

Cross Border Armed Banditry & Its Implications On Nigeria's National Security

Stanley Ikechukwu Uwakwe Ph.D* Philip A. Attah Ph.D *

* Department of Social Science and Humanities, School of General and Administrative Studies, Federal Polytechnic, Idah, Kogi State, Nigeria.

* E-mail of the corresponding author: uwakweike@gmail.com

Ola Raheem Ph.D

Directorate of Policy, Research and Strategy, Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission, Abuja, Nigeria

Abstract

Within the last decade, Nigeria has grappled with increased insecurity due to Boko Haram terrorism/insurgency, armed banditry, cattle rustling, kidnapping, among others. These have resulted in loss of lives, destruction of property, fear and tension across the country. Severally, these issues of insecurity have been attributed to the activities of non-Nigerians who enter the country illegally through the various unofficial borders across the nation. This study examined the phenomenon of cross border armed banditry and its implications on Nigeria National Security. The study deployed the qualitative research model in generating primary data while secondary data was retrieved from books, journals and internet materials. Findings indicate that cross border armed banditry has been triggered and sustained by the neglect of border communities by government, collaboration and partnership between criminals and some residents of border communities. Cross border armed banditry has worsened insecurity and distorted livelihood patterns. Thus, the study recommends a total overhaul of Nigeria's border security management strategy.

Keywords: Armed banditry, Nigeria's National Security, cross border

DOI: 10.7176/IAGS/100-05

Publication date: September 30th 2023

1. Introduction

In today's global discourse on national security, significant attention has been focused on borders and the role they play in internal and international security. Border security studies has occupied an important position in global security debate as the rate of criminal activities across the territorial frontiers increases in scale since the end of the World War II in 1945. In recent times, the capacity of many countries to provide national security has been questioned and challenged by transnational criminals who make use of border areas as transit points after undertaking their criminal activities. Nigeria has a total land border of 4,047km with an 84 entrance approved border control post and over 1,400 illegal routes (Otoide, 2014). Countries bordering Nigeria on land include: Benin Republic, Cameroon, Niger and Chad Republic. Many of these countries particularly Niger and Chad Republics face serious national security challenges due to the activities of armed bandits and terrorists operating under groups such as Al-Shabaab, Islamic States in the Magrib, Al-Qaida, among others. Members of these groups have consistently taken advantage of the porous nature of Nigerian borders to enter and exit the country after unleashing terror on citizens.

Porous international borders have negative consequences on the national security of any country. In the Nigerian context, it has resulted in upsurge in cross border banditry, terrorism, cross border fundamentalism that has enhanced religious radicalism and fundamentalism. Studies by Adebayo, 2013, Eselebor, 2013, Akinyele, 2016) have sufficiently buttressed the nexus between national security of a nation and its borders arguing that an insecure or poorly managed international border is recipe for national insecurity. In addition, an insecure border allows easy proliferation of small arms and light weapons which Attah and Ogwu (2020) says can result in economic and health challenges. The nexus between border security and national stability accounts for why States give attention to their international borders basically to prevent armed bandits and other criminal elements from having easy entry and exit.

Studies by Abdulbaqi and Ariemu (2017); Bagu and Smith (2017); Ilo, Jonathan-Ichaver and Adamolekun (2019); Chilwa and Chilwa (2020) have argued that violence related to the activities of terrorists and bandits have had severe negative effects on Nigeria's national security resulting in massive loss of lives, destruction of property,

internal displacement of persons, among others. Extant studies on Nigeria’s national security have focused substantially on the causes and effects thereby neglecting the international dimensions as represented by the activities of cross border armed bandits. Thus, this study examined cross border armed banditry and its implications on Nigeria’s national security.

2. Objectives of the Study

The study is guided by the under listed specific objectives:

1. To identify the causes of cross border armed banditry in Nigeria
2. To outline the issues and challenges in Nigeria’s cross border security management
3. To examine the implications of cross border armed banditry on Nigeria’s national security

3. Scope of Study

The general geographic scope of the study is South-west Nigeria. The South-west region is one of the six geopolitical zones in Nigeria. It consists of Ekiti, Lagos, Oyo, Ogun, Ondo and Osun. However, the specific geographic scope of the study is Seme border in Lagos State and Idiroko border in Ogun State. This is because Seme and Idiroko are the only modern official Nigeria-Benin Republic borderland posts in South-west Nigeria while others such as Ayegun borderland, Okerete borderland (Oyo State); Imeko-Afon borderland, Ilaara borderland (Ogun State) thus can be regarded as routes occupied by patrol team and check points.




Figure: 1: Map of Nigeria showing the study locations. Source: Geography Department, University of Ibadan, 2022.

4. Conceptual Discourse

4.1 Cross Border Security Threats in West Africa

Cross border crimes and criminality have existed in Africa even during colonial rule but gained prominence since the 1970s. Previously, it existed within the context of cross border smuggling of goods by traders and businessmen/women (de Andres, 2008:2). Within the 1980s, cross border crimes metamorphosed into human trafficking; this practice involved the cross movement of young girls to a foreign country to serve as domestic servants and sex slaves. Young men were not left out as many were transported to other countries to serve as domestic servants and drug peddlers. Indeed, the period led to the emergence of criminal cross border gangs and networks across several nations who coordinate the cross border corridor for the enhancement of this trade. The increase in these cross border criminality resulted in security threats to several west African countries. The scenario was worsened by the introduction of cross border smuggling and trafficking in small arms and light weapons across the sub-region. Indeed, this has brought about increased insecurity, threatened national security

of west African countries, resulted in increased insurgency, terrorism, banditry and other insecurities that threaten the sub-region.

Furthermore, West Africa is highly vulnerable to terrorist attack because of the availability of small arms and light weapon. The United Nation Report (2012) observes that arms proliferations had spread through West Africa after the fall of Muammar Gadhafi in Libya and the arms have fallen into the hand of terrorist movements in Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Cameroun (Thomas & Kujenya, 2015:2). Small arms and light weapons are commonly used in communal, ethnic and religious conflicts, armed robbery, assassination, cultist rivalry battles, kidnapping and abduction that is rampant in West African societies because of its portability and easy accessibility which is traceable to cross border arms smuggling (Attah and Ogwu, 2020). Keili (2008) observed that Sierra Leone civil war was escalated by the easy circulation of small arms and light weapons: where the violence claimed 50,000 people, 30,000 limbs were amputated and about 215,000-257,000 women were victims of sexual violence.

4.2 Cross-Border Armed Banditry and Nigeria's National Security

Nigeria is one of the countries with porous and poorly managed international borders in West Africa. Apart from this, the country is surrounded by unstable countries from where illegal arms stream down to Nigeria. For instance, arms used during the civil war in Liberia and Angola were brought into Nigeria through the Gulf of Guinea (Olaonipekun, 2020). The arms serve as veritable instrument for cross border armed bandits and other criminally minded persons to perpetuate criminality across the country. These weapons are used for terrorism related crimes, kidnappings, armed robbery and other criminal activities which threaten Nigeria's national security.

Closely linked to the above is the phenomenon of herdsmen attacks which continue to threaten the nation's national security. The increased attacks on communities have been attributed to activities of non-Nigerian herders who access the country through its various porous borders. Indeed, Ewetan and Urhie, (2014) and Okereke (2016) have attributed Nigeria's cross-border security challenges specifically to factors including border porosity, inter-agency rivalry, poorly-manned security system and Intelligence sharing weaknesses. There is no gainsaying that the issue of border security is dominated by porosity; thus encouraging all sorts of cross border or trans-border criminal activities such as human trafficking, smuggling, drug trafficking, terrorism, armed robbery, money laundering and illicit arms trafficking.

5. Empirical Overview

Extant literature has established the fact that most borders in West Africa, including Nigeria are permeable and porous, providing gateways for transnational organized crime to flourish. The problem is not the porosity but the institutional challenges and opportunities to exploit capacity development practices among the border security agencies to secure and make the border safe. Scholars such as Asiwaju, (1985); Eselebor, (2010); Okeke et al, (2014); and Akinyele, (2016) have specifically cited the Berlin Conference (1884-1885) where Africa was partitioned as a quintessential example of colonial creation of African borders. While this argument may be plausible, linking African borders porosity and management control to colonial legacies is not sufficient to explain border porosity and border crises in Africa. For example, American-Mexican border, Canadian-US border, France-Netherlands border, Colombia-Ecuador border were also colonial created borders yet they are secure to some extent. Perhaps, an alternative explanation is the capacity development framework adopted by the state in the management of its international borders. Thus, an alternative argument is needed to explain the current gaps affecting border security management control in Nigeria.

Eselebor (2013); Emecheta and Onyejelem, (2013); Akinyemi (2013) and Olaniyan (2016) have identified border porosity and limited man power of border security personnel with neglect of capacity development practices and how such affect existing institutional framework. By this, Nigeria has several and one of the highest numbers of security agencies that directly or indirectly work at her international borders to ensure border security and consequently, national security. These key agencies include the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), Nigeria Custom Service (NCS), Nigeria Police Force (NPF), The Directorate of State Security Service (DSS), Port-Health Service (PHS), Plant Quarantine Services (PQS), and National Agency for Food Drug Administration Control (NAFDAC), National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), etc. These security agencies are assigned to monitor, regulate, and manage activities at international borders in a way that would enhance Nigeria's national security. This to some extent has not transformed into effective border security management. Perhaps, a major challenge in the security of Nigeria's international border is the capacity development and institutional framework in managing border security.

In this context, the porous nature of Nigeria borders remains central, but what implications cross border armed banditry has on Nigeria's national security needs to be interrogated. This study therefore examines cross border armed banditry and its implications on Nigeria's national security using Seme and Idi-Iroko borders in south-west Nigeria as case study.

6. Research Methodology

A research design can be seen as a blue print or road map that specifies how data relating to a given problem should be collected and analysed. It is a systematic technique, procedure or arrangement formulated to collect and analyse the data through a creative means. To realize the research objectives of this study, exploratory research designs was utilized. The research was conducted in Seme and Idiroko borders of the South-west states of Lagos and Ogun, Nigeria. The choice of this areas of study was based on the fact that it is a vast border area between Nigeria and few neighbouring Franco-phone and Anglo-phone West African countries, namely: Benin Republic, Republic of Togo, Burkina Faso, Cote D'Ivoire and Ghana. Also, because of the presence of security agencies and the existence of law in international boundaries that recognises the two land border as an entry or exit point.

The sample size for this research study emerged from four main border security agencies at Idiroko and Seme borders in South-west Nigeria. These border security agencies include: Nigeria Customs Service (NCS), Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), Department of State Security (DSS) and National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA). The study adopted the purposive non-probability sampling technique in selecting the sample population. Purposive sampling technique was used in this survey. because the researcher selectively focused on the human capital deployed (border security institutions) to South-west border in Nigeria as its populations. While the representative sample of the study population size was purposively drawn from four main border security agencies.

However, the target population of this study consist of agencies from both physical border security agencies and human security agencies notably: Nigerian Customs Service (NCS), Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), Department of State Security (DSS) and National Drugs Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA). The target population consisted of twenty (20) respondents from the above highlighted study population.

Data for the research were collected from two main sources: Primary and Secondary sources. Primary data were obtained from In-depth interviews (IDIs) and Key informant interviews. Secondary source of data included information gathered from books, journals, articles, monographs, government white papers and policy documents related to borders and national security in Nigeria. However, the study relied mostly on the primary sources of data collection.

7. Data Analysis methods

Specifically, the information generated were transcribed and thematically analysed in simple descriptive and narrative form. Content analyses were used to analyse the data obtained from the field. The analysis commenced from the data collection stage, observations, interjections, body language and emphasis made by the respondents on certain issues. Also, the context of which the respondents perceived the issues were noted on the note taking exercise. The results of the research were then discussed in relation to extant literature. Also, relevant quotations from the respondents were paraphrased and highlighted. The quotations were deployed towards reaffirming, disagreeing or bringing new thoughts into the discourse.

8. Limitations of the study

The findings of this study should be generalised with caution because the study population is not representative of the total population of border security agents and agencies in the study locations in particular and Nigeria at large. However, this limitation does not in any way invalidate the study findings. The study provides robust local and contextual information based on the perceptions and knowledge of the respondents on cross border armed banditry and its implications on Nigeria's National Security with particular focus on the South-west region.

9. Presentation of Findings

9.1 Causes of Cross Border Armed Banditry in Nigeria

Collaborations between border communities' residents and armed bandits

An official of the Nigeria Custom Service noted that a border is a socio-economic environment; a crucial part of every nation which also serves as the gateway of any sovereign country. According to the respondent, border community dwellers are very hostile to security agencies assigned to monitor and regulate the influx of human, goods and services at border posts. These community persons see security agents as enemies who came to deny or disrupt their cross border economic activities. Many of them partner and collaborate with criminals including armed bandits, smugglers and other transnational criminal groups to sabotage efforts by security agents at the borders to secure the nation. Similarly, an official of the Nigeria Immigration Service submitted that "the hostility and ignorance of many border community dwellers go to an extent of forming loyalty with these criminals and traffickers by conspiring and harbouring criminals, foreigners, illicit goods, and other undesirable elements that can even affect their own health and personal security. (IDI, Assistant Controller, Nigeria Immigration Service, 2020). In the same vein, an official of Port Health Services (PHS) revealed that the

perception of border communities is that border territory belongs to them because of their existence in the locality prior to federal government establishment of border posts. The respondent noted that border communities' indigenes believe that the establishment of border post and patrol disrupts their socio-economic activities with their kinship/siblings from the other side of the border. Many of the border communities have existed before the colonial demarcation of borders. Incidentally, the Africa Berlin Conference of 1884/1885 separated and allocated different citizenship by the colonialists. These persons who were forcefully separated maintained their ethnic kinship across the various borders.

Neglect of border communities by government

Findings revealed that over the years, many communities around Nigeria's international borders have been neglected by successive governments. Many of these communities do not have good road network, they lack access to basic infrastructures such as hospitals, electricity, water, etc. Due to lack of government presence in the areas, indigenes of border communities do not have a sense of allegiance or loyalty to the government in its effort to tackle cross border armed banditry in the country. An interview respondent noted that border communities are given low priority in terms of infrastructural development when compared with other communities; despite that they are gateway areas. They are being deprived and marginalized in terms of basic amenities, no accessible good road network, no pipe borne water, no health/clinic centre, dilapidated school structures, etc; border communities in Nigeria are totally neglected in terms of social welfare by government. The negligence is one of the reasons that worsen our job condition, sometimes because part of social amenities in the communities are provided by criminals and smugglers, you know he who pay the piper dictates the tune. This situation does not help officers in fighting criminals. (KII, Border Security Officer, 2020)

Large number of illegal routes

Sampled respondents noted that because of the large number of illegal entry and exit routes into Nigeria, no amount of security personnel is enough for the task of tackling cross border armed banditry in Nigeria. According to respondents, the issue of border porosity is attributed largely to the problem of illegal routes into Nigeria. Findings revealed that the official border points are sufficiently manned by the relevant security agencies. However, the illegal routes are unofficial hence do not have security personnel. Similarly, these illegal routes are not permanent, they are bush paths that are often created in remote and secluded areas through which armed bandits enter the country to unleash havoc on communities.

Inadequate manpower and security equipment

An official of the National Boundary Commission, Abuja during an interview session noted that the way a country manages its territorial boundaries determined its fears and comfort (national security). Thus, nations make concerted effort to ensure that border security agencies are well equipped in terms of physical and technological manpower; however, security agents at Nigeria's borders still grapple with the problem of poor manpower and absence of high tech security equipment for improved border security. Some of these equipment includes: drones, aerial surveillance equipment, scanners, among others. The respondent stated further that in the context of international best practice, manpower is not limited to a definite number, but includes modern tools for detecting cross border criminals and sharing of intelligence with other security agencies. Another respondent from the Nigeria Custom Service (NCS), Abuja, in an interview noted that border as a point of entry and exit of a sovereign state needs to be jealously guarded with all necessary modern equipment and the adequate strength of human capital that will ensure proper management of border and adjoining territories. However, shortage of manpower makes it impossible for border security institutions to effectively manage (in term of monitoring, regulating and controlling) Nigeria's international border. This is largely due to the existence of illegal routes (porous nature) across Nigeria's international borders and when this is compared with the statistical number of the current staff, there is a wide human capital gap all over the border security agencies not just the NCS alone (KII, NCS, Abuja, 2020)

Poverty and unemployment among youths of border communities

Another cross border armed banditry highlighted by respondents is poverty and youth unemployment. Some of these youths are graduates who do not have any form of employment after graduation. After many years with a sustainable means of livelihood, many of them embrace crime and criminality or align with transnational criminal gangs. Closely linked to the issue of unemployment is the get-rich-quick syndrome of many youths in the border communities. The view of a respondent in this regard is stated thus:because of this quick riches attitude and mentality, some of these youths indulge in cross border criminality in collaboration with their friends across the border. This is particularly so because these youths are very familiar with the terrain; many of them have the map of this area in their palms. So you see when this happens, it becomes particularly difficult for security agents who in most cases are non-indigenes hence are not too familiar with the area when compared to youth indigenes

(KII, Border security agent, 2020).

Existence of cross border filial relationships

A respondent noted that due to the manner in which borders were demarcated in Africa during the colonial era, many families and members of the same ethnic groups were separated into different countries. Many of these groups and persons have continued to maintain close relationship. In essence, armed bandits may occasionally gain easy access into the country due to their ability to speak a particular language, religion, etc. Also, individuals may be reluctant to provide information about bandits because they are family members from across the border. Findings indicated that, though, boundary recognises sovereignty of the state, ethno-cultural connection and affinities along the borderland region is one of the causes of cross border armed banditry. Reaffirming this view, a border post security official noted that indigenes of border communities often use the guise of visiting their kith and kin across the border to aid criminals in smuggling small arms and light weapons into the country. The respondent's view is expressed thus: "...in the name of I want to see my relations, they move with arms, illicit goods and contrabands within and across the border and sometimes serve as spies to criminals. We as security officials here are Africans and cannot stop them from visiting their families." (KII, Security agent, 2020)

Implementation of ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and Goods and the ETLS

The development of ECOWAS Free Mobility Protocol on transit is designed for the free movement of persons, goods and services in the West Africa region, being a part of the globalizing world. The ECOWAS free mobility aimed to strengthen and empower Africans and ensure economic integration as well as improve the security of borders and facilitate easy movement of persons and goods among member States. As interesting and impressive as the Protocol sounds, an official of the Nigeria Custom Service described it as a cause of armed banditry in Nigeria. According to the respondent "...the objective of the ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol on transit has been abused by transnational criminals. Many of them hide under the Protocol to move in and out of the country and when security agents raise concerns, they tell you that they are ECOWAS citizens. Likewise, they hide arms and ammunitions in products and declare such goods as ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme Goods (ETLS) which automatically makes such good enjoy certain level of diplomatic cover (KII, NCS Official, 2020)

10. Cross Border Armed Banditry: Issues and Challenges in Nigeria's Border Security Management

Studies by scholars such as Dokunbo and Oche, (2003), Eselebor, (2013), Bassey and Osita, (2010), Bashir, (2015) and Lafaji, (2003) have dwelt extensively on the issues and challenges besetting the effective management of Nigeria's border. However, under the context of cross border armed banditry, Nigeria's border management is still faced with a variety of issues and challenges. Based on findings from the study, these are discussed thematically below:

Endemic corruption along border corridors

The corrupt practices of the security operatives at the borders pose a serious challenge to the fight against cross border armed banditry in Nigeria. Security agents mount roadblocks along border corridors to extort money from drivers and other road users. Due to this situation, criminals may gain easy entry and exit upon payment of bribes to border security agents. Similarly, it is important to note that in some instances, trucks conveying goods are not thoroughly searched by relevant agencies thus small arms and light weapons may be concealed and transported into the country through such channels by cross border criminals and bandits. The poor searches could also explain the ease with which other criminals including terrorists and insurgents move in and out of the country unleashing death and creating fear and insecurity.

Instability and Conflicts in neighbouring countries

Many of the countries in Africa at large and West Africa in particular are faced with one form of instability or the other. Many of these countries are faced with economic and political instability. The emergence of armed banditry, terrorism and insurgency has worsened the security problems of West African countries. Nigeria which is has borders with many of these countries is faced with problems associated with cross border criminality, insurgency, banditry and terrorism. Many of these criminal groups gain easy entry into Nigeria due to the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS) which allows for free entry of persons from the West African sub-region and goods produced within the sub-region. Consequently, both the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and the ETLS serve as leeway for cross border armed bandits, insurgents, killer-herdsmen, terrorists and other criminals from other countries in the region experiencing instability and crises to gains easy and free entry into the country.

Inter-agency rivalry among border management agencies

Inter-agency rivalry constitutes an inherent challenge in the fight against cross border armed banditry in Nigeria. According to Omogui (2006:66), agency rivalry is a state of competition, contention or emulation that exist within and between agencies for something of perceived value to the contending interest. This could be tangible or intangible recognition and other perceived benefits to self-esteem" which can be positive (good natured) or negative (associated with injurious consequence, for instance the inability to cooperate optimally in support of national defence and security objective). Basey and Osita (2010) and Adekanye (1998) both contended that rivalry could be due to differing individual perspectives, new strategic concept, powerful functional and regional orientations, and technological initiatives, with each having differing force structure implications. Many of the border management agencies are at loggerhead over which agency has the mandate to perform certain roles at the border. This lack of synergy creates room for sabotage, poor cooperation and distrust which makes effective border management against cross border armed banditry difficult.

11. Implications of Cross Border Armed Banditry on Nigeria's National Security

Nte (2011) argued that there is a direct link between the availability of weapons such as small arms and light weapons (SALW) and cross border security. When the border security of a nation is weak, small arms and light weapons becomes easy to smuggle. In the case of cross border armed banditry, the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS) which allows for minimal inspection of certain goods and products manufactured within the West African sub-region provides leeway for cross border armed bandits to navigate entry and exit into Nigeria. For instance, cross border criminals have taken advantage of the ETLS to smuggle arms, ammunitions, contraband drugs and other products into Nigeria. These has resulted in easy availability of arms with the resultant consequences of increase in kidnappings, armed robbery and general insecurity in Nigeria. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons is one of the major security challenges currently facing Nigeria, Africa and indeed the world in general. The trafficking and wide availability of these weapons fuel cross border armed banditry, terrorism, insurgency, communal conflict, political instability and pose a threat, not only to Nigeria's cross border security, but also her economic development.

Similarly, cross border filial relationship and the implementation of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons has implications for Nigeria's national security. For instance, undocumented migration is rampant due to family and ethnic links between residents of border communities. Also, the ECOWAS protocol on free movement of persons which confers certain privileges on citizens of the member countries tend to provide cover for cross border armed bandits to gain easy entry into Nigeria. The contributory role of illegal routes to increase in cross border armed banditry in Nigeria cannot be overlooked.

Cross border armed banditry has resulted in massive loss of lives, internal displacement of persons within communities in Nigeria particularly in northern (north-west) Nigeria. Communities have been sacked, schools, hospitals, markets and other infrastructures have been destroyed. Armed banditry has created fear and heightened insecurity across the country. Kidnappings, armed robbery, rape and other criminal activities are prevalent due to the cross border armed banditry. Socio-economic activities have been negatively affected in communities and states experiencing cross border armed banditry. Government spending on security has skyrocketed as funds that ought to have been deployed towards building infrastructures are channelled to security. Hunger and poverty are other implications of cross border armed banditry as livelihoods are distorted due to internal displacement, injures sustained during attacks by armed bandits, among others.

It is on the basis of these implications of cross border armed banditry on Nigeria's national security that Oji and Okechukwu (2014) argued that the vastness of the nation's borders in the face of these challenges bring to the fore the need for a rethink on the management and security of the Nigeria's borders and seaports – without which effective fight against insurgency, kidnappings, armed banditry, arms trafficking and proliferation will remain an optical illusion. Thus, there must be innovative technology and sound intelligence services that will help protect Nigeria's borders. Musa further argues that the use of innovative technology – radars and alarm systems are major ways modern nations utilise to monitor and secure their borders against transnational criminals and gangs.

12. Conclusion

Cross border armed banditry is a contemporary security challenge facing Nigeria. It is an offshoot of several factors. Indeed, no single causative factor can be attribute to it. However, cross border armed banditry has become prevalent in Nigeria and has become a major security challenge to Nigeria and contributes to the increase in internal insecurity in the country which has resulted in loss of lives and property as well as distorted development. No doubt, the 21st century is characterised by globalisation with the need for integration and cooperation. As globalisation increases, the challenges of cross border security become more complex and require innovative approaches. It is against this backdrop that Nigeria cannot afford to be lackadaisical in the pursuit of effective and efficient management of its international borders in order to curtail the phenomenon of

cross border armed banditry.

References

- Abdulbaqi, M & Ariemu, K. (2017) "Newspapers framing of herdsmen-farmers' conflicts in Nigeria and its implication on peace-oriented journalism." *The Creative Artists* 11(2), 78-105.
- Addo, P. (2006). "Cross-Border Criminal Activities in West Africa. Option for Effective Responses" KAIPTC paper, No, 12.
- Adebayo, A (2013) "Cross-Border Alliance and Crime Proliferation in West Africa" in Albert et al (eds.) *The Security Sector and Conflict Management in Nigeria*. Ibadan: Peace and Conflict Studies Programme Institute of African Studies University of Ibadan, Ibadan.
- Adekanye, J. Bayo. (1998). "Conflicts, Loss of State Capacities and Migration in Contemporary Africa". Appleyard, R. (ed.) *Emigration Dynamics in Developing Countries, Volume 1: Sub-Saharan Africa*. Sydney: Ashgate
- Adeola, Gabriel L. and Fayomi, Oluyemi O.(2012). "The Political and Security Implications of Cross Border Migration between Nigeria and Her Francophone Neighbours". *International Journal of Social Science Tomorrow*, Vol. 1, No. 3. 1-9.
- Akinyele, R. (2016). Globalization, Insurgence and Insecurity in Nigeria's North-East: A Boundary Perspective cited in Olaniyan and Akinyele (eds.) *Nigeria's Ungoverned Spaces: Studies in Security, Terrorism and Governance*. O.A.U Press, Ile-Ife, Nigeria.
- Akinyemi, O. (2013). Globalization and Nigeria Border Security: Issues and Challenges. *International Affairs and Global Strategy* www.iiste.org ISSN 2224-574X (Paper) ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) Vol.11, 2013
- Asiwaju, A. (ed.) (1985). *Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations Across Africa's International Boundaries, 1884-1885*. London, New York. Christopher Hurst.
- Attah A. P and Ogwu, H. P. (2020). Impact of Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in North-Central Nigeria. *Research on Humanities and Social Sciences* www.iiste.org ISSN 2224-5766 (Paper) ISSN 2225-0484 (Online) Vol.10, No.18, 2020
- Babatunde, O. A. (2009). "National Security and Migration: Towards and Effective Cross-Border Management in Nigeria". Geneva, Switzerland: International Organization for Migration (IOM).
- Bagu, C. & Smith, K. (2017) "Criminality & reprisal attacks in Nigeria's Middle Belt." *Search for Common Grounds*: Available at: https://www.sfcg.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/04/Criminality-Reprisal-Attack_FINAL.pdf
- Bashir Saad Ibrahim, (2015) Cross Border Trade in West Africa: An Assessment of Nigeria and Niger Republic. *African Review Vol. 42, No. 1, 2015: 126-150*
- Bassey, C and Osita, O (2010). 'Governance and Border Security in Africa'. Malthouse Press, Lagos.
- Chiluwa, I, Chiluwa, I.M (2020), Deadlier than Boko Haram': Representations of the Nigerian herder-farmer conflict in the local and foreign press. *Journal of Media, War & Conflict* (Sage)
- De-Andres, A. (2008). " West Africa under Attack: Drugs, Organized crime and Terrorism as the New Threat to Global Security". UNISCI Papers, No. 16.
- Dokunbo, C and Oche, O (2003) The ECOWAS Framework and Transnational Crimes: Implications for National Security. *International Security Journal, Number 1, Issue 1*.
- Emecheta, K. and Onyejelem, E. (2013), "Managing Security Sector and Conflict in Nigeria Through Cross-Border Alliances." In Albert, I. O. (Eds.) *The Security and Conflict Management in Nigeria: Peace and Conflict Studies Programme, Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, Ibadan*
- Eselebor, W. (2010). Trends and Challenges in the Management of Security Border in Nigeria: A PhD Thesis Submitted to Peace and Conflict Studies; Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria.
- Eselebor, W. (2013). "Security and Development in the Context of Borderless Border in West Africa". Albert, Isaac Olawale and Eselebor, Willie Aziegbé (eds.) *Managing Security in a Globalised World*, Society for Peace Studies and Practice. 171-191.
- Ewetan, O. O. and Urhie, E. (2014). "Insecurity and Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria". *Journal of Sustainable Development Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1. 40-63*.
- Ilo, U.J., Jonathan-Ichaver & Adamolekun, Y. (2019) "The deadliest conflict you've never heard of: Nigeria's cattle herders and farmers wage a resource war." *Foreign Affairs* (January 13). <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/nigeria/2019-01-23/>
- Keili, F. (2008). Small Arms and Light Weapons Transfer in West-Africa: A Stock-Taking Sierra Leone.
- Lafaji, B (2003). Transnational Crimes: The Problems of Enforcement and National Security. NIIA, Lagos,

- Nigeria.
- Nte, N. D. (2011). "The Changing Patterns of Small and Light Weapons (SALW) Proliferation and the Challenges of National Security in Nigeria". *Global Journal of Africa Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1. 5-23. of: Nigeria's cattle herders and farmers wage a resource war." *Foreign Affairs* (January 13). <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/nigeria/2019-01-23/>
- Oji, O. and Okechukwu, R. (2014). "Cross Border Crimes in West African Sub-Region: Implications for Nigeria's National Security and External Relations". *Global Journal of human social science: F Political Science*, Vol. 14, Issue 3. 45-46.
- Okeke. et al, (2014). Cross border crimes in West Africa Sub-Region; Implications for Nigeria's National Security and external relations. *Global Journal Inc.* (USA). Online ISSN 2249-460X & prints ISSN: 0975-587Xx
- Okereke. D. (2016). "Widespread Insecurity in Nigeria: A Case for Urgent Restructuring of Security, Intelligence Agencies". Security Analyst/Consultant
- Omoigui, A. N. (2006). "Inter-Service Relations: Imperative for Jointness". Being a Lecture delivered at the National War College (Defence College). Abuja, 27 January
- Onuoha, F. C. (2011). "Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation and Human Security in Nigeria". *Conflict Trends*, Vol. 1. 50-56.
- Otoide, L. (2014). 'Dynamic Imperatives of Nigeria's International Boundary', Inaugural Lecture Series 145, University of Benin, October 2. in Akinyele, R. 2016 Globalization, Insurgence and Insecurity in Nigeria's North-East: A Boundary Perspective cited in Olaniyan and Akinyele (eds.) *Nigeria's Ungoverned Spaces: Studies in Security, Terrorism and Governance*. O.A.U Press, Ile-Ife, Nigeria.
- Thomas, H. et al. (2012). The 9/11 Commission Report, Washington DC: The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Exec.pdf.
- in Albert, I. 2013 From Rivalry to Collaboration: Security Agencies and Public Safety in Nigeria; in Albert et al (ed.). *The Security Sector and Conflict Management in Nigeria*. Peace and Conflict Studies Programme, Institute of African Studies. University of Ibadan, Nigeria.
- Wali, M. A. (2010). "Security Sector Reform in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects for the Intelligence Community". *International Journal of Politics and Good Governance*, Vol. 5, No. 5.3, Quarter III. 13-21.