

The Arab Spring and the Required Questions of Renaissance

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Abstract

This study discusses the Arab Spring revolutions that took place in the Arab World a few years ago by reviewing the historical relationship of the crisis of Arab thought (religious, political and modernist) describing it as a cumulative product which accumulated in Arab mentality and formed an ideological path that was difficult to abandon. This was one of the most important factors for the deterioration of the Arab renaissance concept in ideological composition and one of the most prominent reasons for the failure of the revolutions that swept the Arab states demanding the regimes' downfall or political and democratic reform. The study also brings to light the revolution concept throughout history and presents the most important opinions of researchers in their view of the Arab Spring from different perspectives and ideologies. The study attempts to analyse the framework of the revolutions' reality by revealing the most important characteristics of the revolutions in each country and their transformation into civil and sectarian wars in some states, and their success in others.

Keywords: Arab Spring, revolution, Renaissance, Islamic Caliphate, politic, Thought, Secularism, Political Islam

Discourse of Arab Renaissance and Political Thought:

From the beginning, the revolution concept was associated with renaissance thought organically yet the renaissance term is the constitutive effective discourse for any revolutionary action in history or for building the civilized renaissance model that exercises its awareness from the inside (current reality) that it experiences without the need for looking back chronologically at history and culture or imitating the alternative model case in the present. Therefore, the process of searching for the ideal renaissance model is determined by awareness and internal visualization of reality and accumulates quantitatively and qualitatively over time. This is required to produce an intellectual and reformist state to lead the renaissance so that it becomes a revolution of the mind and a revolution of enlightened and reformist thought. This kind of revolution is led by collective consciousness including minorities and popular masses before its transformation into a political revolution. "This is because a revolution is not merely radical change of reality but also involves building a new way of thinking and establishing a pattern of behavior that transcends the boundaries of changing reality" (Dedde 2012). And there is no doubt that the question of the Arab renaissance turns on the "I" dialectic which clings to the concepts of "identity, heritage and religion" facing the "other" which carries with it different and emerging variables in its new concepts: "freedom, politics, secularism, democracy and modernity". Between this, there is a vicious circle and a gap in renaissance thought. It stands unable to establish a solid political ground for the construction of Arab political theory and we, in both dualities, live outside our reality and historical context.

Mohammed Al-Jabri expatiated on analyzing the idea of "renaissance and decline" (Al-Jabri *et al.* 1983) for Arabs historically and on diagnosing the Arab mind which does not cease measuring the present using the past as "the project is not completed or achieved even at the mental perception level" (Al-Jabri *et al.* 1983) for Arabs. Furthermore, the fall of the Arab renaissance was due to its being a victim of only two existing models that the Arabs were forced to both choose: the first being the past model, represented by the utopian Islamic civilization and the canonized religious model in order to assert and prove themselves. Moreover, "the Arabs remained attached to their leaders and their gods afraid of their identity and their foundations, looking at the world and its variables pessimistically and with hostility or they drowned in their cultural narcissism which adorns their view of themselves as the best nation whereas they have come to be at the end of the convoy [of progress]" (Harb *et al.* 2000). Opposing this model is the "European civilized model" which moves towards present progress and knowledge, which are outside the discourse of the true Arab reality that the Arabs experience. It seems that the crisis in Modern Arab Islamic thought lies in an attempt "to restore" the lost state as this thought expended decades in attempting to restore the caliphate in its old form. At the same time.

The nationalist movements were replacing the sacred caliphate thought with the western principle of "sovereignty of the nation" (Al-Sayid *et al.* 2000) which in turn formed the starting point for the beginning of an ideological conflict between two legislations that were completely different.

The main renaissance issue for Arabs put forward by al-Jabri is that "the other side of general renaissance discourse does not exercise politics as a discourse in existing reality but rather as a discourse that searches for another reality. However, at the same time it supersedes existing reality in order to present the extolled Arab Islamic reality as an alternative whereas present European reality is in its liberal or even post-liberal phase." (Al-Jabri *et al.* 1983) The real dilemma of the crisis of Arab political thought discourse centres on the process of the complete separation between individuals in the community, the collective consciousness of the people and the political power in the state. This separation allowed the clergy and the caliphs to monopolise political influence and exclude

the public from political interaction and decision and rule making. This exclusion is rooted in the past political structure therefore; political discourse is a taboo subject that leads its adherent into an abyss if he tries to evade the discourse's boundaries that serve the authority. Thus, history is not devoid of the tombstones of the victims who confronted the authority such as Abd al Hamid al Katib, Ibn al Muqaffa' and Ibn Rushd.

Nevertheless, the discussion about Arabs owning an effective political theory in governance and politics, and one that is clear historically remains widely controversial despite conflicting views surrounding its manner of being. This is especially because the Greek books and those of Aristotle were translated into Arabic except the translation of 'political' books from Greek heritage which were overlooked (Badawi et al. 1940).

It is logical that we find them ignoring this area of knowledge and this is due to the religious caliphate theory and preserving the caliphate authority. Consequently, they added the Islamic characteristic to their intellectual political structure. The Arabs resorted to the idea of an Islamic caliphate, which in fact was based on a political practice that introduced its religious harbingers in the manner of a "religious Imamate" (Ali 1952) – not Ibn Khaldun's utopian caliphate that is unattainable except by divine power (Laroui 1983). Thus, it was based on conflict and tribal influence and its political substrata became apparent in the battle 'Tahkim Safeen'. It neglected the legislative and essential content of Islam, which was present in the community of Medina during the era of the prophet and soon gave it political and financial power. In addition, as Ibn Khaldun observed (Ibn Khaldun 1999), this former kind of caliphate was able to topple the Persian rule and resist the Romans. Thus, the discourse of Arab political thought in this phase is characterised by ambiguity of the objectives as a result of 'religious politicisation' operations in which religion was burdened with an excessive amount of news.

In addition, the recording and writing stage was delayed until the second century "Hijri calendar". The delay of writing which gave the divine mind an opportunity to penetrate through and play with it (Arkoon 2009) "although it kept a portion of its content" (Laroui 1983) during the first Rashidiyya caliphate. "Therefore, the rule that the Arabs knew was that of a standard reign coupled with politics and after a very short period of time, it was named the caliphate rule." (Ibid 1996)

The Islamic caliphate theory was considered tantamount to an exclusion of the relationship between the authority and the eligibility of individuals and even popular minorities due to its political interactions which" production of Arab mind Alarzhoxi"(Arkoon 2009).

The Quranic text certainly confirms this religious executive principle (Abed Assalam 2008) however; we must not overlook two crucial matters comprehensive of the Qur'anic text in which the discourse comes generally and collectively as well as the social and historical context for legislation. Therefore, what was the need for the existence of a legislative council amongst Muslims during the prophetic era for example, or for living in peace with non-Muslim minorities or the prophet's practice of multiple marriages between the Arab tribes? The political concept, in its primitive and internal appearance, was an organizational concept and was an urging necessity for the individual in society for insuring rights and responsibilities and then accordingly forming social units. However, the caliphate quickly moved away from its perfected essence after the death of the prophet because it transformed into an absolute political leadership emptied of religion and driven by tribalism and superiority. Then, it became a practice of superficial politics that teetered between power, weakness and division. Nevertheless, the Rashidiyya caliphate was exempt from this, as some saw that it remained containing the caliphate's religious essence despite the fact that we see that it included political leadership (Ali 1952). Furthermore, Abdallah Laroui had talked about "a number of Asian and Arab political components that the Islamic state mingled with but failed to comprehend because we do not possess any historical testimonies relating to them". (Laroui 1983)

Moving again historically, secular movements or the secular character of national movements progressed dramatically to blast this full construction by separating religion from life. This separation was closer to the separation process of pragmatism and included the maintena consciousness, ascent to power and political participation in it. Yet, it also involved limiting it in a way that did not yield good Arab political thought. For example, Burhan Ghalioun sees it as "artificial, transferred from the West and fell into the hands of the elite and then transformed into an authority that brought hostility to the nation" (Ghalioun 2003). It seems that most of those who adopted secular thought surpassed an important point in precision, hidden in the source and content of European secular thought, which emerged from Western history's natural transformation and did so of its own accord. The root problem of Arab mentality today lies in Arabic cultural background, which is incapable of welcoming Western modernism and freeing it from the Arab cultural and religious reality. Instead, it remains in a state of shock making it recoil far into the past or is reincarnated within itself. Abdalelah Belkziz describes it "as a defect in knowledge as a result of failing to build an adequate distance between its cognitive implementation in its private European field and between its implementation for building a distinct concept of the state and politics in Arab countries." (Bekziz et al. 2001)

This study know that the emergence of secularism was not a sudden event but was the logical result of bloody religious conflicts that lasted for centuries in Europe and that it was "a procedural and pragmatic solution imposed by the wars' settings during the 16th and 17th centuries" (Abed Assalam 2008). "Thus, the secular trend came out in the form of a theory and philosophical thought and not as a new doctrine alternative to religion. It was

an attempt to prevent the confiscation of religion by the state and prevent monopolising it in order to extract politics from religious exploitation and regulating relations between individuals” (Belkiz 2001). It also includes the elimination of the theocracy of religion and thus attains the true practise of democracy or a democratic regime which contains the essence of political participation.

Secularism emerged from the heart of rationality and experimental science based on trial and error together with knowledge and this is what has become the dominant direction in our world today as well as a historically mutant and natural trend. Nevertheless, it is the way to understand religion, the logic of worship and the search for God away from instinctive accepted beliefs. However, Arab secularism blundered in the opinion of Burhan Ghalioun because of the ambiguity of the concept and confusion of its essence with reality. For this reason, he suggests replacing it with the term “democracy” because this achieves equality, as secularism can be synonymous to dictatorship (Ghalioun 2003).

This is a normal matter according to idle Islamic thought, which represents the populist rule for Arabs “despite the fact that our societies and states are secular and our thought is secular. Secularism is not a slogan but a historic trend, a set of influences and an ideology that is compatible with progress and social transformations on the global level.” (al-‘Azma 1992) Although the manifestations of Islamic civilization era were consider secular in the historical context at that time. As secularization hidden. (Jmaiel 1997)

The discussion of democracy brings us back to the fact that it grew in the heart of secularism. This study cannot deal with this troublesome term except through the aforementioned theory of replacement or through the theory of dismantlement and integration adopted by Abdalelah Belkiz. “In the concept of democracy lies the greatest possibility for once again dismantling secularism positively and for integrating it theoretically, close and corresponding to its actual physical place with regards to political relations and conflicts.”(Belkiz 2001)

This is study believe that the thesis of replacement, the dismantlement of liberal thought today or the temporal assay posed by Islamists, between the principle of Shura and democracy, are solutions and outlets that are incapable of constructing and transforming because they are interior theses, which grew in their historical context and outside the facts of our reality. This was the outcome of social conditions that cannot be measured without attaining a balance between the present and liberalisation from cultural and religious heritage. This requires thorough mental, reformist, and educational liberalisation before moving towards an open-minded bourgeois movement.

The idea of democracy is sincerity and the mechanism of secularism’s essence. The difference is that democracy is capable of heading towards practising actual politics for any existing society: for minorities, the majority and for rule. It is also a form of partial instability between religion and the state and does not eliminate the legitimisation of religion but places it in a dynamic, which should be measured using the current social and historical context, and not by comparing it to historical legitimisation and the standard Arab mentality. Arab mentality refuses to see the present historical reality and it continues to compare the present with the past. This matter obscures Islam from politics, disrupts its interaction with it, and rules out interpretive readings of the Quran. It also prohibits the unrestricted religious mind, which was replaced by the theory of analogy and delusional discretion, and seeing the future via the past. This mentality also seeks to return matters as they were originally concerning the Fiqh structure in all areas of life (Al-‘Azma 1992). This is recognise the comprehensiveness of rules and principles in religion however, we are incapable of understanding the demands needed in order to change these rules presently. This is because we still read our discourse as if it were canonized and we do not connect with our religious side in any way and we fail to go beyond the fundamentalist mind to the critical mind. The idea of having a head to the Islamic state who enjoys religious leadership whether executive or political is itself the first principle of politics’ natural and innate principles that the human being is bound to. The partial separation of religion from the state provides the opportunity for practising politics and a democracy that is right for individuals and for minorities. However, the remaining issue is how to deal with modernist outputs, issued by the West to the world. We are forced to know and test them within our historical reality. This study cannot surpass them or surpass the issue of creating an Arab methodology that appoints a specific mechanism able to comprehend the realities of this age in order to accommodate itself with them and one that surpasses western theories. This dilemma is due to being incapable of producing knowledge or a unique Arab theory that is based on the cultural, historical, traditional and present backgrounds altogether and that does not bring theoretical alternatives that continue to ascertain its failure.

The Discourse of Revolution

Arabic history contains a number of revolutionary cases and the revolutions were distinguished by being internal that it is to say under the state rule. There were also effective external revolutions that reached the ruling power and that began the process of natural destruction in order to arrange a new political system in preparation for radicalism – such as the Abbasid revolution over the Umayyads and what followed of political revolutions. However, the Umayyad rule had the lion’s share in internal revolutions historically due to opposing movements (Al Khawarij, companions of the camel and Shiites) and tribal conflicts which saw their right to rule against the

Umayyad's attempt to change the course of Islamic rule drastically for the first time and change centralization and likewise the political power that they owned. It is very noticeable that the term 'revolution' was not associated with these political movements despite its containment of the revolutionary concept and only possessed literal expositions in language dictionaries where it meant rampage. (Manzur 1993) In addition, its contextual significance remained to mean 'elapse, strife or movement' (Attabari 1988). As for in the West, Hannah Arendt indicates that the linguistic root of the term 'revolution' refers back to the elliptical image of planetary orbit then it was used as a counteractive metaphor for expressing human fate and acquired a biological image to become the base of radical social theories for the spirit of the modern age in the French revolution (Arendt 2008).

In this new period, the term 'revolution' is novel in its 'coup' meaning as it remained a term forbidden to use with a radical or political meaning historically because it was employed to express opposition movements, internal strife or departing from the dominant political regime (the caliphate). These employments have their historical justifications in view of the political and historical context that they experienced. We find that historians recognised this issue and employed it to serve their authority and existing regime. Therefore, the discussion is about a revolution theory that feeds individuals' revolutionary awareness and forms a political threat to the caliphate by creating revolutionary models and movements, which carry an impendent danger mentally due to the connotations of the term and realistically due to the actions and conduct of the revolution itself. Meanwhile, its existence remains in the context or in 'strife' against compliance with the caliphate and rulers and an objective that strengthens the pillars of rule and legitimizes the need for its continuance. On the other hand, it is possible to say that the radical concept of the revolution that is common today was associated with the modern state and the modern historical context for humane political awareness that is based on individual freedom, and which has not appeared outside of its modern content. In that, the term 'revolution' was based on the radical meaning, which was considered the tool of scientific development and necessary for humankind subject to the principle of freedom and human equality or mass explosions expressing the psychology of the masses or an urgent economic necessity for the bourgeois or the proletariat class (Al-Kayali 1979).

The revolution term attained maturity and took on a liberal meaning at the end of the Ottoman rule. Its meaning began to change with the emergence of western reformist thought, and it became associated with the Arab revolution against the Turks after a long period of political, religious and ideological reformist processes by reformists and thinkers, led by al-Kawakibi, who concentrated political thought into getting rid of 'tyranny'. Belkziz saw that the path pursued by the reformist generation before the great Arab revolution attempted to "reconcile modern political concepts with the legitimate political system that opposed the mechanism of modernity (democracy and Shura consultation)" (Belkziz 2001). However, reformist and revolutionist thought quickly ended after the Arab fall and the penetration of imperialism. Thus, the term 'revolution' entered a new phase that founded liberal thought, the meaning of freedom and getting rid of European imperialism to achieve national independence. Nevertheless, it remained a temporary idea that did not transcend the limits of place, time and individuality specific to each state as well as military liberation from the mandate or from custodianship. The revolution was unable to confront Zionism, the separation of states and parties, the growth of tyrannical thought, original political Islamic thought and nationalist thought thus; it was very far from democracy.

This study cannot overlook mentioning the military coups that were able to achieve rule thanks to nationalist movements and which broadcasted their political and ideological principles regarding the military aspect of the state describing it as the quickest way to grasp authority. There is an obvious difference between this kind of revolution and the concept of a revolution described as "a large popular movement against the existing constitution and which has the goal of changing the existing system of rule in the state" (Bishara 2012). The latter does not involve partial change domineered by the elite and military leaders where revolutionist thought comes to a standstill and languishes for many decades under totalitarian movements ending with a revolutionist model case that causes changes from the inside. It was interpreted as being the true Arab model for making political decisions led by individuals and the masses and not by the elite from the military. Thus, the revolutionist infection spread quickly and surprisingly in a number of states as well as the revolution of the hungry and the oppressed throughout the years of deprivation, poverty and unemployment. Thus, the voice of reformism got louder and demanded the existence of multiple parties as well as space for democratic freedom and combatting corruption, which shook the trees decades ago. "It also succeeded in drawing up a reformist path which differed in effectiveness in Jordan, Algeria, Morocco and Bahrain" (Mossadek 2012) and was named an Arab spring following in the footsteps of the European spring although the latter did not consist of conflict.

As a result, it becomes apparent that the term 'revolution' in its historical context is a political term invented in the West meaning a radical coup led by large groups from all social classes and thus is what determines its system and democratic laws. The reason behind this is that Arab political thought is based on the singularity of authority, the isolation of individuals, ruling out the community and the religious and historical employment of politics, which blots out the western concept. In addition, the existence of models and examples for a collective revolutionist experience that creates its own laws is lacking.

The current discourse describes the revolutions as an ardent Arab spring. This study do not refute the

revolutionist nature of the term ‘revolution’ and its popularity which aroused the peoples’ willingness to get rid of oppressive regimes that bequeathed tyranny and bore it for more than fifty decades. As a result, the revolution discourse came strongly and violently to the people and thus they entered the first stage: turning unitedly towards a declared goal. This goal was expressed by the term ‘coup’, which sprang from the nation’s ignorance, led them to the public squares after accumulated years of idleness and awoke with intense violence and contestation. The second stage followed and was undoubtedly more dangerous because it exposed the shallowness and superficiality of political awareness in Arab societies, which never acquired any political role nor ever interacted with the political regime. Thus, political will has been a unipolar individual will monopolised by the family of the ruling regime or ruling political party and the concept of having a multi-party political system is almost ineffective.

The ‘post-coup’ stage came quickly and successively secreting weakness, disintegration and chaos and it did not only topple the political regimes but the nations too where they faced political and sectarian impediments. It is clear that overcoming this stage will take ample time. The gap between the Arab individual’s relationship with authority and the absence of the concept of democracy and social equality for minorities and the majority caused the states’ political interests to tip the balance during the Arab spring in some countries. It also transferred power and scattered it between individuals to produce extremist groups, opposition groups to the previous regime and groups in support of the regime. This is not to mention media discourse, which came as an objective equaliser in this stage and where the televised image lost its credibility, and truth was undoubtedly one of the first victims of the Arab spring.

Perhaps what made the Arab spring revolutions a contentious and sleepless issue for readers of modern history in the beginning from their outward panoramic view was the fact that they gained distinct revolutionist characteristics – the details will be later discussed- which excluded them from the “models represented by Lenin, Mao Tse-tung or Guevara and were poles apart from Khomeini’s model or national liberation movements or nationalist coups in the Arab world caused by military elites based on the concepts of unity, freedom, socialism and justice.” (Harb 2001) These characteristics also placed them in front of a cross roads, making some consider the spring as a turning point in the history of world revolutions. This approach, which announced its full support for the revolution “considered the change, no matter how remote its positiveness, preferable to the current situation and its gloom” (Hroub 2012). Others considered it a new stage closer to “producing a political opportunity than a revolution as a result of systematic difficulties when receiving modernism”(Dedde 2012) in the Arab community or the problem was due to an Arab mental deficiency in possessing political awareness for the process of reconstruction after dismantlement.

Ali Mubarak attempted to create foundational discourse for the revolution starting from the question of tyranny that dominates classical Arab awareness which reached a state of idleness three centuries ago before it was overcome in its external reality. It is therefore a process of freeing the mind from tyranny before uprooting it from reality and this, in Mubarak’s opinion, will lead to freeing the reality that eventually dissolves into an intellect. It is not just superficial practice of the structure of meaning and what it means is that identity is the essence of the relationship between intellect and reality.”(Mubarak 2012)

Meanwhile, others viewed the revolutions with suspicion and doubt considering them as starting the division of the Arab world into statelets and princedoms that were subject to sectarian or doctrinal rule. The origin of this division was the implementation of the theory of ‘chaos creation’ which Mohamed Al Rumaihi explains was “a term created by the new conservatives” (Al-Minawi 2012) to define the changes in the Middle East. It meant that these communities were politically idle and that in order to activate them, chaotic and troublesome events were necessary for change to happen. This is what Condoleezza Rice stated saying, “that the chaos created by the process of democratic transformation initially is a created chaos and may make the situation preferable to the one currently experienced by the region.”(Al-Minawi 2012) This situation is the one described by political and demographic change and began with the invasion of Iraq. On the other hand, some people rejected these revolutions and clung onto the principle of stability and nonviolent security - which a number of countries lost due to their revolutions being caught in the trap of internal fighting and failure. Thus, they favoured peace and gradual reform instead of the concept of a radical revolution “as it saves the groups from a large expense they would have to pay in the midst of a revolution’s outbreak since when a revolution explodes due to real reasons, its shrapnel reaches all areas of the communities’ lives and shakes what took many years to stabilize.”(Hroub 2012)

The Youths’ Revolution

Most of modern literature addressed this characteristic considering it a joint part of the revolutionist construct as it was the generation of young civilised revolutionists who held up the revolution flags and who gathered the people in the public squares and surrounded them in their thousands. “Speech was the first thing that harmed the revolutionists who used it; the meanings in the slogans they raised expressed their intentions such as in, ‘The people want to topple the regime’” (Dedde 2012). It is “the general rule that participates in determining fate and in political decision-making and transforms freedom into a cause and a practice” (Bishara 2012). They went out to the streets and squares to free themselves from the unemployment that crushed their humanity and to eradicate

corruption and bribery asking for bread, freedom and justice. They made up the largest section of society and were the most realistic, not an Aristotelian ruling for the elite nor were they biased toward a particular party nor any nationalist, socialist or Islamic ideological movement and they only had in mind freedom and equality for all. This objective that the revolutions were created for, toppled the elitist, superficial regimes as well as the category of intelligent cultured people who monopolized the space for the revolutionist concept and were incapable of changing it because they held an elitist concept worlds apart from general public awareness. Thus, although initially the idea of unity was individual and biased towards the class of thinkers and philosophers it became a collective idea we experience in reality. “The youthful zeal that toppled the regime in Tunisia and Egypt was successful in encouraging large popular groups to unite against the ruling class in order to merge the angry public expressing their discontent and the young people that sought engagement in the productive sphere as well as the bourgeois who continued complaining about their marginalisation from national economy” (Mossadek 2012). Meanwhile, some saw that these revolutions refuted “the perverse accusations blaming young people for being a careless failing the youths possess a profound awareness and they are prepared to undertake the maximum sacrifice in order to improve their situation and to confront what they see as oppression and injustice.”(Hroub 2012)

The Digital Revolution

The globalisation of communication, digital progression and the dominance of the visual image online and in television in the twenty-first century created communication between countries and continents and a radical transformation of how to manage the facts concerning the revolutionist reality. It evoked a process of change and a toppling of the political regimes, which came as a sudden shock to the nations. These changes eliminated the traditional frameworks for the revolution concept and created instead an electronic space that traversed countries and continents transferring news and slogans and uniting the words of the revolutionists in a few moments. It proved its strength and presence after its invasion of the state’s intelligence and security apparatus. The exchange of information in the demonstrations was tantamount to an open forum between free groups previously banned from congregation in the public arena. It also contributed to the acclimatization of the young demonstrators to the developments taking place in the squares and to developing counter strategies to the security’s movements, causing disturbance”. (Mossadek 2012) However, some theorists saw the situation as intentional deceit and so, the truth was the first victim of these revolutions and this contributed to “creating all kinds of ambiguities that present inaccurate facts and a lack of clarity in statements.” (Dedde 2012) It came to serve the thesis of creative chaos, which was created by the American mentality. The idea of media politicization emerged to serve revolutionary interests for a number of different views. Therefore, instead of uniting the revolution’s words, it became the main agent in concealing and dissipating the facts and so the revolution fell into hidden hands – the most prominent of these being the visual and the digital media.

The Suddenness Of The Revolutions And Their Speed

The timing and suddenness of the revolutions, which completely shocked the Arab world. They also questioned whether these revolutions were sudden like the hunger revolution in France, which transferred the people’s spring to Europe after they reached breaking point or whether they were accumulated revolutions known to man through the movement of sociology’s natural cycle that depends on Ibn Khaldun’s principle of political and civilised construction and destruction. It may be linked to an overlap with the war “so it gradually become a revolution to a point that is similar to the American revolution preceded by the liberation war” (Arendt 2008) or with a military coup operation that ends with the revolution concept or it consists of disordered random revolutions which aim only at spreading destructive chaos and are an antithesis of the regime and of organised change. In his book about the revolution and the aptitude for revolutions, the doctor Azmi Bishara infers “that modern revolutions are not about successive changes in governance according to a repeated cycle to emphasize the suddenness of the revolution term which always includes a non-gradual turning point that terminates what preceded it.

This is because quantitative accumulation leads to noticeable change via a mutation, which is equivalent to the revolution in society” (Bishara 2012). And the Doctor Hatamilah sees that the revolution “is not a random event because it is not born in the moment of its execution or during the attempt of execution but is dormant in the layers of suffering collective awareness until it surfaces and is activated due to specific circumstances and timings” (Hatamilah 2012). Issam Naaman uses the Machiavellian concept in his speech about the theory of ‘Creative chaos and creative destruction’ which was considered one of the most prominent modern political theories. It is linked to the Arab revolutions where it leads to the creation of a new system or new plans and ambitions, which lead in the end to destructive chaos. According to Joseph Schumpeter who says in his book, ‘Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy’ that “subversive competition is also destructive and contributed to creating a revolution within the economic structure through constant demolition of old elements and the constant creation of new elements (Nu’amaan 2012)”. “Because creative chaos is founded theoretically on the duality of dismantlement and construction, this means that strategic American thought, in its current form, is no longer right except in a world where chaos is used to restructure it as per America’s mission in building the New World.”(Al-Minawi 2012)

Sharnksy was of the most prominent in fuelling support for the concept of creative chaos in the Middle East.

Varying Revolution Results

Hannah Arendt notes that the people's words were the key words to understanding the revolution as those who witnessed calamities chose them (Arendt 2008). Therefore, the discourse of the people takes us to talking about the curse upon them which was poverty and that pushed "the crowds into the public arena from being secluded in their homes of deprivation" (Bishara 2012) as occurred in the French revolution. It also leads us to talking about those who were capable of enduring suffering amongst the huge poverty-stricken class who led the revolution because they were its fuel. According to Aristotle, these people were also the fuel of tyrants and dictators who gained power in order to mobilize the poor against the rich and usually, tyrants address peoples' emotions in the name of equality. However, equality in this case as if they were the ruled and not the rulers in order to reap the benefit themselves (Arendt 2008). Therefore, Aristotle saw that this gain was "useful to an individual or a group of people and was the decision-maker in political affairs". (Arendt 2008) In both these cases, the people alone are the fuel of the revolution.

It is beyond doubt that the masses of poor and deprived Arabs especially the young generation with collective awareness went out and revolted to seek for happiness and freedom in the squares of change in the name of peace, avoiding blood or violence such as in the carnation revolution, the white revolution and the jasmine revolution (Hatamleh 2012). However, undesired change principles announcing freedom and democracy through the slogan of will and change of the present, 'The people want to overthrow the regime'. Thus, the revolution was a sociological act unlike the concept of a coup confined to elite military individuals in the state. However, the outcomes varied consisting of rapid revolutionary response, blood and killing and ended with fighting and sectarian quota.

Every political case differed in nature from the next. This was due to the different composition of each society and this is what geared the revolution for success or for its downfall into sectarian rule or into a fierce civil war. The Tunisians were able to present a revolutionary model that shocked the Arab world when they gathered and revolted to say their last and final words, and after the fixed success of the jasmine revolution. This model was transferred to Egypt and it succeeded in turning the political scales when the army embraced the words of the revolutionists. Even before the revolution, "those who opposed the idea of Mubarak's offspring inheriting the position of head of the republic believed that the army would not accept it and this became manifest when the army was disobedient in the case of killing protestors" (Bishara 2012). Structure of Egyptian revolution is based on two conflicting levels of thought. These include religious politicised thought which believes in the authority of religion and the fundamentalism of politics in order to be "a dynamic extension of the Eastern Salafi reformation in its confrontation with the perfectionist secular model and the attempt to confine its effects and expansion to the Islamic world" (Faisal 2000). This is represented by the Muslim Brotherhood, and nationalist thought denies the fundamental content of religion and its link with politics and so refuses to build any conciliative relationship with the authority. Therefore, it is devoid of the practical religious content that is linked to the political system. Discussing religion is merely a spiritual matter (secularism). As for Libya, we were faced with the worst case as Libya sat under the reign of an eccentric political personality that was enamoured of the principles of the green book, the third universal theory and systems of backwardness "which took the country back to the times before the industrial revolution" (Harb 2011). Although it is one of the world's greatest sources of oil, the beginning of the revolution in Libya was accompanied by violence, threat and blood and ended with the revolution's termination due to the disjointed and deranged structure of society and the loss of collective consciousness during the transfer to the construction stage after destruction.

The thinker Azmi Bishara excelled in diagnosing the Libyan case in saying, "the Libyan nation wants the recoupment of the regime not its overthrow because there is no longer a regime after the advent of Gaddafi, thus the rule cannot be described as republican, nor monarchical, nor revolutionary, nor backward, nor primitive, nor tribal." (Harb 2011)

In Yemen, the tribal system and reign triggered the revolution's termination. It led to the outbreak of conflicts and internal congestion, which caused Yemen to enter a civil and regional war. As for Syria, the conflict was more severe and deadlier on the Syrians themselves, caused killing, and the displacement of millions into neighbouring countries. Therefore, it seems that the Syrian situation is beyond the regime's control and its refusal to give up rule and aggression. Syria also faces the stubbornness and breakup of the opposition that has led to it becoming a space for terrorism and extremism and finds itself between the taking sides of some states with the regime considering that, "the steadfastness of Assad and his persistence changed the rules of the American political game in the new Middle East (Al-Minawi 2012) where several of the Gulf states experience downfall as a result of support given to those demanding freedom and so are replaced by constitutional kingdoms and republican regimes. In this equation, Russia, China and Iran will be the main drivers of these revolutions' success. This then 'will lead Syria to the unknown and to an earthquake that would burn the whole region'" as said in Assad's words according to the British Telegraph (Nu`aman 2012).

Therefore, we face varying revolution outcomes where the success of some and the failure of others assigned the composition of the private community in each state. However, the issue of a lack of Arab political theory and collective awareness for revolutionary practice remains and the clarity of its direction and purpose lingers in the backbone of the outcomes. This study add to this the decline of the transitional phase for each state where the new authority in rule after the revolution remained on a par with the authority that preceded it “and wasn’t comprised of governments that had created the revolution but rather of a combination of governments comprising of the opposition force with influence from the previous regime” (Belkiziz 2012) and even worse as we see in the Egyptian scenario today. The young generation that took to the squares and offered itself as a martyr to the revolution was a motor that the parties and opposition benefited from and that former regimes toyed with to gear towards a specific direction using the digital image initially before abandoning it altogether.

Undoubtedly, Montesquieu’s principles concerned distributing power and property and about the power of the human mind, which made it an associate and a subject of the world we live in. This is because man-made laws were derived from it and organised human nature. Likewise, it was the tool that put an end to tyranny. “Human nature continuously retaliates against the oppressive government however; most nations are obedient to it, despite peoples’ love for freedom and their hatred for tyranny. The existence of a just government requires the arrangement, organisation and amendment of powers as well as enabling them to function and this is considered one of the wonders of law-making.” (Montesquieu 2010)

On the other hand, Rousseau layed down a legal constitution for the principles of sovereignty and freedom in his theory ‘The State of Nature’ in the ‘The Social Contract’ which attracted the general public and formulated an example of an organised and model government. It also contributed to changing the concepts concerning the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. Thus, the democratic concept that Rousseau formulated for the right of the people and in their full will subjects them to the responsibility for the choice of public goals and interests, which are occupied by the elite, and choosing the ruler according to the state of nature and human’s proper instinct. “The nation that never abuses the right to rule, also does not abuse the right of independence and the nation that always rules righteously, will not need to be ruled.”(Qarqout 1972)

Revolutionary change means a change in the depth of thought and reformation and not the sovereignty of political Islam, "Because Islam is Islam"(Al-Sayid 2000). Revolution is the power of nations and all the communities, not civil wars. Unfortunately, this is the falsity of the Arab spring.

Conclusion

This study concludes the failure of what has become known as the Great Arab revolutions. It was not something new for the Arab nations but was the cumulative failure of the Arab political theory in full, even before application and the result of a historical closure. In fact, Arabs have never known the revolutionary concept throughout their history nor have they practised it since any sociological, revolutionary act was considered a deviation from the Caliphate system and from the leader’s authority and was completely suppressed. The revolutionary concepts in the modern age have not been capable of realising any democratic achievements for the Arab nations. They were a cumulative series of corruption, defeat and severe weakness in the ideological and social composition in the Arab world. Despite this, some Arab countries attempt to maintain a state of partial stability after their revolutions. On the other hand, we find the scene becoming more autocratic politically and suffering economically.

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