

The Strategic Value of Natuna EEZ from Tiongkok Perspective

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Abstract

Indonesia was originally a non-claimant state in the South China Sea dispute. The potential conflict was created by considering Chinese statement that some of the territorial waters of Natuna Islands are Chinese traditional fishing ground, which in fact is within the Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This claim has potential to threaten the sovereignty and sovereign rights of Indonesia's territorial waters since Chinese aggressive attitude will certainly change Indonesia's attitude on strengthening its diplomacy and defense posture in the region. This study is aimed to analyze two critical issues; first, the strategic values of Indonesia's EEZ in Natuna from the Chinese perspective and second, the appropriate Defense Diplomacy strategies to respond to Chinese claims. The research method follows a qualitative approach in which the data is collected from interviews, official documents, field notes and others. The results show that problem solving by defense diplomacy approach has been considered as a strategic step. Therefore, Indonesia always prioritizes the use of diplomatic method done by ministries and institutions to address the Chinese claim.

Keywords: The South China Sea, Exclusive Economic Zone, traditional fishing ground, UNCLOS 1982, defense diplomacy, Chinese

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INTRODUCTION

Indonesia sent a protest note to Tiongkok after some pressure from Tiongkok via Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessels. A diplomatic protest note from Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kemenlu) does not necessarily make the CCG ship withdraws from North Natuna Sea (Jawa Pos, 2020). In fact, the CCG ship entered to Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) again in North Natuna Sea in September 2020. Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla) data stated that the ship was detected entering Indonesia since September 12, 2020. As a response, Nipah Island KN-321 was sent by Bakamla to remind the ship to leave Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone. Bakamla stated that Chinese Coast Guard ship with hull number of 5204 was detected to enter the Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone area in North Natuna Sea (Jawa Pos, 2020).

The Chinese resistance and followed by Indonesia's response have eventually created problems given the different stances between Indonesia's arguments based on UNCLOS 1982 (Pratomo and Kwik, 2020) and Tiongkok's arguments based on the historical claims (DeLisle, 2012) to jurisdiction in North Natuna Waters. In this regard, Indonesia considers them as the non-Claimant State country. However, Chinese claim on imposing some of the territorial waters of Natuna Islands as its traditional fishing ground claim into Chinese territory could worsen the situation. Furthermore, this jurisdictional maritime boundary conflict in the North Natuna Waters will potentially involve Indonesia.

One reasons why the Chinese make such actions is due to their historical claim that Natuna region was the area ever controlled by the Ming dynasty. This historical claim, is indeed not recognized in any of international law. The worldonly recognizes the United Nations Convention on Law of Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982 as a foothold in determining the boundaries of marine areas, including the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of a country (Marciniak, 2017; Juan, 2013). However, in the Spratly case, Tiongkok did not want to recognize the decision of Permanent Court of Arbitration in Hague, Netherlands won Philippines over the dispute over ownership of coral clusters in the South China Sea. By controlling the Spratly, Tiongkok then applied the nine dash line map as part of its territory. Indonesia, which was not involved in the Spratly dispute, was also affected because the nine dash line protruded into the North Natuna area. This area was also claimed by the Chinese as part of the territory controlled by the Ming dynasty.

Chinese choose not to recognize the arbitration court's decision. While as a country who follows the principle of independent and active in its foreign policy, Indonesia choose to be in compliant with 1982 UNCLOS, despite the fact that Indonesia cannot bring this case on this basis. Chinese attitude of rejecting the international law and followed by Indonesia's statement have created problems given the gap between Indonesia's arguments based on 1982 UNCLOS, Tiongkok historical arguments for jurisdiction in North Natuna Waters in general and Indonesia's EEZ in particular.

Based on the international maritime law, Chinese claim over Indonesia's EEZ in Natuna Island is indeed a violation of law, in reference to the concept of an archipelagic country and UNCLOS 1982 (Ras and Ritonga, 2001). Chinese claim to Indonesia's EEZ is a form of arrogance to fully control the South China Sea area. This

will surely disturb Indonesia's sovereignty over in North Natuna Sea. In addition, this Chinese claim to North Natuna Waters could destabilize Indonesia's domestic security because it would trigger tensions between Indonesia and Chinese.

Indonesia must maintain their defense and security postures in Natuna waters as the response to this complex situation. The islands within Natuna Waters cluster have been used as the base points for the outermost territory of Indonesia in Government Regulation Number 38 of 2002 and Government Regulation Number 37 of 2008 concerning Amendments to Government Regulation Number 38 of 2002 on List of Geographical Coordinates of Line Points of Indonesian archipelago.

Indonesian government as a sovereign state and as an archipelagic country has taken an important step on August 10, 2018 to defend its territory by changing the name of its territorial sea from Natuna Sea to North Natuna Sea based on the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between various ministries and institutions. This process has also been reported to the International Hydrographic Organization.

The Chinese and Indonesian governments have not stated that there is a maritime boundary dispute in the North Natuna waters. However, the conflict potential between Tiongkok and Indonesia is inevitable, especially when Chinese continue to enforce its claims in the North Natuna waters by overlapping claims between Chinese traditional fishing ground and Indonesia's EEZ claims.

This peace effort with Tiongkok is consistent with Indonesia's development agenda as a World Maritime Axis with five main pillars, in where the fourth pillar is advancing maritime diplomacy. Indonesia invites all partners to work together in maritime sector. The fifth pillar emphasizes on building the maritime defense force to create a dither effect. Therefore, based on the aforementioned problems, researchers will focus on this following title: "Strategic Value of Natuna EEZ from a Chinese Perspective."

There are several references to support this research. References to South China Sea crisis include Indonesia's diplomatic efforts to China to solve tahun potential conflict on Natuna Continental Shelf in South China Sea (Arifin, 2014), defense strategies in Natuna Sea to protect national interests in facing conflict in South China Sea (Darmawan , 2016), Indonesian diplomacy efforts to Tiongkok's claims of Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone in Natuna Sea (Deni & Sahri, 2017), Chinese claims about traditional fishing ground in Indonesia's Natuna Waters in of UNCLOS 1982 perspective (Idris et al, 2017), and Indonesian defense diplomacy in the South China Sea conflict (Saragih, 2018).

The practical benefit of the study's result can be used as a guide and recommendation for related agencies to use the defense diplomacy efforts to handle the claims of Chinese traditional fishing ground in Natuna Waters. Therefore the settlement for this problem should be done peacefully and Natuna waters can be avoided from tensions between the two countries which may lead to the open war.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Defense Strategy

Tippe (2016) stated that defense from political side is a concept that cannot be separated from everyday state life. Defense is a reality to determine the safety and sovereignty of a nation and state. It becomes important when the national needs aimed at achieving recognition. Minister of Defense Regulation Number 25 of 2014 on the State Defense Doctrine Book, State Defense Doctrine is essentially a teaching on fundamental principles to provide direction for management of defense resources.

The State Defense Doctrine is the basic principle believed to be the basis for defense strategy. It is extracted from values of nation's struggle and past experiences to serve as guidelines and teachings in developing the concept of state defense and security. State Defense Doctrine at strategic level has functions to create a universal defense system, both in peace and war situation. State Defense Doctrine in peace time is used as a guide to prepare the defense forces to have deterrent power. During the war, it is used as a guide to use all national forces to save the country from threats. The defense problem is the most crucial thing, territory can be pawned only because of security and defense issues. Therefore, diplomacy is a strategic choice for resolving disputes to avoid war. Today, the defense diplomacy role in strategic environment development becomes more important. The defense cooperation is a real form of defense diplomacy to solve security problems jointly both at the regional and international levels.

Theory of Sovereignty and State Sovereign Rights at Sea

The debate about the territorial sea boundary of a country has led to various negotiations, such as the Den Hague Codification Conference 1930, 1st UN Conference and 2nd UN Conference at Geneva in 1960, and finally formulated in 3rd UN Conference on Law of Sea, 1982, which was a maximum width of 12 (twelve) sea miles measured from baseline.

The sovereignty thought as the highest power of a state in international law has shifted. International law comprehension of sovereignty in sense of unlimited supreme power is untenable, because of the current rapid development of international relations, especially since the international community in globalization era. The

supreme power has shifted to a more limited direction, namely only within boundaries of state, while outside the boundaries of state is given and limited by international law, as for example in UNCLOS 1982.

The state sovereignty in sea territorial is affirmed by Article 2 paragraph (1) UNCLOS 1982 that sovereignty of a coastal state, apart from its land and inland waters and, in case of an archipelago country, the archipelago waters, includes a sea route border called as a territorial sea.

Determination of a country's sovereignty over its waters is very important to determine the rights and obligations and what mechanisms can be applied to law enforcement (Buntoro, 2014, p.19). The sovereignty level of each maritime zone is different. The difference in sovereignty level, among others, in inland waters (internal waters) does not recognize the rights of other countries, while in archipelagic waters and territorial sea, coastal state must accommodate the interests of other countries in form of shipping and aviation and other uses.

UNCLOS 1982 regulates various maritime zones with different legal status. Broadly speaking, Convention divides the sea into two parts of maritime zones, namely zones under and outside national jurisdiction. Zones under national jurisdiction are further divided into maritime zones under the sovereignty of a coastal state, namely the archipelagic waters and territorial sea, and maritime zones where the coastal state can exercise sovereign rights, jurisdiction and special rights, namely the contiguous zone and Economic Exclusive Zone. Figure 1 shows the Maritime Zone based on UNCLOS 1982




Figure 1. Maritime Zone According to UNCLOS 1982 (Obaradai, 2020)

UNCLOS 1982 has two ways to explain concept of sea sovereignty. First, sovereignty is seen in relation to maritime zone, where a coastal state or archipelagic state has sovereignty over inland waters, territorial seas and archipelagic waters. Second, sovereignty is linked to sovereign rights and jurisdiction of a coastal state.

Defense Diplomacy Concept

Conflict resolution in defense diplomacy becomes a strategic step. Defense diplomacy is used for the national interests of a country through peaceful usage of defense capabilities and resources, especially on how a country uses resources peacefully through the defense spectrum to increase bargaining power in negotiations with other countries (Simamora, 2013).

Defense diplomacy is done in peacetime using armed force and related infrastructure as a security policy tool and foreign policy. Defense diplomacy is also a process to involve state actors (such as armed forces, politicians or intelligence agencies) and also non-governmental organizations, think tanks and civil society. This differs from military diplomacy, where military diplomacy focuses only to use military force in diplomacy related to security issues (Saragih, 2018, p. 53). Defense diplomacy aims to improve relations between countries through formal and informal channels, with government and non-government, at low risk and cost.

Article 33 of UN Charter stated that disputes over national borders at sea can be resolved amicably, both legally through international judicial bodies and diplomacy as efforts to build mutual trust (Confidence Building Measures / CBM). Legal settlements can be made through the International Court of Sea Law in Hamburg, International Court of Justice in Hague and Arbitration Court and Special Arbitration Court. Diplomatic settlement uses negotiation, investigation, mediation and conciliation. CBM settlement is done through dialogue in various international forums and collaborative surveys and research in maritime sector (Wiranto, 2016).

Literature on international relations explains that territorial problems are classic causes of conflicts between countries and are a constant threat to international peace and security. Unclear boundaries in sea are a latent factor that will destabilize relations between countries. This unclear boundary creates overlapping claims which eventually lead to border disputes (Indrawan, 2015).

Exclusive Economic Zone

Historically, concept of Exclusive Economic Zone was created from practices done by Latin American countries

through the unilateral statements after the Proclamation of US President Harry Truman on Continental Shelf in 1945. This concept is the latest development of International maritime law regarding the national jurisdiction of coastal states, namely the introduction of conception that coastal states have been patrimonial hereditary to supervise every state and people's interests in the sea area, later known as the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Chile, Ecuador and Peru countries in 18 August 1952 issued a joint claim as outlined in Santiago Declaration. This declaration demands a sea area with a width of 200 nautical miles as their territorial sea, where the coastal state has full sovereignty. The expansion of three countries is based on what they call the Biome Theory. According to this theory, three coastal countries have a very close biological link between life on land and life in sea. The off coast of three countries has islands that rich in fertilizers derived from Guano bird droppings. These birds usually eat Anchovy fish in the waters along its coast. These fish food is much plankton from hot Humboldt Current flows from North to South at a width of about 200 nautical miles from their coast (Syamsumar, 2010, p. 30).

The members of Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) from African countries issued a resolution in December 1971. This resolution is a recommendation that African countries expand their territorial sea to 200 nautical miles. As a continuation, OAU held a regional seminar on law of sea in Yaounde, capital of Cameroon in June 1972. One decisions of seminar was to support the conception of EEZ, which was then submitted by Kenya at UN Seabed Committee meeting held in July 1972.

The results of OAU seminar and Santo Domingo Declaration were used as material for negotiations regarding the EEZ in 1982 UN Conference on Law of Sea to make UNCLOS 1982 and Chapter V regulates the Exclusive Economic Zone.

METHODOLOGY

This researcher uses a postpositivist paradigm. The case study method is used examine in detail and depth the study subject (case), as well as the related contextual conditions. The research was conducted by examining legislation, literature and key informants related to disputes in the South China Sea. Informants were selected purposively based on their competence in understanding disputes in the South China Sea.

This case study research is based on Yin (2009). This study uses a single case study of South China Sea. Tiongkok uses history to claim that their traditional fishing ground is South China Sea or in North Natuna Waters. This claim overlaps with Indonesia's EEZ. Indonesia's claim for North Natuna Waters is based on UNCLOS 1982 provisions which should also be used as the basis for Tiongkok as a country that has ratified the Convention. A single case study is appropriate to use to find a new concept of dispute resolution in the South China Sea

Data collection was done by reviewing legislation and literature related to the South China Sea disputes. Interviews were also conducted with officials authorized to handle the South China disputes, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, BIN, Bakamla, Kasal Operations Staff and strategy directorate of defense ministry. Interviews were conducted by open questions. Researchers ask questions and if they are still lacking, additional questions are asked to get a complete figure of the South China Sea dispute.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The problem of national defense is very complex. The resolution does not only rest on ministry to handles defense, but also becomes the responsibility of all related agencies, both government and non-government agencies. In understanding and knowing the strategic value problem of Natuna's EEZ in a Chinese perspective, researchers conducted interviews with Ministries and Agencies as the leading sector or have the capacity to talk about Indonesian diplomacy related to Chinese claim issue. They are Ministry of Foreign Affairs, BIN, Bakamla, Kasal Operations Staff and strategic directorate of Defense Ministry.

Tiongkok's View of South China Sea

The South Chinese Sea region, especially the North Natuna waters, has a very large geopolitical role because it becomes a meeting point for Chinese with the neighbors, especially with ASEAN region. The history shows the territorial issues, security, natural resources and energy security. Natuna waters for Tiongkok are very important for many types of fish and also natural resources that can support their economic, political and defense and security development.

Tiongkok's territorial sovereignty claims over the South Chinese Sea, including both the Spratly and Paracel island groups within it, covering approximately 1.7 million square kilometers. Chinese based its claim on history that Chinese has long controlled and utilized the islands in South China Sea, both in Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands. According to the Chinese, they have been using the two islands since Emperor Wu of Han Dynasty in 2nd century BC. The next dynasties as the last rulers of Kingdom of Ancient Chinese, the Tang, Song, Ming and Qing Dynasties, also took advantage of two islands. These dynasties used it for economic, military and scientific interests for Chinese people. Thus, Chinese as the heir to throne of these dynasties felt entitled to claim territory

over the two islands.

The People's Republic of China considers that historically they inherited sovereignty over the South China Sea islands from past Chinese administration. The Nine-dotted Line (11 dotted lines at that time) was officially released by Government of the People's Republic of China in 1948. After the founding of People's Republic of China, islands of the South China Sea came under the jurisdiction of Guangdong Province and Hainan Province, respectively.

Sansha City, with jurisdiction over Xisha (Paracel Islands), Nansha (Spratly Islands) and Zhongsha Island (Macchesfield Banks), was officially founded in July 2012. Therefore, Chinese sovereignty over the South China Sea is based on "historical rights" and evidence held by Vietnam (Yamamoto, and Esteban, 2015) is clearly insufficient (China Institute of International Studies, 2017, p. 122).

The "nine-dot line" includes too large area which violates the United Nations Convention on Law of Sea. This is not only a misunderstanding of Chinese claim, but also a one-sided interpretation of 1982 UN Convention on Law of Sea. The Chinese government has never claimed sovereignty over the entire South China Sea, but all of the islands and coral reefs and surrounding marine areas. The area size of the nearest ocean is depends on how people understand "nine-dot line." There is no definite statement from China side.

Tiongkok tends to become aggressive to defend the claim. This aggressive attitude in the South China Sea dispute can be seen from various efforts to get de jure and de facto recognition. For example, PRC (People's Republic of China) submitted a map to United Nations in 2009 that contain nine dotted lines that cut across the waters of Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Philippines. Apart from that, to confirm its claim in the South China Sea, Chinese has also included a map of its territoriality in its passport since May 15, 2012 that contain the disputed islands. These passports indirectly force other countries to recognize Chinese claim when their immigration officials put a stamp on passports (Agus and Isman: 2016).

China has been more active to enhance the maritime capabilities and provocatively and unilaterally claim the entire South China Sea. China has even built its military air bases in disputed Spratly region, namely in Subi, Mischief and Fierry Cross Reef. Through these three bases and Woody Island, Chinese is expected to be able to carry out war throughout the South China Sea region (Tjahjanto, 2017).

Based on analysis of observations of strategies and actions taken by China, Head of BPPK Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Siswo Pramono, explained that China maintains its coral islands in the South China Sea because there is direct access to high seas, considering that China is a land lock country, China uses it only for trade routes, not for war, and the only option is via the South China Sea. Basically, Chinese only wants this South China Sea route as its main trade route because Tiongkok wants to become a major industrial country, so China must leave South China Sea open but remain in its power. The key to South China Sea is Indonesia as the largest coastal country in ASEAN. Tiongkok tries its best in Natuna, but China cannot possibly control Indonesia, because it will be a risk to China's trade relations, considering that Indonesia also has an important role in trade routes in Malacca Strait.

Indonesian Diplomacy Strategy

Indonesia initially was not included in South China Sea dispute because there is no claim to the coral reefs ownership. Indonesia became the initiator for Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea since 1990. Indonesia intends to become a "peacemaker" to turn South China Sea from potential conflict areas into mutually beneficial cooperation. Indonesia disputes after China in 2011 confirmed its claim to around 90% of South China Sea waters in Nine-dash line. Some of lines claim the EEZ area of Natuna Island waters. China fishing boats since 2014 have started open fishing operation in Natuna waters that claimed as China maritime zone. Indonesia certainly welcomes the 2016 International Arbitration decision which invalidated Chinese Nine-dash line.

Kasal Operations Staff, Rear Admiral Didik Setiyono, explained that defense cooperation between Indonesia and China had started long ago. One of them is military cooperation as the defense diplomacy between the Republic of Indonesia and France. It was done through the Joint Declaration between the Republic of Indonesia and People's Republic of China on Strategic Partnership, signed by President of Republic of Indonesia and President of China in Jakarta on April 25, 2005. Indonesian Navy level signs the Term of Reference (TOR) for Navy to Navy Cooperation Talk (NTNCT), in Beijing China on February 28, 2013. Implementation in form of implementation of 1st NTNCT / 2013 in Beijing, 2nd NTNCT / 2015 in Jakarta, 3rd NTNCT / 2017 in Zhanjiang and 4th NTNCT / 2019 in Bali.

The strengthening of defense diplomacy was done in 2019 by attending the 2019 China-Southeast Asia Maritime Exercise and 70th People's Liberation ARMY (PLA) Celebration in Qingdao China, Implementation of 4th NTNCT / 2019 in Bali to create future maritime community initiatives and world maritime axis strategy. It was agreement to face challenges in South China Sea through bilateral and multilateral cooperation, submarine rescue cooperation plans, illegal vessel interest information exchange plans, strengthening warship visits, bilateral training plans, conducting mutual Passing exercises (Passex) , inviting the PLA Navy to send a Seskoal

Pasis and Hydrographic Course, plans for Chinese language courses in China and officer exchange activities, increasing high-ranking officials visits, plans for defense industry cooperation and plans for 5th NTNCT in China in 2021.

Minister of Defense at Ministry of Defense level visited China in December 2019 to talks on strengthening dialogue and cooperation in an effort to maintain regional peace and stability. The diplomacy activities done by Minister of Defense were consistent with state diplomacy strategy. RI-PRC bilateral relations are strategic relations Partnership with highest level of relations compared to other countries and an increase in cooperation level done by Ministry of Defense must be balanced by Indonesian Navy with an emphasis on increasing military diplomacy activities.

Many parties still doubt that China will make an open conflict in the South China Sea region. Chinese power is arguably massive and tends to overpower than small countries, but open conflict will be very risky for China domestic situation, especially from an economic perspective. Meanwhile the US has the world's number one military force. The military strength, fighting experience in several countries and coalition support makes the US should be concerned the power if there is an open war with China However, far main bases and rely on bases at sea (aircraft carriers) and several countries (South Korea and Japan) are a separate danger for US to fight in South China Sea. Therefore, US likely continue to implement Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) to suppress China, but will not start an open conflict with China given the large budget for fighting and operational costs that have been incurred to support FONOPS.

The BPPK Head for Ministry of Foreign Affairs also made an analysis of China's strategy patterns related to Chinese conflict in Natuna. Indonesia should not be too hasty because China has much greater economic cooperation with Indonesia, China will rethink about starting a bigger conflict in Natuna. Chinese has only sent Coast Guard ships to approach Indonesia's EEZ without a fight. Indonesia also doesn't need to act too aggressively by starting attacks. Indonesia must have defensive guard to emphasize that North Natuna waters is Indonesia's EEZ and China cannot come without the permission to the coastal state.

Regarding the security of Indonesia's EEZ in North Natuna Sea, Bakamla has implemented appropriate SOPs to deal with Chinese maneuvers, synergizing with Indonesian Navy and KKP has certainly built sufficient defense. Bakamla in mid-2020 has also inaugurated the establishment of Indonesia Maritime Information Center (IMIC) as one framework to support maritime vigilance. IMIC becomes a Representation Center for collection and analysis of Indonesian Maritime Security information, and information sharing center and analysis to relevant stakeholders, both domestic and overseas. The establishment of IMIC aims to increase the capacity and capability of Bakamla as a National Maritime Information Center to support the implementation of law enforcement; providing information support to stakeholders; and confirming the reports of regional information agencies.

Foreign Ministry also emphasized that Indonesia must think carefully to take the next steps for bilateral negotiations and cooperation with China in Natuna waters. Indonesia refuses to negotiate with Chinese because the two parties use different legal bases. Indonesia uses 1982 UNCLOS, while Chinese only uses historical claims. Therefore the points to be conveyed have never agreed because they use different grounds. However, there is possibility that Indonesia will negotiate cooperation with Chinese as long as 1982 UNCLOS is used as a legal basis in negotiations, considering that Tiongkok is one country to ratify the 1982 UNCLOS.

The competition for world powers between Tiongkok and US in the South China Sea will affect Indonesia, but can Indonesia still hold the principle of a free and active foreign policy. The BPPK Head for Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained that Indonesia's impartial attitude, both to Chinese and America, was good for Indonesian economy and even ASEAN countries. There have been dozens of countries recently enter to Indonesia because Indonesia does not side with any big country. Indonesia has been created for a long time. Indonesia does not take sides because it has become a stable country. Indonesia basically avoids conflict in ASEAN because it will affect on country's economy and war certainly requires a lot of money. It is better to avoid open conflicts.

Indonesia is 2/3 of ASEAN region. ASEAN countries tend to submit to Indonesia. This can be seen when the US asked Indonesia to join in Indo-Pacific pact. Indonesia sees the two parties profitable and should not remove one of them. Therefore, Indonesia created a concept called the ASEAN outlook on Indopacific to creates cooperation projects with both Indopacific, Tiongkok and US agree with Indonesia's perspective and willing to make projects in ASEAN. This concept is approved by all ASEAN countries because they do not have to remove a profitable cooperative partner. These projects also serve to avoid the war. The big countries will invest the projects in ASEAN and they will not damage it by starting a war, and stability of region can be saved.

CONCLUSION

The South China Sea crisis could become the next cold war, but it is unlikely to become an open war. Incidents involving military force are possible but it will not cause the parties to declare war, especially the US and Tiongkok. The US is unlikely to declare war with Tiongkok because the war in the South China Sea is very

expensive. US finances are not ready for war. The US military power is far greater than Chinese but scattered and handles conflicts around the world. The US requires tremendous effort to fight in the South China Sea because the distance is relatively far than distance between China and the South China Sea. Moreover, Chinese is also unlikely to declare war with US because the South China Sea is Chinese front yard. Chinese will not bring war to its territory. Moreover, Chinese industrial centers are located along the coast of South China Sea. Besides, Chinese must have realized that the US military strength is still above the Chinese military strength. So, Chinese might be brave enough to take an provocation action but it is less likely to declare war with US.

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