

# Securitization of Politics and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Boko Haram Experience

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## Abstract

Security is one of the cardinal projects necessary for engendering an organized society and everybody is a critical stakeholder. However, it appears that this project has been politicized in Nigeria and the politicization has led to sporadic emergence of injurious ethnic militias who have equally become tools in the hands of the political elite group for achieving what was impossible at the polls. The study used Boko Haram insurgency to problematize the politics of securitization and relying on extracted axioms from the Marxian theory of social production and reproduction, the work discovered that the quest for primitive accumulation arising from the use of state power by the political elite group is responsible for the politicization of security in Nigeria. Among others, the study recommended that as a practical step to reduce securitization, good governance rooted in the will of the governed should be institutionalized.

**Keywords:** security, securitization, politics, Boko Haram.

## ◆ Introduction

Man, as a social being with innate clashing and splashing interests, naturally seeks to institute a social order where the security of lives and properties would be safeguarded, guaranteed and propagated. Therefore, in the state of nature, the desire of man to protect his private property weaved around the 'needs of the stomach' compelled him to surrender his rights of arbitrariness and to enhance the enthronement of distinct civil societies whose primary concern was to institute social order where rights to properties, rights to life and rights to existence would be guaranteed and enforced by the state. As man traverses through different socio-formations, his ideas, experiences, internal and external stimuli, as well as his motivations, propensities and predispositions compelled him to modify his sense of security and adjust to new and emerging security trends and challenges.

Nonetheless, it is important to amplify that the nature, dimensions and intensity of security threats witnessed in a given polity is inversely proportional to the nature, character and system of production and distribution of material values. Thus, the level of development of the productive forces finds its expression in the acculturation pattern, as well as in the system of politicking and allocation of socially produced common wealth.

As a corollary of the above, in a polity, such as Nigeria, where distribution is amplified; where production is de-emphasized; where comprador instincts and residues predominate; where centrifugal tendencies are becoming more elastic; where ethno-regional conflicts are normative; and where struggle among the economic notables and political gladiators for crass appropriation of public wealth has been given extreme religious and regional leverage, the resultant effects are politicization of security and indeed the securitization of politics.

In this paper, we shall, among others, explore the nexus and implications of the politics of securitization and the securitization of politics on Nigerian polity. We shall use the experience of the rampaging Boko Haram insurgency to interrogate the problematic. Issues explored include: theoretical perspective; explanatory matrix on security; securitization; remote, immediate and proximate causes of insecurity, as well as empirical analysis of securitisation and Boko Haram insurgency.

## ◆ Theoretical Perspective

The theoretical propositions adopted in this study were extracts and axioms derived from the Marxian analysis of social production and reproduction theory. These are nonetheless akin to what Marxian scholarship refers to as socio-economic system (Abalkin, Dzarasov and Kulijov, 1983). Meanwhile, Marx (1976) noted that the production of surplus value is the framework for analyzing the dynamism of the capitalist society.

Hence the basic propositions of this theory is that the fundamental interest of man (all living things) is security and survival; thus in order to survive or be secured, man must produce and reproduce himself. This social production and reproduction give character to other human values; the social activities are in part or full related to pains, pleasure, security, violence, development, underdevelopment, poverty, riches etc. What can be produced is based on a combination of the quality of labour, non-human physical resources and interpersonal relations, and in every social production process, there must be someone or group of people that make binding decisions; those who make decisions also use it to their advantage. Every man struggles to remain in a

favourable position in social production and reproduction process and those who are satisfied with the production system struggle to retain the system while those that are not satisfied struggle to alter the *status quo*.

Notably, capitalist system of social production, distribution and exchange dominates the global economy generating its conflicts and poverty because only a few controls the production process leaving out the majority of the working people poor unlike the pre-capitalist communal system of production where the majority controlled the production process. Although capitalism has generated great wealth and knowledge unlike any other system of social production hitherto known to man, it has also generated greater disparity, inequality, human suffering and misery as wealth and power are increasingly privatized and the gap between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots' has indeed reached the elastic limit. Thus, Ogban- Iyam (2005:45) remarks that:

The current challenge to any modern polity is how to (1) adapt communal society production to the current large scale societies or polities or (2) how to transform a capitalist social labour to social products and no longer private product in which a majority rules or (3) to transform a socialist production system to a communal social production system in which a majority rules or (4) how to carry out a combination of 1 and 3 above where the majority are recessive and dominated by communal social production and minority of its citizens capitalist social production system

The above quotation suggests that Nigeria is most fitted for the fourth category where both the communalism and capitalism are rife. In Nigeria, capitalism is dominant though not deeply rooted and popular but communalism tainted in feudalistic practices is dominating and deep rooted.

Based on the foregoing, we state as follows:

- Rival groups namely – communalists and capitalist are continuously struggling to capture, control and dominate the Nigerian economy.
- Nigerian state is in a permanent status of economic disequilibrium arising largely from low production of material values and pursuit of policies aimed at instituting beggar mentality, hopelessness and stunted political imbecility.
- Arising from the above, cultural secularisation is deliberately disjointed and tainted with intolerance and fear complex; this is largely because specific critical cultural values are deployed as tools for perpetrating grandiose personal and group appropriation.
- As a corollary, social atomization is regimented and atomized towards extensive selfish ends. This truncates efforts at national consciousness and lives the political economy within the throes of constant protection of ethnic/clannish identities.
- This struggle between these groups breeds policy inconsistencies and discourages diversification of the economy
- That low intensity of social production and reproduction, low material and mental capacity of the leadership impel them to rely on **received and prepared** development agenda which they are equally incompetent to understand, interpret and implement.
- The existence of uncoordinated and inchoate economic structure is implicated in the persistence of over-bloated state structure which, in the midst of disjointed economic structure, rather serves as vehicle for advancing political patronage and re-cycling of loyal but criminally-minded political surrogates; whose preoccupation is idleness and thuggery.
- The existence of low productive potentials and competitiveness in the midst of liberalization project undermines the development of potent internal markets and thus enhances the emergence of a group of individuals who reify the State and market, alienates others in the decision making and implementation and hence see the political economy as their "self-serving shops and supermarkets."

The above factors combine to unleash Nigerian model of fascism characterised by blind pursuit of wealth by the few. The prevailing agony, poverty, malnutrition, malnourishment, alienation and suffocation generate reactionary and rebellious counter-reactions as seen in the unprecedented crimes and in the emergence of insurgents, such as Movement for the Emancipation of Niger-Delta (MEND), Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Odua People's Congress (OPC), EGBESU and the Boko Haram.

#### ◆ Security Explained

Security has to do with freedom from danger or with threats to a nation's ability to protect and develop itself, promote its cherished values and legitimate interests and enhance the well being of its people. Thus internal security could be seen as the freedom from or the absence of those tendencies which could undermine internal cohesion and the corporate existence of the nation and its ability to maintain its vital institutions for the promotion of its core values and socio-political and economic objectives, as well as meet the legitimate aspirations of the people. Internal security also implies freedom from danger to life and prosperity (Imobighe cited in Oche, 2004:76-77).

Accordingly, Buzan (1991) analysed security from three levels. These include individuals, states and

international systems. The sectors, which he also addresses in the article “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century”, are Political, Military, Economic, Societal, and Environmental. These concepts cannot adequately address the issue of security separately, each one is intricately and complexly linked with the next forming a web of information that a security analyst or international relationist must detangle to understand each concept individually in order to ascertain how they affect each other on the whole.

Meanwhile, Security in social sciences parlance is conducted into principal ordinary meanings as follows:

- a) The condition of being safe;
- b) A financial pledge which is at the same time a form of investment.

Technically speaking, security is a direct synonym to safety. It signifies absence of, or protection from, physical danger. As noted by Lerner (1964:626):

Security is sometimes used in such phrases as state security, security risk, security police, etc, to denote (a) the safety or protection, and/or (b) the agencies to which the safety of the state is entrusted ... In a larger sense, security is virtually identical with welfare and signifies absence of, or protection from, material want.

The above postulations indicate, *inter alia*, that security is multifaceted and multidimensional in meaning, applications and projections. As a consequence of the foregoing, Luckham (2012:2) observes that:

Security is not only multi-headed, but also morally ambiguous and politically contested. Everything depends on who speaks in the name of security. Whose security are we talking about? From what are they secured? And how is their security protected (or neglected)?

Meanwhile, the moral and political confusion weaved around security stems from two different perspectives on the theory and practice of security itself. Indeed two perspectives on security: Security as order vs. Security as an entitlement dominates the literature. On one side, security involves ‘seeing like a state,’ even in a modern world where ‘the state’ comprises global and national power structures as well as nation states. The state based perspective on security sees it as a process of social and political ordering.

This order is achieved through military power, surveillance or the control of new media. Post-conflict ‘stabilization’ and ‘state-building’ in countries like Sierra Leone or Afghanistan has been premised upon the creation of political order so that development can take place. Another perspective conceives security, in terms of entitlement of citizens (2011 *World Development Report’s* formulation of citizen security, the UN’s endorsement of human security and the ‘responsibility to protect’). However, the two perspectives on security are mutually interconnected faces of governance. Both address the problems of power and the use of force, but from different directions.

In practical term, security encompasses, but it is not limited to the following:

- ◆ Freedom from hunger, want, starvation and diseases;
- ◆ Conviction that the ‘needs of the stomach’ are safeguarded and guaranteed;
- ◆ Mustering of adequate security machinery in a given polity to protect the lives, property and investments of the citizens;
- ◆ guaranteeing the future of the people through responsible and responsive governance;
- ◆ instituting adequate safeguards against oppression, suppression and alienation of the mass of the citizens
- ◆ evolving political actions that will deepen affective, ascriptive and evaluative orientations among the citizens;
- ◆ implanting statecraft based on effective production and equitable distribution of socially produced wealth; and
- ◆ improving the residues of patriotism, solidarity and cooperative behaviour (Okolie, 2012:7-9).

Indeed much of the principles enunciated above cohere with Luckham’s assertion and prescriptions on security. According to him, accounting for security from below is a priority for two reasons:

-It reveals the agency of people who are insecure, including their survival strategies and their capacity to challenge dominant social orders, as has been seen in the Arab Springs.

-It helps us understand the complex local contexts where vulnerable people seek security. In these contexts, state security agencies can easily become oppressors. Ordinary people may well seek protection elsewhere, even from otherwise malign and violent bodies such as paramilitaries and criminal mafias (Luckham, 2012:2).

In its pure political connotation, especially as it concerns most states in Africa, security can aptly be conceived within the intellectual purview of the Copenhagen School. They remarked as follows:

Security is not a fixed unit but it is created through a process of securitization. In other words, politicians can turn a political issue from a non-security related problem into a security problem by confronting it with an external threat. In a mere “speech act”, they can construct a common enemy and thus inspire their subjects to more closely identify with each other. For Karyotis, in the particular depiction of immigrants as ‘the others’, politicians engage securitization to firstly maintain “culture and identity” of their electorates, secondly prevent economic destabilization through massive immigration and thirdly “safeguard their [own] legitimacy and increase their electoral power”. Thus the security question is institutionalized and can be evoked where it promises political advantages

(Van Munster, 2013:3, 9-11).

Much of the ascribed political advantages turn out to conduce into advancement of personal interests of few political gladiators; who, in pursuit of economic advantages resort to securitization.

#### ◆ **Securitization: Conceptual Analysis**

Securitization, as a concept, originated from the writing of Ole Waever (1995), ... holds that some things do not really exist in hardened, maternal reality, but only exist as social constructs in peoples' minds because people tacitly agree to act as if something existed (Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopaedia).

In consonance with the above reasoning, the Wikipedia, the online free encyclopaedia noted that securitization describes the process of real-life actors "interpreting" and re-interpreting" things so that some audience become convinced in a particular context, that what was once a non-security problem must now become a security problem. Thus, according to Taureck (2006: 3), 'security is a (illocutionary) speech act that solely by uttering 'security' something is being done. It is by labelling something a security issue that it becomes one (Waever, 2004:13). By stating that a particular referent object is threatened in its existence, a securitizing actor claims a right to extraordinary measures to ensure the referent object's survival. Taureck noted therefore that the issue is then moved out of the sphere of normal politics into the realm of emergency politics, where it can be dealt with swiftly and without the normal (democratic) rules and regulations of policy making. For security, this means that it no longer has any given (pre-existing) meaning but that it can be anything a securitizing actor says it is.

According to Taureck (2006:3), to prevent 'everything' from becoming a security issue, a successful securitization consists of three steps. These are: (1) identification of existential threats; (2) emergency action; and (3) effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules (Buzan *et al*, 1998: 6). To present an issue as an existential threat is to say that: 'If we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in our own way)' (Buzan *et al*. 1998: 24). This first step towards a successful securitization is called a securitizing move. A securitizing move is in theory an option open to any unit because only once an actor has convinced an audience (inter-unit relations) of its legitimate need to go beyond otherwise binding rules and regulations (emergency mode) can we identify a case of securitization. In practice, securitization is thus far from being open to all units and their respective subjective threats. Rather, it is largely based on power and capability and therewith the means to socially and politically construct a threat.

In her remark, and in consonance with the views expressed by Huysmans, Aradau criticized the moral/ethical dimension in the process of securitization. She argued as follows:

[securitization] is: a technique of government which retrieves the ordering force of the fear of violent death by a mythical replay of the variations of the Hobbesian state of nature. It manufactures a sudden rupture in the routinized, everyday life by fabricating an existential threat which provokes experiences of the real possibility of violent death (Aradau 2001).

Therefore, securitization is not just a call for political or moral priority but if need be, for permission to break the normal rules of politics, i.e. by using force, by taking executive powers, or by imposing secrecy (Adiong, 2009:5). Again, Caballero-Anthony and Emmers (2006:23) added that it is when the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics and may refer to the classification of and consensus about certain phenomena, persons or entities as existential threats requiring emergency measures.

Adiong (2009:6) further noted that the proponents explain that securitization is mostly about calls for closure against things perceived as existentially threatening and further, the consensual establishment of threat needs to be sufficient so as to produce substantial political effects. The constructionist school remarked that what constitutes an existential threat depends on a shared understanding of what is meant by such a danger to security. They classified threat into three as follows:

- Actual threats are existential conditions that can, at any moment, reduce security.
- Potential threats are conditions tending to reduce security but will not transformable to actual threats due to some constraints.
- Fictitious threats are conditions that are perceived to reduce security but do not really exist.

Arising from the foregoing, Adiong (2009:6-8) noted that securitization is the successful process of labelling an issue a security issue and results in the transformation of the way of dealing with it. This transformation has relevant implications; through the label "security" problems are turned into existential threats that require exceptional, emergency measures, which may include breaking otherwise binding rules or governing by decrees rather than by democratic decisions. Thus, Haacke (2007: 3) simply stated that to securitize an issue is to present as urgent and existential, as so important that it should not be exposed to the normal haggling of politics but should be dealt with decisively by top leaders prior to other issues.

Meanwhile, Caballero-Anthony and Emmers (2006:23-24), outlined five key terminologies in the

process of securitization which was presented by Copenhagen School for security studies, namely: security, securitizing actors, referent objects, specific audience, and the speech act.

. **Security:** A socially constructed concept about survival wherein an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated object. It is securitized when articulated by a securitizing actor.

. **Securitizing Actors:** These are actors in governments, international organizations or civil societies that securitize an issue by articulating the existence of threat(s) to the survival of specific referent object.

. **Referent Objects:** These can be individuals and groups (refugees, victims of human rights abuses, etc.) as well as security issues like states (military security), national sovereignty or an ideology (political security), national economies (economic security), collective identities (societal security), or species or habitats (environmental security) that possess a “legitimate” claim to survival and whose existence is ostensibly threatened.

. **Specific Audience:** The act of securitization is only successful and complete once the securitizing actor succeeds in using the language of security which is the “speech act” to convince a specific or significant audience e.g. public opinion, politicians, military officers or other elites, etc. that a referent object(s) is/are existentially threatened.

. **Speech Act:** This is an important part in the process of securitization. According to Wæver (1998), with the help of language theory, we can regard "security" as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done. Through this process, two things become very clear. First, the word "security" is the act and second, the utterance is the primary reality.

Arising from the foregoing discussion, we state as follows:

- Labelling a given object, subject or action as being securitized does not necessarily mean that the subject is of objective essence for the survival of a given state.
- Through the use of security acts, anybody can succeed in branding or constructing something as an existential problem.
- The success and ability to effectively securitize a given object is highly dependent on both the status of a given actor, and of course, on whether similar issues are generally perceived.
- If a subject is successfully securitized, then it is possible to legitimize extraordinary means to solve a perceived problem. These may range from declaring a state of emergency or martial law, mobilizing the military or attacking another country.
- Again, if something is successfully labelled as a security problem, then the subject can be considered to be an illegitimate subject for political or academic debate (Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopaedia).
- Labelling power shift to the ‘south’ was securitized and hence the referents (‘northern elements’) were indoctrinated and mobilised through taking up arms in the branded guise of Boko Haram.
- Again, accepting the insurgency as securitization issue of concern empowered the leadership to adopt extraordinary means (state of emergency) to deal with the situation.

It is, nonetheless, important to note that securitization could take place in any of these five political sectors:

- Military
- Political
- Economic
- Society
- Environment

However, a securitization could easily involve more than one of these sectors. In the case of the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, one could state that the conflict was securitized militarily; weapons of mass destruction were one reason for the invasion. However, the war was also securitized as a societal problem; human rights in Saddam's Iraq were mentioned in the public rationale. Another less obvious example would be the immigration debate in the United States. Concerns of terrorist infiltration are regularly cited as grounds for home land security measures which led to the adoption of the tight control of borders. Because it is easier to securitize an issue following September 11, this concern for safety and security has taken attention away from the economic factors that have always been at play in international migration.

In Nigeria, the restiveness in the Niger Delta was securitized by consolidation of all these factors listed above. The invasion of Odi by the Obasanjo’s administration was securitized on military and political considerations. The constant attacks on the leadership of the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) were securitized on essentially military and political considerations. The issue of Boko Haram terrorism is being securitized on the consideration of all the five factors listed above.

In line with foregoing, Buzan *et al* (1998:25) opined that:

Securitization examines how a certain issue is transformed by an actor into a matter of security. Securitization is an extreme version of politicization that enables the use of extraordinary means in the name of security. For the securitizing act to be successful, it must be accepted by the audience.

Securitization studies aims to understand "who securitizes (Securitizing actor), on what issues (threats), for whom (referent object), why, with what results, and not least, under what conditions." The term was coined by Ole Wæver in 1995, but seems to have become commonplace, at least within constructivist studies of international relations (Buzan, Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, 1998:25).

The above citation is very instructive and insightful. Among others, it outlined the basic elements of securitization, unfolded its processes and as well highlighted the critical factors that incubate security threats in Nigeria. Meanwhile, security remains the epicentre upon which the core, middle range and routine values of polity are built. As a process with hydra-headed and sometimes monstrous and vacillating character, security remains basically the *telos* of man. The gregarious nature of man necessarily presents conditions for security and insecurity in human societies.

#### **Remote, Immediate and Proximate Causes of Insecurity in Nigeria**

Achumba, Ighomereho and Akpor-Robaro (2013:80-83) outlined the remote, immediate and proximate causes of insecurity in Nigeria to include the following:

##### **a. Remote Factors**

- Pervasive material inequalities and unfairness
- Ethno-regional conflicts
- Conflict perceptions between the public and government
- Weak security system
- Loss of socio-cultural and communal value system

##### **b. Immediate and Proximate Factors**

- Porous borders
- Rural-urban drift
- Social irresponsibility of companies
- Unemployment/poverty
- Terrorism

In addition to the above, and depending on the prism one views it, insecurity in Nigeria can also be situated within the character of the political elites that control the state power and the quest to use such power for material accumulation; in doing so, anything goes including formation and empowering of ethnic militias (by politicians) who *ipso facto* would be the vanguard for actualizing what was impossible in a civilized process through a backdoor act. Against this backdrop, Onaiyekan (2012) noted that:

In Nigeria's 'winner takes all' political culture, where the country's political elites from a number of regions, religions and ethnicities compete for power and the control of oil resources, militant groups (like Boko Haram) serve as a kind of pressuring mechanism for achieving what cannot be achieved in elections, in parliament, or in backroom deals (cited in Onuoha & Ugwueze, 2014:24)

Germane as the above are, existing scholarship appears to gloss over the fundamental and recurring factors rooted in the securitization of politics and innate politics that trail the management of such security threats. Indeed politicization and/or securitization of the process of managing these potential and actual threats stimulated the escalation of the Boko Haram terrorist acts. The situation becomes worse given the impunity that characterizes the Nigerian political culture.

#### **Securitization and Boko Haram Insurgency**

The preceding analyses are germane and clearly linked securitization to Boko Haram insurgency. However, prior to the Boko Haram threat, several issues had been securitized as security situation in Nigeria continued to deteriorate. The perceived marginalization of the South-East geopolitical zone was securitized, as MASSOB became potent security threat. Again, the South-West geopolitical zone is equally nursing the feeling of unfair treatment. Hence the militant wing of Odua People's Congress (OPC) had been on the prowl. Also, following the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election believed to have been won by late Chief MKO Abiola, the Yoruba political elites used the umbrella of NADECO to unleash unmitigated attacks on the military junta led by late General Sani Abacha. The State was heavily challenged as the survival of the Nigerian State hanged in symphony.

In addition, the obvious alienation, neglect and pauperisation of oil bearing communities in the Niger Delta region threw up counter-revolutionary forces championed by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). The issue was securitized and the Nigerian State explored extraordinary means to tackle the grievances.

However, the poor or inept handling of most of these security threats unleashed further criminal acts and exacerbated the level of crime in the polity. See Table 1 below for presentation of level of crime from 2000 to 2008.

**Table 1: Level of Crime from 2000 to 2008**

Year	Theft	Armed Robbery	Kidnapping	Assassination	Fraud
2000	29127	1877	243	1255	7927
2001	40796	2809	349	2120	10234
2002	35231	3889	337	2117	9134
2003	33124	3497	410	2136	9508
2004	37289	3142	349	2550	9532
2005	46111	2074	798	2074	9580
2006	41901	2863	372	2000	6395
2007	21082	2327	277	2007	5860
2008	23927	2340	309	1956	5058
<b>Total</b>	<b>308588</b>	<b>20929</b>	<b>3444</b>	<b>18215</b>	<b>73228</b>

**Source: Summary of Available Crime Statistics in Nigeria (2003-2008)**

Culled from Achumba, Ighomereho & Akpor-Robaro (2013:84)

Table 1 shows that from 2008, the rate of theft, armed robbery and kidnapping which reduced in 2007 was on the rise again and as a confirmation of this, Ani (2009) equally observed that “the rate of theft, armed robbery especially in the banks, kidnapping and assassination has continued to rise especially in the southern part of the country” (cited in Achumba, Ighomereho & Akpor-Robaro, 2013:84)

Also, CLEEN Foundation (2012) in a survey of crime rate in Nigeria found that robbery rate has increased significantly in the past one year. Also the vandalization of business installations; in particular, those of GSM operators, has been on the increase. Research has indicated that these vices are not equally distributed in the country (CLEEN Foundation, 2012). For instance, the South East states of the country have the highest incidence of kidnapping, armed robbery and fraud while the northern states are characterized by bombing by the Islamic Sect, Boko Haram. With the incessant Boko Haram bombing of the northern part of the country, Nigeria indeed joined those isolated countries that carry that revolting tag of being referred to as terrorist states

As a corollary of the above, the incessant attacks by the Boko Haram insurgents complicated the already worsened security situation in Nigeria and appear to push the polity unto the verge of precipice. See table 2 below for global peace ranking of selected states in Africa.

**Table 2: Nigeria and other West African Countries on the Global Peace Index Ranking**

S/N	Country	GPI Score 2009	GPI Rank 2009	GPI Score 2010	GPI Rank 2010	GPI Score 2011	GPI Rank 2011	GPI Score 2012	GPI Rank 2012
1	Ghana	1.76	52	1.78	48	1.75	42	1.81	50
2	Sierra Leone	-	-	1.82	53	1.90	61	1.86	52
3	Burkina Faso	1.91	71	1.85	57	1.83	51	1.88	52
4	Gambia	-	-	-	-	1.91	62	1.96	74
5	Senegal	1.98	80	2.03	79	2.05	77	1.99	78
6	Guinea	-	-	-	-	2.13	92	2.07	92
7	Guinea Bissau	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.11	95
8	Liberia	-	-	2.15	99	2.16	97	2.13	101
9	Mali	2.09	96	2.24	109	2.19	100	2.13	102
10	Benin	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.23	114
11	Niger	-	-	-	-	2.36	119	2.24	116
12	Mauritania	2.48	124	2.39	123	2.43	130	2.30	125
13	Cote D'Ivoire	2.34	117	2.30	118	2.42	128	2.42	134
14	<b>Nigeria</b>	<b>2.60</b>	<b>129</b>	<b>2.76</b>	<b>137</b>	<b>2.74</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>2.80</b>	<b>146</b>

**Source: Compiled from Global Peace Index (2009-2012). Culled from Achumba, Ighomereho & Akpor-Robaro (2013:87)**

Statistics from table 2 above indicate that insecurity pervades Nigeria’s landscape. In fact between 2011 and 2012 the country dropped four places to 146th out of 158 countries in the 2012 Global Peace Ranking. In fact, Nigeria has been identified as the least peaceful country in West Africa (GPI, 2012). Indeed, Igbuzor (2011) remarked that West Africa is among the most unsecured region in the world and Table 2 above indicates that Nigeria is the most unsecured country in the region as it has consistently ranked high among the countries in West Africa. On the contrary, Ghana, a neighbouring country to Nigeria has consistently ranked low and is taken as the most peaceful country in the region (Achumba, Ighomereho & Akpor-Robaro, 2013:87).

We have to reiterate that there is a synergy between securitization of clannish/ethnic demands and the Boko Haram insurgency. Simply put, the blind, chaotic and unmitigated crave for power by few northern elites and their southern collaborators led to securitization of political transition; and hence informed the recruitment

and use of the Boko Haram insurgents to arm-twist the political leadership into abdicating their offices. Presently, Nigeria appears to be at war herself as statistics in tables 3-5 below demonstrate.

**Table 3: Some Instances of Boko Haram Attacks and casualty statistics in Nigeria between 2009 and 2010**

S/N	Date	Nature and Place of Attack	Number of Casualties
1	26 <sup>th</sup> July, 2009	First clash with the security agencies in Bauchi state after an all night attack on Dutsen-Tanship police station	42 people killed including 39 sect members, 2 policemen and 1 soldier
2	27 <sup>th</sup> July, 2009	First attack in Yobe state during an invasion in Potiskum Divisional Police Headquarters	4 killed including 3 policemen and 1 fire service officer
3	29 <sup>th</sup> July, 2009	Confrontation with security men at Mamudo village, along Potiskum/Damaturu Road, Yobe state	33 members of the sect killed
4	29 <sup>th</sup> July, 2009	An all-night battle with combined security operatives at Railway Terminus, Maiduguri	Unreported scores killed and operational base of the sect destroyed
5	13 <sup>th</sup> March, 2010	Attack in Northern part of Jos, Plateau state	300 people killed
6	8 <sup>th</sup> September, 2010	Attack at Bauchi Central Prison	No record of death but prisoners were freed
7	24 <sup>th</sup> Dec., 2010	Bomb explosion in Barkin Ladi, Jos, Plateau state	30 people killed
8	31 <sup>st</sup> Dec., 2010	Explosions at Mogadishu mammy market, Abuja	About 10 people killed

**Source:** Sani (2011: 17) "Boko Haram: History, Ideas and Revolt", *Journal of Constitutional Development*. 11 (4): 1-16 and Okpaga et al (2012: 86) "Activities of Boko Haram and Insecurity Question in Nigeria", *Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review*, 1 (9) 77-98

**Table 4: Some Instances of Boko Haram Attacks in Nigeria between 2011 and 2013).**

S/N	Date	Nature and Place of Attack	Number of Casualties
1	28 <sup>th</sup> Jan., 2011	Attack on the ANPP governorship candidate's convoy at Lawan Bukar ward, Maiduguri	7 people killed including the governorship candidate
2	2 <sup>nd</sup> Mar., 2011	Attack on DPO Mustapha Sandamu's residence at Rigasa area of Kaduna state	2 policemen killed
3	30 <sup>th</sup> Mar., 2011	Bomb explosion in Damaturu	A policeman was injured
4	2 <sup>nd</sup> April, 2011	Bomb explosion at Dutsen-Tanship Police Station	2 policemen injured
5	4 <sup>th</sup> May, 2011	Attack at Maiduguri Prison on Kashim Ibrahim Way	A prison warder was killed
6	5 <sup>th</sup> May, 2011	Attack in Maiduguri Government House	2 people killed including the Duty Officer and a 13-year-old boy with another injured
7	9 <sup>th</sup> May, 2011	Attack on the residences of 2 Islamic clerics, Sheikh Goni Tijani and Mallam Abur, at Mairi and Bulabulum Wards in Bauchi state	The 2 Islamic clerics were killed
8	9 <sup>th</sup> May, 2011	Chairman of NURTW Bauchi state was attacked	1 person died – the chairman
9	13 <sup>th</sup> May, 2011	Bomb explosion at London Chinki, Maiduguri	2 people killed
10	15 <sup>th</sup> May, 2011	Bomb explosion at Lagos Street, Maiduguri	5 people injured including 2 soldiers and 3 policemen. Also, a police man was shot dead same day in the city
11	29 <sup>th</sup> May, 2011	Bomb explosion in Bauchi military barrack	14 killed
12	29 <sup>th</sup> May, 2011	Bomb explosion at Zuba, a suburb of Kubwa in Abuja	8 people lost their legs
13	31 <sup>st</sup> May, 2011	Attack on Shehu of Borno's brother	1 person killed – the Shehu's brother
14	1 <sup>st</sup> Jun., 2011	Attack on Police Station in Maiduguri	5 people killed
15	12 <sup>th</sup> Jun., 2011	Attack on a drinking joint in Bulumkutu, Maiduguri	4 people killed
16	16 <sup>th</sup> Jun., 2011	Bomb explosion at Police Headquarters, Abuja. Also, bomb explosion at Damboa town, Maiduguri.	2 people killed 4 children killed
17	20 <sup>th</sup> Jun., 2011	Attack on Kankara Police Station in Katsina state	2 people killed
18	9 <sup>th</sup> July, 2011	Clash between Boko Haram and the military in Maiduguri. Also, bomb blast in a church at Suleja, Niger state	31 people killed. 4 died in that of Suleja with scores injured
19	11 <sup>th</sup> July, 2011	Bomb explosion at a relaxation joint in Fokados Street, Kaduna	Unreported scores killed with many more injured
20	12 <sup>th</sup> July, 2011	Attack on a moving military patrol vehicle with IED in Maiduguri	5 people killed



21	15 <sup>th</sup> July, 2011	Bomb explosion in Maiduguri	5 people injured
22	23 <sup>rd</sup> July, 2011	Bomb explosion close to the Palace of the Shehu of Borno	3 soldiers injured
23	25 <sup>th</sup> July, 2011	Bomb explosion near the palace of a traditional ruler in Maiduguri	8 people killed
24	26 <sup>th</sup> Aug., 2011	Attack on the United Nations building in Abuja	25 people killed with about 60 more injured
25	12 <sup>th</sup> Sep., 2011	Bomb explosion in a Police Station in Misau, Bauchi state	7 people killed including 4 policemen
26	13 <sup>th</sup> Sep., 2011	Attack on the military after a raid in Boko Haram hideouts in Bauchi state	About 4 soldiers injured
27	17 <sup>th</sup> Sep., 2011	Attack on Mohammed Yusuf's brother-in-law two days after playing host to Obasanjo	1 person – Babakura Fugu – killed
28	3 <sup>rd</sup> Oct., 2011	Attack at Baga market in Maiduguri	3 people killed
29	4 <sup>th</sup> Nov., 2011	Attack in Damaturu, Yobe state	About 150 people killed
30	27 <sup>th</sup> Nov., 2011	Attack in Geidaam, Yobe state	7 people killed

**Source:** Sani (2011: 40-41) “Boko Haram: History, Ideas and Revolt”, *Journal of Constitutional Development*. 11 (4): 1-16 and Okpaga et al (2012: 86-88) “Activities of Boko Haram and Insecurity Question in Nigeria”, *Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review*. 1 (9): 77-98

31	18 <sup>th</sup> Dec., 2011	Bomb detonation in Shuwari, Maiduguri	3 sect members died
32	22 <sup>nd</sup> Dec., 2011	Bomb explosion and gunshots in Borno state	4 people killed and several others injured
33	24 <sup>th</sup> Dec., 2011	Bomb explosion in Jos	About 80 people killed
34	25 <sup>th</sup> Dec., 2011	Bomb explosion at St. Theresa's Catholic Church in Madalla, Niger state	About 50 people killed and several others injured
35	30 <sup>th</sup> Dec., 2011	Attack in Maiduguri	7 people killed
36	5 <sup>th</sup> Jan., 2012	Attack in a church in Gombe	6 people killed
37	6 <sup>th</sup> Jan., 2012	Attack in Christ Apostolic Church, Yola, Adamawa state. Also, attack at Mubi, Adamawa	17 people killed. Also, 20 Igbo people were killed in Mubi
38	20 <sup>th</sup> Jan., 2012	Multiple attacks in Kano	About 250 people killed
39	22 <sup>nd</sup> Jan., 2012	Attacks at 2 churches and the headquarters of Tafawa Balewa LGA in Bauchi state	About 10 people killed
40	26 <sup>th</sup> Jan., 2012	Bomb explosion in Sabon Gari, Kano state	Many injured
41	28 <sup>th</sup> Jan., 2012	Attack in Gambiru Ngala, Borno state	1 killed
42	29 <sup>th</sup> Jan., 2012	Attack in Gambiru Ngala, Borno state	2 killed
43	30 <sup>th</sup> Jan., 2012	Attack in Maiduguri environs	6 killed including 2 Air force officers
44	4 <sup>th</sup> Feb., 2012	Attack in Damboa town, Borno state	2 killed
45	5 <sup>th</sup> Feb., 2012	Attack in Yobe	An SS man killed
46	7 <sup>th</sup> Feb., 2012	Attack at Kano market and military barrack	5 people killed
47	7 <sup>th</sup> Feb., 2012	Another attack in Kano	10 people killed
48	10 <sup>th</sup> Feb., 2012	Shootout with soldiers in Maiduguri	4 people killed
49	10 <sup>th</sup> Feb., 2012	Attack in Police Station in Shagari Quarters, Kano state	No casualty recorded
50	12 <sup>th</sup> Feb., 2012	Tip-off in Maiduguri	Some members of Boko Haram killed
51	15 <sup>th</sup> Feb., 2012	Jail break in Koton Karji prison, Kogi state	A warder killed and 199 prisoners freed
52	15 <sup>th</sup> Feb., 2012	Attack on policemen in Minna, Niger state	2 policemen killed
53	17 <sup>th</sup> Feb., 2012	Attack I Geidam, Yobe state	2 people killed
54	17 <sup>th</sup> Feb., 2012	Attack in Maiduguri metropolis	5 people killed
55	19 <sup>th</sup> Feb., 2012	Bomb explosion near a church in Suleja on the outskirts of Abuja	5 people injured
56	11 <sup>th</sup> Mar., 2012	Suicide bomb attack in a church in Jos, Plateau state	4 people killed and 38 others injured
57	8 <sup>th</sup> April, 2012	Bomb explosion on Easter Sunday near a church in Kaduna	36 people killed with 13 others injured
58	29 <sup>th</sup> April, 2012	Bomb attack at a lecture theater used as Christian worship in the University of Kano	19 people killed including 2 professors

59	3 <sup>rd</sup> Jun., 2012	Suicide car bomber drove into a church in Yelwa during Sunday service	About 12 people killed
60	10 <sup>th</sup> June, 2012	Attack on a church congregation in Biu town, Borno state	Unreported number of people killed

**Source:** Okpaga et al (2012: 88-89) “Activities of Boko Haram and Insecurity Question in Nigeria”, *Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review*. 1 (9): 77-98 and *Vanguard* December 1<sup>st</sup>, 2012 also retrievable from [www.vanguardngr.com](http://www.vanguardngr.com)

61	1 <sup>st</sup> Oct., 2012	Attacks at Adamawa State University, Federal Poly, and the school of Health Technology and also University of Maiduguri in Borno state	About 43 students killed
61	1 <sup>st</sup> Oct., 2012	Attack in Minna, Niger state	2 policemen killed
63	7 <sup>th</sup> Oct., 2012	Confrontation between the military and the sect members in Damaturu, Yobe state	About 32 people killed including 30 members of the sect and 2 civilians
64	8 <sup>th</sup> Oct., 2012	Reprisal attack for the death of military officers through IED in Maiduguri	10 people killed
65	14 <sup>th</sup> Oct., 2012	Attack at Dongo Dawa village in Gwari LGA of Kaduna state	24 people killed
66	28 <sup>th</sup> Oct., 2012	Attack in Kaduna	8 people killed and 100 injured
67	28 <sup>th</sup> Oct., 2012	Suicide bomber struck at St Rita’s Catholic church in Angwar yero, Kaduna state	8 people killed
68	29 <sup>th</sup> Oct., 2012	Attack at a drinking bar in Gindin Akwati Barkin Ladi, Plateau state	6 people killed
69	21 <sup>st</sup> Nov., 2012	Attack in Maiduguri by the sect	10 people killed
70	22 <sup>nd</sup> Nov., 2012	Attack on ladies believed to be on mini-skirts in Maiduguri	20 women killed
71	24 <sup>th</sup> Nov., 2012	Bomb explosion in St Andrew’s Anglican church at the Armed Forces Command and Staff College Jaji, Kaduna state	15 people killed
72	26 <sup>th</sup> Nov., 2012	Attack on SARS headquarters in Abuja	2 officers killed and 30 detainees freed
73	1 <sup>st</sup> Jan., 2013	Shootout in Maiduguri	14 people killed including 13 sect members and a soldier
74	2 <sup>nd</sup> Jan., 2013	Attack on a Police Station at Song town of Adamawa state	4 people killed including 2 policemen and 2 civilians
75	4 <sup>th</sup> Jan., 2013	Attack on a military check-point in Marte town of Adamawa state	7 people killed including 5 sect members, a soldier and a policeman
76	19 <sup>th</sup> Jan., 2013	Attack on a contingent of Mali-bound Nigerian troops in central Kogi, Kogi state	2 soldiers killed and 5 others injured
77	19 <sup>th</sup> Jan., 2013	Attack on Emir of Kano’s convoy	5 people killed mostly the Emir’s security guards
78	21 <sup>st</sup> Jan., 2013	Attack of a market in Damboa town	18 people killed mostly local hunters
79	23 <sup>rd</sup> Jan., 2013	Attack at Gwange area of Maiduguri	5 people beheaded
80	27 <sup>th</sup> Jan., 2013	Attack of Gajiganna village near Maiduguri	8 civilians killed
81	1 <sup>st</sup> Feb., 2013	Clash with the military in two forests outside Maiduguri	17 sect members killed
82	8 <sup>th</sup> Feb., 2013	Attack on 2 polio clinics in Kano	10 polio immunization workers killed and 3 others injured
83	10 <sup>th</sup> Feb., 2013	Attack in Potiskum, Yobe state	3 North Korean doctors killed
84	15 <sup>th</sup> Feb., 2013	Bomb attack against military patrol vehicle in Maiduguri	2 suicide bombers died and 1 soldier injured
85	16 <sup>th</sup> Feb., 2013	Attack on a construction company in Bauchi state	1 security employee killed and 7 foreign nationals abducted
86	19 <sup>th</sup> Feb., 2013	French family taken hostage in Cameroun near the Nigerian border	No casualty reported but the family members were abducted
87	20 <sup>th</sup> Feb., 2013	Attack of a military patrol vehicle in Maiduguri	3 people killed including a suicide bomber and 2 civilians
88	18 <sup>th</sup> Mar., 2013	Bomb explosion in a luxurious bus park in Kano	More than 70 people killed and several others injured
89	16 <sup>th</sup> April, 2013	Clash between the JTF and the sect members in Baga, Borno state	Over 200 people killed mostly civilians

**Source:** [http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/timeline\\_of\\_Boko\\_Haram\\_attacks\\_in\\_Nigeria](http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/timeline_of_Boko_Haram_attacks_in_Nigeria)

90	18/6/2013	Attack in Maiduguri	22 people mostly civilians were killed
91	6/7/2013	Sporadic shooting and throwing of explosives on government boarding school in Mamudo village Borno state	At least 43 people were killed, mostly, students
92	29/7/2013	Coordinated bomb blasts Sabon Gari, Kano state	At least, 6 people died and 6 others injured
93	4/8/2013	Attacks at military base and police post in Bama, Borno state	12 soldiers and 7 police officers were killed
94	11/8/2013	Shoot-out Ngom village near konduga in Borno state	12 people were killed
95	11/8/2013	Coordinated attacks including shooting and throwing explosives Mosque in Konduga, Borno state	44 worshippers killed and 26 others injured

**Table 5: Some Cases of Boko Haram Attacks after Its Designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the US Government.**

S/N	Date	Nature and Place of Attack	Number of Casualties
1	28/11/2013	Attacks on residents of Sabon Gari village in Damboa District, Borno state	More than 17 people were killed
2	30/11/2013	Coordinated attacks at Baga in Ningi villages	Scores of people were killed including 7 fishermen
3	2/12/2013	Around 200 Boko Haram gunmen dressed in military uniform launched coordinated attacks on an air force base in Maiduguri	Scores of people killed
4	20/2/2014	Coordinated attacks at Bama	More than 115 people killed
5	22/2/2014	Coordinated attacks at Izge village	More than 100 people were killed
6	25/2/2014	Attacks on Federal Government Boarding School at Buni/Yadi	About 59 people mostly students were killed
7	15/3/2014	Boko Haram clash with the military at 21 Armoured Brigade, Nigerian Army, Borno	More than 350 people were killed
8	5/4/2014	Attacks on Buni/Gari village mosque	More than 17 people were killed
9	9/4/2014	Multiple attacks on Dikwa, Kala Balge, Gambulga and Gwoza villages in Borno	More than 210 people killed
10	14/04/2014	Bomb blast at Nyanya motor-park, Abuja	More than 100 people killed and over 200 others badly injured
11	15/04/2014	Attack at a Government Senior Secondary School, Chibok, Borno state	Over 275 girls were said to have been abducted
12	26/04/2014	Attack in military unit at Blabili, Dandao, Borno state	More than 44 people killed
13	01/05/2014	Bomb explosion in a Taxi park at Nyanya, Abuja	More than 25 people killed and above 71 others injured
14	02/05/2014	Attack on commuters along Maiduguri-Beneshiek-Damaturu Road.	About 10 people killed
15	05/05/2014	Boko Haram attack in Gamboru village, a border town with Cameroon	About 300 hundred people killed and 11 girls abducted
16	19/05/2014	Bomb explosion in Sabon Gari Kano	Over 10 people killed and several others injured
17	20/05/2014	Bomb blasts at Jos Terminus market, Plateau state	About 150 people killed
18	21/05/2014	Attack on Alagarno, a Village in Borno state close to Chibok	About 17 people killed
19	24/05/2014	Bomb explosion in Jos football viewing center	Unspecified number of people killed
20	28/05/2014	Attack by gunmen at Gurmushi, Borno state	More than forty people killed
21	2/06/2014	Bomb blast at a bar and a brothel in military base, Mubi, Adamawa state	More than 60 people killed
22	3/06/2014	Boko Haram attacks at Attagara, Agapalawa and Aganjara, Gwoza Local Government Area of Borno state	More than 100 people were killed
23	15/06/2014	Attack at Borno market	More than 15 people were reportedly killed
24	17/06/2014	Bomb blast at football viewing center at Damaturu, Yobe state	About 21 killed and others seriously injured
25	23/06/2014	Suicide bomb attack at Kano School of Hygiene Technology, Kano state	About 8 people killed and many others injured

26	25/06/2014	Bomb attack at a shopping mall in Abuja	About 24 people killed and many others badly injured
27	29/06/2014	Gunmen attack at some churches in Chibok community, Borno state	Actual number of deaths yet to be unravelled
28	14/07/2014	Attack in Borno	About 26 people were killed
29	23/07/2014	Boko Haram attack in Kaduna	About 39 people were killed
30	24/07/2014	Suicide bomb attack on Buhari's convoy in Kaduna	More than 82 people were reportedly killed
31	31/07/2014	Boko Haram attacks in Yobe mosque and another female suicide bomb attacks in Kano	About 18 people were reportedly killed

**Source:** compiled by Ugwueze, (2014: 12-19) Ugwueze, Michael I. (2014) The United States National Interests and the Fight against Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria. Unpublished.

Meanwhile, whatever explanations that may be adduced, it is our reasoned contention that Boko Haram remains autochthonous terrorist group sponsored by disaffected and disgruntled political notables from largely the northern extraction who are determined to sustain their acclaimed 'inalienable rights' to rule since according to them they are 'born to rule'. They mask their intentions on religion but their mission remains to institutionalize northern hegemony on the polity. The ferocious attacks of the sect on the helpless and hapless masses remain unprecedented, coordinated and tenacious.

### Conclusion/Prognosis

The paper examined the inherent politics of securitization in Nigeria. It explored the interface between securitization and the menace of Boko Haram insurgency while outlining the impact of the insurgency on the Nigerian State. Against this backdrop, we conclude as follows:

- That unhealthy rivalry between politicians from the southern and northern divide has tended to securitize virtually all issues associated with governance.
- The desperation, disagreement and growing intolerance among the political class on the distribution and appropriation of commonwealth has reduced all government policies and actions to suspicion and misinterpretation, thereby securitizing political actions and counter-actions.
- The securitization of political transition has further widened the scope of dissent among members of the same political party (Peoples Democratic Party – PDP) who agreed to pursue their respective irreconcilable ambitions from two overlapping fronts – the PDP and the All Peoples Congress (APC) and yet they remain in one umbrella, the PDP.
- The seemingly slow or inaction of the Federal Government to declare full state of emergency and deal decisively with the insurgents is a further demonstration of the securitization of politics.
- The securitization of the process of dealing with the insurgents over the Chibok kidnappings has further exposed the lacuna inherent in the management of security in Nigeria. It has also exposed the lack of inter-agency coordination among the security agencies.
- The seemingly free passage in the landscape enjoyed by the insurgents is a further demonstration of internal complicity within the rank and file of the law enforcement agencies as well as tacit collaboration with the civil society.
- The politicization of security rather than reduce actual threats will rather elevate potential threats to constant normative variable that reproduce actual threats.
- Finally, the constant securitization of politics will deepen centrifugal forces and if not checked shall lead to violent dismemberment of the polity.

Arising from the foregoing, we recommend as follows:

1. That as a practical step to reduce securitization, good governance rooted in the will of the governed should be institutionalised.
2. A unique confederation designed to encourage separate production and distribution values should be agreed upon and specified percent of productions royalties should be remitted to the central government which must exist for coordination of foreign relations **and nothing more**. Representatives of such 'clearing' polity (government) must be equitably distributed among the geopolitical zones and a system of rotation must be entrenched to support political transition.
3. Law enforcement agencies should be recruited based on the constituent geo-political zones and must include only indigenes of these respective zones. Local content utilization must be enforced to avert the ongoing sabotage and seeming mutiny being experienced during the prosecution of anti-insurgent measures.

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