Book Review: Julien Barnes-Dacey and Daniel Levy (Eds.), The Regional Struggle for Syria. London: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), 2013; Pgs.: 79; ISSN: 978-1-906538-86-6

Abstract

In the Arab world Inter-Arab relation is characterized by power struggle between Pan-Arab nationalist military Officers and regional Monarchies. They poised themselves in Arab politics to change the political discourse prevailing in the Middle East. This Pan-Arab nationalism led to extensive interventions in the affairs of various states as it happened in Syria at present. The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)—first Pan European think tank launched in October 2007, with the objective of conducting research and promoting informed debate across European effective and value based Foreign Policy—has prepared a very important booklet entitled as The Regional Struggle for Syria. This work is edited by Julian Barnes Decay and Daniel Levy, and provides insights in understanding the Syrian conflict and the role of regional and international players. This book is a collective contribution of different scholars and is divided in eight (8) chapters.

In the Introduction, “Hegemony and Sectarianism after Iraq”, the book deals with the sectarianism which prevailed after Iraq invasion by US in 2003. Here the author emphasises that the Syrian Civil war patronised by regional players who have strong weight on the ground. Among these countries, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar support rebels’, while as Iran, Iraq and Hezbollah movement support Assad regime. Other players who put right themselves are Jordan, Kurds and Israel to gain their interests too. In this conflict Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey are providing arms and human support collected from different countries all over the world which resulted in regional clashes and bomb explosions particularly in Turkey and Lebanon. This conflict adopted the regional communal rivalry because rebels depend on Sunni forces while as Assad heavily depend on Shia forces. This polarity happened due to hegemony of some regional states after ousting Saddam from Iraq and wishes to achieve its goal due to rebel backing with the thought “must not lose” basis (p.8; italics mine). Much imbalance is created when US turned blind eye to the region and pawed way for rebels and the region became an epicentre of conflict and would engulf whole world as it happened in Paris Moreover Gulf States are contesting not only for broader regional gains (as Saudi monarchy support Salfi’s while Qatar and Turkey is playing Brotherhood Card) but also to overcome Iranian influence. However the resistance axis are more sound ideological  though Hamas turned its back to Assad but rest are gripped very tightly with each other. World powers too poised themselves into rebel blocs (like US, EU support rebels through Gulf States) while as Russia support Iran backed Assad regime for regional gains. In such turbulent conditions two joint UN-Aran League envoys for Syria, Kofi Anan and Lakhdar Ibrahimi proposed a regional accord through Geneva I and II paid almost nothing for long lasting solution.

The first chapter, “The Gulf States: United against Iran and divided over Islamists”, deals with conflicting ideologies prevailing in the region. According to Hassan-Hassan, the Arab state, though appearing united against Iranian influence in the region to weaken the resistance axis, but inter Gulf State rivalry is clear among them to achieve regional superiority. Earlier these states tried to develop influence on Assad and motivate him politically but failed to achieve their divided objectives when Assad refused to bow down and used ruthless power to overcome rebellion by killing hundreds of protesters. These states later provided every kind of assistance to rebels like Qatar to groups ideologically close to Muslim Brotherhood while as Saudi’s more conservative Salfi groups even tried to pressure US to provide high grade weapons to rebels. Saudis particularly are pitching from 1979 to overcome Iranian influence in the region and for this Syrian conflict is better option. These regional forces, particularly Saudi Arabia, wish to overcome resistance axis influence by playing the tribal Sunni card from Iraq to Syria, via Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Jordan who achieved the neutralized citizenship. They want to achieve the lost glory which for which Assad declared them as “Half Men” (p. 19) on their criticism to Hezbollah during Lebanon-Israel war. But the internal divide among the Gulf States have weaken their cause while as Assad through resistance Axis gained some ground.

Chapter Two, “Iran: Syria as the first line of defence”, by Jubin Goodarzi opens with the Iranian support to demonstrators by declaring them Islamists against the Gulf Monarchs but changed its tune when his friend befell prey to uprising. While understanding the regional lore on uprising Iran assured all-out support to Assad to keep his regime intact For Iran, Syria is only option to surmount Israeli threat by channelizing military equipment’s to Hezbollah via Assad regime and to maintain pressure over Israel.

Chapter third, “Iraq: Sunni resurgence feeds Maliki’s fears”, deals with suspicion and threat of the Sunni insurgency to Maliki government in Iraq. This title feeds Maliki’s fears and pushes him to support Assad who remained very painful for Iraq during last decade because most of the insurgents entered in to Iraq via Syria and Damascus kept intentionally blind eye towards them to disturb US forces in Iraq. The author considered Maliki support to Assad genuine in order to minimise the Sunni insurgent pressure or to get any strong hold in Iraq. This suspicion was also fed by the role of Gulf States in Iraq earlier and now in Syria as commented against them in a dinner party by Bagdad Ambassador by saying “the same people who conspired against Iraq are now conspiring against Syria” (p. 34). This statement infuriated Saudi foreign Minister and was barely calmed by Syrian Foreign Minister. In a TV interview Noori al Maliki directly condemned states like Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar for their involvement in destabilization of Syria and Iraq. However the author highlighted the double standard of Maliki govt. too, who one side believes in negotiation and on the other provides full support to Assad. For Baghdad support to Assad is compulsion because if Sunni rebels got hold over Iraq means the dispersed Insurgent groups in Iraq will get strength. Moreover Maliki govt. in Iraq has concern over the double standard of CIA which fights as counter terrorism forces in Baghdad and provide arms to the Syrian rebels. All these concern have created doubts in the Iraqi govt and the situation forced Maliki to take Assad side to balance the power in the region while as Sunni force are fighting to topple Assad and later Baghdad to reconstitute the Sunni hegemony in the regions.