

## The “Africaness” of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and Goals’ Attainment

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### Abstract

The myriad of Africa’s development problems manifesting in; low standards of living, abject poverty, undemocratic governance, restiveness in politics and general instability has been attributed to the continent’s continued encapsulation in growth and development initiatives proffered by the developed countries either, through their governments or the multilateral institutions which they dominate. The belief is that African generated solutions could remedy this situation hence the NEPAD idea. But how much of Africa is NEPAD? Or is it a ruse? Is there really an ideological foundation for the NEPAD? The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) was conceived in the spirit of Pan-Africanism. But NEPAD truly speaking has turned out to be Africa’s response to the prevailing global neo-liberal trend. Though, Africa could not have afforded to ignore this trend, this article submits that for a development initiative to anchor its strategies at goals’ attainment on the magnanimity of western benefactors makes it claim to originality faulty. More so, the triage which political issues which are often undermined in modernizing institutions in most of the developing economies will crowd-out the attention which NEPAD requires from the donor partners so that at the long run, NEPAD would be counter-productive.

**Keywords:** Africa, economic development, neo-liberalism, donor partners

### 1. Introduction

In Africa, non-representative governance, gross underdevelopment, instability, pandemics and general disaffection are prevalent. Poverty and diseases are endemic in the continent. Half of Africa or 340 million of its population live on less than one US dollar a day. With a life expectancy of 54 years compared to 75 years for the advanced countries, 140 out of every 1000 African children die within age five. Only 58% Africans have access to safe water. Illiteracy rate is 41% of people over 15 years. Africa represents only 1.74% of the world market, attracting only 1% of international investment (SARPH 2002:4). Africa’s trade with the rest of the world is 45.6% compared with North America’s 13.2%, Europe’s 12.8%, Latin America’s 23.7% and Asia’s 15.2% (SACC 2003:16).

On April 9, 1998, the then South Africa’s Vice-President, Thabo Mbeki in a lecture, “The African Renaissance, South Africa and the World”, at the United Nations University, Tokyo, articulated an initiative to redress the litany of Africa’s development problems. He called for a departure from centuries’ old past prejudices that have denigrated Africa. The process of bringing this about culminated in initiatives sponsored by Presidents Mbeki himself, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, code-named; The Millennium Partnership for Africa Recovery Programme (MAP). It was unveiled in January 2001, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland to mean a firm commitment by African leaders to take ownership and responsibility for the sustainable development of their continent.

Simultaneously, Senegal’s President Abdoulaye Wade was tinkering with a similar initiative called the Omega Plan which he presented to the Francophone Africa Summit in Yaoundé, Cameroon in January, 2001. Omega Plan was premised on the need to develop physical and human capital as basic requirements for sustained and balanced growth. A thematic consensus in both initiatives, rest in the fact that they were inspired by the need for Africans themselves to launch Africa on the part of growth and development. Both initiatives coalesce under the name; New African Initiative (NAI), when the 37<sup>th</sup> summit of the defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU) Heads of States and governments on July 11, 2001, in Lusaka, Zambia, adopted the idea of a re-born Africa as a policy framework for Africa’s socio-economic development in the twenty-first century. The summit instituted an implementation committee made up of Thabo Mbeki and Abdoulaye Wade (both of them) co-authors of the initiative (in addition to Mbeki being the chairman of the Non-aligned movement); Olusegun Obasanjo, (the Chairman of the G77 who was to present the initiative to the G8 and the Bretton Woods Institutions); Abdelaziz Bouteflika (the OAU chairman at the Extra-ordinary Summit in Sirte, Libya, September, 1999 when the idea first received the attention of African leaders); and President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. When this implementation committee met in Abuja, Nigeria, on October 23, 2001, the NAI was renamed, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).

NEPAD was conceived as a new thrust in Africa’s relations with the rest of the world; particularly the developed countries. NEPAD is predicated on the assumption that Western generated therapies as contained in the Structural Adjustment programmes and other development initiatives of the IMF, the World Bank and the neo-colonialist activities of multinational corporations, rather than lead Africa out of the woods, had further

facilitated its bondage to the shackles of Western manipulation and domination. It was therefore, reasoned that African-generated, African-owned, African-led, African-operated, and thus an “**Africanness**” of strategies could reverse this trend.

NEPAD’s birth could not have been timelier, given its stated objectives which broadly aim at reversing “this abnormal situation by changing the relationship that undermines it” (NEPAD 2001:1). NEPAD aims at the socio-economic and political revival of Africa via an intra-African synergy and a genuine partnership between Africa and the developed world. The choice of NEPAD is premised on the assumption that there are commonalities in the problems of Africa between and among its states. Hence, NEPAD has emerged to become the economic force of the African Union “to engage the industrially advanced world” (Adigun 2002:35).

Criticisms have however trailed NEPAD’s claim at being a novel initiative and threatens to deprive it of the necessary legitimacy. This development largely stems from NEPAD’s underpinning in neo-liberal orthodoxy. This is from the point of view that NEPAD’s principles do not mark a departure from the age-long development initiatives that were in the past well crafted by Bretton Woods institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. Hence, it is a continuation of policies. With a heavy dependence on the industrialized North for funding, there is also, no departure from the age-long trend of African nations being largely aid recipients. Flowing from the foregoing, there becomes a worry on the claim to “Africaness” of the NEPAD initiative in its philosophy of African Renaissance. This article is a contribution to the reservations about the Africaness of NEPAD and the implications of same for the attainment of its goals.

## **2. Theoretical Framework**

NEPAD is deep-rooted in neo-liberal orthodoxy. Its strong point being that market forces are the engines that propel development with states providing the enabling environment to regulate and facilitate same. This kind of theory is replete with a dominance of economic postulations which by “incorrectly assuming that market based prices can allocate resources appropriately”, “has ignored the political issues at stake in modernizing institutions” (Scott 2002:161). These include corruption, unstable governments, lopsided allocation of resources, etc. To so ignore such political issues will portend danger because when for instance Europe led world trade for a long time, this was because “the Europeans also led in establishing accountable governments” (Scott 2002:172).

It has been shown that this realization that is the need for accountable, governments did not in an unfettered manner inform the insistence of the NEPAD proponents on good governance as a cardinal principle of the NEPAD. Benham (2003:273) has shown that staff of the World Bank and the IMF had responsibility in drawing the draft documents of NEPAD. However, in order that the NEPAD idea receives a Pan-African outlook at least in its conceptualization and ownership, these agents joined African leaders in their claim to NEPAD’s Africaness and by so doing, tried to avoid being accused of foisting an agenda on Africa.

## **3. Previous Pan-Africanist Development Initiatives up to NEPAD**

Though, Pan-Africanist sentiments and thinking in their earliest forms are perceived ordinarily as contemporaneous with national aspirations and hence associated with political emancipation of the Black man, Pan-Africanism, for the purpose of a framework for Africa’s economic development has been well captured in foremost references to the ideology. For instance, before the twentieth century when the word “pan-African” and “Pan-Africanism” became popular after the 1900 London congress to include all reactions against the oppression of the Blackman, the idea of an Africa “high in science and technology” so as to in Blyden’s words “build ships, navigate ships, ply the trades, instruct in schools control the press and thus aid in shaping the opinions and guiding the destinies of mankind (Esedebe 1980: 40) was well captured. And D. E. B. Dubois talked of it (Pan-Africanism as agent of economic development) in 1930. this was when he said that, “the Pan-African movement aimed at an intellectual understanding and co-operation among all groups of African descent in order to bring about the *industrial* . . . emancipation of the Negro people” (emphasis added) (Esedebe 1980:1).

The way of bringing this about Blyden insisted, more than one hundred years ago at a lecture at the Liberian College in 1881, is that “The African must advance by methods of his own. We must possess a power distinct from that of the Europeans.” In the same vein Nkrumah, almost a hundred years after Blyden’s polemic, reinforced the factor of unity or economic and political integration as it came to be known as the strategy to a grand Africa. This Nkrumah opined will come about by employing all of Africa’s resources under “a central organization to formulate a comprehensive economic policy for Africa which will embrace the scientific, methodological and economic planning of our ascent from present poverty into industrial greatness” (Nkrumah 1965; 157).

In the view of its initiators, NEPAD epitomizes this expression since it was conceived as a new thrust in Africa’s relation with the rest of the world, particularly the developed countries. But before NEPAD, there were concerted African efforts to address the problems believed to be at the root of Africa’s development. Interestingly, some of such initiatives were supposedly ingenious. In this regard, we have noted the example of Edward Wilmot Blyden’s African Personality idea of close to 200 years ago such efforts some include. This, he encapsulated in his Liberian College lecture of 1881 where he declared; “the African must advance by methods

of his own. We must possess a power distinct from that of the Europeans.”

Since independence, there have been a series of “Africa’s development thinking” which were “often heroic efforts by African leaders to craft an appropriate and indigenous development paradigm for the continent” (Maloka 2002:1). In this regard, “the first significant attempt was the ‘Declaration on Cooperation, Development and Economic Independence’ adopted by the OAU in 1973” (Maloka 2002:1). In the 1980s we saw the Lagos Plan of Action for Economic Development of Africa. The African Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER) “was an attempt to reverse the Lagos Plan of Action after five years of unsuccessful implementation of the initiative” (Maloka 2002:2). It was adopted by the OAU in 1985 and was to be used by the OAU to pressure the “United Nations at its Special Session in 1986 to adopt the Programme of Action for African Economic recovery and Development 1986-1990” (Maloka 2002:2). There were also, other complementary United Nations’ initiatives such as the UN Programme for the Economic Redressing and Development of Africa, Alternative Structural Adjustment Programme for Africa and the African Scope of Reference for SAP’s for Socio-Economic Redressing and Transformation (Ekpo 2002:1). The year 2000-targeted initiatives included the protocol for the establishment of an African Economic Community and the Final Act of Lagos 2000. The current millennium has seen the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in July 2000 and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) which was consummated in October 2001.

#### **4. The Objectives of NEPAD**

That the African *eldorado* year of 2000 had come and gone without African states getting out of the woods is all history. But African leaders refuse to relent in their efforts hence, the NEPAD idea, which is hyped as Pan-Africanist, given that it is a collective resolve of Africans to take their destiny in their hands by applying African remedies to African problems. This is, with the aim of eradicating poverty in Africa and placing African countries both individually and collectively on the path of sustainable growth and development and thus, halt the marginalization of Africa in the globalization process (NEPAD 2001:15). To this end, Africa is to achieve and sustain an average gross domestic product growth of above 7% per annum for the next 15 years, ensure the reduction of the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by half by 2015, enroll all children of school age in primary school by 2015, to make progress towards gender equality, reduce infant mortality ratio by two-thirds by 2015, reduce maternal mortality by three-quarters by 2015, provide access for all who need reproductive health services by the same year as well as implement a national strategy for sustainable development by 2005 in order to reverse the loss of environmental resources by 2015 (NEPAD 2001:16).

To this end, NEPAD leaders have taken responsibility for the following objectives:

- (i) strengthen mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution;
- (ii) promoting and protecting democracy and human rights;
- (iii) restoring and maintaining micro-stability through fiscal and monetary policies;
- (iv) regulating financial market and private companies;
- (v) promoting the role of women in several economic development;
- (vi) revitalizing health training and education with a high priority given to HIV/AIDS;
- (vii) maintenance of law and order;
- (viii) the promotion and development of infrastructure (Mbazira 2004).

#### **5. The Bases for ascribing Africanness to NEPAD**

The selling point of NEPAD is the hype about its Africanness. Through the policies of the World Bank, and the IMF, and the neo-colonial policies of countries like the United States, Britain, France, etc., who have not only influenced the adoption but also the execution of the economic and sometimes political policies of many African countries, African economies came under bondage and African countries had had to go cap-in-hand to the west for aid. NEPAD is said to have set out to arrest this and other neo-colonialist trends. To underscore African leaders’ resolve via NEPAD to halt this trend, President Obasanjo once declared that African countries will no longer tolerate the situation where “the industrialized nations continue to impose extraneous demands on the continent and their threats to withhold aid if such demands are not met” (Abdullahi 2002: 35). Aptly put, this means that “Africans will no longer, be wards of benevolent guardians; rather, the architects of their own sustained development” (Komolafe 2002:21).

Taunted as a major reason for the less-than-successful scorecards of the previous attempts at continent-wide development programmes for Africa, included non-African ownership of such initiatives (NEPAD 2001:10). The failure of development in Africa, has mainly been due to the “marginalization of its people from decision-making” (Mashama 2002;1). Hence, “The New Partnership for Africa’s Development will be successful only if it is owned by African peoples united in their diversity” and “only if our peoples are masters of their own destinies” (NEPAD 2001:13). African peoples are therefore, enjoined to mobilize and allow themselves to be mobilized in support of the implementation of the NEPAD “initiative by setting up at all levels, structures for organization, mobilization and action”, because, “The New Partnership for Africa’s Development is envisaged as a long-term vision of an African-owned and African-led development programme” (NEPAD 2001:15).

Often, the goals of ventures are itemized in their priorities. Therefore, if “Ensuring African ownership, responsibility and leadership” (Nkuhlu 2003:30), forms the first of the thirteen broad principles of the objectives of NEPAD, it only accentuates the Africanness of the origin and content of NEPAD.

Further ascription of Africanness to NEPAD derive from its being an OAU mandated process and NEPAD’s Heads of States and Governments Implementation Committee (HSIC) has to report to the African Union (AU) Summit annually. The AU Chair and Secretary General are ex-officio members of the Implementation Committee and the AU secretariat participates in the steering committee’s meetings.

President Joaquim Alberto Chissano of Mozambique insists; “NEPAD is first a partnership of Africa, and then, a partnership with someone else. We own the initiative”. Olaniyan (2004:137), posits that, “the distinguishing features of NEPAD are the emphasis on African ownership...” To further underscore its Africanness he went on, “African countries have taken steps to ensure sound implementation of its objectives.” This is especially in the area of institutions that will bring this about such as;

- (i) the location of NEPAD in the office of or reports directly to the President,
- (ii) institution of NEPAD as an inter-ministerial or inter-departmental committee in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- (iii) location in the Ministry of Finance and Planning or location in the Ministry of Regional Integration which is akin to a Ministry of NEPAD.

“... (NEPAD) represents a homemade brew or an indigenous strategy for economic growth in Africa” (Farukanmi 2003:35).

So far, a preliminary conclusion that will suffice is that, the Africanness of NEPAD rests in the resolve of African leaders to halt the dependency syndrome, involve African people in the formulation of the strategies aimed at Africa’s sustainable development and ensure that such strategy as NEPAD is incorporated into national governments and the African Union to underscore its relevance.

## **6. How Truly African is NEPAD?**

As an initiative posturing as an African framework anchored on the need for a new relationship between African and the developed world and international agencies, NEPAD is apt. But as to its being truly Africa-owned, this would be acknowledged with conjecture except we first of all, attempt an analyses of the following issues; (a) Those involved in the initiative or what was the extent of Africans’ involvement in bringing NEPAD about? (b.) Funding or on whose resource is it anchored? These will be our parameters of ascribing Africanness to the NEPAD project.

### *6.1 Those Involved*

At inception, frantic efforts were made to accord NEPAD international certification with the African civil-society and organized private sector sidelined. The treatise of Shadrack Gutto at a forum in Addis Ababa in March 2002, queried why NEPAD was first presented to the G8 before African governments discussed it. The truth is that the MAP and Omega Plan visions which culminated in the NEPAD, principally aimed at extricating Africa from the debt burden. But conditionalities to bring this about such as Peace, Security, Democracy, Economic and Corporate Governance could only derive from those, set by the giver of the waiver. Hence, “in formulating the [NEPAD] vision and project, focus was on the crucial dialogue between African states, the G8 and the Bretton Woods Institutions” (Raji 2002:47).

This has led to criticisms of the NEPAD initiative as lacking in collectivity as a continental project. A major exponent of this gripe against NEPAD is Gambian President Yahaya Jammeh who wondered why the NEPAD had to be presented to the outside world first, before Africans whose problems it was meant to solve could deliberate on it. When the Canadian High Commissioner to Nigeria David Angell gave a lecture “The International Partnership in Support of NEPAD” in Ile-Ife, Nigeria, to flag-off a nation-wide campaign for peace project he doubted the efficacy of the NEPAD therapy to Africa’s development problems given the slight public engagement in support of it. And this is because it is not well known, understood and embraced because of non-sufficient involvement of the people in articulating it.

Wameyo (2003:89) insists “that the NEPAD process is not people centred ...” According to the South Africa Bishops Conference (April 2002), “NEPAD has completely failed to meaningfully engage with communities and civil society organizations. NEPAD completely sidelined civil society.” Though, this is not surprising “given the perception of civil society as an irritating animal by African politicians” (Wameyo 2003: 84), and hence ignoring their role in shaping Africa’s development, it is tantamount to a surgeon refusing to take the pulse of his patient before wheeling him to the operation table. Civil society is the heartbeat of the people and for NEPAD, civil society has continued to fault its framework. The truth is that;

On a more ideological plane, civil society critics contend that NEPAD is an unquestioning endorsement of the neo-liberal framework for seeking uncritical integration into the world economy, and that such an endorsement, besides many other misgivings it may give rise to, fails to recognize that it seems to assign a subordinate role to the African economies in the current globalization process

(Mshama 2002:4).

When some 200 social movements, organizations and institutions from 45 African countries met in Bamako, Mali, between January 5 and 9, 2001 under the aegis of African Social Forum, the Africanness of NEPAD with regards to consultation was one of their gripes. They observed that whereas, NEPAD claims ownership of the process by the African people and indeed exhorts Africans to mobilize themselves behind NEPAD, they have not been consulted in the process. NEPAD they insist lacks ownership at the grass root level.

Herein lies, the democratic deficit of NEPAD, which though, has put the promotion of democracy and good governance on high priority, yet the formation plans, began without the full involvement of the people. Mshama (2002:1) queries; “How can such a plan succeed...?” And this is a problematic trend in the globalised world; “for major national and international priorities to be determined outside of democratic process... in the international sphere” (SACC 2003:12). When in 1986 the United Nations released the Declaration on the Rights to development, Africa celebrated it as a development plan that was peoples’ participation friendly. How come, when Africa itself launched what was supposed to be a pan-African development initiative i.e. NEPAD, the people were ignored?

Quoting Adebayo Olukoshi, Wameyo (2003:87) notes that “Development cannot be the exclusive monopoly of the elite, it must necessarily have popular anchorage.” So, when the New African Leadership Group made up of Obasanjo, Mbeki, Wade, etc., having assigned to themselves the role of “deciders” of the fate of Africa and hence, conjunction with the G8 decided to foist on Africans the neo-liberal features in the Washington Consensus, they reduced NEPAD to “a marketing exercise” and “a heads-of-state project.” (Mshama 2002:2).

### 6.2 The Funding

On the question of upon whose resources NEPAD is anchored, the NEPAD was premised on the assumption that the G8 would fund it. Actually, when Mbeki presented the “African Renaissance” idea to G8 meetings and particularly at the World Economic forum July 2001, his striving was to drum up support from the super powers for Africa’s “realization that it must be responsible for its own development so long as donor community plays its part” (Nabudere 2002:17). When at the G8 summit at Genoa, the G8 accepted this plea by instituting an Action Plan for Africa it did not disguise its self-seeking interest when it gave conditions for partnering with Africa in NEPAD. African states are to demonstrate further commitments to conflict prevention, management and resolution, consolidation of democracy and rule of law, operation of free market economies so as to attract foreign investment. The G8 “acceptance speech read thus;

We have decided today to forge a new partnership to address issue crucial to African development. We are committed to promoting this objective with our African partners and multilateral fora – in the UN, the World Bank, and the IMF, and in a new Round of WTO negotiations. Our partnership will support the key themes of the New African Initiative, including:

- \* Democracy and political governance
- \* Prevention and reduction of conflict;
- \* Human development by investing in health and education, and tackling HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria including through the Global AIDS and Health Fund;
- \* Information and communication technologies;
- \* Economic and corporate governance;
- \* Action against corruption;
- \* Stimulating private investment in Africa;
- \* Increasing trade within African and between Africa and the world
- \* Combating hunger and increasing food security (Nabudere 2002:20).

By accepting these terms, African leaders have further turned blind eyes to the inequalities of the current globalization process and would be agreeing with former US Assistant Trade Representative to Africa; Rita Whitaker, that for African states to benefit from the AGOA and by implication from the current globalization exercise, they have to have WTO compliant laws (Ojeh 2005:13) and thereby, in the view of Chakraverthi (2003:1) “accepting all the unfair measures that exists in the WTO rules which they are struggling to change in the WTO”. In Uruguay 1995, Africa leaders had endorsed the unequal terms of the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement. During subsequent talks principally in Seattle (November, 1999), Cancun (September 2003), and Hong Kong (December 2005), African states which constitute the chunk of the 80% third world membership of the body (Ojeh 2004:6), have not been able to effect an outright re-write of these terms of trade. The consequence has been the further widening of the very gap, which NEPAD seeks to fill. This is so because, now as before, “If there is any evidence of the disadvantage of the new states in international law, it is in the area of International Economic Law” (Okhonmina 2004:8).

Like defeated Generals, African leaders have submitted via NEPAD, to uphold the unequal clauses of the WTO trading system and hoping that, “If a new round of multilateral trade negotiations is started, it must recognize and provide for the African continent’s special concerns, needs and interests” (NEPAD 2001:56). The truth is that, from the moment African leaders declared; “We therefore, call on our development partners to assist us in

this endeavour” (NEPAD 2001:16), they signaled a return to the status quo. That is, the beggarly, aid-driven, dependency-based development strategies and effected same at the 2002 G8 summit in Canada as depicted satirically by then deputy of the Canada based World Pan-African Movement, Charles Roach in the already very popular photograph of the kneeling camel and its master/rider (Osahon 2002:30).

In what looks like a platform for the scrutiny of its annual score-card, the OAU, and later the African Union in conjunction with the Non-aligned Movement and the G77 has since the year 2000, met annually with the G8. At these fora, after ascertaining the level of the new nations’ compliance with Western development strategies, aid packages were handed out to them by the great nations. Little wonder, African States were jolted by recent statements from Moscow to the effect that the G8 summit it hosts later this year (2006), would focus on strengthening Russia’s energy problem. Vladimir Putin, insists that the G8 is not just about debt cut (for Africa) and that his, being a country developing socially was in a better position to appreciate the problems of developing countries (Radio Deutsche Welle: 31/01/06 10.pm Nigeria Time).

This depicts how precarious development strategies can be when predicated on the goodwill of donors. Such goodwill could be withdrawn without notice should the donor contend with superior needs. For NEPAD, from the beginning, the donors never disguised this possibility. The NEPAD idea was premised on the assumption that the G8 will fund it.

How altruistic can the donor nations be? Their aid gestures can only be self-serving, currying the favour of the so-called “failed states” to fight terrorism and when dealt with, aid could decline or even cease. This was the case after the cold war when aid to African declined “from \$17.2 billion in 1990 soon after the collapse of the Berlin wall in 1989, to \$12.3 billion today” (Nabudere 2002:26). Military aid halved from \$2 billion in 1985 to just over \$1 billion in 1997 and development assistance from \$820 million in 1991 to \$541 million in 1996 (Tilton 1998:1). It is from these same donors that African leaders are expecting \$64 billion annually to float NEPAD – the famed African owned concept which in the worlds of President Levy Mwanawasa, then OAU Chairman, in a joint press conference with French President Jacques Chirac in Paris, February 8, 2002, “must be implemented with the countries that have the necessary financial means” (SARPN 2002:1). At the end of the press conference, President Obasanjo who was also in attendance along with Presidents Hosni Mubarak, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Abdulaye Wade, all of whom were the initiators of the NEPAD idea (with Thabo Mbeki who was absent), was to in obeisance profusely “thank President Chirac on the behalf of all of us for the opportunity he has given us to be together today to discuss a very important matter [of how other countries would fund an African project]” (SARPN 2002:2), even when such donors have cautioned, “that Africa should not expect too much too soon” (SACC 2002:15)

Cautioning on dependence on the developed countries for the success of NEPAD, Nigeria’s Vice-President Atiku Abubakar, addressing African Ambassadors while on a visit to Beijing, 1<sup>st</sup> July, 2002, recalled a Nigerian experience of disappointment from the west. Nigeria, he recalled, had taken the west seriously when on the dawn of the “present administration”, the latter had promised to assist (the former) in its economic recovery programme. Nigeria he said had for the next two years, drawn up its annual budget making provisions for such assistance, which never came. He therefore, admonished that, “for NEPAD to succeed, it was better for African countries to implement the programme with their own resources (Adefaye 2002:13).

In a similar skepticism, former President Arap Moi of Kenya, speaking in Blantyre, Malawi in early 2004 noted “that Africa was doomed to perpetual poverty and backwardness unless African leaders free themselves of egocentricity”. “No country in the west had an obligation to baby-sit or spoon-feed independent African nations”. African leaders must accept this fact, however unsettling, and rethink about their developmental strategy (Osahon 2002:35).

To sum up therefore, SARPN (2002:4) says of the role of the advanced nations in the NEPAD project, as that of “mobilizing people to act-under the supervision of those who mobilize people to act”. And we ask, between the supervisor and the actor who influences the act? The actor can only act the script given by the supervisor/director.

### **Africanness and Goals’ Attainment**

This paper has expressed reservations on the claim of Africanness of NEPAD on the grounds of:

- (a) lack of sufficient consultation and involvement of African peoples and states in drawing up the NEPAD initiative.
- (b) the concepts bloated reliance on foreign donors for its sustenance;

But the grouse over the non-originality of NEPAD and the banality of the claim of Africanness, does not detract from the modest achievements of the NEPAD project. In consonance with its good governance initiative, NEPAD does not recognize illegitimate governments. In 2003, coup plotters in Sao-Tome and Principe on threat of non-recognition by the African Union did a retraction and President Fernandez was restored. Foure Eyadema of Togo was denied recognition by ECOWAS and AU leaders until he went through the process of an election. Through the peer review devise a couple of countries have either been or about to be peer reviewed to ascertain the levels of their good/co-corporate governance compliance. They include Ghana, Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya and

Mauritius. On account of poor good-governance credentials, on January 26, 2006, Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir was denied the chair of the AU. Also, NEPAD's new structure for peace and security is worthy of note. Only recently in May 2006, the long elusive peace/cease fire agreement between the Sudanese government and Darfur rebels was signed in Abuja.

In the area of partnership with the West, NEPAD is basking under an international acceptance and the trend of debt forgiveness is appreciable. The World Bank and ADB in a measure of response are funding regional projects in Africa. There are strong evidence of synergies between NEPAD goals and development initiatives from the West. The Washington-base Corporate Council on Africa (CCA) has pledged to assist in NEPAD's call to strengthen the private sector. The CCA is establishing "structures that would facilitate the financing of select development projects and programmes, beside harmonizing the programmes of actions of governments and providing amenities fit for their execution" (William-Adigun 2002:35).

In as much as these and other NEPAD goals are emerging and are being made manifest, the thesis of this paper is that they are not products of its Africanness because, NEPAD's declaration that "The hopes of Africa's people for a better life can no longer rest on the magnanimity of others" is turned inside-out by the evidence throughout this presentation and elsewhere that NEPAD cannot succeed without the good-will of the west.

#### Conclusion

The vigor of re-envisioning Africa via NEPAD is unparalleled. But its inclusion in the present globalization exercise that is operated on Breton Wood's recipes of deregulated and free market economies will leave Africa perpetually subservient in this partnership. For Africa, the genre of today's global partnership if not restrained, can in the words of Adebayo Adedeji result in a pseudo-imperial partnership. (Busia 2003:136). Africa can check this trend. Recently, some debt relief has been achieved. On July 8, 2005, G8 leader rose from their summit in Gleneagles Scotland, promising to raise aid to Africa from \$25 billion to \$50 billion (Adisa 2005:2). African and other third world countries' insistence on the redrawing of the WTO agreement has stalled successful outcomes of trade talks since the Uruguay Round of Talk in 1995.

Sufficiency in consultation is required of a programme like NEPAD, to enable it gain the followership and commitment of those whom it would directly impact upon and not the present compromise of the four wealthiest African governments and the G8. The driving forces behind NEPAD should be the people represented in institutions like the NEPAD secretariat and not personalities like Obasanjo and Mbeki.

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