International Affairs and Global Strategy
ISSN 2224-574X (Paper) ISSN 2224-8951 (Online)
Vol.103, 2026


# Implications of Russia-Ukraine War to Food Security in Africa: A Case Study of Djibouti and Tanzania

Prisca Matenda
Department of Peace and Governance, Bindura University of Science Education
Bindura, Zimbabwe
E-mail: prmatenda@gmail.com

Jeffrey Kurebwa (Corresponding author)
Department of Peace and Governance, Bindura University of Science Education
Bindura, Zimbabwe
E-mail: jeffkurebwa2015@gmail.com

**Abstract**
This qualitative research investigated the effects of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on food security in Africa, focusing on Djibouti and Tanzania through interviews and document analysis. The objective was to assess the disruptions in essential imports from the conflicting nations and the adaptive capacities of these countries. Employing a qualitative methodology, data were collected from fifteen participants selected through purposive sampling. Key informant interviews and documentary analysis were utilized to gather information. Through qualitative content and thematic analysis, the study identified trends related to import dependency, policy responses, challenges to resilience, and the overall impact on food security. The findings revealed that both Djibouti and Tanzania are significantly dependent on imports for their cereal requirements, particularly wheat and maize sourced from Russia and Ukraine. The conflict led to disruptions in Black Sea exports, resulting in increased prices and potential shortages. Although initial panic subsided as governments implemented measures such as releasing reserves and reducing tariffs, structural limitations hindered long-term solutions. Djibouti's arable land is less than 1%, which restricts its ability to substitute imports. In contrast, Tanzania possesses greater agricultural potential; however, underdeveloped irrigation systems and low crop yields impede its resilience. International collaboration facilitated humanitarian and financial assistance, yet geopolitical complexities arising from the broader conflict delayed the establishment of coordinated strategies, thereby reducing effectiveness. The study concluded that the mixed short-term effectiveness of resource constraints was intensified by geopolitical instability, highlighting the need for regional contingency planning. Additionally, it was determined that vulnerabilities arising from agricultural deficits exacerbated the impacts, necessitating multi-level cooperation to address existing gaps.
**Keywords:** Russia-Ukraine war, dependency, international trade, diplomacy, humanitarian aid.
**DOI:** 10.7176/IAGS/103-02
**Publication date:** January 31st 2026

## 1. Introduction

Tensions between Ukraine and Russia have been evident since Ukraine gained independence in 1991 (Gierczak, 2020). According to Kuzio (2017), Ukraine has since emerged as one of Russia's most significant satellite states, heavily influenced by Russian political figures, oligarchs, and corporate interests. The Ukrainian government has been characterized by corruption and inefficacy in addressing the needs of its citizens (Kubicek, 2009). Lushnycky and Riabchuk (2009) note that the Orange Revolution (2004-2005) in Kyiv was a response to the encroachment of Russian politics on Ukraine's sovereignty, reflecting the Ukrainian populace's commitment to establishing a democratic framework. However, the social fabric of Ukraine is marked by ethnic, religious, and linguistic divisions, with certain areas, particularly the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and the Crimean Peninsula, exhibiting a strong Russian identity (Wanner, 2014). Gierczak (2020) indicates that the Russian military's intervention in Crimea in 2014 intensified the international discord between the two nations. While the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has deep historical roots, the invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, raised significant global alarm due to the critical role both countries play as agricultural exporters. Collectively, they account for nearly 30% of the global supply of wheat and barley, as well as vegetable oils and maize (FAO, 2022). More than 50 developing countries depend on Russia and Ukraine for over 30% of their wheat imports, with some African nations relying on them for over 50-60% (FAO, 2022). Even before the onset of conflict, food insecurity was poised to escalate across Africa due to the economic repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic, ongoing conflicts, climate-related shocks, and rising prices (WFP, 2022).

 

Tanzania relies heavily on imported wheat, accounting for 70-80% of its domestic consumption, with annual imports exceeding 500,000 metric tons, primarily sourced from Russia and Ukraine (WFP, 2022). Before the pandemic, nearly half of Tanzania's population faced significant food insecurity, and over 70% of children under five years old suffered from stunting due to chronic undernutrition (FAO & WFP, 2022a). Similarly, Djibouti's dependence on wheat imports exceeds 90%, with most supplies coming from Ukraine and Russia, which transit through the Port of Djibouti to reach landlocked countries (FAO & WFP, 2022b). In Djibouti, the rate of acute malnutrition increased from 13.8% in 2020 to 20% in early 2022, coinciding with a doubling of food-insecure individuals over two years (WFP, 2022). The ongoing conflict disrupts grain and oilseed exports from the Black Sea, which are crucial for African food markets, leading to global price surges in wheat and vegetable oils that exacerbate undernourishment risks (FAO, 2022). This situation is further complicated by the lingering effects of the pandemic and economic instability, which limit import capabilities. Both Tanzania and Djibouti face significant challenges, including rising food prices that disproportionately affect poorer citizens, disrupted supply chains that may cause shipment delays or failures, and fiscal constraints that hinder the financing of higher-cost imports and necessary subsidies (FAO & WFP, 2022a; 2022b). Additionally, port blockages in Ukraine and Russia further limit alternative supply options. These factors jeopardize the ability of these nations to maintain affordable domestic food availability and could destabilize the food systems that vulnerable populations rely on for survival and development. Djibouti's porous borders with conflict-affected countries pose additional risks of regional instability (FAO & WFP, 2022b). As global hunger escalates sharply, the repercussions of this crisis may endure for years. This context underscores the critical nature of the Ukraine crisis for food security in Africa, particularly emphasizing the acute reliance of Tanzania and Djibouti on wheat imports and the risks confronting their already vulnerable populations in the absence of proactive policy measures.

## 2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

This section presents a comprehensive literature review and theoretical framework aimed at elucidating the effects of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on food security across Africa, particularly emphasizing the cases of Djibouti and Tanzania. The review contextualizes the discussion within the broader landscape of global food systems, agricultural trade relationships, and the vulnerabilities that have been intensified by geopolitical developments. It critically analyzes previous research concerning various dimensions of food security, the measures taken in response, and the theoretical frameworks that guide evaluations of food crises. The investigation will be grounded in the Food Security Governance Framework, Dependence Theory, and Food Regime Theory.

### *2.1 Food Security Governance Framework*

The food security governance (FSG) framework, introduced by Timmer (2014), serves as a comprehensive tool for assessing the various multi-level factors that influence food and nutrition security at both national and household levels. This framework is particularly valuable for analyzing the effects of external shocks, such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict, on food security outcomes in African countries. The FSG framework is grounded in the four pillars of food security as defined by the FAO in 2009: availability, access, utilization, and stability over time. However, it enhances these concepts by asserting that food security outcomes are influenced not only by domestic supply and demand dynamics but also by a variety of international and national governance mechanisms and policies that affect price stability, trade patterns, and social safety nets (Timmer, 2014). The aspect of availability is shaped by agricultural production and the degree of reliance on imports, which are regulated through international trade agreements and regulations (Timmer, 2014). The access dimension encompasses national and household income levels and purchasing power, which are affected by macroeconomic policies and susceptibility to fluctuations in external commodity prices (Timmer, 2014). Similarly, the aspects of utilization and nutritional stability are contingent upon factors such as the cultivation of drought-resistant crops, the presence of effective information systems, and the capacity for crisis response (Timmer, 2014).

The FSG framework offers a robust model for the longitudinal examination of the war's multifaceted impacts on food security resilience by thoroughly analyzing determinants across various scales. It explores the interplay of global supply chains, domestic market dynamics, and household welfare within two significant African contexts (Timmer, 2014). Additionally, it acknowledges critical governance elements, such as trade policy responses, that exacerbate vulnerabilities. Consequently, the FSG perspective aids in identifying systemic transmission pathways and potential policy intervention points (Timmer, 2014). By employing a multi-level and dynamic approach, the FSG framework addresses shortcomings of previous food security models, effectively capturing the interactions among international, national, and local dimensions that influence nutrition security outcomes during macroeconomic shocks (Timmer, 2014). This positions it as a fitting theoretical framework for guiding the current research.

 

*2.2 Dependency Theory*

Dependence theory emerged during the 1960s and 1970s, primarily through the contributions of Latin American structuralist scholars such as Raúl Prebisch, Celso Furtado, Osvaldo Sunkel, and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979). These theorists aimed to elucidate the ongoing underdevelopment observed in peripheral economies that rely heavily on the export of primary commodities to more advanced industrial nations. The theory critiques neoclassical economics for its assumption that integration into the global capitalist framework inherently yields benefits. Instead, it posits that economic interdependence frequently exacerbates structural inequalities between the Global North and South. Proponents of dependence theory contend that poverty is a result of entrenched asymmetric power dynamics within the international division of labor (Ferraro, 2008). Peripheral economies are perceived as perpetually dependent on low value-added primary production, which is largely controlled by transnational corporations. This integration into trade under unfavorable conditions obstructs industrialization and diversification efforts in developing countries (Prebisch, 1962). The manifestations of dependence include deteriorating terms of trade, burdens of foreign debt, reliance on foreign technology, and the transfer of resources to core economies (Sunkel, 1972). Cardoso and Faletto (1979) characterize dependency as "a conditioning situation in which the economies of one group of countries are conditioned by the development and expansion of others" (p. 16).

Dependency theory serves as a valuable framework for analyzing the global hierarchies that contribute to the structural obstacles faced in agricultural development within Sub-Saharan Africa. The ongoing issues of rural poverty and food insecurity in numerous African countries can be understood through their reliance on primary commodity exports and financial assistance from more affluent nations. For instance, Prebisch (1962) illustrated the decline in agricultural commodity prices relative to industrial goods during the mid-20th century, which adversely affected producers in peripheral economies. The integration of African nations into global markets, a process initiated by colonialism and its subsequent effects, led to a focus on cash crops at the expense of food crops, thereby increasing reliance on food imports and external aid (Kentor, 1981). The existing power imbalances enable multinational agribusinesses to influence agricultural policies in ways that favor their interests in developing countries (McMichael, 2012). Dependency theory sheds light on these global disparities that contribute to rural marginalization. It offers a macro-historical perspective that helps to contextualize the structural barriers to rural development, which are deeply rooted in the legacies of colonialism and current economic inequalities.

*2.3 Food Regimes Theory*

Food regime theory emerged in the 1990s to explore the political economy factors that drive transformations in the global agri-food system. Scholars such as Friedmann and McMichael (1993) developed this theory to examine the cyclical phases of capitalist accumulation, which are influenced by evolving hegemonic geopolitical structures that shape agricultural production, trade dynamics, and consumption trends over time (Buttel, 2017; McMichael, 2009). The theory identifies three distinct "food regimes" since the 1870s, each associated with the dominant superpower of its era. The first regime, led by Britain from 1870 to 1914, primarily focused on supplying the industrial workforce. The second regime, which emerged in the aftermath of World War II under U.S. dominance, was characterized by export-oriented agricultural policies aimed at surplus disposal. The third regime, which has prevailed since the 1970s, is marked by increased vertical and horizontal integration within global agri-food networks, connecting producers and retailers on an international scale (Friedmann & McMichael, 1989).

Transitions between food regimes signify a reconfiguration of institutional frameworks that accompany changes in global hegemonic leadership. These shifts result in an uneven redistribution of food entitlements across different regions, with marginalized populations often facing heightened vulnerabilities as global trade dynamics and consumption patterns evolve (McMichael, 2000). By examining the political structures that have influenced various historical phases of global food systems, this theory deepens the understanding of power imbalances that shape international food dependencies (Friedmann, 1993). The theoretical framework can be applied to analyze the disruptions caused by the Russia-Ukraine conflict through a geopolitical perspective. Alterations in power dynamics are leading to a reallocation of global agricultural export controls, exacerbating existing dependencies in Africa on staple imports from the Black Sea region. Viewing this upheaval as a potential transition to a new phase in the food regime provides insights into the evolving global trade structures that affect food security vulnerabilities. International interdependencies are being reshaped through revised trade agreements and the development of new supplier partnerships aimed at offsetting the impacts of disrupted export volumes (Nicholls, Monchuk & Black, 2022).

The post-pandemic landscape has encountered significant pressures to move away from the liberalizing

 

framework, primarily due to the inadequacies of financialization that have intensified undernutrition in the context of inflationary shocks, which disproportionately affect vulnerable populations (McMichael & Schneider, 2011). Increasing geopolitical tensions may accelerate the establishment of a new regime, characterized by the transformation of global supply chains, thereby necessitating revised trade agreements and safety nets to support those benefiting from the transition while alleviating adverse effects on peripheral nations that lack the capacity to navigate uncertainties during these realignments (Clapp & Ismail, 2017). Consequently, the Food Regime Theory serves as a valuable analytical tool for understanding the transformations within global food systems and for interpreting the evolving vulnerabilities related to food security in net-importing African countries that are susceptible to trade disruptions driven by instability. This theoretical framework, grounded in political economy, aids in elucidating the complex interactions between global and local dynamics across different temporal contexts, which influence the uneven distribution of entitlements amid unstable transitional adjustments between dominant trade structures.

A significant portion of the current literature offers preliminary analyses regarding the effects of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on global food prices and availability; however, there are notable deficiencies in comprehending the implications for food security in Africa (FAO, 2022; Glauber & Laborde, 2022). One major limitation is the predominant emphasis on short-term consequences, with a scarcity of studies extending their projections beyond the year 2023 (Challa et al., 2022; Laborde, 2022). As Freeman (2022) observes, 'Longer-term vulnerability analyses are still emerging' (p. 12). There is a pressing need for further investigation into potential medium- and long-term structural changes in agricultural practices and trade dynamics. Moreover, the regional disparities among the 54 African countries have not been thoroughly explored, despite the differences in import dependencies, resource availability, and policy frameworks (Challa, Wolde, Kumie & Ali, A., 2022). As noted by Schroeder-Wildberg (2022), existing analyses often 'generalize vulnerability across the entire continent,' neglecting the unique circumstances of individual countries (p. 4). The availability of disaggregated data at both national and local levels is still limited. Furthermore, the strategies implemented by governments and humanitarian organizations to mitigate these challenges have only recently begun to be documented and assessed for their effectiveness (FAO, 2022; World Bank, 2022). To facilitate optimized responses, there is a critical need for more empirical evaluations of 'policy tools, programs designed to foster resilience, and societal adaptation mechanisms' that are being implemented on the ground (Freeman, 2022, p. 14). While the literature acknowledges the initial impacts, it would greatly benefit from research that dissects the varied experiences across Africa, anticipates longer-term changes, and rigorously evaluates the evolving policy responses to provide robust evidence-based support.

*2.4 Global Food Systems and Agricultural Trade*

Agricultural trade is pivotal in maintaining global food security by balancing imports and exports with domestic production (Timmer, 2015). Following the food crisis of 2007-2008, Baffes and Dennis (2013) noted that the surge in agricultural commodity prices underscored increasing interdependencies and vulnerabilities associated with concentrated trade routes. Russia and Ukraine have become significant suppliers of essential staples to low and middle-income countries, particularly in the Global South (AMIS, 2022). Together, these nations represent approximately 30% of global wheat exports, 12% of maize, and 75% of sunflower oil exports, all of which are vital for food processing and industrial applications (World Bank, 2022a). The ongoing conflict has critically hindered grain shipments from Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea, which are essential for exports to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) under long-term agreements (FAO, 2022). The closure of ports and the imposition of sanctions on Russia affect over 50 million metric tons of wheat and maize exports, significantly reducing global availability as domestic stocks remain inaccessible for international trade (Kandil, 2022). Additionally, high input costs and limited supplies are driving up prices for staples such as wheat, surpassing levels experienced during the 2008 crisis, thereby exacerbating difficulties for the world's most vulnerable populations who are heavily reliant on these commodities (De Pinto & Nuruzzaman, 2015).

*2.5 Food Security in Sub-Saharan Africa*

Sub-Saharan Africa is experiencing profound challenges due to its significant dependence on imports to address demand inefficiencies exacerbated by climate variability and insufficient local production. Current estimates indicate that over 280 million individuals are undernourished, with more than 800 million lacking consistent access to adequate and nutritious food, which increases their vulnerability to economic shocks and climate-related stresses (FAO, 2022b). The combination of import-driven inflationary pressures and broader macroeconomic declines is pushing an additional 19 to 49 million people into extreme poverty across Africa and other developing regions (World Bank, 2022b). National food security is influenced by the interplay of various dimensions of access, availability, and utilization (Barrett, 2010). The prevalence of undernutrition in Sub-Saharan Africa is alarming, contributing to high rates of child mortality, stunted growth, and deficiencies in

 

essential micronutrients (Timmer, 2015). Although overall food supplies surpass basic caloric needs, their uneven distribution perpetuates chronic vulnerabilities among socioeconomically disadvantaged groups, while also heightening transient risks during emergencies that disrupt established coping strategies (FAO & WFP, 2021).

Food access challenges are primarily rooted in poverty, which constrains purchasing power due to high dependency ratios and unemployment rates (Pangaribowo, Gerber & Torero, 2013). Political and economic instability further intensifies these issues, jeopardizing the resilience of livelihoods (ISC, 2018). Nations affected by conflict experience the most profound and severe shortages, exacerbated by disruptions in agricultural trade networks (Verpoorten, Arora, Stoop & Swinnen, 2019). In response, several African nations have implemented immediate strategies such as subsidies, humanitarian aid, and export limitations; however, systemic food insecurity remains a pressing issue. This situation necessitates the diversification of trade partnerships and the enhancement of local production capabilities through comprehensive long-term reforms (USAID, 2011). Investments in agriculture, the establishment of irrigation systems, the adoption of climate-smart practices, and the development of improved seed varieties are all aimed at increasing yields on current agricultural lands, thereby avoiding the more expensive expansion into vulnerable ecosystems that are susceptible to degradation (Godfray, Beddington & Crute, 2010).

*2.6 The economic and trade relationships between Russia, Ukraine, Djibouti, and Tanzania, and their implications for food security.*

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has had profound repercussions for African countries such as Djibouti and Tanzania, which depend heavily on food imports from these nations. Before the onset of hostilities, Russia and Ukraine supplied more than 90% of Djibouti's wheat imports, while 25% of Tanzania's wheat originated from these two countries (WFP, 2022). This reliance, combined with the trade disruptions caused by the conflict, has jeopardized food security in these regions. Russia has become an increasingly important economic ally for various African nations through trade and investment, with total trade between Russia and Africa doubling to over $20 billion in the decade leading up to 2020 (UNCTAD, 2020). A significant portion of Russian exports to Africa consists of food and agricultural products, with wheat being the primary agricultural export. Key African importers of Russian wheat include Egypt, Nigeria, Tanzania, Algeria, and Morocco (USDA, 2021). Prior to the conflict, Ukraine was also a significant food supplier to Africa, exporting agricultural goods valued at over $2.9 billion in 2018 (FAO, 2019). Major Ukrainian exports to the continent included wheat, maize, and vegetable oils. However, the ongoing war has severely limited Ukraine's ability to export due to Russian blockades and military actions targeting its ports and infrastructure. For Djibouti, the heavy reliance on wheat imports from Russia and Ukraine, coupled with unprecedented global price increases since the war's inception, has had devastating effects (WFP, 2022). As a small nation with no domestic cereal production, Djibouti's susceptibility to external supply shocks and its inability to manage rising import costs are particularly acute. With over 75% of its food needs satisfied through imports, the consequences for national food security and living expenses have been substantial (FAO, 2022).

Tanzania has experienced significant increases in wheat and bread prices, attributed to diminished domestic supplies and higher import costs from alternative sources such as India, Romania, and Canada (FAO, 2022). Despite being an agricultural producer, Tanzania remains a net food importer, with its local production and buffer stocks proving inadequate to compensate for the decline in imports from the Black Sea region. Additionally, the country relies heavily on Ukrainian fertilizer, and the resulting shortages have escalated local food production expenses (AfDB, 2022). Nevertheless, as reported by Xinhua (2022), Tanzania's relatively larger population, extensive land resources, and agricultural potential offer a degree of resilience against external shocks, particularly when compared to Djibouti, which has minimal local production capabilities. Tanzania's initiative to increase its strategic grain reserves from 200,000 tons to 1 million tons aims to strengthen food sovereignty, contrasting sharply with Djibouti's high dependency on imports and inadequate storage facilities. The pronounced wealth inequality and poverty in Djibouti further intensified the crisis by limiting food access for its citizens, unlike the situation in Tanzania (WFP, 2022; FAO, 2022). The trade disruptions expose the power imbalances between exporting nations and those reliant on imports, aligning with the dependency theory's assertion that unequal trade perpetuates global disparities (Amin, 1976; Frank, 1967). Furthermore, critiques of dependence on unstable global markets are highlighted through food sovereignty perspectives (Rosset, 2003). This crisis underscores the imperative for African countries to cultivate resilient, localized food systems to diminish import reliance, as suggested by food regime theory (McMichael, 2013). Enhancing strategic reserves and fostering regional trade can improve food availability, while supporting smallholder production can reduce vulnerability to external shocks (Friedmann, 1993). Consequently, the ongoing conflict emphasizes the fragilities inherent in the globalized food system.

 

*2.7 The role of international relations in shaping the implications of the war on food security in Djibouti and Tanzania*

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine is generating significant geopolitical and economic consequences worldwide, particularly affecting food security in African nations that rely heavily on imports, such as Djibouti and Tanzania (Martin & Glauber, 2022). The hostilities between Russia and Ukraine, both of which are key suppliers of wheat and other essential commodities, have led to disruptions in global food supply chains and increased price volatility (Laborde, 2022). The frameworks of international relations (IR) provide valuable perspectives on the repercussions for African countries. Realist theories emphasize the competition among great powers for resources, which adversely affects peripheral nations, including those in Sub-Saharan Africa (Verma, 2022). In contrast, liberal theories examine trade relationships and the potential for collaborative responses to the crisis (Mutambukah, 2022). Critical theories highlight the persistent inequities between the Global North and South, as well as the neo-colonial influences contributing to food insecurity (Owusu-Sekyere, 2022). Djibouti, characterized as an arid and least developed country, imports more than 90% of its food, rendering it vulnerable to fluctuations in supply and prices (FAO, 2021). Its limited economic capacity and strategic location further increase its dependence on foreign aid, remittances, and port revenues. Analyzing Djibouti through a realist perspective reveals that its reliance on food imports and susceptibility to income instability reflect its diminished power within the international system, particularly about dominant players controlling essential resources (Le Billon, 2022). The material capabilities of a state significantly influence its bargaining power. Although Tanzania possesses greater agricultural potential, it too is heavily dependent on imports of fertilizers from Russia and Ukraine, which are crucial for its agricultural sector (Reardon, 2022). The autonomy of the state over its agricultural markets may be constrained by pressures from international organizations and more influential nations (Taylor, 2022).

Liberal theorists contend that collective efforts through international organizations, such as the World Food Programme, can provide avenues for mitigating the effects of crises in at-risk nations (Keohane, 1986). While realism emphasizes divisions among states, shared interests may drive collaboration among leading food producers (Jervis, 1999). Engaging in multilateral diplomacy and coordinating policies could contribute to market stabilization. Conversely, critical theorists argue that market-oriented strategies overlook fundamental issues, such as commodity speculation, and treat food as a mere commodity rather than a fundamental right (Holt-Giménez & Shattuck, 2011). Proponents of food sovereignty assert that reliance on global markets is a result of neo-colonial structures that prioritize agribusiness over the needs of small-scale farmers and consumers (Rosset, 2003). Sustainable solutions necessitate the emergence of transnational agroecology movements that confront the inequitable power dynamics inherent in the global food system (Holt-Giménez & Altieri, 2013). Consequently, various international relations frameworks underscore the significance of global power relations, trade connections, and the historical context of extraction and dependency in shaping the repercussions of the Ukraine conflict on food security in Africa. Each theoretical perspective offers valuable insights into the challenges faced while proposing potential remedies aligned with its views on the roles of states, markets, and international collaboration. A comprehensive analytical framework can shed light on both the immediate consequences and the underlying factors contributing to vulnerability in Africa as a result of the conflict.

*2.8 Cooperation and policy responses between African countries and international organisations in addressing food shortages caused by the war.*

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has prompted immediate collaborative efforts and policy interventions to mitigate the resulting food shortages in Africa. Notable multilateral initiatives include the African Union's emergency food plan, which was launched in May 2022 with a budget of $1.2 billion aimed at bolstering local agricultural production and enhancing regional trade (AU, 2022). Additionally, United Nations agencies such as the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) have mobilized over $1 billion in targeted assistance, encompassing food, cash, and nutritional support for the regions and populations most adversely affected (WFP, 2022). In response to the crisis, regional economic organizations have implemented measures such as tariff reductions and coordinated export-import strategies to streamline food distribution. For example, the East African Community has eliminated import duties on wheat and flour to reduce expenses, while also negotiating collective import contracts to ensure a stable regional supply (EAC, 2022). Furthermore, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa has established a $1 billion fund to finance food imports and facilitate policy discussions regarding response strategies (COMESA, 2022).

Tanzania and Djibouti have adopted various measures, including price controls, subsidies, and social safety nets, to shield consumers from rising costs. In Tanzania, the government has initiated an Agricultural Emergency Response Plan, allocating $130 million to enhance strategic grain reserves and promote agricultural development through improved inputs, irrigation, and mechanization (FAO, 2022). Meanwhile, Djibouti has accelerated

 

upgrades to its port infrastructure to facilitate larger grain imports and has launched cash transfer programs aimed at supporting 100,000 vulnerable households (WFP, 2022). On a bilateral level, African nations are diversifying their trade partnerships to mitigate risks. In 2022, Tanzania secured a contract with Russia for 300,000 tons of wheat and is currently in negotiations with Argentina (FAO, 2022). Djibouti has entered into an agreement with India for wheat supplies and is working to strengthen trade corridors with Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia (Wadhwa, 2022). Nonetheless, ongoing trade deficits and shortages of foreign exchange limit the capacity to manage import costs. On a multilateral scale, African countries have engaged with organizations such as the UN, G20, and WTO to advocate for a resolution to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, seek exemptions from export bans, and obtain financial assistance to alleviate import expenses (WTO, 2022). Their collective lobbying efforts emphasize a unified stance against trade barriers that exacerbate food insecurity, thereby fostering cooperation to exert pressure on exporters regarding the disproportionate effects on nations reliant on imports. However, this solidarity faces challenges. The competition for limited resources has prompted countries to enter into independent contracts, which undermines regional coordination. Additionally, stockpiling by wealthier nations restricts availability for poorer neighbouring countries, as highlighted by dependency theories (Fridell, 2014). The power dynamics favoring aid-dependent countries remain evident, aligning with food regime analyses (McMichael, 2013). Enhancing strategic reserves necessitates external financing, which further exacerbates debt burdens, as suggested by dependence theory (Frank, 1967).

## 3. Research Methodology and Design

This research employed a qualitative case study approach to thoroughly investigate the effects of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on food security in Africa, specifically focusing on Djibouti and Tanzania as illustrative examples. Qualitative methodology encompasses the strategies utilized for gathering and analyzing non-numerical data (Abend, 2008). It emphasizes the collection and examination of textual or visual information rather than numerical data (Marvasti, 2004). Qualitative methodology allowed for an examination of the political, economic, and social factors influencing food security in intricate environments through diverse sources (Baxter & Jack, 2008). The use of multiple case studies from Djibouti and Tanzania is warranted as it enables cross-case analysis and comparison (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007), resulting in a more robust and generalizable set of findings than could be achieved through a single case. Yin (2018) further emphasizes that 'the analytic benefits from having two (or more) cases may be substantial' (p. 61). For this study, a sample of 15 locally accessible experts was selected, comprising academics and researchers, government officials involved in national food security strategies, representatives from international organizations such as the United Nations World Food Programme, and international relations journalists. This selection was made due to the challenges in accessing participants from the case countries, ensuring that the chosen individuals possess a comprehensive understanding of the subject matter. Data collection for this research relied on secondary sources alongside interviews. The study participants provided empirical insights derived from previous studies, particularly regarding the implications of conflicts and their effects on food security in nations dependent on food imports. The participants also possessed a comprehensive understanding of the policy frameworks related to food security and had practical experience in food importation, including contingency measures to address potential supply disruptions caused by conflicts. Their contributions were invaluable in elucidating these aspects. Representatives from international organizations played a critical role in this study due to their extensive experience in managing past crises and their involvement in efforts to ensure food supply continuity during emergencies.

## 4. Discussion Of Findings

The study findings are discussed under this section.

4.1 *Understanding of the economic and trade relationships between Russia, Ukraine, Djibouti, and Tanzania, and their implications for food security*

One of the key participants stated that:

> *Our countries heavily rely on Black Sea imports, so war disruptions impact us directly. Russia and Ukraine have long been major trading partners for many African nations, particularly in the agriculture sector. I have seen first-hand how disruptions from the war in Ukraine are negatively impacting food security across our continent. Our markets had become quite dependent on stable, affordable supplies from the Black Sea region. However, with ports now blocked and shipments unable to transit, stable access to these vital food imports has been shredded. When I speak to counterparts from other African Union member states, I hear similar stories of the domino effect war is having on national food systems, commodity prices and people's livelihoods.*

Another key participant mentioned that:

> *Russia and Ukraine are both major exporters of wheat, maize, sunflower oil and fertilizer globally. While Djibouti and Tanzania do not have significant direct trade with Russia, they are quite reliant on wheat imports. Before the war, around 30% of Tanzania's wheat imports came from Russia and*

 

*Ukraine. For Djibouti, that figure was even higher at over 50%. The disruption to Black Sea exports from the war immediately cut off a crucial source of affordable grains for these East African nations. Both countries have had to scramble to find alternative suppliers to make up for shortfalls and prevent food price inflation from hurting consumer access to affordable staples. The challenge is that global supply chains were already strained by the pandemic, so replacing millions of tonnes of grain exports from the conflict zone has not been easy. This import dependency is a major vulnerability exposed by the war that threatens food security.*

The existing literature aligns with the insights gathered from the participants. Due to the continent's close diplomatic and trade ties with both parties involved in the conflict, the disruption of the food supply chain has resulted in millions facing acute socioeconomic challenges. The ongoing violence has led to considerable interruptions in the supply chains for essential commodities such as food, fuel, and fertilizers, alongside a dramatic increase in prices for wheat, sunflower oil, and crude oil (GMO Global Market Observation, 2014). Russia and Ukraine are significant producers and suppliers of fertilizers and staple foods, including sunflower seeds, maize, rapeseed, and vegetable oils (GMO Global Market Observation, 2014; Lago, 2022; AUDA-NEPAD, 2022). The crisis is anticipated to lead to food shortages and social unrest in Africa. Document analysis revealed that before the conflict, Russia and Ukraine were responsible for 30-40% of wheat, barley, and maize imports in Djibouti and Tanzania (FAO, 2023). A senior diplomat from Tanzania noted that Ukraine exported between $10-15 million worth of corn annually to Djibouti, as indicated by port records (Port of Djibouti, 2022). Additionally, Russia was a crucial supplier of fertilizers, with Tanzania sourcing 60% of its imports from Russia each year (MOA, 2022). It was found that sub-Saharan Africa imported 26% of its wheat from the Russia-Ukraine region before the onset of the war (WFP, 2022). These findings support the literature indicating that the region was heavily reliant on imports from the Black Sea area (FAO, 2021).

Africa's considerable dependence on imports of essential foodstuffs and fertilizers from Ukraine and Russia before the onset of the conflict, rendered the continent particularly vulnerable to disruptions in supply (Ghenna, 2022). The dramatic increase in fertilizer prices, attributed to limited exports, threatens to cause a significant short-term reduction in agricultural production throughout Africa for the ongoing growing season. Some analysis suggest that production could decline by at least one-third due to diminished imports of these critical agricultural inputs (Ghenna, 2022). The potential decline in food production in Africa, linked to reduced fertilizer imports during wartime, raises concerns about long-term food insecurity and increased hunger across the continent, which could jeopardize overall stability, as ongoing shortages may intensify existing instability (Ghenna, 2022).

The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine has profoundly impacted global grain markets, resulting in a substantial increase in food prices worldwide, which poses significant challenges to food security and economic stability in Africa (FAO, 2022). As illustrated in Figure 2, the prices of wheat surged by over 60%, while maize prices rose by 30% from January 2021 to June 2022, primarily due to the war (FAO, 2022). The FAO (2022) highlights that "Conflict-related supply uncertainties continue to support strong prices globally" (para. 2). This escalation in the cost of staple foods jeopardizes the accessibility and affordability of food for vulnerable populations throughout the continent. Chijioke (2022) emphasizes that ‘increased prices of food items affect the purchasing power of consumers, especially those in the lower economic class. This exacerbates food insecurity’ (p. 2). Furthermore, these rising prices may trigger broader economic challenges through inflation, which could further erode household purchasing power (UNDP, 2022). As GDP faces pressure, societal issues such as poverty and crime may intensify without appropriate interventions (World Bank, 2022). Additionally, there is a risk that demand will shift towards less nutritious alternatives, compromising dietary quality and increasing the long-term risk of non-communicable diseases (FAO, 2022). For example, IFPRI (2022) reported that ‘higher grain prices are expected to shift diets toward cassava and yams in parts of West and Central Africa’. In light of these significant threats, it is crucial to foster coordinated regional and international efforts to manage price fluctuations, enhance food reserves, provide social protection for vulnerable groups, and invest in agricultural productivity and resilience (FAO, 2022; UNDP, 2022; IFPRI, 2022). The FAO (2022) asserts that global coordinated actions are essential ‘to soften the blow to the most vulnerable from high food prices while bolstering agricultural productivity’ (para. 5).

Cooperation and policy responses between African countries and international organizations in addressing food shortages caused by the war

Findings aligned with calls in existing research for coordinated policies enabling regional trade of essential goods, as inflationary pressures risk exacerbating vulnerabilities without mitigation measures across boundaries (Oxfam, 2022).

One participant stated that:

 

*While these high-level meetings aim to raise awareness, mobilise political will and resources, I have yet to see demonstrated impact on the ground in the two countries. Plans are announced but then what? Monitoring food prices or investment in irrigation months after is discouraged. Commitments need to link directly to well-funded readiness programs, not just hopes for self-sufficiency through dispersed small projects.*

Another participant stated that:

*Certainly, there have been several multilateral initiatives launched in response to this crisis. At the regional level, the African Union convened an emergency food security summit in Ethiopia in May 2022 that brought together AU member states including Djibouti and Tanzania. This summit aimed to raise awareness of the crisis and mobilise a coordinated African response. However, following the summit, there were some criticisms that more concrete actions and resources were needed for follow up implementation at country levels. In Tanzania for example, we introduced tariff waivers on some essential food imports like wheat and cooking oil to make them more affordable. We also provided subsidies to boost domestic fertilizer production since imports from Russia were disrupted. However, budget constraints meant these measures could only provide temporary relief and not sustainably address root challenges like low agricultural productivity.*

One participant also mentioned that:

*At the continental level, the new Africa Continental Free Trade Area agreement created more flexibility for countries to import food regionally as a substitute. But non-tariff barriers and financing gaps have hindered its full potential as an emergency response. The World Bank and IMF also provided some emergency loans and foreign exchange support to stabilise food prices. Looking ahead, we need to strengthen regional coordination mechanisms so countries can better share information, coordinate releases of grain reserves regionally when needed, and plan jointly for disruptions to vital imports like through regional contingency stockpiling. Sustained investment is also required in food production infrastructure if we want African nations to strengthen self-reliance in the long run.*

Existing literature indicates that the Russia-Ukraine conflict has intensified food insecurity throughout Africa by disrupting grain supplies that many countries rely on for imports. As noted, Djibouti and Tanzania have initiated collaborative measures at both domestic and regional levels to mitigate these impacts; however, significant gaps persist, necessitating enhanced collective action. Domestically, both nations have allocated emergency funds for temporary grain imports to counteract anticipated shortages before the upcoming harvest cycle, as reported by interviewees from the FAO and WFP (Interviews, July-Aug 2023). Djibouti has earmarked $10 million, while Tanzania has set aside $24 million, supporting the FAO's claim that strategic reserves serve as an initial buffer against external supply and price shocks (FAO, 2021a). Nevertheless, national reserves can provide only limited relief without the implementation of sustainable, long-term strategies. Additionally, regional coordination has emerged as a vital cooperative approach, as highlighted by both data collection and existing literature on collaboration (Oxfam, 2023). In May 2022, the African Union held an emergency food security summit in Ethiopia and Senegal, which included participation from Djibouti and Tanzania, illustrating continental-level cooperative efforts to tackle crises with cross-border implications.

Despite the criticisms articulated by an academic expert in the aforementioned interview, the follow-through on initiatives stemming from such summits has been deemed insufficient, characterized by a lack of concrete actions, resources, and coordination between meetings aimed at enhancing emergency preparedness and self-sufficiency over time. This perspective aligns with existing literature that underscores the importance of ongoing coordination to bolster adaptive capacities through regionally integrated policies that facilitate the trade of essential goods (Oxfam, 2022). Responses that are reactive in nature have proven inadequate without the establishment of resilient partnerships that promote crisis-sensitive trade to mitigate inflationary pressures, as indicated by analytical frameworks focused on fostering stability in vulnerable environments. While nations have acknowledged emergency needs through cooperative measures, they have often failed to implement lasting solutions that would create systems resilient to future challenges. Regional meetings have demonstrated the potential for scaling efforts at a continental level; however, practical support has not kept pace with these intentions. The focus on maintaining reserves rather than fostering resilient production has perpetuated a reactive stance rather than a proactive one. Although cooperation has initiated some progress, it has not met the expectations outlined in the literature, which emphasizes the critical need for sustained multi-level collaboration to enhance stability in the context of commodity scarcity.

*4.2 The capacity of Djibouti and Tanzania to mitigate potential food security challenges arising from the Russia-Ukraine war*

A key participant stated that:

 

*Most smallholder farmers in both Djibouti and Tanzania still utilize very traditional practices that have low productivity, such as hand cultivation with basic tools instead of mechanization. This makes their production highly vulnerable to stresses like drought since they can't implement intensive methods. There is need for modernized approaches like irrigation, improved seeds, and use of equipment to raise yields and make farms more resilient. However, most rural communities lack access to financing or training needed to adopt new techniques. Unless smallholders are supported to overcome barriers preventing upgraded agriculture, they will struggle to self- sufficiently cope with external crises like the impact on imports from the Ukraine conflict.*

Official statistics indicate that Djibouti attained a mere 20% self-sufficiency in grain production before the onset of recent crises (WFP, 2020). According to World Bank reports (2022b), only 1% of Djibouti's land is arable, compounded by persistent water scarcity. Although government documents have committed to enhancing smallholder productivity through the expansion of irrigation and the use of hybrid seeds, advancements have been minimal, even prior to the disruptions caused by the pandemic and conflict, which hindered investment, as noted in evaluative reports (FAO, 2020; IFAD, 2021). These findings corroborate existing literature that highlights structural underdevelopment as a factor that exacerbates vulnerability (ActionAid, 2021). There is a pressing need for increased focus on mechanisation and productivity improvements to enhance self-sufficiency in the face of supply chain uncertainties.

One of the study participants indicated that countries maintained strategic grain reserves as an affordability and availability buffer. However, inspection of reserve levels showed cover of just 2-3 months' national needs on average, below the recommended minimum 6 months following FAO guidelines (2020b). The participant further stated that:

*Yes, when we examined official statistics on existing stockpile amounts, it indicated that on average, Djibouti only had enough to cover around 2 to 3 months of domestic grain demand. However, the Food and Agriculture Organization recommends nations aim to have a minimum 6-month supply in reserves to better withstand disruptions, like what we've seen from the Ukraine conflict cutting off imports. Only covering 2 to 3 months' worth of needs leaves very little buffer if outside sources are delayed or prices rise too high for people to import extra. The countries are vulnerable because their stockpiles don't meet suggested norms. It raises questions about whether more investment needs to go towards building up strategic reserves as a stronger line of defence.*

Livelihood analyses further indicated 35-45% of citizens lived below the poverty line, constrained in market access (World Bank, 2021; 2022c). These contextual factors limit the effective market absorption of higher import bills. Meanwhile, landlocked Ethiopia and South Sudan heavily depended on Djibouti and Tanzanian ports for food imports according to port authority coordination meeting minutes (Port of Djibouti, 2023; Dar es Salaam Port, 2023). Infrastructure and related policies shape trade capacities meriting attention. Cross-border coordination offers potential to pool stocks and imports collectively for cost efficiencies. Researchers pointed to low budget allocations, with agricultural spending just 3-4% of national outlays prior to shocks (TACAIDS, 2022; IFPRI, 2020). Participants agreed financial constraints influenced abilities to invest in irrigation, research, extension and social protections needed for steady supply enhancement. Research indicates that both nations encountered various structural limitations that hindered market-oriented mitigation efforts. In response to the food insecurity intensified by the Ukraine-Russia conflict, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) extended financial assistance to Tanzania through the Extended Credit Facility (ECF). Key policy initiatives supported by this funding include: the provision of targeted and temporary subsidies for petroleum imports by eliminating excise duties to reduce energy expenses; lowering import tariffs on cooking oil to enhance affordability by decreasing duties on both refined edible oil and crude cooking oil; implementing fertilizer subsidies to enhance local agricultural output and partially compensate for diminished imports; waiving value-added tax on domestically produced fertilizers; and reducing mining royalty fees for minerals utilized in the energy and fertilizer sectors. Furthermore, Tanzania has pledged to the IMF to promote human development, inclusivity, and food security through focused interventions in areas such as education, health, water and sanitation, urban planning, nutrition, and social protection. These findings resonate with existing literature that underscores how underdevelopment constrains mitigation opportunities, even in prioritized sectors, despite earnest policy initiatives. Enhancing long-term productivity drivers is deemed essential, albeit necessitating ongoing resource allocation.

The findings illuminate the capacities of Djibouti and Tanzania to confront food security challenges, particularly in light of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The analysis reveals that these nations encounter significant obstacles in mitigating deficits, which arise from a combination of structural issues within agriculture,

 

market dynamics, infrastructure, and policy frameworks that are historically characterized by underinvestment. Although emergency interventions have been implemented to meet immediate demands, persistent vulnerabilities are attributed to a deficiency in strategic productive capabilities, integration, storage facilities, and safety nets that are essential for resilience, as outlined in relevant theoretical models. These limitations in capacity were intensified, rather than instigated, by external crises that highlighted pre-existing weaknesses, a notion supported by established risk management methodologies. Insights gained from stakeholder interviews provided valuable context to the quantitative data, revealing the complexities of trade-offs, resource limitations, and gaps in policy execution. Nonetheless, the ability to generalize these findings was constrained by the small, localized sample sizes and logistical challenges encountered. The results resonate with the advocacy for coordinated efforts to enhance regional self-sufficiency through integrated policies that promote trade, infrastructure development, and regionally tailored innovations, as underscored in the African Union's frameworks for agriculture-driven growth. By addressing issues related to connectivity, productivity, and financing, these countries could improve their resilience against global uncertainties.

## 5. Conclusion

The research indicates that the interactions among Ukraine, Russia, Djibouti, and Tanzania are fundamentally rooted in the agricultural production capabilities of Russia and Ukraine, which are significant suppliers of essential foodstuffs and agricultural inputs. These inputs encompass cereals and fertilizers, while Djibouti and Tanzania depend heavily on imports for their food and agricultural needs. Prior to the onset of the conflict, Russia and Ukraine were responsible for supplying approximately 30-40% of the wheat, barley, and maize imports for Djibouti and Tanzania (FAO, 2023). International collaboration has been shown to both mitigate and intensify tensions, as indicated by various sources. While global diplomatic efforts have promoted the export of goods, political factors have hindered timely responses, and concerns regarding unilateralism persist. The dynamics of geopolitics play a crucial role in determining whether the consequences of such tensions are exacerbated or alleviated, influenced by either a collective global will or the exploitation of vulnerabilities. This perspective aligns with the assertion that effective and sustained cooperation necessitates a multilateral consensus that transcends individual national interests to effectively address crises (Antwi-Boasiako, 2022). The resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) have underscored the importance of negotiations that invoke international humanitarian law to facilitate grain exports from Ukraine (UNSC Resolution 2682, 2022). Emerging evidence has underscored the significant role of geopolitical factors in worsening global food insecurity, a situation aggravated by the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. As highlighted in the UNSC resolution (2022) advocating for the easing of grain exports, multilateral negotiations through international institutions are essential for addressing this crisis.

Djibouti and Tanzania initiated collaborative measures at both domestic and regional levels to mitigate adverse impacts, although significant gaps persisted that necessitated enhanced collective action. Domestically, both nations allocated emergency resources for temporary grain imports to counteract anticipated shortages before the forthcoming harvest cycle, as noted by interviewees from the FAO and WFP. Djibouti designated $10 million, while Tanzania earmarked $24 million, supporting the FAO's claim that strategic reserves serve as an initial safeguard against external supply and price shocks (FAO, 2021a). Nonetheless, national reserves could provide only limited assistance in the absence of sustainable, long-term strategies. Additionally, regional coordination emerged as a viable approach to cooperation (Oxfam, 2023). In May 2022, the African Union organized an emergency food security summit in Ethiopia and Senegal, which included participation from Djibouti and Tanzania, highlighting continental collaborative efforts to tackle crises with cross-border implications.

The research findings illuminate the capacities of Djibouti and Tanzania to confront food security challenges, particularly in light of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The analysis reveals that both nations encounter significant obstacles in mitigating deficits, which arise from a combination of structural issues related to agriculture, market dynamics, infrastructure, and policy frameworks, all of which are deeply rooted in historical patterns of underinvestment. Although emergency interventions have been implemented to meet immediate demands, persistent vulnerabilities are attributed to a lack of strategic productive capacity, integration, storage facilities, and safety nets that are essential for resilience, as outlined in various conceptual models. These limitations in capacity have been intensified, rather than solely instigated, by external crises that have highlighted existing weaknesses, a perspective supported by applied risk management methodologies. Prior to the onset of the war, data indicated that Tanzania maintained a grain self-sufficiency rate of 75% on a national scale, with regional variations (URT, 2021). In contrast, Djibouti's official figures revealed a mere 20% grain self-sufficiency before the recent crises (WFP, 2020). The World Bank (2022b) reports that arable land constitutes only 1% of Djibouti's land area, compounded by persistent water scarcity. Although governmental initiatives have committed to enhancing smallholder productivity through the expansion of irrigation and the use

 

of hybrid seeds, progress has been limited, even before the setbacks caused by the pandemic and the war, as noted in evaluative studies (FAO, 2020; IFAD, 2021). The findings resonate with calls for a coordinated approach to bolster regional self-reliance through integrated policies that promote trade, infrastructure development, and regionally tailored innovations, as highlighted in the African Union's frameworks for agriculture-led growth. By addressing gaps in connectivity, productivity, and financing, these nations could be better equipped to navigate global instabilities.

**References**

Adams, A. M., Cekan, J., & Sauerborn, R. (1998). Towards a conceptual framework of household coping: Reflections from rural West Africa. *Africa*, 68(2), pp. 263-283.

AfDB. (2022, March 31). Impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on Africa. African Development Bank. https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/impact-russia-ukraine-conflict-africa

African Development Bank. (2022). *African Economic Outlook 2022.* AfDB.

African Union (AU). (2022). *Communiqué on the Launch of the African Emergency Food Production Facility.* www.au.org

Allan, T., Keenlyside, P., Nilsson, A., Rødseth, T. O., & Sandalow, D. (2022, April 15). *The global food crisis is here - and it could get much worse.* Foreign Policy.

Amin, S. (1976). *Unequal Development.* New York: Monthly Review Press.

Angen, M. J. (2000). Evaluating interpretive inquiry: Reviewing the validity debate and opening the dialogue. *Qualitative Health Research,* 10(3), pp. 378–395.

Archer, E. R. (2003). Identifying underserved end-user groups in the forecasting of climate impacts on agriculture. *Climatic Change,* 57(1-2), 41-65.

Barrett, C. B. (2010). Measuring food insecurity. *Science,* 327(5967), pp. 825-828.

Banks, M., Bergiel, B., & Upson, J. (2020). A managerial perspective of entrepreneurship. *Journal of Business Research,* 106, pp. 107–121.

Baxter, J., & Eyles, J. (1997). Evaluating qualitative research in social geography: Establishing 'rigour' in interview analysis. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 22(4), pp. 505–525.

Bernard, H. R. (2017). *Research methods in anthropology: Qualitative and quantitative approaches.* Rowman & Littlefield.

Bowen, G. A. (2009). Document analysis as a qualitative research method. *Qualitative Research Journal,* 9(2), pp. 27-40.

Carter, N., Bryant-Lukosius, D., DiCenso, A., Blythe, J., & Neville, A. J. (2014). The use of triangulation in qualitative research. *Oncology Nursing Forum,* 41(5), pp. 545–547.

Chen, C. C., Greene, P. G., & Crick, A. (1998). Does entrepreneurial self-efficacy distinguish entrepreneurs from managers? *Journal of Business Venturing,* 13(4), pp. 295–316.

Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). (2022). COMESA monetary institute managing the food shock facility. *COMESA Bulletin* Vol 2, May 2022.

Cosh, A., Cumming, D., & Hughes, A. (2012). Regional factors and high-growth firms. SSRN *Electronic Journal*.

Creswell, J. W., & Miller, D. L. (2000). Determining validity in qualitative inquiry. *Theory into Practice,* 39(3), pp.124–130.

Creswell, J. W., & Poth, C. N. (2018). *Qualitative inquiry & research design: Choosing among five approaches* (4th ed.). SAGE.

Creswell, J. W., & Creswell, J. D. (2018). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods approaches* (5th ed.). SAGE.

Creswell, J. W., & Poth, C. N. (2018). *Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches* (4th ed.). SAGE.

Crotty, M. (1998). *The foundations of social research: Meaning and perspective in the research process.* SAGE.

Devereux S, & Sabates-Wheeler R. (2004). *Transformative social protection.* IDS Working Paper 232. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.

Dorward, A., & Kydd, J. (2004). The Malawi 2002 food crisis: The rural development challenge. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 42(3), pp. 343-361.

Dunne, C., Pryor, J., & Yates, P. (2016). *Becoming a researcher: A research companion for the caring professions* (3rd ed.). John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd.

East African Community (EAC). (2022). *EAC partner states implement measures to ease impact of Ukraine conflict*. EAC Press Release.

Etikan, I., Musa, S. A., & Alkassim, R. S. (2016). Comparison of convenience sampling and purposive sampling. *American Journal of Theoretical and Applied Statistics*, 5(1), p. 1.

FAO. (2019). *Ukraine - FAO cooperation.* www.fao.int

 

FAO. (2020). *Nutrition country profiles-Djibouti*. www.fao.org
FAO. (2021). *GIEWS Country Brief on Djibouti.* www.fao.org
FAO. (2022). *Impact of the Ukraine-Russia conflict on global food security and related matters under the mandate of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations*. www.fao.org
FAO. (2022b). *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2022*. www.fao.org
FAO. (2022). *Crop Prospects and Food Situation*. www.fao.org
FAO. (2022). *The importance of Ukraine and the Russian Federation for global agricultural markets and the risks associated with the current conflict*. www.fao.org
Frank, A. G. (1967). *Capitalism and underdevelopment in Latin America*. NYU Press.
Fridell, G. (2014). *Alternative trade: Legacies for the future*. Fernwood Publishing.
Friis, C. (2022, June 30). *How the war in Ukraine is affecting global food security*. Devex.
Friedmann, H. (1993). The political economy of food: a global crisis. *New Left Review*, 197, pp. 29-57.
Gichura, R., Mjomba, E., & Machuki, V. (2019). The moderating role of education in the relationship between financing and entrepreneurial success in small and medium-sized enterprises in Kenya. *The Journal of Entrepreneurship,* 28(2), pp.197–215.
Government of Tanzania. (2022). *Tanzania Food Security Situation Report, March-May 2022*. Prime Minister's Office.
Guest, G., Bunce, A., & Johnson, L. (2006). How Many Interviews Are Enough? An Experiment with Data Saturation and Variability. *Field Methods,* 18(1), pp. 59–82.
Havnevik, K., Bryceson, D., Birgegård, L. E., Matose, F., & Waiswa, E. (2007). *African agriculture and the World Bank: Development or impoverishment?* (No. 41). Nordic.
Holleman, H., Vink, N., & Fresco, L. O. (2022, May 31). *What the war in Ukraine means for global food security*. IIASA.
Holt-Giménez, E., & Altieri, M. A. (2013). Agroecology, food sovereignty, and the new green revolution. *Agroecology and Sustainable Food Systems,* 37(1), pp. 90-102.
Israel, M., & Hay, I. (2006*). Research ethics for social scientists*. SAGE Publications.
Jervis, R. (1999). Realism, neoliberalism, and cooperation: Understanding the debate. *International Security*, 24(1), pp. 42-63.
Keohane, R. O. (1986). Reciprocity in international relations. *International Organization,* 40(1), pp. 1-27.
Laborde, D., Estrades, C., & Bouët, A. (2022). *Russia's war in Ukraine: Implications for global agricultural markets and food security*. IFPRI Discussion Paper 2130.
Le Billon, P. (2022). *Geopolitics of resource wars: Resource dependence, governance and violence.* Routledge.
Li, Y., Challinor, A. J., Yang, K., Wreford, A., & Xiong, W. (2022, February 3). *The potential impacts of the war in Ukraine on global food prices and trade.* IIASA.
Lopes, H., & Campbell, M. (2006). English use amongst Bantu languages: Language contact and language maintenance in Southern Africa. *South African Journal of African Languages*, 26(2), pp.73–108.
Makaza, D. M. (2023). Zimbabwean women in motor vehicle spare parts sales: The impact of gender on business growth and success. *Journal of African Business,* 20(2), pp. 156-172.
Martin, W., & Glauber, J. (2022). Trade policy and food security. University of Chicago Press.
Mason, J. (2002). Qualitative interviewing: Asking, listening and interpreting. In T. May
(Ed.). *Qualitative research in action.* pp. 225–241. SAGE.
Maxwell, J. A. (2013). *Qualitative research design: An interactive approach* (3rd ed.). SAGE.
McMichael, P. (2013). *Food regimes and agrarian questions*. Fernwood Publishing.
Noy, C. (2008). Sampling knowledge: The hermeneutics of snowball sampling in qualitative research. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, 11(4), pp. 327-344.
Orb, A., Eisenhauer, L., & Wynaden, D. (2000). Ethics in qualitative research. *Journal of nursing scholarship*, 33(1), pp. 93-96.
Owusu-Sekyere, E., Jordaan, H., & Chigudu, S. (2022). Ukraine-Russia war exacerbates Africa's food insecurity caused by COVID-19. *The Conversation*.
Palinkas, L. A., Horwitz, S. M., Green, C. A., Wisdom, J. P., Duan, N., & Hoagwood, K. (2015). Purposeful sampling for qualitative data collection and analysis in mixed method implementation research. *Administration and Policy in Mental Health*, 42(5), pp. 533–544.
Rosset, P. M. (2003). Food sovereignty: global rallying cry of farmer movements. *Food First Backgrounder,* 9(4), pp. 1-4.
Taylor, I. (2022). Dependency redux: why Africa is vulnerable to global shocks. *International Affairs,* 98(1), pp. 169-191.
UN News. (2022). *Ukraine war impact on food security demands 'urgent solution.* www.un.org
UNCTAD (2020). *Russia's economic engagement with Africa*. UNCTAD Research Paper No. 53.
USDA. (2021*). Russia: Wheat expansion continues*. USDA Foreign Agricultural Service.

 

Verma, R. (2022). Geopolitics, food security and resilience-thinking: The case of Russia's war on Ukraine and the global food system. *Eurasian Geography and Economics,* pp. 1-13.

World Food Programme (2022). *Global Update: Impact of Ukraine conflict.* www.un.org

World Food Programme. (2022). *WFP Chief to UN Security Council: The Ukraine conflict will worsen global hunger.* www.un.org

World Trade Organisation. (2022). *Members discuss global food security and WTO response to Ukraine conflict.* www.wto.org

Yin, R. K. (2018). *Case study research and applications: Design and methods*. Sage publications.