

Globalization and Democratic Governance in Africa: An Assessment

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1. Introduction

There is an established link of a mutually reinforcing kind between globalization and democracy. This interdependence is desirable for both movements that have driven the dynamics of experimentation with globalization that has inevitably spurred democratization in Africa since the 1980s. Globalization has reached its climax in the 21st century dating back to the industrial revolution; that accelerated the economic typology of global economic integration. Towards the end of the 19th Century, economic globalization gained speed and with the collapse of the former Soviet Union as consequences of perestroika and glasnost, globalization then spurred political reforms in favour of democracy. Between globalization and democracy is a complex wave of interdependence. At the behest of political reforms as an integral part of structural reforms of the 1990s, they impacted significantly on institutions and economic restructuring has also impacted the rule of law and respect for human rights (Mubangizi 2010).

The intensification of integration of world economies as exemplified by free trade, massive movement of finance capital and interactions facilitated by technology is the process of globalization. These specific processes create a global market by intensifying competition. These have economic, social, technological and political components (Stiglitz, 2002) Brysk, 2002; Mubangizi, 2010). Globalization has in all its ramifications raised complexities and contradictions in its wake but especially for democracy in Africa.

The democratic resurgence of the 1980s was couched to eliminate authoritarian rule in Africa which appeared in the form of one party system or military rule. In the 80s, many countries in sub-Saharan Africa were straddled on the authoritarian continuum of military dictatorship or one party rule with the characteristic violation of human rights, lack of respect for the rule of law and arbitrariness in governance that was widespread due to lack of accountability and transparency. The democratization process spurred by globalization was designed to enthrone democracy as a system of rule in which political leaders or representative of the people would be chosen by the electorates, and in that contractual engagement would be accountable and responsive to the needs, interests and wishes of the people. Democracy entails on the minimum respect for rights of the people and the guarantee of equal opportunities for majority of the people (Mubangizi 2010, p.4). This broad conception of democracy reflects Huntington's conservative and minimalist approach that it is a political system that "its most powerful collective decision-makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes, and in which virtually all adult population is eligible to vote" (1991, p.40). Due to population dynamics and the complex nature of modern life, it is no longer possible for all adult citizens of a country to vote. But beyond this limitation, contemporary liberal democracy still resonates the antiquated flare that it is built on an egalitarian idea of ruling and being ruled in turn (Shapiro and Hacker-Cordon 1999). Schmitter and Karl (1991, p.247) conceptualizes democracy in this characteristic framework of ruler-ruled relationship thus:

Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives.

Democratic system of governance therefore operates with rulers who access power through period elections as the regulatory mechanism of public accountability. Elections are therefore competitive in the context of candidates and parties as well as a highly aggregated policy options. The public realm is activated by representatives who seek to meet the aspirations and interests of the citizens. The impact of the public realm on the realm of politics and governance underscored by the structural socialist conception of democracy promoted by Joseph Schumpeter (1943, p.269) as "institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the peoples vote". The democratic process is both competitive and cooperative and are both mutually reinforcing in order for democracy to thrive. Cooperation is an essential aspect of democracy without which competition is impossible. Through political parties, voluntary associations and movements offer the platform for cooperation and debate to discover preferences, choose candidates, seek redress and influence public policies (Schmitter & Karl 1999). Mitigating the state-citizen relationship in a democracy is the civil society that seeks the meeting of citizens' interest and resolution of conflicts through cooperation via deliberations. Democracy therefore, offers the freedom to achieve

cooperation in order to compete.

The minimal standards of democracy are woven around democratic principles of power that rest on the consent of the people, respect for rule of law, guarantee of basic freedoms, majority rule and minority dissent; and regular and periodic fair and free elections contested by political parties (Elaigwu 2005; Dahl 1982). These had been established by Robert Dahl in his *polyarchy* as the procedural minimalist conditions for modern democracy. Modern political democracy would exist where:

- i. Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials.
- ii. Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon.
- iii. Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials.
- iv. Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices.
- v. Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment on political matters.
- vi. Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information.
- vii. Citizens have a right to form relatively independent associations or organizations such as political parties or pressure groups.

These Dahlian prescriptions of the minimum conditions that must be prevalent to ascribe to a given system of government as democratic have remained theoretically valid and resilient. Further elaborations on the minimalist theory of democracy emphasize regular conduct of free and fair elections (Morlino 1998; Przeworski 2001).

On the basis of the foregoing, globalization's surge in the 1990s produced democratic regimes in nearly all African countries especially sub-Saharan Africa by 1999 in reflection of the changing dynamics of contemporary international order that was shaping out as a new world order of capitalist triumphalism and liberal democratic order. The democratic rebirth was predicated on a number of promises democracy entails. Some of these include broadening participation in government through collective decisions that are induced by broad based cooperation through deliberation. Put differently, democracy in Africa was expected to evolve inclusive government open to all individuals and groups.

Democratic governance was also expected to be accountable and transparent in a manner that the citizenry would activate democratic accountability through election. Democratic governance was also expected to cause growth and development. Introducing democratic governance mechanisms, it was expected that fair and predictable rules would be guaranteed by democracy which would reproduce opportunities for citizens to realize their potentials. Democracy was also expected to subject governance to the dictates of the rule of law and by logical extension eliminates or at least reduces oppression and injustice.

This paper interrogates globalization conceptually, historically and motivationally in relation to Africa to reveal the dynamics of state restructuring on the continents' politics and economy. The second part deals with the democratization process and the associated trajectories. Part three will review the social and economic impact of globalization on African economies and society. Part four will then examine the interface between globalization and democratic governance to show the reality of global economic integration and democratic governance in Africa and the contradictions thrown up in the globalization – democratic governance trajectory in the seemingly new world order.

2. Globalization: Meaning, History and Motives

The term globalization has been used for a variety of reasons with multiplicity of meanings. This gives the term broader coverage to mean continental wide interdependence (Keohane and Nye 2000). This intensification of integration and interdependence in social, economic, technological, cultural and political spheres reflects "growing political linkages globally", constriction of time and space due to information technology revolution, the creation of a homogenous global culture by setting universal standards for products and culture of social life (Kahler and Lake 2005). With phenomenal transformation of communication and transportation technologies, the distance between continents, states and regions in space and time has been shrunk dramatically hence the terms "global village", "global citizens", "one world", "villagization", "the global interdependence", "the growth of a world system" or "accumulation on a world scale" (Amin 1995; Ohiorhenuan 1998; Nabudere 2000; Petras & Veltmeyer 2004).

Globalization emphasizes interdependence and reinforces this with ease in communication and movement of goods, services and skills. Thus Nsibami (2001, p.1) describes globalization as

a process of advancement and increase in interaction among the world's countries and peoples facilitated by technological changes in locomotion, communication, political and military power, knowledge and skills, as well as interfacing of cultural and value systems and practices

The phenomenon is associated with intensification of cross-border trade and rising financial and foreign direct investment through accelerated liberalization and advances in information technology (Daouas 2001; Haile 2004). This explains the heavy inclination to economic globalization thereby emphasizing cross national

flows of goods and services, investment, production and technology (Genyi 2011; Petras and Veltmeyer 2004). The most profound effect of globalization has been its creation of a new world order through the sheer scope and depth of flow of material, financial and technological resources. In doing this globalization has raised its institutions and reconfigured global power relations “that have replaced the previous structures associated with the nation-state” Petras & Veltmeyer 2004). The state has been watered down to pave way for unfettered movement of private capital. Hence Joseph Stiglitz (2002, p.98) described the phenomenon of globalization from an intellectual sphere with a heavy dose of experience with global financial governance as

the closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world which has been brought about by the enormous reduction of costs of transportation and communication and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flow of goods, services, capital, knowledge and (to a lesser extent) people across borders

This economic course of globalization is its most profound character. By guaranteeing unfettered flows of finance capital, globalization pursues profit maximization in a fierce competitive process by private firms with ferocity. The primary institutions that govern globalization are therefore the IMF, World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Economic globalization has three major components; finance, trade and Multinational Corporation all of which are mutually interconnected in their operations (Goldblatt 1997; Genyi 2009). Multinational firms need the movement of huge finance capital for investment, while intra-firm trade has since surpassed inter-state trade (Genyi 2009).

In addition to economic globalization are cultural, military, social environmental and political forms of globalization. These variegated but interdependently reinforcing forms of globalization have been captured succinctly by Mats Lundahl (2004, p.9) as the core of the phenomenon thus:

We are living in an era of globalization where the four corners of the world have come together; where commodity and factor markets are strongly interlinked; where technologies spread from more advanced to less advanced regions; where information travels virtually instantaneously; where financial capital moves in milliseconds; where economic policies in different countries tend to be more and more entangled with each other; where political systems spread, mainly from western democracies to other parts of the world; where different cultures borrow elements from each other and influence one another; where traditional family and gender patterns are broken up as a result of foreign influences; where religions confront each other etc.

Nowhere has the meaning and forms of globalization have been so clearly, simply and strongly reflected as this. While globalization seeks new spheres of investment for profits, new forms of political regimes such as liberal democracy were required in places as Africa to liberalized the economic and political contexts while technology facilitated the inter linkage of the other facets of globalization. Democratic governance was expected to leverage on the free flow of information courtesy of technology and undergird growth and development. Put differently, democracy was to open the governance space and entrench good governance practices such as transparency and accountability and the respect for rule of law. Since the 1990s therefore what has been the African experience with democratic governance spurred by globalization?

Globalization has undergone six major phases. The first phase related to the diffusion of world religions and the emergence of civilizations that covered the continents of the world. The fourth to the eight centuries represented this phase which was when Christianity was firmly established in Europe and begun to reach out to Africa and India. Other religions such as Islam, Confucianism, Hinduism and Buddhism had spread out with distinct languages and cultures.

The second phase of the globalization phenomenon coincided with the Mongol empire and others as evidence of emerging civilizations. From Eastern Europe to Japan emerged forces that destroyed major civilizations and established suzerainty from Indo-Chinese border and the Persian Gulf to Southern Siberia up to the Northern parts of Europe and Russia (Lundahl 2004). Europe and China and the oriental were linked and knowledge about these areas spread as the British Isles were to link much of Asia such as Indonesia and Sub-Saharan Africa.

The third phase of the globalization movement coincides with intensification of the discovery of territories and their conquest especially by Europeans particularly Portugal and Spain. This progress covered the middle ages of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries when the Dutch, British and French joined the fray in territorial conquest. The Americans had also arrived on the global scene too and the subsequent wars on continental Europe and other parts of the world. War during this period had begun to acquire a global face.

The fourth phase of globalization began with the industrial revolution that accelerated global commerce marked by the triangular trade between the Americans, Europe and Africa. European manufactures moved to North America and Africa while slaves from Africa worked the plantations in America and raw materials from North America and Africa fed European industries. The era coincided with the transport revolution that sped commodity trade, labour migration and movement of finance capital (Obstfeld 1998; Baldwin and Martin 1999;

Birdo, Eichengreen & Irwin 1999). These movements resulted in territorial competition among European powers and hence the African partition. The era was marked by the First World War and the great depressions of the 1980s. These events showed the global movement in terms of trade patterns, and capital flow (O'Rourke and Williamson 1999).

The fifth globalization phase started with World War II which was global in character in terms of active war engagements that occurred in Europe, Africa and Asia. In Africa after the war, colonial territories were liberated following political independence for most of the territories except the former Soviet Empire. New global alignments were in response to and prosecution of the Cold War such as NATO, Warsaw Pact and the Non-aligned movement.

The sixth and perhaps on-going phase of globalization began with the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall. The re-unification of Germany and the dissolution of the former Soviet Empire paved way for a ferocious wave of globalization that is marked by expansion in international trade, unrestrained movement of finance capital, deepened integration of global economies (Europe and North Atlantic) in terms of commodity and factor markets (Castles and Miller 1993 and Obstfeld 1995; Helliwell 1998). Technological spread and trans-nationalization of firms and economic and political interdependence are the major characterization of this wave of globalization. The revolution in information and communication technology exemplified by telecommunication and the mass media buzz are unmistakable marks of the sixth wave of globalization. These and political tendencies especially liberal democracy have spread across the world particularly Eastern Europe, Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.

3. Globalization and Democratization in Africa

The Huntingtonian Third Wave of democratization coincides with the contemporary wave of globalization as relates to Africa. The first wave 1828-1962 seen as 'minimal democracy' affected the United States of America and other parts of Europe which showed only 50% of adult population enfranchised in countries with responsible executives and periodic elections. Africa was under colonial rule throughout this period. The second wave 1940-1974 affected Europe, and the entire developing world in Latin America, Asia and Africa. Following the end of World War II, decolonization in Africa enthroned democracy but many countries began to witness reversals in the mid 1960s and more countries were authoritarian by the 1970s than democratic. The third wave began in 1974 and is on-going. The resurgence began in the late 1980s following in the heels of structural economic reforms in the period.

By 1990, of the 54 African countries, majority straddled the Freedom House categorization of free to partly free and not free continuum of democratic trajectory. This shows that most of the authoritarian one party or military regimes had collapsed giving way to more functional democracies in terms of multi-party elections that were more periodic and regular. By 2007 Freedom House had rated 11 countries free in terms of civil liberties. These include Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritius, Namibia, Sao Tome, Senegal and South Africa. These groups of countries have the advantages of small populations and less dependent on oil or other hard mineral exports whose revenues are controlled by central governments that lean heavily on rents. During the same period, 21 countries were rated partly free by Freedom House. These include Nigeria, Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, CAR, Comoros, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. 15 other countries including Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Cote d'Ivoire, equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo and Zimbabwe were termed not free. Majority of African countries constitute the last two categories with Nigeria, DRC and Ethiopia accounting for a greater proportion of the African population (Herbst, 2008).

Except for Libya and the CAR as well as Guinea Conakry and Mali that have witnessed reversals by way of outright military coups in Mali and Guinea Conakry and the revolutionary uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, all African countries are seen as democratic with the semblance of multiparty elections that are usually characterized by irregularities and even opposition boycotts. For reasons of periodic and regular elections most African countries are democratic. However, what has been the governance experience along the promises of globalization within the framework of democratic rule?

4. Globalization and Democratic Governance in Africa

The interface between globalization and democracy is supposedly simple. Globalization as a process require free flow of information, transparency of state institutions, intolerance of corruption and the fair application of the rule of law (Richard 1995; Iwilade 2009). Private businesses operate at most efficient levels where public institutions are efficient and business rules also need to be stable and fairly predictable. The only form of government capable of guaranteeing unhindered flow of information, transparency in transactions, accountable state institutions without corruption and respect for rule of law by all concerned is democracy. Above all, democratic regimes are relatively more stable, a condition necessary for investment, production and development.

The goals of globalization have surer bet of achievement under a democracy, unfettered movement of capital supports the growth of domestic institutions that in turn strengthen democratic practice.

The enthronement of democracy in Africa spurred by globalization sought to decentralize the state and reduce its sphere of influence hence the introduction of deregulation and privatization. As economic liberalization deepens, the state symbolically and partly relinquished its powers and leverages over economic and social investment and resource allocation. By attempting to reduce the size of the state and her influence over economic issues, the political space is supposedly expanded to include a variety of groups hence deepening the contestation for power and enlarging the space for political participation. This process has enhanced accountability, transparency and respect for rule of law to a degree unattained during authoritarian one party or military rule. Legal frameworks for business and governance become far more predictable and stable. This is how globalization interfaces democratic governance, an ostensible demonstration of their mutually reinforcing mix. It is this blend that Eichengreen and Leblang (2006) are therefore convinced to assert that “democracy and globalization go hand in hand”.

The basic tenets of democracy include respect for the rule of law, respect for the constitution and guarantee of fundamental human rights, enthronement of good governance, tolerance of strong opposition political parties, independent and impartial judiciary and the unambiguous and predictable laws (Lipset 1959; Stephens 2011). Democratization in Africa since the 1990s necessarily involved raising democratic institutions and introducing and reinforcing democratic values for human rights, enforcement of the rule of law in order to promote transparency and accountability in government and allow the flourishing of the civil society (Gordon 2005).

As politically independent countries with regular elections, and strong opposition political parties free to challenge the ruling party, elaborate freedom of the press and a virile civil society, many African countries can be said to be democratic. The World Banks’ six democratic governance indices are fairly precise and reflect these features of a democratic polity. These include;

- i. Voice and accountability: this covers basic liberties and franchise to freely elect leaders.
- ii. Political stability which include the absence of violence.
- iii. Government effectiveness which measure service delivery and efficient administration.
- iv. The quality of government regulation (which relates to free enterprise).
- v. The rule of law which deals with effective public services and the court system and
- vi. Control of corruption.

On the measure of respect for basic freedoms and practical accountability that entail the use of elections by citizens to change or elect leaders Africa has recorded obvious progress. By 2007, 48 of 54 African countries were clarified by Freedom House as democratic. At least regular elections held in those countries even though with attendant irregularities. Nigeria’s 2003, 2007 and 2011 have however been roundly associated with irregularities. The 2011 elections witnessed logistical improvements but significant levels of vote rigging, ballot box stuffing and seizures with votes cast exceeding registered voters in several places abound (TMG 2012). Presidential and parliamentary elections in Zimbabwe since 2002 have heavily been infused by irregularities. Freedom of the press including civil society is also highly circumscribed. In much of Africa, civil society organizing is booming and has tended to fill the gap in the absence of strong opposition political parties. As the situation in Zimbabwe, Uganda and Nigeria has shown, opposition is hardly tolerated by the ruling parties that seek to coerce them out of existence by co-opting their strong members or infiltrating opposition parties to weaken them. In Nigeria, the All Progressives Congress (APC), a major opposition party that emerged from a merger of the former Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) and the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) has come under severe harassment by the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) by way of impeachment of elected governors in Adamawa and Nasarawa States with possible scenarios in Edo state. In this regard Ghana and Senegal stand out as clear examples of availability of basic freedoms, tolerance of opposition parties to the extent that they could win national elections as has been demonstrated in both countries and Botswana.

These positive elements of democratic governance masked the merely morphological transformations that have morphed democratic realities. Poignant in this case is the seemingly success in the removal of authoritarianism that was characterised by obvious personal rule to personal and imperial rulers under the guise of democratic elections. Personalisation and centralisation of government have remained unfortunate realities in Africa (Diamond 2008). The difference is that military coups and one party system served personal rule but with democratisation even with multiparty elections personalisation of power emanate from exploitations of neo-patrimonial, patronage and prebendalism that extract loyalties via social cleavages. The strong tendency to remain in power and dominate the political space with ruling parties makes African democracies merely electoral democracies. Examples from Malawi, Gambia, Egypt, Mauritius, Benin, Mali, Niger, Sierra-Leon Cote de voire, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Nigeria. Manipulation of the electoral process including amendment of the constitution to remain in power has been witnessed in Nigeria, Cameroon, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Senegal.

Africa has begun to experience relative political stability if measured in terms of absence of military coups, but for Mali and Central Africa Republic in 2012/2013. 46 African countries have remained relatively stable especially sub-Saharan Africa. While these countries have experienced stability following periodic elections and peaceful handovers in Nigeria, Ghana, Ethiopia, Botswana, Mauritius, Cape Verde, Zambia and Tanzania, a number of countries have consistently experienced violence of great magnitude. The return of democracy to Nigeria since 1999 for instance had sparked off violence in the Niger Delta until 2008. The 2011 Presidential election results were greeted by post election violence that affected many urban areas in Northern Nigeria. The Boko Haram insurgency which began in 2009 has remained the most destructive forms of instability to the Nigerian State since the Civil War in 1967-1970. From Sudan to South Sudan, Zimbabwe, Egypt and Tunisia, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Serra-Leone, Liberia and Mali and CAR, political violence has remained a stubborn reality of African democratic experience. These violence experiences erupt along African countries fault lines of ethnicity and religion. These social and political fissures are elaborately exploited by African leaders for personal gains as well.

Governmental effectiveness in terms of functional and efficient service delivery has remained a critical question challenging governance outcomes in Africa. In 2005, the World Bank noted that global poverty figures stood at 1.4 billion people of which 384 million were in the absolute poverty bracket from sub-Saharan Africa. This is more than half of Africa's total population and yet the figure represent the highest percentage of the poor in the world of any region numerically and proportionally (Sundaram, Schwank and Arnim 2011, p. 6). Sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed relative economic growth since 2000 but much of this has been based on resource extraction and has rather exacerbated rising inequality and limited employment growth hence poverty levels have worsened. With many civil conflicts and the 2008 economic crisis; inequalities, poverty and unemployment have reached terrible levels.

Unemployment and high poverty levels suggest that African democracies are rather ineffective or at least yet to impact positive material livelihood of the mass of Africans. Democratic governments in Africa have clearly shown that service delivery is not on the table. The neo-patrimonial character of democratic leaders shows that production of public goods such as good roads, functional education, and health care and clean drinking water and power supply has never been priorities. Economic and social infrastructures are very low and poorly maintained. South Africa remains the most understanding example with high quality infrastructure in this regard.

Larry Diamond (2008, p.2) has unequivocally framed the African power struggle narrative to imply that it has remained largely 'a contest between the rule of law and the rule of the person'. In between the rule of law and the rule of the person are found corruption and the lack of its control. Democracy presupposes that contestation for power be based on issues of governance and appeal to the citizens for their consent to rule over society in accordance with their aspirations. This contest in the public domain should be opened to all with the desire and capacity for public service. Unfortunately, incumbent political leaders seek to centralize power in the office of the President or Prime Minister and use it to constrain the political space to the ruler's advantage in order to remain in power. Police services are used to harass, intimidate, incarcerate, humiliate and punish opposition figures. Public resources are used through grand corruption to obtain public support. Vote buying, huge bribing of parliamentarians to amend the constitution and alteration of electoral rules are used to manipulate the contestation process for power in favour of incumbents. The third term agenda in Nigeria under Olusegun Obasanjo (El Rufai 2011) and President Abdulaye Wade's manipulations in the follow up to the 2007, elections aptly illustrate the interface between manipulation of the rule of law and corruption. The dominance of one party of the political space in South Africa-the ANC, Nigeria-PDP and Mozambique lend support to this claim. Though South Africa appears to exhibit effective governance, the signs of emergence of corruption are palpable. In Nigeria, corruption is endemic and Nigeria's democratic experience suggests that democracy is enhancing corruption (Genyi 2014, Lynch and Crawford 2011). The 24 year corrupt rule of Daniel Arap Moi in Kenya that ended in the 1990s seemed to be back in 2013 as evidenced by the laptop mess, the Anglo leasing sleaze and the SGR tenders malfeasance are indicative of the high level of corruption in contemporary Kenya. Maina Kaia (2014, p.13) describes further evidence of corruption hampering transparency and accountability and diversion of public resources and increasing cost of business when business people continue to be harassed by public officers demanding for kick backs that are valued at over half the contract sum. Transparency International in its 2008 report ranked Sudan, Guinea, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, DRC and Zimbabwe as the 12th most corrupt countries in the world. Nigeria, Malawi, Uganda, Burundi, Kenya and Serra-Leon also show high levels of corruption (Mubangizi 2010)

In Nigeria and many other sub-Saharan African countries, support for democracy may be endangered due to the declining trust between citizens and their rulers for lack of accountability, ineffectiveness in governance and lack of respect for the rule of law.

5. Conclusion

Globalization as a process looks impossible to be halted and its twin political component democracy also seems incontestable as a form of rule and is without a substitute capable of meeting the goals of globalization. Globalization supports democratization in raising strong institutions and predictable rules that in turn encourages good governance. External demand for democracy has checked excessive and arbitrary rule no doubt on the African continent but internal pressure from within Africa is critical for democracy to realize its governance promises. Reasonable levels of freedoms are prevalent with strong civil society's mediation of political struggle for power and accountability. South Africa, Ghana, Malawi, Botswana, Rwanda and Senegal give the hope for democracy in the continent. The experiences in Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Sudan with widespread corruption, a dysfunctional public service record, violence and shrinking political space due to abuse of rule of law and the less effective justice systems are major challenges to the democratic project in Africa. International capital seeking investment opportunities in Africa may be threatened when rising disenchantment result into the search for alternative governance mechanisms.

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