Challenges Facing the Application of Conflict Anticipation as a Peace Monitoring Strategy in Post Conflict Mt. Elgon and Cheptais Sub-Counties, Kenya

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Abstract

Whereas conflict anticipation as peace monitoring strategy is one of the tools for conflict management in post-conflict situations, it has not been widely embraced with its efficacy confronted by social, economic, political, bureaucratic, diplomatic and environmental challenges. There is a further differentiation in its application between state and non-state actors at the grass roots level. The evaluation of conflict anticipation in post-conflict scenarios is essential to analyze its effectiveness and accountability. It is upon this that this study sought to investigate the challenges Conflict Anticipation as a Peace Monitoring Strategy in Mt Elgon and Cheptais Sub-counties. A sample of 350 respondents comprising male and female local residents, leaders, state and non-state actors from Mt Elgon and Cheptais Sub-counties of Kenya were considered for the study. Research objective and hypothesis were formulated based on the study constructs. A standard questionnaire was used to collect data from respondents who were identified using stratified and purposive sampling technique. Both quantitative and qualitative data was collected and analyzed. Statistically quantitative data was analyzed using both descriptive and inferential statistics. Study findings revealed that that state and non-state actors indeed face compounded challenges in the implementation of conflict anticipation.

1.1 Introduction

Peace monitoring is a global phenomenon. It has been practiced most visibly in intra-state conflicts that have occurred and have been perpetrated in different countries around the world. This has been witnessed in the involvement and intervention of the United Nations (UN) in the conflicts in Myanmar, Palestine, Syria, Kosovo, Macedonia, Indonesia, Thailand and Aceh among others (UN, 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier et al, 2000; Pearce, 1999; Peace monitor, 2012 & UNESCO, 2013). Its involvement in peace processes has to a large extent influenced the state of conflicts and peace in these countries.

On the African continent, the United Nations as well as the African Union (AU) have been active in conflict predictions and peace processes in the numerous violent conflicts. In particular, the UN has partnered with the AU to bring about peace in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Sudan, Somalia, Ivory Coast, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo and Zimbabwe among others (OESC, 2006; 2013; Pearce, 1999, Peace Monitor, 2012; AU, 2008). In the IGAD region, the IGAD has responded and also partnered with the AU and the UN in post conflict management in post war African states like Sudan (IGAD, 2006). In East Africa, the East African community (EAC) states employ conflict anticipation in ensuring stability in Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya.

Kenya is among the violence riddled states in Africa. Some of the violence is patent while majorities are of latent/low intensity manifesting themselves in political, economic, environmental, natural resources, land, ethnic clashes and recently terrorism that have attracted international attention (Ruto *et-al*, 2006). The role of the state in these conflicts has been low-key though it has played a significant role in suppressing these conflicts. One of the significant conflicts that the role of the state was visible in was the Mt. Elgon land conflict that flared out in 2005 (Rok, 2011 & Simiyu, 2008). The introduction of peace monitoring has been a novel approach in post-conflict management since 2002 (NSC, 2009). Its dynamics has not attracted incisive academic interests for purposes of designing appropriate strategies for post- conflict management. Whereas conflict anticipation and peace monitoring are increasingly being recognized as resources for conflict management, they have not been fully embraced by the state and non-state actors as a cornerstone for peace and conflict management in Mt. Elgon and Cheptais Sub Counties. This study interrogates conflict anticipation and its relationship with the post-conflict management in Mt. Elgon. It argues that the process is confronted by many social, economic, political and bureaucratic challenges and a further differentiation in its application between actors' calls for an examination to evaluate its effectiveness in post-conflict management in Mt. Elgon and Cheptais Sub Counties since 2002 to date.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Peace Monitoring is an emerging concept at the global level and it is still an inter-state/state affair. Conflict anticipation as its strategy has to some extent failed in restoring peace in Mt. Elgon and Cheptais Sub Counties and other parts of the world. Examples from Myanmar, Philippines, Aceh Province, Afghanistan, Thailand, Liberia, Uganda, Sudan, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe portray peace monitoring as still a top-down process

mostly state imposed (ICG Org, 2012 & Peace Monitor, 2012) and hampered by many challenges. Post-conflict studies have been slower to emerge and very few provide a ready-made guide to how peace processes should be measured. In Kenya, Conflict management and peace building continue to face major challenges in the current national and regional mileu. Instability in neighboring states has resulted in increased cross border conflicts, proliferation of small arms and humanitarian crisis evident by loss of life and property thereby warranting increased peace monitoring and conflict anticipation to manage conflicts. While it became more practical after the 2007/8Post Election Violence (PEV), it is still a state-owned affair. It has been practiced in Wajir- Borana and Oroma (Ibrahim & Janice, 1997), Post Election Violence hot-spots like Uasin Gishu, Molo, Burnt Forest, Nairobi and Kisumu (NSC, 2012 & Republic of Kenya-RoK, 2012) and other conflict zones. As one of the tools for conflict management, it is practiced in Mt. Elgon and Cheptais Sub Counties as much as there has never been any clear agreement between the insurgents (Sabaot Land Defense Forces, the Government and the Ndorobo - Moorland Defense Forces and other nationalities inhabiting the area i.e Bukusu). Conflict anticipation is state imposed i.e., through the local administration. Non-state actors have at a great level been involved in positive anticipation. Conversely, these stories are seldom told to major audiences and hampered with the dominant top-down approaches in the region. Conflict anticipation is generally confronted by social, economic, political, bureaucratic and environmental challenges in Mt. Elgon and cheptais Subcounties. There is a further differentiation in its application between state and non-state actors at the grass roots level which has greatly contributed to recurrence of conflicts in the region. The lack of a coordinated approach to conflict management in Kenya makes most actors to engage in ad hoc basis with reactionary interventions instead of proactive peace monitoring and linkage to the required timely action. This study therefore sets out to establish and evaluate conflict anticipation as employed in post-conflict management in Mt. Elgon and Cheptais Sub Counties. Accordingly, it will be the first study in Kenya.

1.3 Study Objective
To investigate the challenges facing implementation of conflict anticipation as a peace monitoring strategy in post conflict management in Mt. Elgon and and Cheptais Sub Counties in Kenya

1.4 Research hypothesis
There are no challenges facing implementation of Conflict anticipation as a peace monitoring strategy in post conflict Management in Mt. Elgon and Cheptais Sub-counties in Kenya

1.5REVIEW OF RELATED LITERAURE
The study reviewed empirical as well as theoretical literature related to the study.
1.5.1 Conflict anticipation as a peace monitoring strategy
New wars will continue to erupt unabated and a relapse of previous wars in post-conflict contexts if greater and smarter efforts are not made to prevent them. Current dangers stem from factors such as the rise of unstable regimes, global economic turbulence, climate change, and the shift in global power distribution. Preventing relapse after war's end is insufficient to prevent most new conflicts. However, post-conflict recurrences constitute only a minority of all conflict outbreaks.

Many actors have made commitments to take serious efforts to prevent violent conflicts. In most respects, these commitments represent a more than adequate normative foundation and a supportive political environment for the development of more robust and effective conflict prevention strategies (USIP, 2009). Recent analyses of secular trends in global political violence concur on major conclusions: the overall level of armed conflict is down significantly since the end of the Cold War though the trend cannot be attributed to effective conflict prevention efforts but to several negotiations held by actors (Lotta & Peter, 2009). Andrew Mack of the Human Security Project explains, "Conflict prevention is still more an aspiration rather than an established practice" (Lotta & Peter, 2009). Similarly, Hewitt *et-al*, (2008) concluded that this empirical analysis "underlines the importance of continued effort by policymakers and researchers to develop better techniques for conflict early-warning and prevention" (Andrew, 2009; Lotta & Peter, 2009).

A good number of experiences around the world show that early warning isn't a challenge but its implementation in good time (NSC, 2011; RoK, 2011 & Alston, 2009). The classic example is that of Rwanda. Despite attempts by President Clinton and others to say that the genocide was upon them, before they realized what was going on, the reality was that anyone who was paying close attention on Rwanda was well aware that mass slaughter was on the cards weeks or months before it actually happened and when it did, the scale of the tragedy became apparent while the West reacted by withdrawing its inadequate forces instead of reinforcing them (Nick, 2006; Romeo & Samantha, 2004). With widespread internet and satellite communications awareness that failing states present a threat not only to themselves and their neighbors, but to anyone who might become the target of those using them as a base, there is no shortage of early warning. Actors have a challenge in tying early warning to effective early action. Just like it was in the most deadly conflicts in Syria, Cambodia,

Guatemala, Rwandan, Somalia, Congo, Sudan and Uganda (CPA, 2001). NGOs warn but suffer the frustration of responding (Ekiyor, 2008) while governments and international organizations are understandably wary acting on the warnings of any source other than their own (Nick 2006). In Mt. Elgon, the same challenge is inevitable as CEWERN has to verify all the warnings given by all actors before acting. In this sense, it becomes tricky to respond when warnings given turn out to be untrue resulting in a costly state action (NSC, 2011). CEWERN is also challenged by time consuming Rapid Response Fund procedures (under NSC) leading to delayed responses. Perceived competition between Sub-County Peace Committees (SCPCs) and security agencies also hinder rapid response as security agencies feel that the prominence given to SCPCs and other peace actors interferes with their mandate. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether trust- and confidence-building will enhance complementarity between these structures (Sebastian *et-al*, 2012).

Lack of requisite development of anticipation institutional capacities by governments, IGOs and or NGOs/CSOs is also a challenge (USIP, 2009). There has been some forward motion with organizations coming up with conflict prevention and anticipation institutions (i.e., The UNDPs, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery in 2001, ICGs, International Conflict Prevention Organization, USAIDs 2003, Office of Conflict Mitigation and Management and Kenya's CEWERN), but they have too frequently been accompanied with reversals or plans that have not come to fruition (USIP, 2009; NSC, 2011; Woocher, 2009). Institutional capacities for conflict anticipation continue to lag noticeably behind (USIP, 2009). Failure of proper mainstreaming of conflict into the foreign policy apparatus of governments and the operation of international organizations has created room for unsustainability. Inadequate capacity in forecasting and risk/conflict assessment analyses in targeting and designing anticipation is a great challenge. It goes well beyond questions regarding the current state of knowledge and tools to questions about institutional design, incentives, and professional practices better structures and processes for regular analysis of conflict risks and decision-making about appropriate prevention.

Failure of actors to apply an appropriate strategy on a specific conflict indicator affects anticipation. Analysis of past experiences and instruments in conflict anticipation fail to inform these choices forcing policymakers to improvise reducing the likelihood of investing in anticipation in the first place. The continued use of the old fashioned mindsets and strategies in the modern complex conflict systems that are marked by their unpredictability, lack of consistent cause-effect relationships, and paradoxically, adaptability and sensitivity to small perturbations hinders anticipation. This calls for the need to design and adopt approaches designed specifically for working in complex systems such as the probe, sense, and respond approach instead of strategies driven by rational-action models (David & Mary, 2007). Conflict anticipation is also challenged by lack of proper participation and coordination between different actors (NSC, 2011; EU, 2008). There is a differentiation in application between state and non-state actors and even to some extend between non-state actors themselves with state actors dominating the field in many regions (Peace monitor, 2012; NSC, 2011; RoK, 2011 & Alston, 2009). Some actors apply quantitative models, others qualitative while others apply both. Most actors have produced qualitative early warning but the lack of proper synchronization for both to be used results in giving varied warnings thus challenging to respond unto them(Nick, 2006).

Mt. Elgon lacks any single office from both actors focused on conflict anticipation but they are embedded in other organizational programs. For instance, the state relies on the local administration i.e chiefs and SCPCs who serve other responsibilities and take conflict anticipation as a part time task. The only available and trained peace monitor operates from Bungoma County offices while the only very active and visible non-state actor the FPFK operates from Kitale (Linda *et-al*, 2012; NSC, 2012). In Mt Elgon, the awareness level of the locals on anticipation is low with no clear documentation of the number of actors trained specifically for conflict prediction and reporting in the region apart from the induction training and few meetings done to SCPCs on general peace monitoring by the NSC. The peace monitor remains the only skilled person in conflict anticipation in the CEWERN system covering the vast region. On the other hand, non-state actors like the FPFK have only local trained volunteers who carry out conflict early warning but it has no employed staff specifically for the same. This shows a gap in capacity in terms of knowledge, mechanisms and institutions (Linda *et-al*, 2012; NSC, 2011; Ezra *et-al*, 2013).

Conflict anticipation is also challenged by lack of proper participation and coordination between different actors (NSC, 2011; EU, 2008). There is a differentiation in application between state and non-state actors and even to some extend between non-state actors themselves with state actors dominating the field in many regions (Peace monitor, 2012; NSC, 2011; RoK, 2011 & Alston, 2009). Some actors apply quantitative models, others qualitative while others apply both. However, most actors have produced qualitative early warning but the lack of proper synchronization for both to be used results in giving varied warnings thus challenging to respond unto them(Nick, 2006). This is also an indication that such differentiations in application results in a weak collaboration framework among civil society caused by competition over donor funding fostering adversarial relationships rather than cooperation and sharing of information thus results in duplication of efforts and initiatives (Ekiyor, 2008). Besides such, evidence shows that effective predictions are those

provided by non-state actors (i.e., FPFK in Mt. Elgon). It is unfortunate that such warnings fail to be acted upon in good time as the discretion to lies with state actors i.e CEWERN who in real sense are limited by their resources (NSC, 2009: 2011; USIP, 2009; Linda *et-al*, 2012). This failure to involve all relevant stakeholders in planning, implementation and impact monitoring in post-conflict anticipation has resulted in actors undertaking ad-hoc approaches which give conflicting predictions that fail to match the conflict time frames thus impossible to assign proper timely early action (NSC, 2011; Paffenholz *et-al*, 2005; Sebastian, *et-al*, 2012).

Lack of adequate resources in terms of funding and personnel are critical in conflict anticipation (NSC, 2009: 2011 & Ekiyor, 2008). In most cases, the International interest in post-conflict operations tend to be ephemeral and cliché, with availability of funds linked to the prominence of a foreign crisis on the domestic agenda of the States that contribute funds. In most cases, funds for post-conflict reconstruction are notoriously supply rather than demand-driven which leads to multiplication of bureaucracy in the recipient country, inconsistency in disbursement procedures, and a focus on projects that may be more popular with donors than they are necessary in the recipient country (Chesterman, 2011). For instance, when the USA overthrew the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, President Bush likened the commitment to rebuild the devastated country to the Marshall Plan. Just over twelve months later, in February 2003, the White House apparently forgot to include *any* money for reconstruction in the 2004 budget that it submitted to Congress (Chesterman, 2011). In these respect, much of the pledged aid given for this post-conflict anticipation programs either arrives late or not at all. Just like in the Mt. Elgon case, many actors source for funding in the name of advancing conflict anticipation but the funds seldom serve the end purpose but are always diverted to other projects. Many of the non-state actors are briefcase NGOs who claim to be active but they only appear on paper and not in practice. On the other hand, CEWERN largely depends on donors, well-wishers and the stringed government budgetary allocations which make it difficult for it to fully invest in capacity, expert and institutional development for EW/R (NSC, 2011).

Stringed state-civil society relations have hindered conflict anticipation in almost all states around the world (Ekiyor, 2008). For instance, though there has been a significant shift in ECOWAS Commission on conflict prevention and the importance of including civil society in structural and operational prevention, at the national level, West African experiences still view issues of conflict prevention as being within the realm of state security (Ekiyor, 2008). The same viewpoint is shared by other regional IGOs like AU, IGAD and EAC (Sebastian, *et-al*, 2012). This means that civil society's formalized prevention activities are often unwelcome or undermined. Furthermore, many governments are suspicious of civil societies and see their activities as being tantamount to opposition. CSOs' ability to mobilize funds from foreign governments and donors also means they can be direct rivals to states in the competition for resources. As most policy-decisions are controlled by the state, the extent to which exemplary initiatives by CSOs inform or influence conflict prevention policy is intangible and in many cases not measured. This therefore makes them to engage in ad hoc and not strategically aimed at influencing policy (Ekiyor, 2008).

Unavailability of an integrative climate of conflict anticipation derails its operations. Reychler and Langer, (2003) argue that an integrative climate is the software of effective conflict anticipation (a favorable social-psychological environment). An integrative or disintegrative climate can express itself in the form of attitudes, behavior and institutions. An integrative climate is characterized by expectations of an attractive post-conflict co-existence,; the development of a sense of 'we-ness', multiple loyalties, reconciliation, trust and social capital; and the dismantlement of sentimental walls (Reychler, 2006). This climate enables people to relate and give relevant information from the local grassroots necessary for EW/R enhancing proper coordination and implementation of the bottom up approaches. In Mt. Elgon, not all people advocate for conflict prevention since others derive benefits from war especially the political class. They operate in a way to hinder conflict anticipation and prevention since their selfish interests are not met (Jonas, 2011). Ethnicisation of the warning-response chain is evident. Ethnic identity of the people involved in the warning-response chain sometimes prevails over the necessity to issue an alert or respond to one. For example, a DPC may have verifiable early warning information but fail to share it, especially where their ethnic groups are involved, for fear of being reprimanded by their community members (Sebastian *et-al,* 2012).

1.6 Theoretical framework

There are a number of different theoretical frameworks for analyzing contemporary conflicts. This study is based upon a multidisciplinary approach which uses a number of different analytical 'lenses' to examine and develop responses to violent conflict. Contemporary conflicts are complex, multi-leveled, entwined with one another and therefore, analysis needs to encompass the international/regional, national and local dimensions of conflict (Johnson, 1994). The lack of a single assessment framework for the complex conflict dynamics challenges blending different conceptual elements (structures, actors and conflict dynamics and their interaction) (Collier *et-al,* 2006; 1999).

1.6.1 Vasquez's Territoriality Thesis theory

As advanced by Vasquez, it contributes to conflict theory by introducing several key hypotheses (Vasquez,

1993). First, humans are territorial by nature and territory is intertwined with their sense of self and group identities; the link between territory and ethno-national identity is particularly salient and thirdly, territory has importance to identity and frustrating it makes us very anxious and more prone to respond to territorial threats with aggression. Consequently, humans respond to threats of territoriality most often by adapting real-politik strategies. These power-based aggressive decisions most often lead to escalation and war.

As Vasquez notes, "The existing theoretical understanding about the relationship between territory and war is that all other factors being equal, states or other sovereign groups, like tribes, will use aggressive displays to demark boundaries" (Vasquez *et-al*, (1995:144) i.e marches are most common and contentious events in Northern Ireland each summer.

Not only are humans predisposed to aggressive defense of territory, but ethno-national links also help to exacerbate this tendency by making the matters more intense and complex. Vasquez contends that "one of the major factors that separates territorial disputes that give rise to recurrent war and those that do not is the presence of ethno-national links in the disputed territory with one or both of the contending sides" (Vasquez *et al*, (1995). In Mt. Elgon, the 2006 land and 2007/8 conflict arose due to the fear of each sub-clan threatened attack on their political and land territories as the two described their sense of power and identity. The Soy and the Semek engaged into conflict because the Soy felt the Ndorobo were invading their original land in the south failing to understand it was the government's idea to resettle the Ndorobos down South for particular reasons (Jonas, 2011). The conflict worsened in 2008 when the Ndorobo lost their parliamentary seat to the Soys and thus Ndorobos retaliated through MDF heightening the levels of violence. The struggle by the Sabaots to maintain their territory of Mt. Elgon against the dominant Bukusu community eyeing it also increased the aggression of the minority Sabot's providing room for conflict to maintain status and prevent the loss of territory and power. This conflict environment then creates a vacuum on what can be done to bring about lasting peace and how it can be monitored in post-conflict contexts and that's where the theories of change links to Vasquez territorial conflict theory.

1.6.2 Theories of Change (ToCs)

As pioneered by contributions of Shapiro, the concept is gaining greater attention within the conflict studies (e.g., Shapiro, 2002, 2005 and 2006; Church & Shouldice, 2002 and 2003; Lederach *et-al*, (2007; OECD, (2008). The concept originated in the theory-based program evaluation literature of the 1970s (Weiss, 1972) crosscheck on pg 90 of its 2003 and has resonated throughout the social sciences (London & Howat, (1996). ToCs have beliefs about the underlying roots of a conflict; assumptions of how root causes are linked; beliefs about the conditions they can be transformed (either in a positively or negatively); and beliefs about interventions for transformations. This assumptions helps predict how an initiative will bring about change (Weiss, 1998). Hernandez & Hodges (2001) define TOC as the articulation of the underlying beliefs and assumptions that guide a service delivery strategy and are believed to be critical for producing change and improvement. The OECD – Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) found that peace work is often based on 'approaches rooted in implicit TOC but in many cases, such theories are subconscious and unstated (DAC, 2008). A research conducted by CDA Collaborative Learning Projects and CARE in Kosovo (Care, 2006**)** found that many peace-building interventions were ineffective because of inadequate TOCs (Care, 2006; UNICEF, 2012).

The lack of trust and fractured relationships among Mt. Elgon residents, their neighbors and at some point with the government officials fuelled the two conflicts that led to loss of more than 3000 lives, damage of property, societal fragmentation and under-development (WHW, 2011). The research focuses on the "Individual Change Theory" that assumes that the transformative change of a critical mass of individuals, their consciousness, attitudes, behavior, and skills, will make peace a possibility as individuals may contribute to population level changes (UNICEF, 2012 & ORS, 2004). This theory seeks to change those attitudes and mistrust by strengthening communication and negotiation skills among key individuals, helping locals and their influential leaders comprehend the value of collaboration and information sharing building a new consensus on "rules of the game." to create room for trust and enhance coordination good enough for sourcing post-conflict anticipation and peace monitoring information (Jonas, 2011). Changing values and attitudes mean that local residents and actors self-concepts shift from being based primarily on an individual, ethnic or regional identity to "public oneness and responsibility to the people". This theory seeks to engender a different way to understand each other despite the status needs and interests in having common stakes (ORS, 2004).

"Individual change" is viewed as the building block of "community change" and if they do not change, it is unlikely that a community will improve. However, these individual changes are not enough, by themselves, to ensure that positive changes will last, unless they occur in entities (ORS, 2004). It's also practical that "changes in community behaviors, attitudes, e.g. perceptions and beliefs and norms" increases their desire to create community change (ORS, 2004). Mt. Elgon residents have passion for the region and are advocating for post-conflict peace and development. It is from this assumption that the local residents will be able to build their trust, open room for communication and actively embed traditional conflict anticipation mechanisms including information sharing at the grassroots level with the top-down approaches to adopt a culture of pro-active

prevention" for stable post-conflict peace. This changed attitudes and relationships are hoped to have ripple effects on peace monitoring (UNICEF, 2012, Linda *et-al*, 2012 & ORS, 2004).

1.7 Research Methodology

This study adopted a descriptive survey research design where 350 respondents were identified to obtain information that describes existing phenomenon by asking individuals about their perception, attitudes, behavior or values Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) and Okoth (2012). Explorative design was used to discover, generate and build theory in the grey area of post-conflict anticipation (Pamela, 2006). Both probabilistic and non-probabilistic techniques were applied. Stratified random sampling was used to identify 11% of the total study population of respondents. Researchers such as Mugenda and Mugenda (1999) suggest that one may use a sample size of at least 10% but for better results, more representative results, a higher percentage is better. The study sampled 350 respondents consisting of people with different backgrounds as indicated in table 1

Political, socio-cultural, historical and economical data influenced by conflict and on which conflict anticipation was applied for conflict management in Mt. Elgon was collected from libraries**,** the internet, television news and radio news channels and stations, embassies and consulates, research journals, written books, and magazines. Open-ended questions were used to allow respondents to respond in their own words and provide more diverse detailed data on the topic under study (Burns & Grove, 1993). Close-ended questions were used because they are easy to administer, analyze, and the respondent was able to complete a relatively larger volume in a given period of time (Polit & Hungler, 1993). Structured questionnaires were administered to determine data types and how the data was organized for analysis. Questionnaires captured both qualitative and quantitative data (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003) Face-to-face interviews were conducted between the researcher and the 15 key informants with specialized knowledge on post-conflict anticipation. An interview guide and instructions was given to the key informants to prepare them. 3 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) (Olaibons, Security Committees) were conducted separately for different groups to accommodate both privacy, generational and gender gaps among the community members. Guided questions were employed. Both qualitative and quantitative methods were used. Data collected by use of questionnaires were presented quantitatively. Quantitative data was analyzed using SPSS version 21.0 for windows.

1.8 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

Both descriptive and inferential statistics used in the study and results thereof are presented below;

1.8.1 Descriptive Statistics

To verify the appropriateness of data sufficiency in conducting the study, the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was applied, as the sample was considered to be representative of the population. In order to check if the data is apposite for such an analysis, the Kayser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy (refer to table 1) was applied, which showed a value of 0.841. Field (2009b), referring to Hutcheson & Sofroniou (1999) which states that values above 0.9 are superb; values between 0.8 and 0.9 are great; values between 0.7 and 0.8 are good, and values between 0.5 and 0.7 are mediocre. Kaiser (1974) recommended a minimum of 0.5. Therefore in this study the sample was significantly adequate for this kind of study.

Bartlett's Test of Sphericity was also conducted to test if there is a relationship in the correlation matrix or if the matrix is an identity matrix (in an identity matrix all correlation coefficients would be zero). For the data at hand, Barlett's Test gave a highly significant result, which is below 0.001. In conclusion, the data was significantly appropriate for this kind of statistical analysis.

Table 1: Test of Sampling adequacy and Sphericity of data

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy		.841
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	31990.995
	Df	2893
	Sig.	.000

Source: Own computation, 2016

Due to the nature of this study where conflict anticipation as a peace monitoring strategy employed in post conflict management was being assessed, assumed univariate and multivariate normality was analyzed. Numerical tests were performed using both Kolmogorov-Smirnov D test and the Shapiro-Wilk test on the total factor scores (Refer to table 2). Both tests analyze if the distribution as a whole deviates from a normal distribution.

Table 2: Test for Normality in data distribution for the study

	Kolmogorov-Smirnov[a]			Shapiro-Wilk		
	Statistic	Df	Sig.	Statistic	Df	Sig.
Conf Ant	.133	45	.001	.894	.003	45
Post Conf Peace mngt	.139	45	.000	.885	.001	45
ImplementChallenges	.146	45	.004	.911	.004	45

Source: Own computation, 2016
   a.   Test statistic is normal
   b.   Test statistic is uniform
   N =312 list wise

      Both tests resulted in significant results, indicating that the data was normally and uniformly distributed. Such normal and uniform distribution allowed the use of statistical techniques that assume normality and uniformity of data distribution such as Correlation and Regression analysis.

1.8.1.1 Response Rate

The target sample for the study was 350 respondents consisting of residents affected by the conflicts, local leaders, professionals and other state and non-state actors. Out of the above target sample, the study obtained 312 respondents proportionately distributed from among all the targeted sections of the study area. This gave the study a response rate of 89.14%. Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) assert that a response rate of 70% and above is an excellent measure of transferability of population characteristics to the sample under study in a manner that creates confidence in generalizability of findings.

1.8.1.2 Respondents Background Information

The below background information was sought from the respondents

**Figure 1: Respondents Gender distribution**

Figure 1: Gender Distribution of Respondents

      Study findings in figure 1 reveal that 62.82% of the respondents were male while their female counterparts constituted 37.18% of the study respondents. This is an indication that more male persons are involved in conflict anticipation as a peace monitoring strategy as compared to their female counterparts.

      The researcher asked respondents to state the locations where they worked or resided within the study area and findings presented in figure 2.


Figure 2: Respondents' residence
Source: Field Data, 2016.

Study findings in figure 2 reveal that 33.01% of the respondents were from Kapsokwony ward while 29.17% were from Kaptama ward. It was also established based on the study findings that 22.77% of the respondents either worked or lived in Cheptais ward while 15.06% were from Kopsiro ward. This is a clear indication that study respondents were drawn from all regions of the study area which gave the study a balance that would eliminate respondent bias. The findings indicate that the population was evenly distributed in all areas of study based on how the area was affected by conflicts in the study period. This facilitated yielding significant results for the study.

The study also asked respondents to state how long they had stayed or worked in Mount Elgon region and findings presented in figure 3.


Figure 3: Length of stay within the study area.
Source: Field Data, 2016.

Results in figure 3 show that 60.58% of the respondents had stayed within Mount Elgon area for over 10 years while 16.67% had stayed in the region for 6 to 10 years. Results further show that 12.18%of the respondents had been in the study area for less than 3 years while 10.58% had been in the study region for 3 to 5 years. This is a clear indication that most respondents had been within the study area either as residents of employees long enough to understand the application of conflict anticipation as a peace monitoring strategy. Such a long stay of respondents within the study area made it possible for them to understand the constructs under investigation by the study.

The researcher also sought to know who the actors were in conflict anticipation in Mt Elgon and Sub Counties and the results are indicated in table 3.

Table 3: Responses on state actors in Conflict Anticipation

Involved Leaders	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Peace monitors	92	29.49
Local administrators	113	36.22
The police	107	34.29
Total	**312**	**100.0**

Source: Field Data, 2016

From findings outlined in table 3, amongst the state actors, the local administration were the most significant actors in conflict anticipation with 36.29% involvement while the police were perceived to have 34.29% involvement as peace monitors at 24.49%. This is an indication that local residents had confidence in existing government actors in matters concerning conflict anticipation in post-conflict management.

The study also asked respondents to comment on the extent to which stakeholders and residents of the study area were receptive to conflict related information and findings presented in table 4.

Table 4: Extent of Reception of Conflict related Information

Method	To what extent are actors and related parties receptive to conflict related information
Chi-Square	21.423
df	2
Asymp. Sig	.000

Findings in table 4 show that stakeholders were highly receptive to conflict related information (X^2=21.423; df=2; P<0.05). This implies that information on possibility of conflict is taken seriously by stakeholders. This is seen in P value that is less than 0.05.

Respondents were asked to state what were some of the challenges in gathering conflict related information in Mt. Elgon and Cheptais sub-counties and findings presented in table 5

Table 5: Challenges in gathering conflict related information

Factors	Most challenging (1)	Less challenging (2)	Least challenging (3)	Not challenging (4)	I don't know (5)
Culture	99	13	5	192	3
Gender stereotypes	190	59	31	25	7
Illiteracy	169	44	13	64	22
Fear	256	28	10	13	5
Inadequate resources	260	31	12	5	4
Unwillingness to provide information	179	42	17	13	61
There is already too much information	54	34	3	219	2

Source: Field Data, 2016

Study findings in table 5 reveal that inadequate resources was the most challenging factor in providing conflict related information with a frequency of 260 followed by fear with a frequency of 256. It was also established based on the study findings that only 54 respondents were of the view that there was already too much information.

Study constructs relating to challenges facing the implementation of conflict anticipation in post conflict Mount Elgon were subjected to regression and findings presented in table 6

Table 6: Multinomial Logistic Regression for challenges facing implementation of Conflict Anticipation Strategy

Mode	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
	B	Std. Error	Beta	T	Sig.
1 (Constant)	2.683	.385		2.255	.024
Inadequate Resources	1.295	.69	.150	1.382	.035
Fear	1.321	.64	.169	1.356	.021
Unwillingness to give Info.	1.309	.59	.152	1.483	.019
Illiteracy	1.299	.55	.192	1.398	.026
Culture	0.992	.53	.204	1.294	.039
Gender Stereotypes	1.311	41	.185	1.502	.042

Source: Field Data, 2016

a. Predictors (Constant): Inadequate resources, fear, culture, illiteracy, unwillingness to provide information and Gender stereotypes

b. Dependent Variable: Implementation Challenges

A multinomial Logistic Regression analysis was performed to ascertain the magnitude of influence of various challenges to the implementation of conflict anticipation in post-conflict Mount Elgon. Study findings in table 6 indicated that inadequate resources was the leading challenge that faced implementation of conflict anticipation strategy and contributed to 69% of the variance in the implementation challenges (Beta 1.295, T 1.382, $P<0.05$).

Based on the above findings, the 312 respondents including 20 individuals interviewed and the 4 FGDs conducted, it was found that both the state and non-state actors have allocated limited resources to individual programmes on anticipation but have majored on response which is a culture that should be avoided. These results were repetitive across board in Mt. Elgon. For instance, there was no single office or established operational base to coordinate conflict anticipation but it's embedded in other programmes just as a part of it.

In an FDG with the County Security Committee, the chair commended that;

It is very challenging to manage peace and security matters in Mt Elgon and Cheptais SubCounties especially on prevention. The area is forested, accessibility is a challenge with poor terrain/road networks and no enough vehicles to access the large area. The human capital placement of the police doesn't match the population, many peace and security platforms like the Bungoma County Peace and Security Working groups, all leveled Peace Committees, Bungoma County Women for Peace Network amongst many other actors are operational but constraints with resources hampers their operations (Focus Group Discussion with County Security Committee on 24th March, 2015.

Fear of reprisal attacks contributed to 64% of the variance in challenges that faced the implementation of conflict anticipation as a peace monitoring strategy (Beta 1.321, T 1.356, $P<0.05$). The respondents feared attacks from the still existing SLDF militia, politicians and persons with influence. These elements of fear clearly came out in Kopsiro, Cheptais, Chebyuk and Kaptama. It also came out clearly that although the major elements of the conflict have been handled, some perpetrators are still in existence and thus any slight move to

share vital information that will be detrimental to their actions will cost the life of the locals. These existing elements of fear are largely waging down the efforts of conflict anticipation.

In an interview with a woman who lost her husband and three children in Chebyuk Scheme due to land conflicts, the woman said;

> I fear talking about anything related to the 2006 and 2007/8 Mt Elgon and Cheptais Sub-counties conflicts. I lost my husband in the land conflict, I lost my three children during the 2007/8 PEV, I know the perpetrators who killed my husband and children too. I saw them do it. I live around them, I see them every day as they continue to plan and commit many other crimes.
>
> I can't tell on them because my security isn't guaranteed. I know with the coming elections, there is a big probability that violence may recur again. I am traumatized, I fear for my life and my only surviving child. I can't share any conflict related information at least not to some extend" (Interview with a key conflict affected person in Kopsiro on 12th March, 2015)

From the above verbatim, the woman represents many other residents of Mt Elgon who may have the same fear of sharing information based on the harm caused by the perpetrators to their families, colleagues, themselves and damage to properties.

Unwillingness to provide information contributed to 59% of the implementation challenges (Beta 1.309, T 1.483, P<0.05). Many people in Mt Elgon especially those who were directly affected by the conflicts or their relatives and those who lost their property were unwilling to express themselves fully on what transpired indications that they were still traumatized by the events that occurred between 2005-2008. Responses from some sub-locations in Kopsiro, Kaptama and Chebwek area revealed large levels of unwillingness to provide any conflict related information that indicate the possibility of occurrence of future conflicts in Mt Elgon and Sub Counties.

In an interview with the Program Officers of Free Pentecostal Fellowship Kenya (FPFK) and ACCORD, organizations delivering Humanitarian assistance, Peace and rights programmes in Mt Elgon and Cheptais Sub-counties, it came out clear that their programmes have been hindered by unwillingness of the locals to share information. The Program officer of FPFK said:-

> It has been a great challenge for us to implement our programmes in Mt Elgon and Cheptais Sub-Counties respectively. People are so reserved and have a feeling that outsiders visit the areas, gather information, take pictures, go do business and make money which is equivalent to laughing at their troubles without providing any lasting solutions. Existence of cultural practices that give women the second place in society also makes them not to talk. Sabaots also go through traditional circumcision processes that teach men to be highly confidential in that they cannot share any information with anyone especially non-Sabaot's. In these sense, they fail to provide early and timely intelligence that can communicate warnings for prevention and timely action. (Interview with NGO actors at Kapsokwony on 17th March, 2015)

In another interview with the Sub Counties peace monitor Mr Kilong Edwin and 7 peace advocates, it was revealed that at times non-state actors fail to provide information due to inaction by the state actors especially the police and area administrators. However in their defense Cheptais OCPD argued that such information received has to be analyzed and verified before any action. The Mt Elgon Sub-County AP Commander also argued that actors with relevant security information delay in sharing it with the concerned parties which contributes to creating crime/conflict friendly environments/ societies that encourage commission and omission of violence (Field data, 2015). In agreement with the field data, unwillingness to provide timely conflict anticipation data is a compounded issue that needs to be addressed. Proper Post Trauma Counseling, awareness creation on the role of the community in conflict anticipation and public education on information sharing will help breach the gap.

Illiteracy was found to account for 55% of the variance in challenges in implementation of conflict anticipation as a peace monitoring strategy (Beta 1.299, T 1.398, P<0.05) while culture contributed to 53% of the variance in challenges of implementation of conflict anticipation strategy (Beta 0.992, T 1.294, P<0.05). Regarding education, respondents indicated that the most interior areas of Mt Elgon like Kongit, Kapkurungo, Chebwek, Kamuneru, Sambocho and Kabwoywo amongst others, the illiteracy levels were high and thus making it challenging for a few people to be able to relay information, challenge individuals fostering conflicts or even read visible signs of a possible conflict. This also challenges the ability of local inhabitants to learn and adopt and interpret modern conflict anticipation strategies, procedures and processes thus hindering conflict anticipation.

The researcher provided sampled 20 locals in Kaptama, Kopsiro, Chebyuk and Cheptais locations with a digital mobile phone and instructed them to operate it, write a text message, access GPRS and WhatsApp. Unfortunately, only 3 amongst the 20 managed to operate the phone, 5 tried, 5 couldn't read English, and the rest couldn't do anything. From this simple practice, it was clear that many people in Mt Elgon and Cheptais Sub-Counties are illiterate especially between the ages of 30-50. In many societies, the age bracket of 30-50 is

regarded as the productive and wise age which in the researchers view can contribute to the peace building, social and economic development and growth (Field Data, 2015).

On cultural basis, the FGD with Olaibons indicated that in Sabaot community, men are the spokesmen and thus most women share crucial information with men who are the ones culturally mandated to speak out but perhaps it was apparent that such information never saw the light of the day due to unknown reasons (Field Data, 2nd April, 2015).

One of the women in the FDG said,

"In Sabaot culture, women aren't supposed to speak about family and decision making matters before men, other leaders or even youths. A woman's place is in the kitchen. Women are submissive to men and only listen and act to what their husbands direct whether right or wrong. They don't advice but listen" (FDG with a Women Group in Cheptais on 4th April, 2015).

This therefore brings out the challenge on the role of women in Peace and Security and also decision making at large. Individual persons and experts in peace building interviewed termed culture as one of the most visible hindrances to Conflict Anticipation as a peace monitoring strategy. In an interview with a Programme officer of Western Human Rights Watch organisation working in Mt Elgon, He said,

"Women in this region have been hampered to progress because of the negative cultures and practices the society continues to nurture. There is little exposure, little interaction and healthy connection, limited space for elf expression for women but enough space for women to be in the shambas, perform difficult chores and fend for their families as their men marry and spend resources in their own dominant way. Women need empowerment in Mt Elgon and Cheptais Sub-Counties" (Interview held on 20th March, 2015 in Bungoma town).

The research established that women in the Sabaot Community only listen and act but they don't speak. They are prohibited to share any information or even interact with persons who might probe them into giving any information touching on the culture of the locals. In these regard, they are meant to lie back at home and watch as men dictate. Further still, gender stereotypes were found to account for 41% of the variance in challenges of implementation of conflict anticipation strategy (Beta 1.311, T 1.502, P<0.05) thus having great ties with cultural beliefs and practices.

A study by David & Mary (2007) established that failure of actors to apply an appropriate strategy on a specific conflict indicator affects anticipation. Analysis of past experiences and instruments in conflict anticipation fail to inform these choices forcing policymakers to improvise reducing the likelihood of investing in anticipation in the first place. The continued use of the old fashioned mindsets and strategies in the modern complex conflict systems that are marked by their unpredictability, lack of consistent cause-effect relationships, and paradoxically, adaptability and sensitivity to small perturbations hinders anticipation. This calls for the need to design and adopt approaches designed specifically for working in complex systems such as the probe, sense, and respond approach instead of strategies driven by rational-action models.

In a separate study USIP (2009) found that new wars will continue to erupt unabated and a relapse of previous wars in post-conflict contexts if greater and smarter efforts are not made to prevent them. Current dangers stem from factors such as the rise of unstable regimes, global economic turbulence, climate change, and the shift in global power distribution. Preventing relapse after war's end is insufficient to prevent most new conflicts. However, post-conflict recurrences constitute only a minority of all conflict outbreaks.

Many actors have made commitments to take serious efforts to prevent violent conflicts. In most respects, these commitments represent a more than adequate normative foundation and a supportive political environment for the development of more robust and effective conflict prevention strategies.

Experiences around the world show that early warning isn't a challenge but its implementation in good time (NSC, 2011; RoK, 2011 & Alston, 2009). The classic example is that of Rwanda. Despite attempts by President Clinton and others to say that the genocide was upon them, before they realized what was going on, the reality was that anyone who was paying close attention on Rwanda was well aware that mass slaughter was on the cards weeks or months before it actually happened and when it did, the scale of the tragedy became apparent while the West reacted by withdrawing its inadequate forces instead of reinforcing them (Nick, 2006; Romeo & Samantha, 2004).

1.9 Conclusions of the study

Regarding the findings of this study, it can be concluded that inadequate resources, fear of reprisal attacks, unwillingness to provide information, illiteracy, culture and gender were the challenges that affected the implementation of conflict anticipation as a peace monitoring strategy in Mount Elgon and Cheptais Sub-counties in Kenya.

1.10 Recommendations

Based on the findings of this study, the recommendation here is to encourage coaching for Emotional

Intelligence for purposes of improving self-awareness among community members. The civil society and religious leaders can take a forefront in this given their large networks of penetration within the study area. Coaching can be described like a mirror that allows people to see themselves more clearly. This kind of method will help people to understand how their behavior affects others. Developing the emotional intelligence is a never-ending journey as people improve it throughout the course of their lives and careers. Development of decision-making skills will also help the implementation of conflict anticipation strategy in early stages of conflict resolution thus making the process even more efficient and bring major long-term benefits supported by upstream solutions. Development of proper structures and resources will also largely facilitate professional and timely linkage policy, warning and action.

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