

The Crucial Role of IGAD in the Horn of Africa

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Abstract

By and large, regional organizations are conduits for facilitating regional response for common problems. In Africa there are many regional organizations and despite the proliferation of such organization, the significant question one could raise is what roles do regional organizations have in Africa? As a way of addressing this dilemma, this paper attempts to examine the pronounced roles of IGAD from four perspectives using secondary sources of data. The paper underlined that IGAD has playing crucial roles in ensuring security, as a multiplier of global agenda, legitimacy provider and instruments of regional resistance in the Horn of Africa.

Keywords: Horn of Africa, conflicts, security, global agenda, regional resistance

Introduction

The political geography of the Horn of Africa region comprises of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Southern Sudan and Uganda. One typical feature that distinguishes the Horn of Africa from other sub regions of the continent is its security stakes and challenges. The region has a reputation as one of the most conflict-affected areas in the world (Kessels, Durner and Schwartz, 2016). This region has been termed as one of Africa's hotspots sub region and over the last four decades, this area has been wracked by major conflicts in Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. Within the past 30 years, the region has 'witnessed wars between states, secessionist movements, intra-state violent conflicts, foreign interventions, terrorist attacks and piracy, as well as violence after contested elections' (Witt, 2014: 1). The region characterized by 'the prevalence and longevity of its multiple conflicts. It has been the scene of two of Africa's longest wars, the thirty year liberation struggle in Eritrea and the equally protracted war between North and South Sudan' (Healy, 2014: 217). Moreover, the region still exhibited a host of 'unresolved issues-boundary demarcation, citizenship, trade and resource sharing have ensured that political tensions and episodes of violent conflict continue to characterize relations between the former adversaries after separation' (ibid.). Horn of Africa is markedly different from the other regions of Africa because of 'the level of conflict and rivalries between and within the states' (Allehone, 2008: 17).

Despite the tragedies mentioned above, the region 'has not been paralyzed by the multiplicity of problems and challenges facing the sub-region. Out of these difficult problems, the region has developed mechanisms to respond to humanitarian emergencies and regional peace and security issues' (Francis, 2005: 215). There was an emerging ambition among members of this sub region to set up regional organization 'in order to develop joint approaches to dealing with common problems, especially those related to lifethreatening drought in the region, and the attendant threat posed by encroaching desertification' (Mwagiru, 1997: 9). In this regard, the six members of the sub region Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda made an agreement in 1986 to establish what became known as the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD). At first, the formation of IGADD 'owed much to the international community and especially the response to the famine that swept across the region in the earlier years of that decade' (Woodward, 2013: 141). During this period, the 'region's international relations were largely divided by the Cold War, with Ethiopia firmly in the grip of a Marxist Leninist regime closely supported by the USSR, while neighboring Sudan and Somalia were backed by the United States' (ibid.). In light of this division, the founding members' states designed regional organization with 'non-political' objective to tackle explicitly the challenges of environment and other measures to address drought and its consequences (ibid.).

The driver for the institutional transformation of IGADD was due to the changes in the geopolitics of the region, in particular the end of superpower patronage exposed countries in the region to greater security risks (Kathina, 2003). On the part of the member states of the sub region, explicitly 'there was a gradual realization that it would be counterproductive to pursue developmental initiatives without addressing the issue of conflict in the subregion' (Murithi, 2009: 138-139). As insecurity in the region continued to spread and intensify, the newly changed leadership in nearly all the countries signed an agreement expanding the mandate of IGADD to include peace and security. This was realized in March 1996 by revitalizing IGADD. Its name was changed from IGADD to IGAD (the Intergovernmental Authority on Development) by declaring its top priorities are conflict prevention and resolution concerns (Jacobsen and Nordby, 2013). This marked the development of security regionalism in the Horn of Africa. Security regionalism, as one of the most discussed themes of international relations, the regional relations among member states of this sub region was first centered on the emergence of IGAD (Woodward, 2013). This is line with the post-Cold War reality of international politics where regional organizations and agencies have emerged as key actors in the maintenance of international peace and security (Francis, 2005). In connection to this, the main focus of this essay to addresses the Horn of Africa international

relations from the point of view of IGAD's roles in the region.

This article proceeds into four sections. The first section ventures to explain the root causes of conflict in the Horn of Africa and how the region could be characterized as 'conflict complex'. The second section attempts to evaluate the performance of IGAD focusing on four crucial areas of its engagement. It starts with the assessment of IGAD's track record in ensuring security in the region. Then, it goes to appraise the role of IGAD on three typical issues: as a multiplier of western global agendas, in providing legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action, and instrument of regional resistance. The third section gives suggestion how to improve the ability of IGAD to manage regional security in the Horn of Africa. The last section provides conclusion.

The root cause of conflict in the Horn of Africa in the context of 'conflict complex'

This section turns to the question of why the Horn of Africa region is so peculiarly violent and how the region could be characterized as a 'conflict complex' system. The Horn of Africa has experienced more inter-state wars than any other region in the world (Berouk, 2011). As Mengisteab (2011: 10) argues, a quick glance at regional conflict statistics illustrate that this region has registered 'four major inter-state wars and at least three violent conflicts in the post-independence era. The major wars were fought primarily but not exclusively over territorial and border disputes. Contextual factors have played a major role in inter-state wars, since the boundaries of the countries of the region were established by pre-colonial empires'. Regrettably, for a scholar of war, the Horn of Africa depicts a laboratory of conflicts (De Waal, 2015). Overall, the region has manifested 'interstate wars and civil wars; conventional wars fought in trenches with air-to-air combat overhead and irregular wars fought by jihadists and followers of a messianic cult; international military interventions and maritime piracy; genocides massacres and non-violent popular uprisings' (De Waal, 2015: 46). Until recently, it had exhibited 'three major territorial wars and three secessions. There are no pure internal wars: the neighborings are entangled in all' (ibid.).

Before identify the root cause of conflict in the Horn of Africa, it is relevant to address first the issue of 'conflict system' whereby most of the conflicts in the region are imbedded in. The notion of 'conflict system' refers to the idea that 'every conflict has intimate relationships regionally, and what might at first appear as individualized conflicts in fact are parts of wider pattern of conflict regionally' (Mwagiru, 1997: 3). The notion of conflict system 'rejects the idea that conflicts do not have transborder realities, and instead perceives individual conflicts as an integral part of a wider conflict system' (ibid.). In connection to this, the concept of a regional 'security complex' developed by Barry Buzan is also an important 'theoretical anchor for discussion of the breakdown of regional security in the Horn of Africa' (Healy, 2014: 217). According to Buzan (1991: 190), security complex assign to 'a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another'. What is emphasis here is that 'security complexes often exhibit interdependence of rivalry as well as that of shared interests' (Francis, 2005: 103). The crux of the matter in security complexes region is that 'geographical proximity and interactions amongst states in a specific geographical area inevitably bind the states and peoples together into a common security threat, and produce distinct threat perceptions to security and feelings of vulnerability' (ibid.). Horn of Africa region manifests security complexes that are 'held together not by the positive influences of shared interest, but by shared rivalries. The dynamics of security contained within these levels operate across a broad spectrum of sectors - military, political, economic, societal and environmental' (Sheehan, 2005: 49-50).

So how the Horn of Africa could be characterized as a conflict complex system? This conflict complex system of the region could be understood from the logic of subversion and alliances practices of the member states of the region. As logic of subversion, the states of the region 'took advantage of every local tension or conflict to support rebel movements in neighboring states' (Berouk, 2011: 16). As indicated by Cliffe (1999: 89) the 'opponents of existing regimes all receive some support from governmental or other forces in other countries of the region. This pattern represents a resumption of the 'mutual interference' that has been prevalent in the Horn for most of the past 30 years'. As powerful tradition of mutual intervention by the use of proxies, 'the states of the region all act as enablers and multipliers of conflict to the detriment of their neighbors' (Healy, 2008: 39). Thus, supporting 'subversive activities had simply become a customary tool poised to destabilize and endanger the security of another state, in what some observers called the time-honored principle of 'my enemy's enemy is my friend' extending throughout the Horn of Africa' (Berouk, 2011: 16).

Driven by logic of alliance creation in the region that range from formal military alliances between leaders or regimes to state, countries in the region 'support for rebel movements in neighboring states and further afield, or even alliances between rebels movements' (Berouk, 2011: 17). There are two illustrative examples of alliance creation that fueled conflicts in the region. The first is the Ethiopia and Somali conflicts during the Cold War period on opposing sides of the two super powers of the period. The second is the associated to 'the mid-1990s Sudan was characterized as a state sponsor of terrorism, and Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda had a common policy to contain and confront it with US support' (Healy, 2008: 39). Thus, the conflicts in the region 'must therefore be seen in terms of their reality as part of wider conflict systems. In this respect, the countries of the

region...relate together through shared conflicts even more than through shared borders' (Mwagiru, 1997: 3).

The root causes of conflicts in the Horn of Africa can be generalized as a result of state fragility, poor and unaccountable governance and the challenges of poverty, the colonial legacy, political and economic problems, lack of access to shared resources and environmental degradation, mutual intervention and political alliances, external powers interventions (Berouk, 2011, Cliffe, 1999, Healy, 2008, 2014). As a result of these underlying factors, 'many conflicts in the Horn challenged the basis of statehood. This applied to the dynamics of Ethiopia and Eritrea, North and South Sudan and Somalia and Somaliland. The implicit (and sometimes explicit) possibilities of new states emerging from conflict meant that essentially domestic conflicts had foreign policy implications' (Healy, 2009: 4). The colonial legacy here refers to the seeds of conflict associated to the misdrawn borders which were agreed upon by the colonial powers and basically ignored ethnic, cultural, historical and religious groups' natural lines as well as the ethno-centrism arising from colonial rule that favored certain ethnic groups (Berouk, 2011). Such legacies triggered conflicts as a result of demands for autonomy from ethnic groups and the territorial claims of regimes of the newly independent states, as well as the chronic injustice that worsening ethnic animosities and antagonisms in most states of the region (ibid.). The underlying political and economic problems of the horn of Africa are related to the nature of state power itself. The state power in the respective countries of the region 'is a key source of conflict: political victory assumes a winner-takes-all form with respect to wealth and resources as well as the prestige and prerogatives of office' (Berouk, 2011: 11-12).

By lack of access to shared resources, it means the situation that inequitable sharing of national resources and lack of representation in the structures of government of the respective states in the region. In this region, large communities have experienced economic marginalization and political exclusion, often mirroring ethnic, religious and racial or clan fault lines lie at the root of many of the internal conflicts (Healy, 2014). The external power intervention in the politics of the Horn also exacerbated local conflicts associated to the strategic location of the region (ibid.). During the Cold War period, the region became a theater where the two super powers staged one of the most destructive rivalries on the continent. At present, the region has emerged a major front in the war on terror that became an essential feature of the international system.

Performance of IGAD in ensuring security

The institutional mission and vision of IGAD 'was to become the premier regional organization for the promotion of peace, prosperity, and integration by assisting and complementing the efforts of member states to achieve through increased cooperation (a) food security and environmental protection, (b) promotion and maintenance of peace, security, and humanitarian affairs, and (c) economic cooperation'(Solomon, 2014a: 4). Out of these entrusted mandates, much of IGAD's most visible work has been in the areas of peace and security architecture. The IGAD treaty notes that a key objective of the organization is the peaceful settlement of inter- and intra-state conflicts through dialogue and maintenance of regional peace and security (Murithi, 2009). Thus, this section assesses the performance of IGAD in ensuring regional security in the Horn of Africa since the mid 1990s. As the introduction section makes clear, peace and security mandate of IGAD emerged in 1996 in the 'context of a broad international consensus that regional organizations should contribute to the management of conflict and the maintenance of international order' (Healy, 2009: 1). In order to assess IGAD's contribution to peace and security in the region, this section focus on the peacemaking role of IGAD in Sudan (1993-2005) and Somalia (2002-2004) thereby it has been actively involved in attempts to resolve the two conflicts. This was because, these two 'major conflicts, those of Sudan and Somalia, have more than any other greatly tested and challenged the initiatives and capacity of IGAD and the ability of its members to act independently' (Omeje, 2008: 83).

An IGAD peacemaking activity in Sudan was pursued in two phases. The first phase covers IGAD's intervention in Sudan through its standing committee on peace. In 1997, IGAD initiated a diplomatic and political offensive to revive the peace talks in Sudan by appointing the then President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya as a Special Envoy to the Sudan peace process. The IGAD peace process under Kenyan leadership brought the warring parties 'into closer dialogue and consolidated the peace process. The IGAD-facilitated peace process created a 'spirit of dialogue' and confidence in the possibility of resolution of the civil war' (Francis, 2005: 228). However, IGAD standing committee facilitated peace processes hardly produce significant gains up until a new balance of power created between the two belligerents. The second phase of IGAD's mediation initiative began in October 1997. Following this, there had been up and downs in the peace process. The IGAD facilitated peace process in Sudan eventually paid off and the parties drafted and signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Nairobi on January 9, 2005, effectively bringing to a close the IGAD peacemaking initiative (Murithi, 2009). Thus, the hosting of the peace process that led to the signing of the CPA between the 'Government of Sudan and the SPLA is among IGAD's significant achievements' (Borchgrevink, and Sande L., 2009: 98). This was because the 'resultant agreement was comprehensive in scope, and its provisions on power-and wealth-sharing are generally acknowledged as being both far-reaching and sound' (ibid.).

IGAD's engagement 'in facilitating the Somali peace process and negotiating a civil war peace settlement

started in 1998. IGAD was disappointed with the lack of progress towards peace and national reconciliation in Somalia, and attributed the problem to the multiplicity of warring factions and warlords not interested in peace and to the opportunity for warlords to benefit from the multiple peace initiatives' (Francis, 2005: 230). In connection to this, 'IGAD summit of March 1998 called for an end to 'the proliferation of competing initiatives' (a reference to Egypt's activities) that served to undermine the peace process in Somalia' (Healy, 2009: 9). However, the 'outbreak of conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea in May 1998 spelt the end of IGAD's consensual approach to Somali reconciliation. Eritrea was soon reported to be arming the Aided faction while Ethiopia stepped up assistance to its own allies in Somalia. The Ethiopia-Eritrea war thus contributed to worsening conflict within Somalia, as the two sides sought out proxy partners' (ibid.). IGAD led the mediation initiatives made a breakthrough in Somali peace process and it produced the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia in 2004. This accord is the milestone in which 'Somali warring factions and civil society signed the Nairobi agreement that would pave the way for the adoption of the Transitional Federal Charter, with a five-year transitional period of government' (Francis, 2005: 231). As far as the peace making role of IGAD in Somalia conflict is concerned, 'even before the fall of the Islamists in Mogadishu in December 2006, IGAD had been at the forefront of efforts to send a mission to stabilize the situation' (Khadiagala, 2008: 11). It also 'proposed a Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM) involving 10,000 troops at a cost of \$500 million in the first year, but the AU approved a smaller force of 8,000 in September 2006, at an estimated cost of \$335 million for the first year' (ibid.).

By looking at IGAD's balance sheet in ensuring security in the Horn of Africa, one can argue that 'IGAD stands out among other African RECs for its proactive peace and security activities' (Healy, 2011: 46) in both Sudan and Somalia peace process. This regional organization is credited with playing an instrumental role in both these countries. This reputation of IGAD 'has been built on its success in achieving two major peace deals, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) for Sudan and the Mbagathi Peace Process for Somalia. The signing of the Sudan and Somali peace agreements in quick succession in late 2004 and early 2005 gave the impression that IGAD was out-performing others in its conflict-resolution role' (ibid.). This was because both 'settlements seemed especially significant in that both addressed long and complex conflicts that had defied previous attempts to secure settlement. While the importance and impact of these settlements should not be denied, IGAD's peace and security activities have only been able to make headway in specific circumstances, usually coinciding with the interests of key member states' (ibid.). From its mandate of maintaining regional peace and security, however, if it 'looked at in the context of the overall regional conflict environment it is clear that IGAD is far from providing an institutional basis for regional security in the Horn of Africa' (Healy, 2009: 11). This was witnessed from other conflicts in the region. IGAD as security architecture 'has been unable to act in a neutral or mediatory capacity. It played no role in trying to resolve the Ethiopia-Eritrea war of 1998-2000 or its aftermath' (Healy, 2011: 46). For instance, IGAD 'has not taken action to resolve several serious conflicts that have erupted in recent years, including in Darfur, the Ogaden, Mogadishu, Kenya and South Sudan' (ibid.).

On top of the above IGAD led peace processes, as the part of its role in reconciliation and peacemaking in the region, this regional organization has also 'worked collaboratively with donors to evolve an early warning system in the region. The Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) was established in January 2000 to serve as the region's mechanism to systematically anticipate and respond to violent conflicts in a timely and efficient manner' (Khadiagala, 2008: 12). As compared to other sub region in the continent, 'IGAD's CEWARN has been recognized as the first comprehensive institutional framework on conflict early warning and response in Africa, drawing on the diverse resources of non state actors' (ibid.).

IGAD role as multiplier of Western global agendas

This section attempts to illustrate IGAD's function as multipliers and conduits of global agendas concerning governance, human rights, democracy, peace and security. IGAD has emerged an important agent in the political relations of the region on issues of regional peace, stability and security. As the foregoing makes clear, the new objective of IGAD incorporated in 1996 was to promote peace and stability in the sub-region and create mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-State conflicts through dialogue. The founding members states of IGAD 'agreed to take 'collective measures' to eliminate threats to regional cooperation, peace and stability, to establish a 'mechanism' for the pacific settlement of disputes and to deal with disputes between member states within this sub-regional mechanism before they were referred to other international organizations' (Healy, 2011: 46). As the institutional mechanism of the organization, 'IGAD Secretariat established a division responsible for peace and security to fulfill the new mandate' (ibid.). As the part of security regionalism in Africa, IGAD's peace and security architecture can be contextualized with reference to the African Union's and United Nation's peace and security architecture.

It was the UN Secretary-General; Boutros Boutros-Ghali articulated the 'Agenda for Peace' in June 1992 as a proactive peacemaking and humanitarian intervention by identifying four major areas of activity of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post conflict peace building. The Agenda for Peace' recommended

by UN is the liberal peace thesis and it is prevalent in most policy documentation associated with peace and security issues (United Nations, 2004). Such a liberal peace approach to conflict ‘refers to political processes of post-conflict reconstruction that put emphasis on human rights, democracy, economic liberalization and the rule of law’ (Omondi, 2014: 94). The primary objective of liberal peace is to ensure ‘a self-sustaining peace within domestic, regional and international settings, in which both overt and structural violence are removed and social, economic and political models conform to international expectations in a globalized, transnational setting’ (Richmond and Franks, 2007: 29). The liberal peace framework also combines democracy, free markets, development and the rule of law (ibid.).

In terms of the maintenance of peace and security in Africa region, AU established the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Out of the three components of APSA, one pillar of APSA is normative values which comprises of human rights, democracy, good governance and related values (Solomon, 2014b). As far as AU liberal peace agenda is concerned, it ‘can be traced back to the 1990 OAU Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World. This declaration marked the onset of a new period in the way the OAU deals with human rights, democracy and peace, and security and development within Africa, a domain that it hitherto considered to be within the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of member states’ (Solomon, 2014b: 52). In doing so, African Union ‘has mainly relied on a liberal peace approach to conflict intervention. There are three main areas in which the AU has directly or indirectly adopted the principles of liberal peace: military interventions, democratization processes, and economic liberalization’ (Omondi, 2014: 97). The adoption of liberal peace agenda by AU is consistent with Chapter VIII of UN, where ‘regional organizations, as intermediaries between the international and the local, are presumed by policy makers and scholars to enforce rules and processes defined at the global level’ (Alden, 2010: 3).

In line with the above normative framework adopted by AU, as regional security architecture, IGAD through its Secretariat also subscribed to the liberal peace agenda for conflict resolution. IGAD is expected to play an active role in implementing the African Union’s peace and security architecture. It has been working to fulfill its peace and security responsibilities entrusted to it by the African Union by embracing the ‘UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, and the responsibility to protect as normative underpinnings’ (MacFarlane, 2014: 435) of its activities. In this regard, one can witness this reality from IGAD two working principles and values that guide its ‘regional contribution to global security governance’ (ibid.). The first principle and value designates the promotion of good governance and protection of human rights through institutionalization of democracy and transparency. The second norms adhere to the promotion of a sense of community that aspires to maintain peace in the region and the peaceful resolution of disputes between and with member states (Kidist, 2009). However, the liberal peace approach criticized as ‘an extension of the Western hegemonic powers over developing nations; executes a top-down approach that does not take into consideration local processes of peace; undermines local initiatives for peace to fit the political agenda of Western nations; limits peace-building processes to state-building by promoting democracy, liberalized economies and the rule of law; and subsumes the human security concept to the agenda of securitization of the human existence at development, peace-building and state-building levels’ (Omondi, 2014: 97). These elaborations point to concur that IGAD as a regional organization could work as a multiplier of Western global agenda of liberal peace in its approach to conflict intervention.

IGAD as legitimacy provider for intra-regional and extra-regional action

This section explains the role of IGAD as legitimacy provider for intra-regional and extra-regional actions. This section makes the case that legitimacy offers a way of enhancing our understanding of the mutually dependent relationship between IGAD and for intra-regional and extra-regional actors. From the point of view of legitimacy perspective, IGAD and extra regional actors ‘have some agency and do influence norm change and international legitimacy even within existing power structures. They are dependent on international validation from the...United Nation Security Council, but they are not predetermined subordinates’ (Bergholm, 2010: 19). International legitimacy is the property of IGAD in the maintenance of regional peace and security (Williams, 2013) as a result of the principle of subsidiarity. In this relationship primacy is given to IGAD as a legitimacy provider for extra-regional actors on the common value of regional peace and security provision. The norms of subsidiarity which refers to a principle of locating governance at the lowest possible (Slaughter 2004) could provide ‘an appropriate guideline for establishing the order of precedence in peacemaking on the region and thereby avoid the problem of organizational rivalry’ (Nathan, 2016: 1). The core issue of the principle of subsidiarity ‘means that a central authority should play a secondary role, performing only those functions that cannot be performed at a more local level’ (ibid.). As a regional organization, IGAD has a role in providing an important legitimizing function for the UN and other international actors (MacFarlane, 2014).

Before starting the discussion, the term ‘international legitimacy’ which is the key organizing concept of this section, need clarifying. According to Andrew (2005), there are five important dimensions of international legitimacy, namely, procedure, shared values, expertise, effectiveness, and persuasion, in order to explore the

various claims related to peace operations made by the UN Security Council and some regional arrangements. Out of this dimensions, because of its relevancy to the theme of this section, I adopted the fourth dimension that concurs effectiveness. This refers to ‘the legitimacy of processes, actors and institutions can also be judged on their ability to deliver ‘effective solutions to shared problems’ (Williams, 2013: 56). As far as IGAD and other intra-regional and extra-regional organizations actions in maintenance of peace and security are concerned, the legitimacy of these organizations is intertwined and dependent in large part on their effectiveness at maintaining regional peace and security. Thus the international legitimacy conveyed by the IGAD to other intra-regional and extra-regional organizations is ‘crucial to establishing the international legitimacy of a military intervention. It is this legitimizing function that makes international organizations so central to contemporary peace enforcement operations’ (Coleman, 2007: 3).

The legitimizing function of IGAD to these entities in practice can be viewed as complementarity relationship, in practice IGAD even if it has certain assets, such as good knowledge of the causes and dynamics of conflicts in the region, it has also liabilities related to a huge deficit of financial, human and material capabilities for effectively maintaining regional peace and security. Moreover, IGAD is ‘arguably better equipped to deal with socio-cultural and political intricacies specific to its regions due to a better understanding of context. Its member states are often directly affected by crises, which could give them a greater legitimacy for intervening. Ideally, they should also be able to respond quicker and more cost-effectively than actors such as the AU or United Nations given their proximity to the context’ (Lucey, 2016: 1). However, apart from these comparative advantages, because of limited capabilities, legitimizing other intra-regional and extra-regional organizations to fill these gaps is crucial to resolve the peace and security challenges of the region.

In fact the resource and capacity deficits partly explain the tendency of IGAD to rely on external funding and technical support. Such dependency on extra-regional power funding may compromise the regional autonomy, integrity, legitimacy and ownership of peace mediation, peacekeeping and peace building processes and operations in the region. As Asnake (2015: 17) argues, in the *modus operandi* of this regional organization, ‘regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. Initiative for establishing the organization in the first place came from extra-regional players’ He also indicated that the ‘role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security’ (ibid.). IGAD relationship with extra-regional power or development partner formalized by the establishment of IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) ‘and from May to July 1994, the IPF supported the organization’s initiatives with offers of international recognition and financial support for post conflict peace building. The IPF sustained the negotiations and provided timely support to ensure that progress was achieved behind the scenes’ (Murithi, 2009: 142). The ‘IPF led by the United States, Norway and the United Kingdom (and to a lesser extent Italy) and civil society groups, were able to get IGAD to agree on establishing this Permanent Secretariat for the Conflict in Sudan and the appointment of new special envoy’ (Byiers, 2016: 39) in 1999. Next to IPF, the other emerged development partner forum was Troika in June 2001 and it was ‘the initiative of the United States to support the Sudan peace process with the United Kingdom and Norway, based on their long-term engagement in the country’ (ibid.).

Apart from the financial and technical support rendered by extra-regional power to IGAD, their impact on the regional autonomy of IGAD is quite obvious. In this regard Asnake (2015: 17) identified three features in the relationship among IGAD, the IPF and other extra-regional players. The first feature is ‘almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are financed by the IPF and other donors’ (ibid.). He concurs that the one ‘who controls the funding will have enormous influence over the process, which undermines regional autonomy’ (ibid.) of IGAD. One typical demonstration is that while ‘IGAD managed to formally broker a Sudanese peace deal in 2004/5, the more decisive role was that of external actors, mainly the US, UK, Italy and Norway’ (El-Affendi, 2009: 12). Second, ‘IGAD members use the IPF to consolidate their position in conflict-mediation’, thereby the forum ‘served as a necessary antidote to the Libya-Egypt initiative for Sudan, which sought to secure Egypt’s interests in maintaining a modicum of control and influence over Sudan to ensure the flow of water from the Nile’ (Murithi, 2009: 1432). Third, ‘the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas’ (Asnake, 2015: 17). In the final analysis, the inherent capacity deficits of IGAD led to domination of the peace process of the region by extra-regional actors.

IGAD as instrument of regional resistance

While the previous sections explain the conflict resolution, multiplier of global norms, as well as the legitimization role of IGAD, this section analyses another key function of this organization concerning resisting extra-regional powers. Ideally, the ‘role of regional organizations as interlocutors between the international community and the local environment has become a well-established principle in international law based on Chapter VIII of the UN Charter’ (Alden, 2010: 2). In fact, such ‘position of regional organizations as a bridge between the international and its values, processes and institutions is seen by many to be the foundation for emerging structures of global governance’ (ibid.). Hence, from the point of view of ‘Western perspective,

regional organizations have served primarily as buffers against internationally-inspired action by providing diplomatic and economic and resistance to ‘outside interference’ be it mandated through the UN Security Council or elsewhere’ (Alden, 2010: 1).

In light of the above, this section makes use of practical example of the ICC’s arrest warrant case against Omar Al Bashir in order to explain IGAD role in resisting such practice. IGAD’s for that matter AU’s (both are scribed to the same position), the bones of contention regarding the ICC based on two rationales. First, Sudan is not a party of the Rome Statute of the ICC. ICC was only able to investigate the situations in Darfur after the Security Council referred it to the Court, and the ‘issuance of an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Al Bashir was prejudicial to ongoing peace processes’ (Odero, 2011: 147). Second, ICC’s actions is a neo colonial conspiracy and the ‘action has been taken without due regard to sustainable peace in Sudan, and is therefore a toothless stooge of ex-colonial powers’ (ibid.). Since IGAD as a regional body reiterates the AU’s position on this matter, I will use AU/IGAD concern over ICC’s African-targeted prosecutions. The AU has also been critical not only the lack of dialogue between the AU and the ICC, but also ‘the ICC’s prosecutions which are focused on African countries despite there being gross violations of human rights in other areas of the world, for example in Syria’ (Apiko and Aggad, 2016: 9).

On the part of AU, one of the criticisms against the ICC is that ‘its failure to consult the AU before a decision to prosecute cases has been made, as the indictments may interfere with simultaneous peace negotiations’ (ibid.). Second, using the organization Assembly Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.221 (XII), ‘the AU Assembly expressed its deep concern at the indictment made by the Prosecutor of the ICC against President al-Bashir. The concern was that this would affect the peace process by undermining the ongoing efforts for resolution of the conflict in Sudan at that time’ (ibid.). AU’s another concerns regarding the actions of the ICC as a neo-colonial conspiracy which alarm over African sovereignty and the long history of foreign intervention on the continent, as well as the ICC double standard problem (Odero, 2011). The ICC’s arrest warrant case against Omar Al Bashir also created irreconcilable differences between AU and United Nation Security Council (UNSC) because of the later decision that reject AU’s request to defer the proceedings of Deputy William Ruto and President Kenyatta. As a result of this action, AU Assembly (Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.245 (XIII) Rev.1) decided that ‘in view of the fact that the request by the AU to the UNSC to defer the proceedings initiated against President al-Bashir of the Sudan had not been met, the AU member states would not cooperate in the arrest and surrender of President al-Bashir. Some African countries have agreed to this non-cooperation in the arrest of President al-Bashir’ (Apiko and Aggad, 2016: 10).

One experience that manifested IGAD’s resistant to international entreaties (ICC’s arrest warrant) not only its adherence to AU stand in this regard, but also practically it moved its special summit on Sudan which was scheduled to conduct in Nairobi, then it moved to Addis Ababa in a bid to avert a diplomatic row over the attendance of President Omar Al Bashir. In doing so, it showed its commitment to AU position by averting the opportunity that exposed him to ICC in this matter since Kenya is a party of the Rome Statute of the ICC.

Measures to improve the ability of IGAD to manage regional security

This section considers the measures to improve the capabilities of IGAD to manage regional security. As the frequency of conflicts and their devastating effects persist, the regional organization was forced to ‘take an active part in the preventive diplomacy in the sub-region. IGAD’s preventive diplomacy has covered the facilitation of the Sudan and Somalia peace processes and civil war settlements, as well as attempted mediation of the Ethiopia-Eritrea war’ (Francis, 2005: 226). As far as the success of IGAD is concerned, Healy (2014: 226) succinctly highlight the peace building efforts of this regional organization as follows:

As the Sudan and Somalia peace processes demonstrated, when the political conditions are rights, IGAD can provide an umbrella for peace negotiations that are locally owned but externally funded. In both cases the peace processes took place over a long period of time during which incremental gains were made. They involved not only the protagonists but also civil society and other non-state actors, as well as interested external players. IGAD proved a good forum for such complex and protracted negotiations and was able to capitalize to some extent on the strength of the social bonds that unite people in the Horn of Africa despite the often-hostile relations between their governments.

IGAD has contributed to the continental peace and security architecture, especially in the case of Somalia and Sudan, however there are many difficulties stand in the way of IGAD playing an effective institutional role in advancing regional peace and security. Among other things, IGAD is beset by many weaknesses as a regional security body, ‘including financing, membership and competition with other organizations. The greatest hindrance to IGAD’s implementation of peace and security measures is its limited financial capacity most of its budget comes from donor funding while member states’ contributions are irregular, likely because they do not see tangible benefits and because multi-membership of RECs means their priorities are directed elsewhere’ (Lucey and Berouk, 2016: 7). Moreover, the effectiveness of IGAD in preventing and minimizing the impact of

armed conflict has been hampered by the following challenges: rivalry amongst member states; regional instability; lack of a regional hegemonic power to lead effective action; lack of sufficient political will; the limited capacity of the Secretariat of IGAD; financial constraints; weak enforcement capacity of IGAD; lack of regional policy on peace and security (Francis, 2005, Olu and Dauda, 2015; Healy, 2014).

Basically, the above 'problems have not only undermined regional political cohesion and common or collective approaches to regional peace and security issues, but also complicated IGAD's mediation, reconciliation and confidence building efforts. The challenges have eroded the effectiveness of IGAD to intervene in and mediate regional conflicts' (Francis, 2005: 234). When one could be contemplating the above weak spots 'leveled against IGAD it must be understood against the backdrop of an institution that, from its very inception, has been tasked with coordinating the settlement of conflicts and other security challenges of a particularly difficult nature that other institutions may also very well have failed to resolve' (Jacobsen and Nordby, 2013: 28). In light of the above significant gaps in the IGAD's peace and security architecture, what is the way forward? There are six recommendations that address the challenges:-

- IGAD first needs to become more streamlined and consider niche areas of advantage. The development of the IGAD treaty is an opportunity to decide how to develop the secretariat and realize a vision of the organization that is best suited to its capabilities, and to enhance efficient decisions (Lucey and Berouk, 2016: 9);
- IGAD would require a level of independence from member states as well as external powers so that it could operate as a neutral body (Mengisteab, 2011);
- Commitments of the member states must be obtained for the following: fully engaging in IGAD's regional mediation; supporting facilitation efforts; desist from promoting other forums for regional conflict resolution; commit to conflict resolution through IGAD, the AU and UN Systems. African and Arab States, and other international actors should be encouraged to recognize and support IGAD as the principal forum for negotiations concerning peace and security of IGAD states (Olu and Dauda, 2015: 141);
- Transform the predatory behavior and build state capacities: Regardless of any efforts made by IGAD, the region will not change until the nature of its member states changes (Mehari and Fassi, 2015);
- Reform towards an era of delivery and democracy: Unless IGAD member states reform faster, they will face increasing popular grievances, protests, and political crises (ibid.) and;
- Refine the draft treaty and the draft protocol on governance and address financial constraints (ibid.).

Conclusion

This essay undertook a review of IGAD's role in the Horn of Africa. This paper identified the underlying causes of conflicts and the modus operandi of the conflict system of the sub region. It examined IGAD's facilitated peace process in Sudan and Somalia. IGAD succeeded in achieving two major peace deals of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) for Sudan and the Mbgathi Peace Process for Somalia. The paper then went to assess the role of IGAD from three perspectives. The first perspective identified is whether IGAD has a role as multiplier of Western global agenda. The finding is that this regional organization endorsed the liberal peace agenda values of human rights, good governance, democracy, the rule of law and transparency. Concerning the legitimation function of IGAD, the paper identified that IGAD has resources constraints and capabilities gap and working with development partners who have vested interest in the promotion of peace and security in the region. In the process of this relationship, the regional autonomy of IGAD is compromised. It has nominal ownership of the peace process and it is indeed dominated by extra-regional actors. The other function of IGAD this paper reviewed was IGAD's role as instrument of regional resistance. By taking ICC's arrest warrant case against Omar Al Bashir, the paper examined this significant role of IGAD that served in defense of the leader of Sudan. The last theme this paper covered was the assessment of major stumble blocks that hinder IGAD from playing an effective institutional role in advancing regional peace and security. Against the identified constraining factors, the paper provided some general recommendations that would scale up IGAD's capabilities.

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