The G8 and Development in Third World Countries in the 21st Century: The African Perspectives

Ngara Christopher Ochanja[1], Ogoh Augustine Ogbaji[2]
1.National Institute of Legislative Studies, National Assembly, Abuja, Nigeria. cossychris@yahoo.com
2.Department of Political Science, Federal University, Dutsin-ma, Katsina State, Nigeria
aogoh@fudutsinma.edu.ng

Abstract
This paper examines the G8 and development in the Third world countries in the 21st century from African Perspectives. It argues that African territories since their contact with the West have remained inferior participants in the global economy and in spite of efforts by African leaders since independence to get out of the cul-de-sac, no tangible result have been achieved with respect to socio-economic transformations. Indigenous initiatives with anti-capitalist goals and objectives were either stifled or circumvented by G8 capitalist entrepreneurs and in most cases replaced by neo-liberal ones dictated principally by the World Bank and its sister agency the IMF. Using historical approach this paper explains that Policy handouts to African countries by these multilateral institutions not only failed to lift the continent's socio-economic fortunes but accelerated its decline. In addition, African continent provided the raw materials that fed most of the intractable socioeconomic crisis which the continent is today well known for. The grave implications this holds for global peace and stability in a fast globalizing world heightened the need to make Africa an environment for strategic intervention thus culminating in what became the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). It is argued that the major objectives of NEPAD is to facilitate Western capitalist penetration, stabilize global capitalism, fight international terrorism, secure alternative energy sources and contain China's expanding influence in Africa. This paper concludes and recommends that Africa must increasing look inward for indigenous resources if it must break the jinx of underdevelopment and dependency.
Keywords: African Development, G8, 21st Century, Scio-economic, NEPAD

I.   Introduction

The G8 are groups of eight most industrialized countries of the world. They include Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States (G8 Research Group, 2005:5) and "account for 48% of the global economy and 49% of global trade, hold four of the United Nations' five permanent Security Council seats, and boast majority shareholder control over the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank" (Schrecker, 2007:1). The firms located within their borders are the primary sources of outward foreign direct investment (FDI) (Schrecker, 2007:1-2), exploiting the global south and emitting about more than 40% (currently) and 60% (historically) of the carbon dioxide in the world (Mori, 2009:9).

African territories since their integration into the international capitalist system through colonialism have remained dominated and exploited members of the international community (Nkrumah 1965; Fank, 1969; Amin, 1974; Rodney, 1972). It would be recalled that since the early 1970s, "Africa has been in the vanguard of the call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO)" (Ajakaiye, 1998:32) for the restructuring of global relations of production and redistribution. To this effect, Africa has played leading roles in enhancing the collective bargain of poor nations under the auspices of numerous "multilateral organization like the G77, the Non-Aligned Movement, the World Trade Organization (WTO), African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP), and the United Nations and its agencies" (Ajakaiye, 1998:32). At the continental level, economic development strategies such as Monronvia Strategy (1979); Lagos Plan of Action (1980 to 2000); Final Act of Lagos (1980); Africa's Priority Program for Economic Recovery 1986 to 1990 (APPER) which later converted to the United Nations Program of Action for Africa's Economic Recovery (UN-PAARED) (1986 to 1990) (Muhibbu-din, 2011:1) were enunciated. Regional and sub-regional integration efforts such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) now African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS), East African Community (EAC), Southern African Development Community (SADC) etc were established.

While most of these efforts have not yielded a modest success, some of them have outrightly been frustrated by the so-called G8 nations in order "to keep Africa's industrial and economic development at bay" (Boaduo, 2008:96). From the 1980s to the 1990s, different brand of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (Toure, 2008:46) were implemented across Africa as precondition for foreign development assistance, aid, and loans. These neo-liberal policies failed to register a modest success in terms of engendering minimal socio-economic development and in many case further compounded African development dilemmas. In the words of Leys, (1994:46) the failure of World Bank and IMF policies in Africa has moved the continent from "crisis" to "tragedy". Thus, by the end of the 1990s, African socio–economic crisis had worsened and the continent became a breeding ground for violence, social

conflicts and humanitarian disasters with far reaching implications for global peace and stability.

It is based on the foregoing background that this paper interrogates the rationale for G8 concern for African development in the 21st Century.

II.   Overview of Development Strategies: Theoretical and Methodological Explorations in Africa

The period of the 1960s is generally regarded by scholars as the decade of African independence. Unlike European countries which emerge from a voluntary Treaty of Westphalia (1648) as viable and stable political entities to form the present international system of states (De Mesquita, 2006), African territories were freed into an already biased international system as economically weak, dependent, politically unstable and highly unviable political contraption. Although the consciousness of this state of underdevelopment predates the period of independence and climaxed in the days of anti-colonial struggles as reflected in ideological and political movements of Pan-Africanism, the opportunity for African people to determine their own destiny and chart the course of their future presented itself only after independence.

An important starting point was in 1963, when a number of African nationalists representing their respective countries came together in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to form the OAU-a continental body whose main aim is to unite Africa countries towards a greater objective of eliminating all forms colonialism (OAU, 1981). Even though the organization was bedeviled with plethora of challenges right from inception and trailed with numerous criticism, the eventual end of formal colonialism in Africa marked by the termination of white minority rule in Rhodesia-now Zimbabwe in 1980, the independence of Namibia in 1990, and the collapse of Apartheid in South Africa and installation of black majority rule in 1990 was a goal well accomplished (Gbor, 1998). Between 1960s and 1970s, Africa had made giant stride with respect to the struggle for development through membership of different international organization including the United Nations Organization, the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as the establishment of sub-regional organizations notable in these decades was the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). African nations were among the leading voices in the demand for the new international economic order NIEO under the auspices of the UN. In spite of the superior voting strength by developing countries (Encarta Encyclopedia, 2009), the industrialized nations used their economic and political advantages to thwart the genuine demand by poor countries to have fair share of international trade, access technology, credit, aid, debt relief as well as fair participation and representation in major international institutions (Encarta Encyclopedia, 2009). Third world countries, demand were often overshadowed by superpower rivalry and competition between the United States and USSR aimed at subverting opponents and winning allies.

The 1980s and 1990s were particularly decisive and crucial decades for African development. At the eve of the 1980s, Africa countries initiated the Monrovia strategy which culminated in the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) of 1980 and the Final Act of Lagos (FAL) in the same years (Muhibbu-Din, 2010). The LPA diagnosed that Africa's economic crisis was caused by the historical injustice suffered by Africa under colonialism and its continued dependence on external forces (Adogamhe, 2008) therefore it prescribed collective self-reliance through radical break with primary product export dependence as well as the reduction in the reliance on external sources of funds to finance development projects (Gattamorta, 2005). According to Ojo (1985) the main objective of the LPA was to significantly address Africa's economic dependence and enhance collective bargaining with the industrialized world. But, as Owusu (2003) rightly notes the LPA concentrated more on external causes of economic crisis in Africa to the neglect of internal causes like absence of good governance and political leadership. In spite of these limitations, the LPA arguably is the first indigenous aspiration to address Africa's transformational challenges which Adedeji (1985:9) described as "Africa's economic Magna Carta". It is noteworthy that barely a year after the LPA was adopted; the World Bank launched a report which was counter to the LPA. The report was entitled "Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action", otherwise known as the Berg report (Adejumobi, 2003:14). This report criticized the development strategies proposed by the LPA based on 'lassier faire economy' and extols the virtue of neo-liberalism. This international conspiracy particularly from the Western axis and its agencies especially the World Bank stalled the progress of the LPA. It must be appreciated that the Berg report not only countered the LPA but also provided the theoretical base for the implementation of SAP programmes in Africa (Gattamorta, 2005).

The period of SAP and the crisis it generated for African development are well too known to deserve detailed treatment here, however, "even under the full weight of SAP policies, African countries did not relent in the search for alternative development strategy" (Adejumobi, 2003:15), other developmental strategies such as the APPER later modified and adopted by the UN General Assembly as UN-PAAERD (1986-1990), AAF-SAP 1989 (as the name implies was to counteract SAP) (Muhibbu-Din, 2010; Adejumobi, 2003) among others were all enunciated. On the whole, these strategies have remained only of archival value with no practical effect due to lack of international support because of their anti-imperial dispositions. Indeed like OAU (1981:7) document rightly posits "despite all efforts made by its leaders, (Africa) remains the least developed continent".

In 1999, at an extraordinary summit of the OAU in Sirte, Libya, the former Libyan Leader, Maummer Quaddafi

proposed the declaration of "United States of Africa" (De Waal, 2002). His proposal, as dramatic and surprising as it was, was a sort of reawakening of Pan-African idea of continental unity spearheaded by Kwameh Nkurma in the early years of independence (Nkurma, 1970) and laid the foundation for the future AU. The new millennium marked a defining moment for Africa (African Union Commission and NEPAD Agency, 2011:10) as the What is today called NEPAD began with a mandate given by the OAU to President Thabo Mbeki (South Africa), along with President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and President Abdlaziz Boutlflika of Algeria to investigate how Africa could overcome its debt crisis" (Waal, 2002:466). In 2001, five African leaders invited to attend the G8 summit in Genoa, [Italy] unveiled the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) which they claimed was "anchored on the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalizing world" (G8 Research Group, 2005:7). The NEPAD document was born out two separate proposals; the Millennium Partnership for Africa's Recovery (MAP) by President Mbeki and the Omega Plan by President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal harmonized into what later became New African Initiative (NAI) (Adedeji, 2003; Waal, 2002; and German Development Institute, 2010). At the 37th OAU summit in Lusaka [Zambia] NEPAD was formally adopted as a new continental development blueprint (Adogamhe, 2008). It is founded on partnership in which African countries commit themselves to good and corporate governance in return for doubling of aid from G8 nations among others. It scope includes initiates on peace and security, food security, infrastructure, democracy and good governance, regional integration, business promotion to mention a few. An important component of this partnership is the Peer Review Mechanism (PRM) expected "to monitor the compliance of African governments to standards of good political, economic and corporate governance and their progress to greater socio-economic development" (German Development Institute, 2010:1). The major criticisms against NEPAD has been that apart from it being elitist, it relies on orthodox neo-liberal formula which is now regarded as the main cause of Africa's economic misfortune particularly from the 1980s to the 1990s.

III.   G8 and African development in the 21st Century

Stabilizing the World Order: the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the end of the Cold War led to a fundamental transformation in global power equation characterized by the political and economic dominance of the United States and its G8 allies: This new international regime is otherwise referred to as 'New World Order'. Accompanying these changes, the phrase 'Stabilizing the World Order' became a catch phrase in Western diplomacy, media propaganda and foreign policy agenda. The Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary (2001) defines 'stabilize' to mean "become… firm, steady, and unlikely to change". 'New World Order' from the western perspective is constructed around issues such as changing nature and structure of power in the world system, "the end of the Cold War" the role of United State in the world system, "and the rise of the insolent supremacy of Western capitalism and cultural values" (Edi, 2007:118). Writing in 1992, Claude Ake, added a new dimension to the world order debate. He pictured the new world order as a radical division of the world into rich and poor nations, aggregations usually referred to in geopolitical terms as north and south (Ake, 1992). This division underscores the inequality maintained and perpetuated by the global capitalist world order; and it is from this perspective that this paper conceives the present 'global order'.

A major feature of the new world order is economic inequality between developed (north) and developing (south) perpetrated and consummated through trade, investments, foreign aid and loan largely in favour of developed nations especially the G8. In this context, what is called 'free trade' is an asymmetric relationship in which African countries are encouraged to produce primary (agricultural or mineral resources) goods as their comparative advantage and import manufactured goods at prices decided by the G8 controlled international pricing regime. As Ajakaiye (1998:27) righly notes the "price system meant that Africa had to sell cheap and buy dear". This is complimented by the regulatory roles of the World Bank, IMF and WTO as major agencies responsible for the implementation of neo-liberal policies the world over. Their policies are considered generally unfavouarable to developing countries interests and responsible for keeping Africa at the bottom of international hierarchy of production. It will be recalled that "the period 1980-2000 was period during which nearly twenty years of painful structural adjustment programme were imposed on Africa [by the World Bank and IMF], but which period today is considered the lost decades for African development" (Alkali, 2003:116). The SAP policies apart from its social and economic costs set the stage for further entrapment of Africa into unrealistic foreign dept that led to siphoning of "over $30 billion [as] net transfer from the African continent as debt service in the period 1984–1995" alone (Alkali, 2003:115 emphasis mine). According to Hoogvelt (2001):

> ....*SAP has tied the physical resources of Africa more firmly into servicing the 'old' segment of the global economy. At the same time it has oiled the financial machinery by which wealth is being transported out of the region.*

The adverse effect of SAP policies and the "vast inequalities of wealth and power, such as those that had been deepened between the members of the G8 and the governments and peoples of Africa during the previous two decades of neo-liberal globalization" (Black, 2011:3), the withdrawal of support and development assistance by

erstwhile cold war belligerents following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the crisis generated by the so-called Third Wave of Democratization since the 1990s, all combined to create severe socio-economic crisis in Africa. The entry of Asian and Latin American countries like China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea and Brazil as newly industrializing countries further unleashed the pressure of exploitation on the African continent. The consequence of these not only threatened the survival of Africa as a people but also weakened their capacity to sustain further exploitation on it by international capital. The adverse implications this created for global peace and stability as "heightened at the start of the new millennium by the increase scale and intensity of the anti-globalization protests that… overshadowed G8 related meetings, at Genoa, Seattle, Quebec city and beyond" (Black, 2011:4) necessitated G8 intervention to crutch African collapsing economy, aimed at "fostering a relatively stable and widely acceptable order" (Black, 2011:3).

In effect, it is a natural fact of life that those who benefit from a system would always strive to hold back change and perpetuates the order that guarantee their interest. The new partnership for African development (NEPAD) introduced in 2002, only provided a platform to legitimize the G8 new form of intervention in Africa. This intervention is therefore not intended to rescue African from economic doldrums but to salvage African imminently collapsing economy to a fairly stable state in order to maintain a global economic balance that is necessary for the survival of international capitalism.

IV.   Containing Negative Spill-over Effects from Africa

The global system we have today has become interlinked and interconnected at all levels of human social relations to the extent that there is no region, group or people that are thoroughly highly isolated from the rest of the world (Holsti, 1995). This created what has come to be known as the 'global village' in terms of cross border policy sensitivity. In foreign policy, this sensitivity means that the traditional notion of national boundary and territorial sovereignty no longer shape outcome of international politics. This explains why the foreign policy today is more of reactions and counter-reactions. Hogvelt (2001:6) illustrates this when he posits that:

> Environmental damage do not stop at national frontier. The thinning of the ozone layer, the green house effect, marine these result primarily from pattern of growth and consumption in the north, the south cannot escape their impact. Similarly, the north also cannot escape the immediate or distant effect of environmental deterioration, such as deforestation, desertification, soil and water degradation, air pollution and urban squalor.

Africa at the dawn of the 21st century cuts the picture of gloom, despondency and desperation (Aderemi, 2002:2) as each passing year reinforces Africa's grim statistics of a continent in which many states are overtaken by poverty and conflict (Bekoe, 2002:232). While Africa is home to only 10% of the world population, roughly 30% of the world's poor are Africans. Thus, Africa is the only region of the world where poverty is increasing in stark contrast to the dramatic gains in the fight against poverty that are seen elsewhere, most notably in Asia (Madavo, 2005:1-2). As poverty deepens below acceptable lines, majority of African could no longer afford western manufactured goods such as textiles, vehicles, electronics and other consumables. In many African countries, "second handed" western goods popularly called "*Tokunbo*" (Ajayi, 2006:113) in local parlance have become the preferred choice as people's capacity to afford new products continuous to diminish. African which hitherto provide large market for G8 nation's manufactured goods has become marginal with Africans now preferring cheaper but low quality goods from South-east Asian especially China with huge implications for return on investment for western multinational corporations operating in the continent.

Political instability especially armed conflicts in Africa since 1990 has been a source of global concern. Writing in 1996 Stedman notes that in 1995 alone, (emphasis mine) there were five on-going wars (in Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan), several countries that were candidates for state collapse or civil war (Burundi, Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Togo and Zaire) (Henderson, 2008:51). This include according to Stedman host of other countries where low level ethnic and political conflict remained contained but unresolved (Chad, Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda) (Henderson, 2008:51). Today, Africa accounts for about 4.5 million refugees, many of whom are women, children and vulnerable groups such as the elderly (Egwu, 2007:406). These incredible levels of instability and insecurity circumscribe the business environment that not only guarantee the security and safety of western investments but also profit and corporate capital repatriation.

Widespread poverty in Africa has created a large pool of "regular and irregular migration to destinations outside the continent" (Economic Commission for Africa, 2006:1) in search of 'better opportunities'. In 2000, out of 175 million migrants 16.3 million were of African origin. In the same year the African continent counted 3.6 million refugees and 9 million displaced persons (Ammassari, 2006:4). G8 countries constitute major destination countries for African emigrant. Africa immigrants in G8 countries have been associated with urban and transnational crime syndicates as well as other social vices that have constituted adversaries to socio-economic stability in receiving countries. For example, Fitzgibbon (2004:5) document that "at least 60% of foreign

prostitutes in Italy hail from African countries" which holds grave public health implications for that country. Also as the US Department of State (2005:49) rightly notes that the health implication of sex trafficking extend not only to its victims, but also to the general public. Mass emigration has also led to the flourishing of international human trafficking syndicates and according to Wanneburg (2005:6) Nigerian group dominate the organized human trafficking networks. Activities of African immigrant population have "apart from being injurious to the national economy of affected states can bring about enormous physical security challenge (Anna, 2001:10). To contain this spill-over, it became necessary for G8 countries to intervene as it was no longer possible for western nations to go to sleep with their eyes closed more so, as G8 nations policy and administrative capacity to check the tide of these spill-over crumbles against the forces of globalization.

Containing International Terrorism in Africa: One of the major reason for the G8 focus on African development in the 21st century can be seen from the light of the ongoing global war on terror since 9/11 attacks on the United States. Since the 9/11 attack on the U.S. war on terrorism has became a central feature of U.S. foreign policy and by extension the G8. In Africa like elsewhere in the world, the spate of terrorism dramatically increased both in frequency and sophistication. In 1998, Al-Qaeda bombs destroyed the America embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, killing hundreds of people, mostly innocent Africans (Toure, 2006:48). The involvement of increasing number of Africans in recent terrorist activities across the globe, the growing suspicious of some African countries like Sudan and Libya as sponsors of terrorism over the years, the growing weakness of state institutions in many African states which constrained their capacity to exercise full jurisdiction over their territories, the expanding pool of unemployed and ex-combatant from many of the conflicts that have been fought in the continent created a precarious condition in Africa. The amalgam on these, have made Africa a focal point for terrorism in terms of its extensive facilitating environment, potential targets, and extent of terrorist interest, as well as why the region is of overall strategic significance to the security of United States (Pham, 2007:42) and its G8 allies.

According to Gilbert et' al (2009:275) Africa's porous borders and range of poor governance issues, the continent's political instability and high vulnerability is viewed with trepidation by" G8 "policy makers who see states within the region as potentially easy targets for the activities of terrorist network". The spate of intra-state conflicts that rocked states like Somalia, Sudan, Angola, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d' Voire etc as well as the proliferation of small arms and light weapons among others gave further vent to the G8 nation's perception of Africa as possible safe-haven that would provide sanctuary for terrorists and terrorists organizations escaping U.S. led assaults in Afghanistan and other part of the Middle East since the 9/11 attack. However, the eventual collapse of central government in Somalia and the sustained tide of violence spearheaded by different faction of fundamentalist Islamic groups only justified G8 strategic security concern about the continent and create the need for strategic intervention to prevent African states from being colonized by terrorist's organizations. The G8 in its strategic calculation, may have reasoned that if the weak state of Afghanistan, despite its distance from the U.S. provided the sanctuary from which 9/11 attacks was initiated, planned and executed, then African "weak states …can pose a great danger" (Pham, 2007:41) to the rest of the world particularly western interests..

Similarly, the presence of extreme poverty especially in sub-Saharan Africa where approximately one in two people live less than one dollar per day (Gilbert et' al, 2009:268), has led to the escalation of violent conflicts over scarce societal resources with high turnover of refugees and internally displaced persons. The high number of unemployed ex-combatant generated from many of these internal wars have in turn created large pool of potential terrorist recruits willing to be engaged. This is further exacerbated by the diffusion of military critical technology since Soviet collapse which has since manifested in Africa with growing knowledge of the technology of bombs making and other potable explosives capable of causing mass destruction. This is also complimented with the proliferation of large stock of illegal arms and light weapons in circulation and readily in use by private individuals and other sub-state actors. For instance, Wannenburg (2005:6) corroborates this when he observe that in conflict ridden regions such as the Niger Delta (Nigeria) weapons are readily available. Communities have large stocks of automatic riffles and small arms, which are used in communal violence, piracy and other crimes. Similarly, the growing spate of terror being unleashed on the general public since 2009 by Boko Haram (an Islamic fundamentalist group) in many parts of Northern Nigeria attest to the credibility of threats that could emanate from sub-state organizations in many parts of Africa particularly as the capabilities of African states to regulate weapons in their respective society is ineffectual (Cillier, 2004). In addition, the growing consciousness amongst African people on the historical realities of their socio-economic backwardness like in the Middle-east, has earned the G8 countries, the hatred of many segment of African civil society. The perception of the G8 nations by many Africans as historical adversaries that deprived them the benefit of development is a source of tension and indeed a potential source of future conflict. The G8 strategic perception of these undercurrents necessitate the need to rebrand and maintain favourable image as champions of Africa's development and to mitigate local dissensions through palliative economic and political programmes in collaboration with cooperating African governments informs G8 new intervention in Africa.

Securing Alternative Sources of Energy outside the Turbulent Middle East: The need to secure alternative energy sources elsewhere in Africa since the intensification of the crisis in Persian Gulf underline the hypocrisies of benevolence of the G8 focus on Africa's development. As Amin (1993:134) rightly pointed out that the Gulf War proves that the control of the planet's natural resources is still the overriding concern of western states. The massive oil prospecting activities in Africa since the 1990s that the revealed promising fields and deposits, particularly in the gulf of guinea deep offshore and the increasing growth of foreign direct investment in the oil and gas sector by major Western Multinational Corporation following the U.S. led Gulf war against Iraq shows clearly that Africa was on a threshold of becoming G8 nation's future energy sources. For as far as history was concerned Africa's importance to the rest of the world particularly western nations is only to the extent which its serve as store house of important and strategic mineral–oil, uranium, gold and diamond, copper, and basic agricultural commodities such as cocoa, tobacco, coffee, palm oil, cotton, groundnuts as well as hide and skins (Hoder, 1978). In fact, the famous 1884-1885, Berlin conference that culminated in the formal colonization of vast majority of African territory was predicated on the need to acquire raw materials, cheap labour and access to market necessary for the survival of emerging international capitalism. During the Cold War, cold war belligerents covertly or overtly encouraged and supported political crisis to cause political upheavals in African to create room for western intervention for the ultimate goal of securing access and control of mineral resources. As Hogvelt (2001:161) notes:

> Since the....end of the cold war, the USA has negotiated 'access' arrangement for troop and equipment deployment in thirty-eight countries (thirty in the third world), in addition to hundred base in sixteen foreign lands that is directly possessed. As Daniel Shirmer. writes, the reason for this type of United States 'forward deployment' in the third world have to do with what pentagon calls challenge of regional stability, but they also have direct commercial advantage.

Post cold war challenges of ever-growing demand for energy, saw yet again the strategic importance of Africa to the rest of the world. African oil became a commodity of strategic interest to the western world. With increased turbulence in the Middle East, especially after the invasion and occupation of Iraq, America has turned in the direction of Africa for strategic oil interests (Toure, 2006:50). "The development of African (West African) oil sector, the world's fastest growing since the turn of the 21st century, is seen as potential panacea to America's" and indeed the G8 "oil supply concern" (Gilbert et' al, 2009:275). Writing in 2008, Mcfate suggest that oil from Gulf of Guinea (including Nigeria-9%; Angola-4.5%; and Chad 1%) now making up more than 15 percent of US imports and projected by the Central Intelligent Agency (CIA) to increase to 25% by 2015 (Gilbert et' al, 2009:275). The growing importance of African oil is underscored by the level at which political instability in Africa affects global energy prices. For instance, recurring violence in the Niger delta region (Nigeria) which undermines Nigeria's ability to supply crude oil to the United States became a recurrent cause of fluctuation in crude oil price in the international oil market. This has reinforced the notion that Nigeria and the new West African 'gulf states' in general are matter of U.S. national security (Douglas et' al 2003:1). To this effect, G8 new interest in Africa has more to do with the need to satisfy her growing domestic energy needs than any serious interests in helping Africa out of its present predicament. Thus, the motive for G8 focus on African development in the 21st century has remained the ultimate goals that have guided Western imperialism in all ages. This can be summarized in the words of V.I. Lenin that "in capitalist societies, foreign policy merely expresses the monopolistic interests in an imperial state, in gaining access to markets, fields of investment and raw materials" (Holsti, 1967:8).

Opening Africa's Economy for further Capitalist Penetration: The objective of the neoliberal project since the 1980s, has not only been to restructure Africa's economy (to meet the expansionary needs of global capitalism) but also to create an enabling environment (Adesina, 2004:1) for Western business interest and guarantee primitive accumulation and transfer of surpluses to home countries. Since the unset of the 1990s, western ideologies of democracy and free trade have been deliberately promoted all over the world by G8 nations particularly in regions where they have strategic business interest and/or investments. In the beginning of the 21st century the promotion of these neo-liberal policies in Africa became an agenda for G8 nations under the so-called *Post-Washington Consensus.* The central idea is to encourage African countries to embrace democracy and economic liberalization as panacea for economic growth and development. However, this is intended for African "states to throw open their borders and ports to all kinds of goods and services including labour without any tariffs or restrictions" (Ajayi, 2006:112). Since the G8 provide roughly 75 percent of the world's development assistance; their deep pockets, organizational resources and superior bargaining power provide them with formidable advantages in trade negotiations and dispute resolution proceedings (Schrecker, 2007:1); it becomes easy for them to market capitalist ideas to poor nations as pre-condition for foreign aid and other development assistance.

To achieve this without compromising international "decency' as well as legal issues such as rights of intervention, sovereign inviolability among other rules of engagement in modern diplomacy, it became necessary

to scheme a mechanism that would be superficially acceptable particularly to Africans. This found expression in NEPAD as regional framework for African development but which relies on old formula of neo-liberalism. The implications for Africa are that since "factor advantages in the global economy-cheap unskilled labour and inputs for primary production - are no longer acceptable bases for economic competitiveness" (Stren & Halfani, 2001:473). Africa lacking "the capacity and infrastructure to compete economically" would be "completely marginalized" (Van Niekerk, 2007:2). But, the irony is that, while G8 countries have insisted that Africa open up its economies as pre-condition for development aid and other facilities, they have always discriminated against African goods and services as not meeting the standards for their local or domestic markets and/or African exports outrightly discourage through high tariffs and other protectionist measures. This is what Mike More, World Trade Organization's D. G., calls "an obscurity" he said, before the Doha Round talks "there is no moral consistency to the talk of free trade, and then block trade in some areas …African exporters" (Legum, 2002).

The G8 focus on African development in the 21st century is consistent with Western agenda outlined in the Post Washington Consensus in which the primary aim is to liberalize African economic and political system within the overall objective of fast tracking the process of globalization (global capitalist expansion). To think that 'free trade' privatization, commercialization, etc, as advocated, promoted and encouraged in Africa by the G8 would halt Africa's steady economic decline particularly in the context of an ever-growing competitive world system in which the G8 already has an overwhelming advantage is to ignore the lesson of history. It will be recalled that neo-liberal development policies imposed on Africa countries during the 1980s failed to produce the desired result and has since remained the bane of Africa's development till date. Therefore, as Bond et al have argued, NEPAD, the institutional framework for actualizing the G8 focus on African development in the 21st century "is an old pro-imperialist project repackaged in new clothes by the neo-liberals (Toure, 2007:53).

Containing China's Expanding Influence in Africa: China's emergence as a rising global power garners increasing attention, much in Asia, but increasingly also in Africa (Gill et' al, 2007:3). For G8 nations, particularly "the United States, China's growing engagement in Africa inherently carries significant implications (Gill et' al, 2007:4). According to Eisenman and Kurlantzick,

> Over the past decade, while the United States has too often ignored sub-Saharan Africa policy, other than counterterrorism cooperation and aid initiatives, Beijing has quietly established relationships with the continent's political and business elites… building close ties with countries from Sudan to South Africa, becoming a vital aid donor in many African nations, signing trade initiatives with more than 40 African states, and developing military relationships with many of the continent's powers (Zweig, 2007:16).

Apart from the large and almost limitless market opportunities the African environment offers, its "importance as an energy supplier to world markets has grown consistently since the end of the Cold War" (Raphael and Stokes, 2011:903). Between 1999 and 2005, China's imports from Africa increased 10 times, and became the number three importer after the U.S. and France. Overall trade since 2000 has more than tripled, reaching nearly $30 billion in 2004, and is expected to reach US$50 billion by the end of 2006 (Zweig, 2007:16). Similarly, in 2005, a large Chinese training program for African diplomats allowed it to present its case, relative to the American case, to African diplomats. Beijing has signed at least 40 oil agreements with various African countries (Zweig, 2007:16) and imports sixty percent of Sudan's total oil production (Davis, 2009:37). According to Thomas Lum This greater acceptance of China by the African countries increases China diplomatic clout in the region and has created an emerging economic and political competition between the Chinese and the United States (Davis, 2009:36) as well as other G8 nations.

The sudden interest in African development by the U.S. led G8 since the unset of the 21st century can also be appreciated from the purview of the needs to contain China's growing influence in Africa that can easily be seen in the dominant role of Chinese multinational corporations, predominance of its goods and services as well as the emerging preference by African government to enter into trade, technical and financial agreements with China than their traditional Western benefactors. Thus, as Gill et al (2007:16) argues China's ambitious, new high-profile role in Africa challenges the United States… It comes in a period of major parallel expansion of U.S. commitments in Africa, propelled by growing U.S. national interests in Africa. It is therefore logical to infer that "China's expanding economic, political, and military ties across the continent" (Thomas-Jensen, 2008:35)-an environment considered strategic by the G8 for "fighting terrorism and securing energy resources" (Thomas-Jensen, 2008:35); explain a lot why the U.S. and her allies must reassert their relevance and established their control and competitiveness in Africa. Therefore NEPAD thus an attractive mechanism by the G8 to achieve an expedient imperial foreign policy goal of neo-liberal ideological dominance in Africa as well as a hegemonic ambition of containing China's expansionism.

V.   Conclusion and Recommendations
This paper interrogates the rationale for G8 focus on African development in the 21st century. It argues that the deplorable socio-economic conditions engendered by the long years of development failures experienced in

Africa did not only affect the capacity of Africa to survive as a people, particularly since the 1990s, but also limited or deflated its capacity to continue to play its global role of the hewer of woods and fetcher of development waters for international capitalism. The crisis arising from the African situation was having spontaneous or distant effects in many parts of the world as a result of growing global interdependence. This made Africa's development crisis to be easily and readily felt in G8 countries as their policy capacity to check the tide of these spill-over crumble against the forces of globalization. The paper explain that the G8 focus on African development in the 21st century is to stabilize international capitalism which otherwise would have been destabilized by reasons of Africa's total collapse which have been long underway rather than an altruistic intervention. The paper contend further that the motive and consequence of the G8 focus is ultimately to further capitalist development in Africa.

Therefore, for Africa to develop, it must increasingly look inward for resources such as finance, technology, human and material input rather than the present dependency approach. Rapid infrastructural development and the creation of an atmosphere that is conducive for indigenous people to drive development must be emphasized by African leaders. Regional and sub-regional cooperation at economic and political levels must be strengthened; particularly common economic zones among African states should be instituted. Of particular significance is good governance and leadership, the peer review mechanism under the G8 contrived NEPAD programme should be adopted with local content to serve Africa's peculiar needs. Finally, partnership with extra-continental powers like the G8 should accommodate the participation of the masses and all policies and programme should be geared towards bettering their lots.

References

Adedeji, A. 1985 *The Monrovia Strategy and the Lagos Plan of Action: Five Years After* In: Economic Crisis in Africa: African Perspectives on Development Problems and Prospects**.** Adedeji, A. and T. Shaw (ed.) Boulder, Colarado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Adejumobi, S. (2003) *Globalization and Africa's Development Agendas from the WTO to NEPAD.* Development Policy Management Forum (DPMF), Occasional Paper No. 12, Addis Ababa.

Aderemi, A. (2002)*Towards an Interpretation of Africa's Development Process: NEPAD and the New Global Orthodoxy.* A Paper presented at the International Conference on the Challenges of NEPAD, AfricAvenir Foundation for Development, International Cooperation and Peace, Yaounde, Cameroon.

Adesina, J. O. (2004) *NEPAD and the Challenge of Africa's Development: towards the Political Economy of a Discourse.* Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal Quebec, Canada Online <.PDF>.
 20090526 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p73038_index.html.

Adogamhe, P. G. (2008)*Pan-Africanism Revisited: Vision and Reality of African Unity and Development.* African Review of Integration 2(2): 1-34

Ajakaiye, A. A. (1998)*Africa and the Emerging World* In: Capacity Building for Crisis Management in Africa, Garuba, C (ed.), pp. 25-50. Yaba, Lagos: Gabumo Press.

Ajayi, K. (2006) *The Political Economy of Globalization and Possibilities for Regional Economic Development in Africa,* Journal of Social Science 13(2):

Ake, C. (1992) *The New World Order: A View from the South*, Centre for Advance Social Science (CASS), Port Harcourt, Mathuse Publishing (UK).

Alkali, A. (2003) *Contemporary International Relations and Nigeria's Foreign Policy* Kaduna: Gaskiya Publishers.

Amin, S. (1974) *Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopmen,t* New York: Monthly Review Press

Amin, S. (1993) *The Challenge of Globalization: Delinking in the South Centre Facing the Challenge: Responses to the Report of the South Commission,* Caledonia, London: Zed Books Ltd.

Ammassari S, (2006) *Migration Management and Development Policies: Maximizing the Benefits of International Migration in West Africa*, International Migration Papers 72E, International Labour Organization, Geneva.

Anna, L. (2001) *Trafficking in Women and Children in Asia and Europe*, Stockholm: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Bekoe, D. A. (2002) *NEPAD and Its Achilles Heels,* Alternatives Turkish Journal of International Relations Vol. 1(4), summer.

Black, D. (2011) *Canada, the G8 and Africa: the Rise and decline of a Hegemonic Project?*, In: Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas 2nd Edition. D. Bratt and C. KukuCha (ed.) Don Mills: Oxford University Press.

Boaduo, N. A. (2008) *Africa's Political, Industrial and Economic Development Dilemma in the Contemporary Era of the African Union,* The Journal of Pan African Studies 2(4), June.

Chazan, et al. (1992) *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa*, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Cillier, J. (2004) *Human Security in Africa: A Conceptual Framework for Review of African Security Initiative*, AHSI Publishers.

Davis, R. J. (2009) *U.S. Presence in Africa: Preserving National Interests and Competing with China to Achieve Strategic and Defensive Objectives,* A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

Desai, S. (2006)*Expanding the G8: should China join?* London: Foreign Policy Centre, January.

De Mesquita, B. B. (2006) *Principles of International Politics: People's Power, Preferences, and Perceptions* Washington D.C.: CQ Press.

Douglas et' al, (2003) *Alienation and Militancy in the Niger Delta: A Response to CSIS on Petroleum, Politics, and Democracy in Nigeria.* Foreign Policy in Focus Special Report, July.

Economic Commission for Africa (2006) *International Migration and Development: Implications for Africa.* A background document for the High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development United Nations General Assembly, 14-15 September.

Edi, E. (2007) *Africa and the New World Order: Voices and Ways of Liberation in Armah's Osiris Rising.* The Journal of Pan African Studies 1(9), August.

Egwu, S.G. (2007) Beyond "Revival of Old Hatreds": The State and Conflict in Africa in Best, S. G. (eds). Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd.

Encarta Encyclopedia (2009) *1978: United Nations.* Archive Article.

Fitzgibbon, K. (2005) *Modern Day Slavery*. U S Department of State: Washington D. C.

Frank, A. G. (1969) *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Brazil and Chile.* New York, Monthly Review.

Gattamorta, M. E. (2005)*The Evolution of Development Strategies for Africa: From the Lagos Plan of Action to the Report of the Commission for Africa* Cemiss Quarterly, Spring.

Gbor, W. F. (1998)*Background to African Crisis.* In: Capacity Building for Crisis Management in Africa, Garuba, C. (ed.), pp. 51-66. Yaba, Lagos: Gabumo Press.

German Development Institute (2010)*African Developments: Continental Integration in Africa-AU, NEPAD and the APRM.* Briefing Paper, April.

Gilbert, et al. (2009)*The United States Africa Command: Security for Whom?* Journal of Pan African Studies 2(9), March.

Gill, et al. (2007) *Assessing China's Growing Influence in Africa* China Security 3(3), Summer

Goldstein, J. (1999) *International Relations 3rd ed.* New York: Longman Inc.

G8 Research Group (2005) *An Overview of the G8 and Ongoing Relationship with African Development from the 2001 Genoa Summit to the 2005 Gleneagles Summit.* The G8 Africa Final Report, June.

Hansen, W. and Schulz, B. (1981)*Imperialism, Dependency, and Social Class.* Africa Today 28(3), 3rd Quarterly.

Hogvelt, A. (2001) *Globalization and the Past-colonial World: The New Political Economy of Development 2nd ed*. Palgrave, Hampshire, Britain.

Holsti, K. J. (1995) *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis 7th ed.* Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Hooder, B. W. (1978) *Africa Today: A Short Introduction to African Affairs*. New fetter Lane, London: Methuen & Co. Ltd.

Huggan, G. (1997) *The Neocolonialism of Postcolonialism: A Cautionary Note.* Links and Letters Vol. 4.

Kegley, C. W and Wittkopf, E. R. (1999) *World Politics: Trends & Transformation 7th ed.* Worth Publishers Inc. New York.

Legum, M. (2002) *Declaration on African Development Challenges.* Economic Justice News Online 5(2), June.

Leys, C. (1994) *Confronting the African Tragedy* New Left Review, March.

Madavo, C. (2005) *Africa: The Development Challenges of the 21st Century.* AFRICA Program Occasional Paper Series No. 4,September Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Mori, K. (2009) *The G8 Summit in the Global Order for Environment and Development.* The Journal of Social Science 68.

Muhibbu-din, M. O. (2011)*The new partnership for Africa's development (NEPAD) Policy on Women Empowerment in Africa: A critical appraisal.* African Journal of Political Science and International Relations 5(1): 1-9, January.

Niekerk, A. J. V. (2007)*Investigating the Marginalization of Africa: Evidence and Explanation* www.essa.org.za/download.

Nkrumah K. (1970) *Africa Must Unite*. New York: International Press.

Nkrumah, K. (1965) *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*. London: Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd.

Organization of African Unity (1981) *Lagos Plan of Action for Economic Development of Africa 1980-2000.* Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: OAU Press.

Ojo O. (1985)*Regional Cooperation and Integration.* In: African International Relations, O. Ojo, D.K. Orwa and C.M.B. Utete, London: Longman

Owusu, F. (2003) *Pragmatism and the Gradual Shift from Dependency to Neo-liberalism: The World Bank, African Leaders, and Development Policy in Africa.* World Development 31(10): 1655–1672.

Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2001) 6th (ed.) Oxford University Press.

Pham, J. P. (2007)*Next Front? Evolving United States–African Strategic Relations in the 'War on Terrorism' and Beyond.* Comparative Strategy, 26.

Raphael, S. and D. Stokes (2011) *Globalizing West African oil: US' Energy, Security and the Global Economy.* International affairs 87(4):903-921.

Rodney, W. (1972) *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.* Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House

Schmidt, R. (2002) *Ownership and Partnership in Africa's Development.* The North-South Institute, June 12.

Schrecker, T. (2007) *The Best of Times, the Worst of Times? The G8 and Prospects for a Global Health Ethic.* Prepared for Sixth Pan-European Conference on International Relations University of Turin Italy, September.

Snoddy, V. K. (2005) *The New partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Will it Succeed or Fail?* M.Sc Thesis Department of navy Civilian, US Army War College Market Street, Philadephia, USA.

Stren, R. and M. Halfani (2001) *The Cities of Sub-Saharan Africa: From Dependency to Marginality.* In: Handbook of Urban Studies, Paddison, R. (ed.) London: SAGE Publications.

Thomas-Jensen, C. (2008) *Beyond AFRICOM: Toward a Comprehensive U.S. Africa Policy* International Crisis Group, Winter 2008.

Toure, T. K. (2006) *Central Challenges Confronting the African State: Rethinking Its Role in Development.* African Journal of International Affairs 9(1 & 2).

U. S. Department of State (2004) *The Link between Prostitution and Sex Trafficking.* Global Affairs, November.

U. S. Department of State (2005) *Trafficking in Persons Report*, June.

Waal, A. D. (2002) *What's New in the New Partnership for Africa's Development?* International Affairs 78(3): 463-75.

Wannenburg, G. (2005) *Organized Crime in West Africa.* Africa Security Review 14(4).

Wikipeadia (2011)*Neo-colonialist Political and Economic Critiques* Wikipeadia Free Encyclopeadia.

Zweig, D. (2007) *Resource Diplomacy Under Hegemony: The Sources of Sino-American Competition in the 21st Century?* Center on China's Transnational Relations1Working Paper No. 18, Hong Kng University of Science and Technology.

The IISTE is a pioneer in the Open-Access hosting service and academic event management. The aim of the firm is Accelerating Global Knowledge Sharing.

More information about the firm can be found on the homepage:
http://www.iiste.org

CALL FOR JOURNAL PAPERS

There are more than 30 peer-reviewed academic journals hosted under the hosting platform.

Prospective authors of journals can find the submission instruction on the following page: http://www.iiste.org/journals/ All the journals articles are available online to the readers all over the world without financial, legal, or technical barriers other than those inseparable from gaining access to the internet itself. Paper version of the journals is also available upon request of readers and authors.

MORE RESOURCES

Book publication information: http://www.iiste.org/book/

Recent conferences: http://www.iiste.org/conference/

IISTE Knowledge Sharing Partners

EBSCO, Index Copernicus, Ulrich's Periodicals Directory, JournalTOCS, PKP Open Archives Harvester, Bielefeld Academic Search Engine, Elektronische Zeitschriftenbibliothek EZB, Open J-Gate, OCLC WorldCat, Universe Digtial Library , NewJour, Google Scholar