenced the political relations. The ideological factor was one of the vital factors in analysing Indonesia-Malaysia political relations during the period of 1961-1971.

Keywords: Indonesia, Malaysia, ideological factors, bipolarity, the United States, the Soviet Union..

1. Introduction.

This article discusses the ideological factors and their impact upon Indonesia-Malaysia's political relations during the period 1961-1971. The ideological factor is one of the important factors in the inter-state relations during the above period, where the struggle between the communist and capitalist ideology was a dominant issue in international relations during the Cold War period. Ideological competition affects the other factors such as economy, territorial and leader's perception. The ideological struggle between capitalist and communists seriously influenced the idiosyncratic and leaders' interpretation in foreign policy decision-making. The domestic political structure and foreign policy decision-making made the interpretation of the leaders' decisions important. The unique political landscape in East and Southeast Asia after 1950 (especially after the Korean War, Taiwan Straits crisis and Vietnam problem) made the ideological factor an important issue in foreign policy decisions and inter-state relations in the region. Both sides of great powers, the communist bloc and the capitalist bloc, placed high consideration upon the ideological factor in their decision-making. This article examines how the ideological factor was vital in the Indonesia-Malaysia's political relations; how this factor influenced the leader's interpretation in foreign policy decision-making, their relations with the hegemonic power, relations with political and economic factors and finally the ideological factor in Indonesia-Malaysia political relations; how the ideological factor influenced the hegemonic power to play her role in Southeast Asian regional affairs and the significance in understanding Indonesia-Malaysia's political relations.

2. Internal Ideological Crisis and Indonesian Politics: The Communist (PKI), Islam (Nahdatul Ulama and Masjumi), Nationalist (PNI) and the Army.

There were four political forces in Indonesia in the 1950's and the early 1960s; the PNI under Sukarno, PKI under Aidit, the Army and the Islamic political parties (Nahdatul Ulama and Masjumi). The split of Islamic parties between Nahdatul Ulama and Masjumi in the early 1950's, and then the banning of Masjumi by Sukarno in 1960, made the Islamic parties relatively weaker than before 1961. The political development in the late 1950's gave more benefit to PKI and PNI. Since the early 1960's, until the collapse of Sukarno's regime at the end of October 1965, only these two parties played an effective role in managing Indonesian politics. Prior to October 1965, the major role and political influence was under PNI and PKI leadership. It was only after the event of the 30th September 1965 that power went to the army's control. Subsequently, the army became more significant in Indonesian politics.

The Indonesian general election of 1955 (held on 26 September 1955) was the first general election held after Indonesia gained formal independence from the Netherlands in December 1949. There was no political party that obtained a strong majority and gained single support for establishing a secure and strong government. The PNI and Masjumi had great support in general elections, but both parties failed to obtain sufficient seats to form a stable government. PNI obtained 22.3 percent (8,434,653 voters), Masjumi 20.9 percent (7,903,886 voters), Nahdatul Ulama 18.4 percent (6,955,141 voters) and PKI 16.4 percent (6,176,914 voters) (Goh Cheng Teik, 1972). Only the above four political parties obtained big percentages and strong support by the Indonesian voters. In term of the parliament seats number, PNI and Masjumi obtained 57 seats respectively, Nahdatul Ulama 45

seats and PKI 39 seats. The coalition of PNI, NU and Masjumi with 159, seats formed a government in 1956. The political parties that were based on Islam (Nahdatul Ulama and Masjumi) had the possibility to become the strongest political party and to control Indonesian politics with 102 seats (Masjumi 57 seats and Nahdatul Ulama 45 seats). The different perception and clash between Nahdatul Ulama and Masjumi had split them and gave more chances to the PNI to be the major player in Indonesian politics. The government coalition between PNI, NU and Masjumi could not run any longer because of the ideological clashes between the PNI and Masjumi. The coalition collapsed thirteen months later. To strengthen the PNI's position in Indonesian politics, Sukarno created another coalition with the PKI as the new party in Sukarno's new political coalition. With the coalition with PNI, the PKI became stronger and played a more important role in Indonesian politics (Hindley, 1962). External support from China and the Soviet Union towards the Indonesian Communist Party and the Indonesian structure of politics, economy and social life contributed to the rise of the PKI in the late 1950's and early 1960's (Nadesan, 1979). The economic situation and the Indonesian social structure in 1950's gave chances to the PKI to attract support from the Indonesian mass population. The big percentages of poor people and rural economic reformation (Land Reformation Programme) under PKI and the roles played by the Labour Organization gave great benefit to PKI.

Other political parties such as Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia (PSII), Partai Kristian Indonesia (PARKINDO), Partai Katolik, Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI), Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (IPKI), Persatuan Tarbijah Islamijah (PERTI) and Partai Rakyat Nasional (PRN) obtained less than 5 percent of voters respectively. For a detailed number of voters, percentages and numbers of seats in parliaments of the 1955 Indonesian general elections refer to table 1 below.

Table 1 The Results of the Indonesian 1955 General Elections.

Political Party	Number of voters	Percentage	Number of Seats
Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI)	8,434,653	22.3	57
Masjumi	7,903,886	20.9	57
Nahdat ul-Ulama (NU)	6,955,141	18.4	45
Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI)	6,176,914	16.4	39
Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia (PSII)	1,091,160	2.9	8
Partai Kristian Indonesia (PARKINDO)	1,003,325	2.6	8
Partai Katolik	770,740	2.0	6
Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI)	753,191	2.0	5
Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (IPKI)	541,306	1.4	4
Persatuan Tarbijah Islamijah (PERTI)	483,014	1.3	4
Partai Rakyat Nasional (PRN)	242,125	0.6	2
Others	3,429,844	9.2	22
Total/percentage	37,785,299	100.0	257

Source: Goh Cheng Teik, 1972, "Why Indonesia's Attempt at Democracy in the Mid-1950s failed," *Modern Asian Studies*, 6(2), 229.

The PNI, under President Sukarno's leadership, was not the strongest political party. PNI did not obtain strong support from the mass population and failed to establish a stable and strong national government. Sukarno required to co-operate with the NU and the PKI in forming a stable central government after Masjumi withdrew from the coalition in 1956. From the 1955 election result, the PKI quickly improved their support especially on the island of Java. Java island was the most important island in Indonesian politics because almost fifty percent of the Indonesian population lived in Java. The mass population support towards the PKI dramatically improved after 1955. The mass support towards the PKI can be seen obviously in the election in the province of Java's in 1957. In the local and regional elections held in Java in the second half of 1957, the PKI received 27.4 percent of the votes. PKI votes in Java increased from 5,477,707 in Indonesian General Election 1955 to 7,514,197 in the local and regional election in 1957 (Hindley, 1962: 917). The PKI was the strongest party in that province's election.

Many factors contributed to the rising and great support of the PKI. The new leadership under Aidit, (and other top leaders such as Lokman and Nyoto), a young and charismatic leader attracted the mass population support to

the PKI, especially of the young generation, to give their support and be actively involved in the Communist Party programme. The PKI social programme and social planning, included land reformation in Java, labour organisation and systematic youth organisation for the young generation, was successful. All of the PKI programmes gave a positive impact to the PKI which rapidly increased support.

Land Reformation was important because most of the peasants in Java were very poor and landless. On the other side there was a very small number of landlords that were very rich and possessed huge areas of land. The Land Reformation, under the communist party, paid attention towards a mass population in Java (where almost 50 percent of the Indonesian population lived) because they hoped that such a programme could solve the mass population problem and improve their standard of living, especially for the poor peasants. The communist ideology and their mass programme succeeded in attracting a big percentage of the population in Java, especially the lower social groups and poor peasants in rural areas.

The PKI under Aidit's leadership was very powerful and systematic in their political management. Most contemporary scholars and some world leaders believed that within less than ten years, the communist party would succeed in controlling Indonesian politics through a general election. The Indonesian domestic political problem between Java and non-Java, i.e. the rivalry between political leaders from Java and outside Java gave advantages to the Communist Party. One of the factors which contributed to Sukarno's co-operation with PKI was the 'Javanese spirit' (Nationalist and PKI were the two political parties that were strongly supported by Javanese). Co-operation among the PNI (Indonesian National Party), NU (Nahdatul Ulama) and PKI was based on the 'Javanese spirit' and was not based on the same political ideology (Jamal, 1986). President Khrushchev of the Soviet Union, during his visit to Indonesia in 1961, believed that the PKI would be successful in controlling Indonesia through a general election (Singh, 1994). With great financial support from the Soviet Union and also from China (after 1963), the PKI's membership and its influence increased rapidly.

Since the early 1960s, the PKI leadership was closer to President Sukarno and had great influence in Indonesian foreign policy decision-making. The Indonesian foreign policy was leaning towards the communists since the early 1960's. The PKI ideology and their leaders in NASAKOM's cabinet played an effective role in Indonesian politics and Indonesian foreign policy decisions. Indonesia's foreign policy since the late 1950's had influenced her relations with Southeast Asian democracy-capitalists. The political relations with Malaysia was very chill in the early 1960's because Malaysia's policy was anti-communist. The Malaysian strategy to contain communism in Singapore was strongly rejected by the PKI Indonesia, and then supported by Foreign Minister Subandrio and President Sukarno. Ideological factors played a significant role in Indonesia-Malaysia's political relations. The hostility and bad relations since May 1961 (the date when the prime minister of Federation of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman declared the Federation of Malayan intention of unification with Republic of Singapore for the purpose of containing communism in the South East Asian region) until late 1965 was dominated by the ideological struggle between communist-socialist and democratic-capitalist.

3. The Competing Ideology in Indonesian Politics (Communist, Nationalist, Religion (Islam) and the Army).

There were four dominant groups based on the ideologies of the Indonesian politics before 1965; namely, Nationalists under President Sukarno, PKI under Aidit, Islamic parties and the Army. Some scholars divided into three competing groups in Indonesian Politic before 1965 (Sukarno, PKI and the Army), but the author thinks Islam groups were also important in Indonesian politioecs because Masjumi and Nahdatul Ulama were two parties based on Islam. In General Elections 1955 both parties obtained great support from mass population. The 1956 rebellion also was strongly supported and actively involved by the members and leaders of Masjumi Party. President Sukarno's party, the PNI did not have enough strong support to form a strong and stable national government. In order to strengthen the party and his position in Indonesian politics, Sukarno introduced a political philosophy, called 'guided democracy' where he combined the Nationalist, religious and communists in his government. He called it Nasakom (NASAKOM is a acronym of N stand for nationalist, A for 'agama' or religion, and KOM for komunis or communist)..

Nationalists, Communists, Islam and the Army group were the four competing groups in Indonesian politics before 1965. Islamic ideologies were important political group in Indonesian politics. Masjumi was banned by Sukarno in 1960 after Masjumi Party was evidently involved in the 1958 regional rebellion. Muslim political parties were strong political forces in Indonesian politics. The split between Masjumi and Nahdat ul-Ulama in 1952 gave a disadvantage to Muslim political parties. Islamic political forces became weaker with that split. The split between Islamic political groups, with the forming of Nahdatul Ulama, benefited the Nationalist and communist groups. The political rivalry between various political parties became less after 1965, when the army under General Suharto took power with great support by America (Scott, 1985). The general election was held in 1971, after five years of consolidating the political process taken by General Suharto. Golkar's party, under President Suharto, gained strong support in the 1971 general elections. Under the 'new order' government, the PKI and other organisations, such as SOBSI (Trade Union Federation) and BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia or

Indonesian Peasants' Association) that had relations with the communists were banned. Most of the leaders and members of PKI were killed or imprisoned during the period of October 1965 until 1969. Millions of PKI members and ethnic Chinese were killed, especially a few months after Gestapu. The diplomatic relations with China were frozen soon after the 30 September 1965 events ((Rizal Sukma, 1999).

After the 1971 general elections the political parties that were strong in 1955 general elections became too weak. Golkar obtained 236 parliamentary seats with 62.82 percent voters. PNI, NU and Parmusi (Parmusi stand for Partai Muslim Indonesia or Muslim Party of Indonesian, were strongly supported by the former Masjumi members) were too weak compared to their achievements in the 1955 general elections. PNI under Sukarno, the strongest political party in 1955 general election, only obtained 6.93 percentages of voters (or 20 parliamentary seats, out of 360 seats). Parmusi obtained 5.36 percentages with only 24 seats. Only the NU increased the percentage to 18.68 percentages of voters, from 18.4 percentages in 1955 general elections (with 58 seats in parliament). Golkar, under President Suharto, with 236 seats in parliament became the strongest political party in Indonesia after 1971. Another 100 appointed seats in parliament were dominated by the army which controlled 75% of the appointed seats. With strong political power, Suharto successfully managed the politics and economic development. For the economic improvement and political consolidation, Suharto turned towards Western capitalist countries. With strong support from the West, the Indonesian economy recovered rapidly. The political relations with capitalist countries improved dramatically under President Suharto after 1965 for the creation of a new economic and political sphere in Southeast Asia. All of the changes in Indonesia were dominated by the changes in the Indonesian domestic ideology.

4. President Sukarno and the Indonesian Communist Ideology.

Sukarno was an Indonesian nationalist and the father of Indonesian independence. He was a great symbol of Indonesian nationalism and Indonesian politics. He did not embrace the communist ideology and did not give support to the communists in the early years of independence. In 1948 his administration squashed the Communist revolt in Madiun. The changes in the political scenario after the mid-1950s changed Sukarno's attitude and his policy towards Indonesian communism.

The internal political problems and international political structure made him lean towards the communist ideology. At the national level Sukarno co-operated with the Indonesian Communist Party under Aidit's leadership. The 1955 Indonesian general election and the split of the alliance cabinet (PNI, Masjumi and Nahdatul Ulama in 1956) influenced Sukarno to co-operate with the communists. The co-operation with the communists at the top national level gave more chances for the communists to spread the communist ideology to the mass Indonesian population. The pro-communist government servants and Indonesian senior officers increased after 1955. The education department and its institution also played a significant role in strengthening communism in Indonesian society (Thomas, 1981). With the support by Aidit and Sukarno, the pro-communist government played an effective role in spreading communist ideology in Indonesia, especially in Java.

Indonesian relations with Western countries were quite cool under Sukarno's administration. The national domestic struggle for power and international political power configuration between the West and East prompted Sukarno to co-operate with the PKI (at the national level) and to make closer relations with the communist bloc in his external and international relations (Range, 1966). Such foreign policy is important in the bipolar structure of international relations. The communist powers, the Soviet Union and China, took the advantages by giving their support to the Indonesian communist activities in achieving their political and economic spheres' objective. The domestic level became more effective and easier to run the communist activities with moral and financial support from international communism. The protection and co-operation given by the Indonesian President was one of the main factors for the rapid spread of communism in Indonesia in the late 1950's and early 1960's.

Indonesian colonial history under the Dutch and Dutch economic and political policy towards native Indonesia has influenced Sukarno's relations towards Western countries. The nature of Indonesia's struggle for independence, especially during the period 1945-1949, also influenced Sukarno's foreign policy that was very chilly towards the Western countries. Domestic political struggles (PKI, PNI, Islamic political parties and the Army) and competing ideologies influenced Sukarno to ally with the communists, which then influenced domestic administration and Indonesian foreign policy.

Ideology and the spirit of anti-colonialism also influenced Indonesian relations with China. The Soviet Union's support of Indonesia's struggle with the Dutch (in the late 1950s until the West Irian issue settled in May 1962) and Western countries influenced the relations with her in the early years after independence. China and the Soviet Union also gave their support to West Irian issues in the late 1950's. China's authorisation for Indonesia to control the whole southern part of East Asia and the Malay Archipelago regions and Southeast Asia encouraged Sukarno to lean towards China in his foreign policy. From Sukarno's perspective, China and Indonesia were the two regional superpowers in the East Asian region. Sukarno did not allow the interference of Western/foreign powers in the political affairs of the Asian region. According to Sukarno, neo-colonialism

should be stopped in the region after 1945. The local powers should play a more active role. The emergence of Western powers, especially the United States in the Southeast Asian region, was unwelcome into the region. In Sukarno's view, the West must be driven out from Southeast Asia, especially in the Malay world and the Malay (native leaders) should be given an opportunity to manage their own region.

Sukarno's foreign policy was different with vice-president Mohd Hatta. Mohd Hatta was pro-West in his foreign relations (Rizal Sukma, 1999). Hatta's policy towards communism was different from Sukarno at the domestic and international levels. The national policy towards the communists was one of the factors that influenced the split between Sukarno and Hatta. Hatta's resignation in 1956 and the unsuccessful 1958 regional rebellion paved the way for Sukarno to lean to and make closer relations with the communist countries. Hatta had different views from Sukarno. He argued that communism should not be allowed to play an active role in Indonesian politics. Co-operation with Western powers was essential for political stability and economic development. The resignation of vice-president Hatta in 1956 and then the collapse of 'parliamentary democracy' (replaced with 'Guided Democracy') in 1959 prompted President Sukarno to control and dominate the Indonesian economy and politics. Sukarno's political policy and socialist economy were responsible for economic catastrophe in the early 1960s and the confrontation with the West/and pro-West Southeast Asian countries.

5. Ideological Factor and Political Conditions in Malaysia.

This part will discuss the ideological factor and political conditions in Malaysia. The main discussions are; the experience of the Malaysian struggle against the communists, the 'emergency' period 1948-1960, the communist movement and the political conditions in Singapore in the early 1960's, the communist movement in Sarawak, the Brunei revolt of December 1962 and Indonesian support. The Alliance government of Malaysia and its anti-communist philosophy are within the main discussion. The discussion will be related to the relations with Indonesia and how these factors have influenced the Indonesia-Malaysia relations.

5.1 Communist Ideology and Malayan Emergency Period 1948-1960:

Malay(si)a had a bitter experience in its struggle against the communist insurgency from 1948 until 1960. Malayan infrastructure, economic and social facilities were destroyed by the communist activities during the twelve years' emergency period. The Malayan Communist Party was strongly supported by Mainland China. To the Malayan people (especially the Malays), communist ideology was linked with fear and rebellion. The Malayan Communist Party was illegal in Malaya and the communist ideology totally different from the philosophy of the Malayan Alliance Party (UMNO, MCA and MIC), the leading political party in Malaysian government. It was different from the position of the PKI in Indonesia, where the Communist Party of Indonesia was a legal political organisation and active in Indonesian politics, especially after the 1955 general elections and under 'the guided democracy' of Sukarno. In Indonesia the PKI were supported by the native Indonesian people, but not in Malaysia (the majority of the Malay/native people rejected the Communist). The popularity of the PKI in certain provinces in Indonesia (especially in Java) was much better than the PNI's support and other major Indonesian political parties. Most of the communist leaders and members in Malaysia were from a Chinese ethnic background. The number of Malays who joined the Communist Party was very small. The communist movement from 1948-1960 in Malay(si)a was considered by the Malays as an effort by the Chinese ethnic to take over Malayan politics and administration from the Malay leadership, led by UMNO.

5.2 Singaporean Politics and the Communist Movement in the early 1960's.

The communist activities and political conditions in Singapore in the early 1960's were one of the important factors in the creation of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963 (Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud, 2000). The idea of Singapore's unification with Malaya and a federation of British colonies in Southeast Asia were not really new. The idea and suggestions of the creation of a federation for the British colonies in South East Asia was raised by the British officers and local native politician before May 1961 (before Second World War, in the 1930s) The idea of unification had emerged a few times before the 1960's, but there was no significant reason for the British government to support the idea of unification. The political development in Singapore, i.e. the communist threat and political ideological rivalries between the communists and democratic-capitalist' political groups in Singapore in the early 1960's, raised the issue for unification.

The communist political development and ideological rivalries in Southeast Asia, i.e. the development in Indochina (the conflict between North and South Vietnam) and the position and achievement of the Indonesian communist party under Chairman Aidit affected the political development in Singapore. The formation of a federation and the unification of the whole of the British colonies in Southeast Asia in the early 1960's was related to the communist expansion and political development in the Southeast Asian region. Ideological rivalries between communists and capitalists were among the important factors in contributing to the unification of the Federation of Malaya, British colonies in Borneo and Singapore in the early 1960's. The British agreed to free her colonies so that the communism expansion could be contained.

Singapore's pro-West government, under Lee Kuan Yew, had faced serious threats from the Communists' political groups since the early 1960's. When the Malayan Communist Party failed to control the Malayan

Federation in 1960, after twelve years of military struggles with the Malayan government from 1948 to 1960, many of the Malayan communists moved to Singapore. They became actively involved in trade unions, the Chinese association, Chinese schools and Chinese political parties in Singapore. The new strategies of the communists were to influence and control the support from the various Chinese Associations in urban Chinese areas, instead of military and guerrilla struggles in the Malayan jungles.

Some of the members of the Singapore People's Action Party led by Lee Kuan Yew were also influenced by the communist political ideology. Some of the PAP members argued and raised open criticisms for the party leadership in the matter of party attitude and policy towards the illegal Malayan Communist Party. In cleaning the PAP party from the communist influence, Lee Kuan Yew took action to sack the communist sympathisers who were members of PAP. The left wing of the PAP (communist sympathisers) formed a new party, 'the Barisan Sosialis' (Socialist Front). The by-election in 1961 was vitally important for the PAP because it was a test as to whether the PAP could gain support for the future political position in the city state of Singapore. The Socialists Front candidate (who openly supported the communist political ideology) defeated the PAP candidate with a secured majority. Mr. Ong Eng Guan (from Barisan Sosialis/supported communist ideology) obtained 7,747 votes and defeated PAP candidates who only obtained 2,820 votes. Ong Eng Guan's victory was more than a personal triumph, as it had great implications for Singapore's future politics and the communist ideology. The by-election result meant that the PAP government was fast losing support from Singapore voters and the communist ideology was widely accepted by the Singapore populations (Lee Kuan Yew, 1998).

The communists had a political plan to control Singapore through general elections. The development of communist sympathisers and their achievements in the early 1960's in Singapore made the PAP very worried. The long-term communist plan was to make Singapore 'the Cuba' of Southeast Asia. The big Chinese majority of the Singapore population would contribute to the reality of communist political ambition in Singapore. If the communists succeeded to control Singapore politics, it would also control the economy and trade in the Southeast Asian region because Singapore was the international business centre in Southeast Asia. The situation would threaten the British economy and security position in Southeast Asia. Malaya and Singapore was the key for the British economy and political policy in Southeast Asia. This situation would encircle Malaysia and Thailand. A strong alliance position of PNI-PKI in Indonesia would benefit them with the communist position in Singapore. The communist political achievement in Indochina would also threaten the pro-West political parties in Malaya and Singapore.

The political development in Singapore in the early 1960's created a strong force for the creation of the unification of all of the British colonies under one administration, i.e. the formation of the Federation of Malaysia. One of the reasons for the formation of Malaysia was to avoid Singapore from becoming a communist city-state. Singapore was important for the political, economic, strategic and communist-capitalist ideological rivalry in Southeast Asia.

5.3 Communist Ideology and its movement in Sarawak/the British Borneo.

Communist activities and their movements in Sarawak/British Borneo was dominated by the Chinese ethnic community. Communist activities in Sarawak had close relations with Mainland China and Indonesian communists. In the years before 1960 the communist movement and activities were supported by Mainland China. The regional political development and the conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia affected the communist movement in Sarawak and other parts of British Borneo. Sarawak was the biggest state in British Borneo. The position of the Chinese in Sarawak's population structure was significant in Sarawak politics. In the early 1960's the Chinese were the majority in Sarawak. The total of Chinese in Sarawak was 244,000 with the highest average annual rate of increase (about 3.5%) (Kroef, 1966). The role played by the 'Chinese Sarawakian' and the geographical location of Sarawak was significant in understanding the communist movement in Sarawak. Sarawak's geographical location was vital in explaining Sarawak communism and their relations with Indonesian communists, especially during the confrontation period.

The first communist association in Sarawak appeared during World War II called 'Sarawak anti-Fascist League'. This organisation harassed the Japanese occupation. In October 1951 the anti-Fascist League formed the 'Sarawak Overseas Chinese Democratic League'. The organisation participated and was actively involved with the Chinese youth in Sarawak and maintained a radical left group in Singapore.

The Sarawak Advanced Youth Association (SAYA) was founded in 1954. SAYA was an important organisation in the 'Clandestine Communist Organisation' (CCO). CCO was formed with the combination of a few groups such as Sarawak Farmers Association (SFA), a number of underground youth groups composed of student and alumni of some of the private Chinese schools and some elements in the Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP). The hardcore of CCO strength was estimated at about 2,000 in the early 1960's and with a 4,000 militant fringe (1,000 of the militant fringe crossed the Indonesian border to receive guerrilla training) and at least 10,000 fellow travellers and latent sympathisers (Kroef, 1966). The objective of the CCO was to achieve Sarawak's independence and self-government and the establishment of a new democratic society as an introduction to a

socialist society and finally a communist society. SAYA and SFA was formally banned by the Malaysian government, but continued to act as a principal recruitment channel. The banning of CCO was taken over by the North Kalimantan National Liberation League (NKNLL) in 1964. NKNLL was designed to win broad support among different population groups and served as the core of an inter-racial communist mass movement. In late December 1964 the Malaysian government had smashed the NKNLL activities.

SUPP was also a useful front for the Sarawak communist activities. SUPP was established in 1959, the oldest Sarawak Political Party. This party dominated by the Chinese ethnic. Before the formation of Federation of Malaysia, SUPP was the only political party to oppose the formation of Federation of Malaysia. The majority members of SUPP were Chinese. In 1964 the total of SUPP membership was 42,000. Only 10,000 of the total members were non-Chinese (Kroef, 1966). The Chinese dominated the party and were involved with communist activities. In May 1964 the SUPP branch at Lundu had been closed down because they were being used as a vehicle for CCO activities in the dissemination of communist propaganda and in giving support to Indonesian terrorists. SUPP branches in Sarikei and Jakar were also involved with communist activities. According to the SUPP co-operation with communists, both branches were closed down in September 1965. SUPP leaders protested the ban of both SUPP branches.

The communist movement in Sarawak had relationships with the political development in Indonesia and Singapore. The communist influence in Indonesian politics and confrontational policy towards Malaysia motivated the communist spirit in Sarawak. Sarawak communists co-operated with Indonesian guerrillas along the Indonesian border during the confrontation era. Since 1963 at least one thousand of young Sarawak Chinese males crossed into Kalimantan Indonesia for training in a number of Indonesian Marine Corps and para-military camps along the Indonesian border. Most of these Chinese youth participated in Indonesian guerrilla attacks on Sarawak. Some of them joined the 'National Army of North Borneo' backed by A.M. Azahari. Sarawak communists co-operated closely with the Indonesians to achieve the communist objective. Many of the young Chinese in Sarawak were proud of the achievement of Communist China and felt that what occurred in Mainland China should be done in Sarawak. Communists should control the state of Sarawak. The co-operation with Indonesia was a means of how to achieve their objective.

Singapore's withdrawal from the Federation on 9 August 1965 affected the communist activities and political situation in Sarawak. In September 1965 SUPP raised the banner of secessionism, demanding a plebiscite to determine if the state should remain in the Federation of Malaysia. The SUPP left-wings and communist supporters handled these activities. The left-wing or Beijing-oriented dominated the SUPP in the mid-1960's. SUPP split into two groups in the mid-1965. The left wing (Beijing Oriented) was influenced by the communists and had close relations with the Sarawak communism. The right wing was moderate or called 'social democratic'.

The Malaysian and British government were responsible for containing the communist activities in Sarawak. One of the communist objectives was to destroy the Federation of Malaysia and to form the state of Sarawak as an independent communist state. Sarawak's communist state had support from the outside, especially from China and Indonesia. For the British the fighting against the communist movement in Sarawak was a part of international communist struggles. The left wing political party and communist struggle in Sarawak failed to create a communist state when the confrontation with Indonesia ended in 1966. The right wing (Democratic Party) dominated and controlled the state of Sarawak. A pro-Malaysia political party formed a stable government in Sarawak.

5.4 The Brunei Rebellion of 1962.

The Brunei rebellion in December 1962 had significant relations with Indonesia and a vital impact upon Brunei's decision to withdraw from joining the Federation of Malaysia. It was a protest to the Sultan of Brunei who supported joining the formation of the Federation of Malaysia. Sheikh A.M. Azahari led the Brunei Rebellion 1962 from Parti Rakyat Brunei, (Brunei People's Party). A.M. Azahari was formerly a leader in the Indonesian Revolution 1945-1949 and was closely related with Sukarno's Indonesia. With the rebellion of December 1962, the Sultan of Brunei changed his decision (in the earlier stage the Sultan gave the support and agreed to join the Federation of Malaysia) to not join the Malaysian Federation. This rebellion was strongly backed by the Indonesians, especially the communist party and other left wing groups in Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak, such as the Malayan Labour Party in Malaya and SNAP in Sarawak. Azahari, with support from the communists and left-wing in British colonies, had another plan to form The North Kalimantan Federation States (consist of Brunei, Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak (Smith, 1963).

The rebellion was one of the struggles between the two ideologies. A.M. Azahari was supported by the Indonesian government, (especially the PKI and other Communist countries, namely China), and the Federation of Malaysia's pro-West was strongly supported by Great Britain, Commonwealth countries (especially Australia and New Zealand) and America.

5.5 The Alliance Political Party in Malaysia (UMNO-MCA-MIC).

The Malaysian Alliance Party led by Tunku Abdul Rahman was anti-communist. The Alliance Party was an

alliance among the Malay Party (United Malay National Organisation or UMNO), Chinese ethnic groups (Malayan Chinese Association or MCA) and Indian ethnic groups (Malayan Indian Congress or MIC). All of the top leaders in the Malaysian Alliance Party were Western educated and pro-West in political philosophy. Educational background, British influence and the emergency experience in Malaya from 1948 to 1960 were among the factors that influenced the Malaysian Alliance Party to be anti-communist and also into having close relations with Western countries, especially Great Britain.

The favours of British and other Western powers during the early days after independence and the way of Malaya in achieving independence from the British also contributed to the Alliance party leaders leaning towards the West and anti-communists. Malaya and Indonesia differed greatly in their ways of achieving their independence. Federation of Malaya achieved her independence by negotiation and peaceful ways, but Republic of Indonesia with hard struggle and five years of revolution war (1945-1949). Most of the Alliance Party leaders and Malayan Cabinet ministers were involved directly in the independence negotiation with British. The top leaders were also involved in the Baling Talks in 1955 between the Malayan government and Malayan Communist Party. The negotiations of 1955 failed to curb the communist movement in Malaya. All of these developments influenced and contributed to the Alliance Party of Malaya becoming anti-communist.

Although Malaya gained independence from Great Britain in 1957, Great Britain was still responsible for protecting Malaya from external and internal threats. AMDA was signed between Malaya and Great Britain within a week after gaining independence. The MCP's struggle in Malaya became active and threatened the Malayan Government because the MCP was supported by the Mainland China and Soviet Union. After Sino-Soviet split in 1963, MCP was closer to China.

The communist movement was different between Malaya and Indonesia. In Malaya, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was an illegal organisation, but PKI was a legal political party in Indonesia. PKI in Indonesia was a legal party, strongly supported by Indonesians who participated actively in the Indonesian general elections. Sukarno formed a political ally with the communists in 1956 after breaking the alliance with the Islamic party (Masjmi, Madjelis Sjura Muslimin Indonesia). PNI Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party), under President Sukarno and UMNO Malaya (The United Malays National Organisation), under Tunku Abdul Rahman, were totally different in terms of their perception towards the communist party. These differences influenced their perception, of the communist party in their home country and their foreign policy decisions towards communist countries. The interpretation and relations with communists were important factors in explaining the relations between Malaysia and Indonesia during the Sukarno era.

6. Soviet Union, China and Indonesian Foreign Relations.

This part will discuss the ideological factor, and the significance of Indonesia's foreign relations and the impact upon Indonesian domestic policy. Among the main discussions are: the Indonesian-Soviet Union relations, Indonesian-China relations, Communist ideology and Indonesian relations with Eastern European countries.

Indonesia had close relations with the Soviet Union and China since the late 1950s. (Nadesan, 1979). After the Sino-Soviet split in 1963, Indonesia became closer to China than the Soviet Union. Indonesia-Soviet Union relations became chill after the 'new order' regime took power in Indonesia in March 1966. The role played by the PKI was important in the Indonesian decision towards the East bloc. Sukarno's dilemma in domestic politics gave an advantage to the communist ideology under Aidit to strengthen the communist ideology in Indonesian politics and Sukarno's government. The communist leadership under Aidit gave their support to almost all of the national policies under Sukarno (e.g. in the West Irian campaign and policy of confrontation with Malaysia). It was important for the communists to attract Sukarno to be closer to them. On Sukarno's side, he needed the PKI to balance the army's power and to encourage the rural population's support for the government (Feith, 1964). After the banning of Masjumi, Sukarno hoped the PKI would control the rural peasants to support his government. The role played by the PKI members in Sukarno's cabinet had influenced Sukarno's decision to lean towards the communist bloc, China and Soviet Union.

The foreign policy and relations towards the communist countries changed when the PKI influence was destroyed after the Indonesian Coup in 1965 (Nadesan, 1979). The new army leader, President Suharto, replaced President Sukarno. The army took power after 1965. The army was anti-communist and pro-West. The changes in the national ideology after 1965 gave a direct impact to the Indonesian foreign relations. The 'new order' government changed the Indonesian foreign policy direction. After 1965 the foreign relations of Indonesia moved closer towards the Western countries. Domestic politics are one important factor which determined Indonesian foreign policy. The domestic politics after 1965 gave a direct impact to the changes in Indonesian foreign policy. The relations with capitalist Southeast Asian countries improved. The confrontation policy towards Malaysia ceased in 1966.

6.1 Indonesia-Soviet Union Relations.

Indonesia had close relations with the Soviet Union since the mid-1950s (Hindley, 1963). The close relations could be seen in state official visits between the two countries, aids, loans and investment from the Soviet to

Indonesia, military, technology and weapons support to Indonesia and moral support to Indonesian struggles (such as West Irian Campaign, and confrontation with Malaysia) (Derkach, 1965).

After the Sino-Soviet split in 1963 the relations between Indonesia-Soviet slightly changed, but Indonesia still received military and financial support from the Soviet Union (Derkach, 1965). In the Indonesian crisis with the West Bloc in the 1960's, the Soviet Union still gave her support to Indonesia. Technological support, military training and equipment continued until the 'new order' administration formed their cabinet in 1966. On the day that President Sukarno's cabinet was dissolved, the Soviet Union called back all of her experts to Indonesia. It was in March 1966.

Indonesia still had close relations with the Soviet Union until the fall of Sukarno, after the Indonesian coup of 1965. Four months after the coup, the Soviet Union still had good relations with Indonesia. In February 1966, General Nasution assured the Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal Malinowski, that the Indonesian armed forces hoped for closer co-operation with the Soviet armed forces. The Indonesian armed forces were still being trained in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union and Indonesia was expecting the remainder of the Soviet Union's modern equipment for the air force under the executing purchase contract. Indonesia-Soviet relations were finally destroyed with the 'new order' decision given to the Indonesian communists. The death sentence of Nyoto, a communist leader on February 1966 and the arrest of fifteen Indonesian ministers in March 1966 (under Sukarno), totally changed the Indonesia-Soviet relations. The Soviet Union called back her 60-70 Soviet technical experts to Indonesia. The chill in Soviet-Indonesia's relations began. The changes in Indonesian political leadership and her philosophy influenced the cold relations with the Soviet Union.

6.2 Indonesia-China Relations.

Ideological factors played an important role in Indonesia-China relations. Since Sukarno's state visit to China in 1956, the relations between the two countries improved constantly. The relationship was severed in 1965 when the political ideology changed in Jakarta.

The PKI influence in Indonesian politics and Sukarno's domestic dilemma forced Indonesia to make closer relations with China during Sukarno's administration. It was started in 1956 when the PKI-PNI political coalition was formed. The PKI took a significant role in managing Indonesian politics after 1956. The PKI took over the roles played by the Masjumi before the broken coalition in 1956. The banning of Masjumi and PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia, Indonesian Socialist Party) in 1960 made the PKI stronger in Sukarno's government. Relations with China's communists improved with the role played by the PKI based upon the communist ideological and international communist co-operation.

Under Sukarno's regime, Indonesia was China's best hope in Asia as a potentially powerful and strategically located anti-western force complementing Chinese policy (Bert, 1975). China invited Sukarno to Beijing in 1956 and proceeded to consolidate further ties with Indonesia through aid, trade and technical assistance.

The Indonesia-China relations dramatically changed after the Indonesian Coup of 1965. There was little chance of good relations between China and General Suharto's regime from the beginning. The significant factor was the ideology. The allegation that China was actively involved and supported the PKI in the 1965 coup was one reason to explain to the Indonesian mass population in the early period after the 1965 event. The discussion about the factor related to the outbreak of Indonesian Coup 1965 is discussed in details in the later part in this article. Whether the coup was supported and the PKI responsible was not important in explaining the Indonesia-China relations after 1965. The coup was officially declared by Suharto's regime that the PKI had led it and was responsible for the death of six generals. The Indonesian mass population's perception in the years after GESTAPU was that the communists were responsible for the coup. The key point was Suharto's policy which was anti-communist and pro West. The PKI's and communist ideology must be destroyed for the 'new order' policy's survival.

Suharto reoriented his foreign policy by repairing relations with the West, renegotiated the massive debts left over from Sukarno's period with Western countries, solicited aid from Japan and Western countries and opened the country up to foreign investment (Mahajani, 1967). Suharto's pro-West and anti-communist leaning influenced Indonesian foreign relations and regional co-operation in the Southeast Asian region. Indonesia's relations with China were frozen from 1966 until 1990. The frozen relationship was dominated by Suharto's anti-communist policy and the 'new order' political survival. The rapprochement in 1990 was due to the changes of China's leadership and the new economic policy in China. The collapse of the Cold War at an international level also influenced Indonesia's decision. The changes in the international political structure and liberal economic policy in China led to the Indonesia-China rapprochement.

6.3 Indonesian Relations with Eastern European Countries.

Indonesian relations with Eastern European countries (Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Poland and Bulgaria) were determined by the domestic political and ideological factors in Indonesia. The relationship was different during the period before and after 1965 because of the changed domestic politics in Indonesia. Indonesia had good relations with Eastern Europe since the late 1950's until the fall of Sukarno after the September event in 1965. The ideological factor played an important role in the relations with communist

countries in Eastern Europe. Indonesia had received aids, loans and investment from Eastern Europe since the mid-1950's. The East European aids and agreement with Indonesia can be seen in table 2. Indonesian relations with the communist bloc changed after 1965. The new Indonesian government under President Suharto banned the PKI. After the banning of the PKI and the rise of the 'new order' regime, Indonesian relations with communist countries in Eastern Europe changed dramatically.

Table 2. East European Aid and Agreement with Indonesia.

Dates	Country/amount
February 1955	East German loan of USD 9.2 millions.
March 1955	Romanian loan of approximately USD 2 millions
May 1956	Czech loan of USD 1.6 millions.
1957	Czech loan of USD 0.8 millions.
1958	Czech loan of USD 6 millions.
1958	Polish loan of USD 39.1 millions.
1959	Polish loan of USD 5 millions.
September 1959	Czech loan of USD 14 millions.
July 1960	Czech loan of USD 33.8 millions.
1960	East German loan – amount unknown.
May 1961	Bulgarian loan of USD 5 millions.
August 1961	Polish loan of USD 30.1 millions.
September 1961	Hungarian loan of USD 29.6 millions.
November 1961	Romanian offer of USD 50 millions.

Source: Hindley, D., 1963. *Pacific Affairs*, 36 (2), summer 1963, 108-109.

7. Indonesian Relations with Western Countries (The Changed Policy towards Western countries after 1965).

Since the late 1950s (after the implementation of 'Guided Democracy' and the collapse of Parliamentary democracy in Indonesia in 1959), Indonesian relations with Western countries, especially the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands, were not very good. Sukarno's political philosophy of 'Guided Democracy,' socialist economic ideology and communist influence in Indonesian government contributed to the nature of Indonesian external policy towards Western countries. The relations with the Western bloc only changed after 1965 when the new government under Suharto replaced Sukarno. The Suharto regime played a dominant role in the new feature of Indonesian foreign policy. The banning of the PKI in March 1966 diminished the whole communist institution in Indonesia. The 'new order' regime led by President Suharto was responsible for reforming the nature of Indonesian external relations to lean towards capitalist policy, instead of pro-communist, as before.

The communist ideology and its political position in the Indonesian government was very strong during the 'Guided Democracy' era. Aidit's leadership was very successful in dominating Indonesian politics during the period from the early 1960s until 1965. During this period, Indonesian relations with the Western countries were very cold. After the banning of the communist party in March 1966 by the 'new order' government, the new era in Indonesian relations with the Western bloc began. The relationship improved rapidly after 1967.

Indonesian relations with the West bloc during the period before and after 1965 were totally different. The ideological factor played a significant role in determining relations with the West. The period 1961-1965 suffered bad relations. During this period Indonesia was closer to the East and the communist bloc after the resignation of vice-president of Mohamed Hatta in 1956. During Hatta's period there were good relations with the Western countries (Rizal Sukma, 1999). The better relations with Western countries improved during the period 1966-1971. The ideological factor in the Indonesian government was an important factor in influencing the differences in Indonesian foreign policy towards the West bloc during both periods. Indonesian relations with Western countries improved after the political upheaval in Indonesia after 1967.

Relations with America were bad during the 'Guided Democracy' era until 1966. The relations improved after 1966. The main factor was the domestic political ideology in Indonesia. After the fall of Sukarno, the opportunity for the United States and other Western powers began. Investment, loan and trade relations began. The changes in relations with America followed with other Western powers. Great Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Japan and other Western countries started political and economic relations after 1966. There were close relations between economic policy, ideological and political relations. The changes in economic policy and ideological factors greatly influenced the political relations. The 'sphere of influence' economically could not be separated from the 'sphere of influence' in politics. The relations between the two 'spheres' were vital during the Cold War era.

Indonesian relations with Canada for example, improved after 1967, according to the political ideological and economic policy changes in Indonesian. Starting from 1968, Indonesia was given more and more consideration

by Canada's government as a prospective partner in the Southeast Asia region (Stubbs, 1990). In 1970 Indonesia was given particular prominence among the countries of Southeast Asia (Heinsworth, 1989). The new economic policy and political ideology in Indonesia improved relations between Indonesia and Canada. Canadian foreign policy makers were attracted by the new Indonesian economic policy and political ideology under President Suharto's government since the late 1960's, and the economic success in the early 1970s. The political ideological changes after 1967 gave a direct impact to the economic development in Indonesia. The rising Indonesian commodity prices, especially oil prices and rapidly expanding Indonesian economy under President Suharto, provided an opportunity for Canadian investment and opened a new market for Canadian goods (Heinsworth, 1986).

The changes in Indonesia's relations with Western countries were dominated by the ideological and political philosophy changes in Indonesia. The Indonesian economic development and new regime in economic requirements had also influenced the changed relations with the Western countries.

8. Malaysia, Democracy-Capitalist and Foreign Relations.

Malaysian political philosophy, domestic political and socio-economy development played an important role in Malaysia's close relations with the Western countries. The democracy-capitalist political philosophy and the nature of relations with Great Britain and Commonwealth countries (during colonial period and after gaining independence) and the political and economic advantages during the period from the 1950's to 1970's influenced Malaysian relations with the Western countries.

Malaysia had close relations with Great Britain and the Commonwealth countries, especially Australia, New Zealand and Canada since 1957. The Commonwealth spirit and international political development shaped Malaysia's relations with the commonwealth countries. Malaysia, for the Commonwealth countries, especially Australia and New Zealand, was considered as 'a British sphere of influence.' The close British relations with New Zealand and Australia directly influenced Australia's and New Zealand's policy towards Malaysia.

Since the end of the Second World War, Australia and New Zealand played a vital role in defeating the communist movement in Malaya. Both countries were greatly involved in the military operation of the late 1940s and 1950s in Malaya. The special relationship between Australia and New Zealand influenced this involvement.

Malaysia's relations with Great Britain continued after its independence in 1957. The long-standing relations between the two countries did not cease with independence in 1957. Britain assisted Malaya in public and economic administration. Military power and security was also highly considered by the British. Military relations were structured under AMDA that was signed in September 1957. Between 1957 and 1961 Great Britain provided some £33 million in aid to Malaya, chiefly under the terms of the Mutual Defence Agreement. This figure includes £13 million in grants supporting the cost of emergency operations (Tilman, 1969). In September 1963 Britain had 55,000 troops, and Australia with 2,600 troops in Malaysia (Tilman, 1969). The British and Australian troops were under a treaty of co-operation for the Commonwealth. During the confrontation period Britain and Commonwealth countries played a vital role in fighting against Indonesian combat, especially in Sarawak and Southern part of Malaya. The relations between Malaysia and Britain were not much different until 1971.

Canada also had close relations with Malaysia under the Commonwealth spirit. Canada had close relations with Malaysia since her independence in 1957, based upon the fact that both countries were members of the Commonwealth. Canada was the first country to open up full diplomatic relations with Malaya in 1958. Under Premier Lester Pearson in 1963, the Canadian government decided to provide military aid to Malaysia during the 'confrontation' with Indonesia (1963-1966). The Canadian cabinet had initially turned down a request from the Malaysian government (Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman) for military assistance, because normally the Canadian cabinet did not approve military aid to non-NATO countries. Based upon the Commonwealth spirit, the Canadian cabinet finally approved military assistance to Malaysia in 1964 (Stubbs, 1990).

Malaysian relations with Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and other commonwealth countries were based upon the British long-standing friendship and the political-economic development during the post-war period. Britain, as a former hegemonic power, still had strong influence over former colonies. The British economic and political advantages in the Commonwealth countries and the Cold War political struggle needed the British to protect her former colonies. The political-military and economic-trade relations between Malaysia and Great Britain shaped the nature of relations and gave protection during the first two decades after the war. Without Great Britain and her allies' protection and support over the federation of Malaysia the result of the Malaysia-Indonesia confrontation might have been different.

As a part of the Western economic sphere, Malaysia has good relations with America and other Western countries. Ideological factors played a significant role in Malaysia's relations with Western countries. The close relations with Great Britain, domestic political and economic policy shaped the relations with other Western countries.

Malaysia did not have good relations with communist countries. Malaysian relations with the Soviet Union, Eastern European countries, China and other communist countries were very cold. The decision was dominated by the Malaysian ideology and political philosophy. The policy was clear under the first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, from 1957 to 1970. Malaysia's foreign policy was pro-West and anti-communist. The early diplomatic relationship was with Yugoslavia (1967) and the Soviet Union in 1968. The relations with communist countries slowly changed under the second Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak. Tun Razak's foreign policy was non-communist. During Tun Razak's era, Malaysia improved diplomatic relations with communist countries. Diplomatic relations with Mainland China was signed in 1974 when Tun Razak made a state visit in May 1974.

The vital factor which dominated Malaysian relations was the ideological and political philosophy of Malaysian leaders. The international relations structure during the 1960's and 1970's also influenced the Malaysian decision. Malaysia was pro-West and had special relations in security and politics with Great Britain. As a small and new independent state in world politics, Malaysia generally followed Great Britain for her security and economic survival. The situation slowly changed after the 1970's.

9. Indonesian Coup 1965, the Communists and Political Upheaval in Indonesia.

The Indonesian Coup of 1965 or GESTAPU (Gerakan Tiga Puluh September, or 30th September Movement) was a significant event in Indonesian politics and ideological changes. The event had transformed the politics of Indonesia from the 'old order' administration (under Sukarno with communist influence) to the 'new order' administration under President Suharto and was pro-West. The Indonesian 'Gestapu' was also important because this event changed the regional political structure in the Southeast Asian region and paved the way to the formation of ASEAN. After the formation of ASEAN in 1967, a new type of relationship between Malaysia and Indonesia began. There are two versions of the Indonesian Coup 1965; version I (the communist action) and version II (the Army and Pro-United States' action). Both versions will be discussed in turn.

Version I:

According to this version the Indonesian Coup of 1965 was a communist strategy to gain power in Indonesia. A few weeks before the 'Gestapu' event, President Sukarno's health was very poor. The communists took prompt action before the army took power from President Sukarno.

At midnight on 30th September 1965 "progressive, revolutionary" military officers backed by the Communist (PKI) leadership, the so-called 'Gestapu,' (September 30th Movement) were involved in the kidnapping and murder of six generals of the Indonesian army (Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud, 2000). General Suharto and Nasution who escaped death (Suharto not being on the priority list and Nasution being wounded) rallied opposition forces and put down the coup.

The objective of the 'Gestapu' had been to purge the army's general staff and critics of the PKI and of President Sukarno. According to this version, if Suharto and Nasution had been killed on the 30th September midnight, the coup might have succeeded and a communist regime might well have emerged in Indonesia (Fifield, 1973).

General Suharto, with key figures Adam Malik, the Sultan of Jokowiakarta and widespread student support, controlled the situation in early October. Suharto was seen as a figure to control Indonesia from the communist coup. Without the role played by Suharto and the army, the PKI would have controlled Indonesia. Indonesia would have become a communist state after 30th September 1965.

This version of the Indonesian coup of 1965 is totally different from version II (discussed below). Since the late 1980's and especially after the fall of President Suharto in 1998, many materials about the 1965 coup were published (and released) which gave more evidence to support version II (Scott, 1985).

Version II,

The Army and pro-United States Action: According to this version, the United States and the Indonesian army were responsible for the Indonesian coup of 1965 (Scott, 1985). The 1965 event was important in taking power from President Sukarno by the Indonesian army, led by General Suharto, and was strongly supported by the American government. The communists became much stronger after 1964 and were much closer to President Sukarno. The army took action because the possibility for the PKI leader to succeed President Sukarno was very great (if something happened to President Sukarno).

Singapore's withdrawal from the Malaysian Federation in August 1965 gave impact to the Western Strategy and Relations to version II (the possibility of ejection of Sabah and Sarawak from Malaysian Federation). The ejection of Singapore from the Malaysian Federation in August 1965 made an impact upon the American decision in Indonesia on 30 September 1965. President Sukarno argued that the ejection of Singapore in August 1965 would have destroyed the federation of Malaysia from inside. It meant that after Singapore's ejection it would be followed by the other part of the federation. The most probable parts of the Federation of Malaysia to follow Singapore's decision were Sabah and Sarawak in Borneo Island (Kroef, 1966). The political development

in both parts of Malaysia in 1965 supported the logic of that argument. The majority of the population in Sabah and Sarawak were not Malays. The Chinese and non-Malays were the majority in both states. The American strategy and its decision on Indonesian on 30th September 1965 affected the political development in Malaysia, especially the ejection of Singapore and would probably have been followed by Sabah and Sarawak. Sukarno's regime would have supported the ejection of Sabah and Sarawak from the Malaysian Federation (Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud, 2000). The Americans must control Jakarta before the Federation of Malaysia was destroyed from inside (Johnson <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/54b/033.html>).

10. Ideological Factor, Political Upheaval and the Changes in Political Relations.

The ideological is a vital factor in understanding the foreign policy and political relations of a state. During the Cold War period, this factor in certain situations became of the most important factors. The ideological stance of a state will determine the position in the systemic structure. It is important in understanding the foreign relations and intra-state political relations. The changes in a domestic political ideology can contribute to domestic political upheaval. The ideological political upheaval generally contributes to the changed pattern of foreign relations and political relations. The relationship and mutual impact of the ideological factor, domestic political upheaval, foreign policy decisions and political relations can be seen in Indonesia and the Indonesia-Malaysian political relations in the second half of the 1960's.

Indonesian political development after 1967 was dominated by the new ideological rising in the Indonesian government. The event on 30th September 1965 gave great chances for the democracy-capitalist military group to control Indonesian politics. The democracy-capitalist military group defeated the socialist-communist groups. In 1965 the Indonesia army was split into two camps. The first group was loyal to the army commander General Yani, who was reluctant to challenge President Sukarno's policy of national unity in alliance with the PKI. The second army group was the right wing who opposed General Yani's group and Sukarno's policies alliance with the communists (Crouch, 1978). The second group was anti-communist and pro-America led by General Nasution and Suharto. On 30 September 1965 General Yani and his inner circle of generals were murdered. Four of the six pro-General Yani leadership were killed on mid-night of 30th September (Scott, 1985). No-one of anti-President Sukarno's army group were killed and targeted by Gestapu, with the exception of General Nasution. General Nasution was able to escape, while his daughter was murdered on that night.

The 30th September 1965 was significant in understanding Indonesian domestic politics and ideological development during the second half of the 1960's. Gestapu was the struggle between the two ideological rivalries in Indonesia and in the Southeast Asian region. The author argued that the rivalries were not solely in Indonesia, but in the South East Asian region because PKI and Indonesia was the biggest country in South East Asia. PKI was the third largest communist party in the world in the mid-1960s and Communist Party of Soviet Union and Mainland China. The struggle between the left (pro-General Yani, Sukarno and PKI) and the right (Suharto, capitalist and pro-America) was closely related with the regional and international political ideological struggle. It was significant in colouring the East Asian region. The army's anti-PKI played a vital role in the 30th September Indonesian event. Without the army's anti-PKI propaganda the massacre might not have happened (Sundhaussen, 1982). After 1965, the right wing group under Suharto played a significant role in Indonesian politics. The changes in ideological factors in Indonesian domestic politics influenced its foreign relations. Indonesian foreign policy was leaning towards Western countries after 1965. The formation of political and economic spheres in Southeast Asia after 1965 was dominated by the changes of ideological factors in Indonesia. The ideological factor played a significant role in Indonesian relations with Western countries after the 1965 coup. Indonesia terminated relations with communist countries and improved relations with the Western countries. A bad economic situation in Indonesia in the early years after the coup was also an important task for the new regime to improve. Suharto had to solve the economic catastrophe in the years after the coup to prove to the Indonesian mass that the democratic-capitalist ideology was much better than the socialist-communist. Suharto needed confidence and support from the masses for his new regime. Western countries also had to assist Indonesia in consolidating the democratic-capitalist ideology strategy. The Tokyo Club (The members of the Tokyo Club were the United States, Japan, France, Great Britain, West Germany and the Netherlands) was formed after the coup by the West, with the main objective and strategy being to assist Indonesia's economic development. The Club was further support from the Western countries towards Indonesia. Before the coup of 1965 event Western countries already gave their support to Suharto. The United States gave strong support to Suharto to overthrow President Sukarno. Other Western countries such as Great Britain, West Germany, Japan and possibly Australia and New Zealand gave support to Suharto Group. Based on the ideological factor West Germany assisted Suharto with delivering sub-machine guns, radio equipment and money of value of 300,000 marks (Scott, 1985).

Ideological development in Indonesia after 1965 was a key factor in the changes in economic development, economic policies, foreign-policy decisions and political relations. Without the changes in the ideological factor, the changes in other aspects would have been impossible.

The ideological factor played a significant role in the Indonesian-Malaysian political relations. Communist-socialist ideology in the Indonesian regime under Sukarno with the PKI influence was the main factor in shaping the hostile relations during the period before 1966. The rising of pro-West support with democratic-capitalist ideology, influenced the harmonious relations between Indonesia and Malaysia after 1965. After 1966 Indonesia's military regime under Suharto was pro-West and followed the democratic-capitalist ideology. Indonesia entered a new economic and political sphere. i.e. Western sphere with capitalist economy and democratic politics. The confrontation with Malaysia ceased in 1966. It was a first step in the Indonesian improved relations with the democratic-capitalist sphere. The negotiations in Bangkok in 1966 and 1967 were the process of the consolidation of the capitalist group's position in Indonesia. The formation of ASEAN in August 1967 was the result of co-operation among the Southeast Asian capitalist states. Indonesia led the regional association. The strong support from Western countries, especially the United States, Great Britain and Japan, contributed to the successful regional association.

The Indonesian-Malaysian political relationship after 1965 was a result of the changed ideological and political philosophy in Indonesia. The states that had a similar ideology, i.e. democratic-capitalist, tended to make good political relations. The regional security alliance also influenced the regional co-operation. Malaysia needed security protection under the British as a SEATO member. Indonesia needed security protection from inside and outside from the United States. The close Indonesian military partnership with America after the coup was clear. All of the ideology, security and economic advantages played a role in shaping the new political relations between Indonesia and Malaysia. The ideological factor led to the other factors in the early years after the Indonesian Coup of 1965.

Ethnic relations in Malaysia, especially the conflict between Malay and Chinese (especially the event of May thirteen 1969) influenced the Malaysian-Indonesian political relations. One of the factors, which contributed to the withdrawal of Singapore from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965, was ethnic conflict, i.e. the differences between the Malay and Chinese. The formation of the DAP political party in Malaysia originated from the PAP political philosophy towards the Malay. The 1969 general election result on the west coast of Malaysia gave some confidence to the DAP and radical Chinese to control Malaysian politics. The aftermath of the 1969 general election was significant for the political and ethnic development in Malaysia. It led to the outbreak of an ethnic riot on 13th May 1969. The riot was a very bad tragedy in the ethnic conflict in Malaysia.

The 13th May ethnic conflict in Malaysia gave a positive effect to the political relations between Indonesia and Malaysia. Malaysia and Indonesia were worried about the possibility of the communist party taking the opportunity to achieve their objective through the conflict. The Communist Party in Malaysia was greatly supported by the Chinese ethnic groups. President Suharto of Indonesia offered military support to Malaysia over the issue to prevent any possibility of a communist rising after the event.

11. Conclusion.

This article discusses how important the ideological factor was in shaping and influencing Indonesian-Malaysian political relations during the period before and after 1965. The ideological factor had a close relationship with the hegemonic powers' activities in Malaysia and Indonesia. The nature of diplomatic relations of both countries with democratic-capitalist and the communist-socialist bloc was based upon the ideological factor. The changed foreign policy of Indonesia after 1965 dominated the changes in ideological factors in Indonesian domestic political ideology. The pattern of hegemonic powers' involvement in Malaysian and Indonesian domestic politics dominated with ideological factors. The ideological factor was one of the vital factors in understanding and analysing the Indonesian-Malaysian political relationship during the period 1961-1971.

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