

A Critical Assessment of Ghana's 2024 General Elections

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Abstract

Ghana's 2024 general elections marked the ninth election with two presidential run-offs since the country returned to multi-party politics in 1992. While the country continues to face some election-related challenges, the conduct of elections has been generally peaceful with uninterrupted transfers of power between rival political parties in the last three decades. This article analyzes Ghana's 2024 general elections with a focus on electoral issues and processes such as the pre-election campaign, management of the elections, and analyses of the election results. The article also engages in a critical comparative analysis of the 2024 election results with previous general elections to unearth emerging trends. The article concludes by exploring the implications of the 2024 general elections on the country's democratic development.

Keywords: Ghana, 2024 General Elections, Fourth Republic, Democratic Development

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1. Introduction

Ghana's 2024 general elections which took place on December 7, 2024, marked the ninth election with two presidential run-offs since the country transitioned to constitutional rule in 1993 after the 1992 general elections (IFES, 2024; Chin, 2024). For observers, Ghana's progress in sustaining its democratic rule for more than three decades in a sub-region that has been bedeviled with recent military coups needs to be applauded. While applauding the country's democratic progress, especially its peaceful conduct of the 2024 general elections (African Union-AU, 2024), it is imperative to also highlight the persistent challenges facing the country's democracy. Challenges such as recurrent electoral violence, corruption, economic mismanagement and ethnic-based politics (Arthur, 2009; Asah-Asante and Brako, 2014). Since gaining independence on 6th March 1957, Ghana continues to experience different types of political life. From the pre-independence era of internal self-rule (1951-1957) when Ghanaians or Gold Coasters took control of their destiny from the British colonial regime under Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah and his Convention People's Party (CPP) government to the post-independence era (1957-1960) of democratic rule (Ayee, 1997). The one-party rule of the CPP government and the periods of military regimes (Ayee, 1997; Darkwa, 2023) also need to be underscored. Among Ghana's past military governments, the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) regime was the longest military rule (1981-1993) in Ghana's political history (Ayee, 1997; Darkwa, 2023).

As revealed, Ghana's democratic trajectory has been interrupted many times by the military since the first coup, which toppled President Kwame Nkrumah occurred on February 24, 1966. The country's political journey, however, took a more positive pathway since the country transitioned to democratic rule in the early 1990s. The founding elections were held in November and December 1992 and the Fourth Republic officially started on January 7, 1993 (Gyimah-Boadi, 1994; Ayee, 1997; Arthur, 2009; Kumah-Abiwu, 2025). For more than three decades, Ghana has not only sustained its democratic rule, but the country has held nine elections with two presidential run-offs since 1992 with the Fourth Republic becoming the longest in the country's political history (IFES, 2024; Chin, 2024; Kumah-Abiwu, 2025). Given the centrality of competitive multi-party elections to democratic systems, this article undertakes a critical assessment of the 2024 general elections with a focus on key electoral issues and processes such as the pre-election campaign, management of the elections, and analysis of the election results. The article also engages in a comparative analysis of the 2024 election results with previous general elections to unearth emerging trends. The article concludes by exploring the implications of the 2024 elections on Ghana's democratic future. Methodologically, the article draws on the published data on the 2024 general elections from Ghana's Electoral Commission (EC) with relevant works from the literature for the analysis. Based on the preceding context, two central questions will be examined. First, what were the main electoral issues of the 2024 general elections? Second, how do the electoral trends and outcomes of the 2024

elections compare to those of previous elections in Ghana? We address these questions by organizing the paper into three sections. The first section discusses Ghana's multi-party elections since 1992 with a focus on the successes and challenges. The second section assesses the 2024 elections with a focus on key electoral issues and processes such as the pre-election campaign, management of the elections, and analysis of the election results. The final section concludes the discussions and provides recommendations.

2. Ghana's Multi-party Elections since 1992: An Overview

Ghana's transition to democracy after Jerry Rawlings' PNDC succumbed to domestic and global pressures in the 1990s marked a significant era in the country's political history. Nic Cheeseman underscores this point when he argues that Rawlings responded to pressures to democratize by constructing "an increasingly rule-bound political system that was responsive to people's needs" (Cheeseman, 2015, p. 5). Rawlings' rule-bound approach, as Cheeseman observes, was different from other African countries such as Kenya where President Daniel arap Moi manipulated state resources to fund his party's election campaign (Cheeseman, 2015). While Cheeseman's argument on Rawlings' rule-bound approach seems to be a fair assessment, experts such as Gyimah-Boadi (1994) would counter the rule-bound idea or argument. In his work on Ghana's transition to democracy in the 1990s, Gyimah-Boadi (1994) argued that the PNDC regime under Rawlings had a severe brand of authoritarian rule throughout the 1980s where his opponents were held in detention without trial, or at best with kangaroo trials and imprisonment that had chilling effects on the society (Gyimah-Boadi, 1994; Haynes, 1993). Issues were also raised about the electoral playing field during the transition era to the extent that Ghana's transition to democracy in the 1990s was described as a "transition without change" (Gyimah-Boadi, 2008). For Gyimah-Boadi (2008), Rawlings was able to transform his PNDC into the NDC party where most of the officials from the old regime were maintained as new ministers in the NDC government.

Abdulai (1992) raised a similar issue on the uneven electoral playing field and argued that Jerry Rawlings and his newly established political party (NDC) created what he describes as "a system of popular control through intimidation" during the transition period through the organs of the revolution that were part of the PNDC regime (Abdulai, 1992, p. 69). Organs such as Mobisquads, Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRS), June Fourth Movement, 31st December Womens' Movement, and the Ghana Private Road Transport Union (GPRTU). Since the organs of the revolution were not disbanded before the 1992 general elections, Abdulai (1992) argued that Rawlings and the NDC used these organs for political mobilization and other incumbent advantages. Incumbent advantages such as the control of the state media in areas such as television, radio, and national newspapers (Abdulai, 1992; Jeffries and Thomas, 1993; Kumah-Abiwu 2023). On the state control of the media spaces during the transition era, Oquaye (2004) argued that the private press was revived after the ban on party politics was lifted, but the press was also threatened with prosecution for criminal libel and harassed in many other ways. He added that the flawed electoral register contributed to some of the challenges faced by the country during the 1992 transition era. He referenced how the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFS) made the case for a complete re-registration of all eligible voters to provide a comprehensive register for the 1992 elections, but their recommendations were not strictly followed.

While the Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC) took steps to remove about 200,000 names from the electoral register, INEC left what was estimated to be an over-registration of 1.4 million intact in the electoral register (Oquaye, 2004). On the voting process, Oquaye (2004) made the following observation:

The credibility of the 1992 elections was marred by several grave incidents that the opposition complained of, including the following: i. ballot boxes, property of INEC, were found in the homes of unauthorized persons; ii. these ballot boxes were pre-stuffed with thumb printed ballot papers, showing a clear NDC preference; iii. several ballot boxes were used even though they were not opened for public view; iv. ballot papers counted in several places were found to be more than the number of those who actually voted, according to the tallies; v. ballot boxes were conveyed by unapproved vehicles under the guard of commandos and without opposition representatives (Oquaye, 2004, p. 267).

Given the electoral challenges that had confronted the transition period, it was not surprising when the NPP blamed their defeat in the 1992 presidential election on an alleged election rigging—"stolen verdict"—by Rawlings and the NDC party with its allies, which led to the NPP's boycott of the parliamentary election held in December 1992 (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993; Nugent, 1999). The NPP boycott allowed the NDC to control 189 out of 200 seats in parliament during the first four years of the Fourth Republic (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993; Nugent, 1999). The next elections occurred on December 7, 1996. Like other scholars, Ayee (1997) observed that the electoral playing field improved during the 1996 elections as compared to the 1992 elections. Unlike the 1992 electoral environment, there was little coercive pressure or overt intimidation of voters during the 1996

elections. For Jeffries (1998), the Chairman of the Electoral Commission, Dr Afari-Gyan, who had assumed the chairmanship of the Electoral Commission (EC) in 1993, had a huge impact in building trust among the political parties, which helped to ensure free and fair general elections in 1996.

Other scholars have attributed the establishment of the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) by the EC in March 1994 to help build a consensus among the parties as another important element that has improved the electoral playing field in the 1996 general elections. For example, the EC's decision to accept the suggestion of the opposition parties to hold the presidential and parliamentary elections on the same day also helped to improve the 1996 electoral process and playing field (Jeffries, 1998). The compilation of a new voter's register in October 1995 and the opportunity that was given to all the political parties to monitor the voter registration process also helped to improve the 1996 electoral landscape. Added to that, the EC accepted the opposition parties' request to provide registered voters with voter identity cards and transparent ballot boxes at the polling stations. The parties also agreed for the final votes to be counted in public view to help protect against ballot-stuffing and other malpractices (Jeffries, 1998; Ayee, 1997). These measures not only improved the electoral process, but they also increased the competitive nature of the 1996 elections, especially between the NDC which was led by Jerry Rawlings and the NPP, led by John Agyekum Kufuor (Jeffries 1998). Ayee (1997) captured it quite well when he argued that the competitive nature of the 1996 general elections could be considered as the start of the dominance of the NDC and NPP as the two major political parties in the Fourth Republic.

Jerry Rawlings with his Progressive Alliance of three parties comprising the NDC, Egle and the Democratic People's Party [DPP] won the 1996 general elections with Rawlings receiving 57.4 percent of the total presidential votes. J.A. Kufuor and the NPP's alliance with the People's Convention Party (PCP) or what became known as the Great Alliance, lost the election with Kufuor obtaining 39.6 percent of the presidential votes. From a comparative perspective, some observers share the view that the breakdown of the 1996 election results mirrored aspects of the 1992 elections. For example, the distribution of the results shows that Rawlings and the NDC parliamentary candidates won in most rural areas, while J.A. Kufuor and the NPP parliamentary candidates performed strongly in urban areas (Jeffries, 1998; Anebo, 1997). It could be argued, based on the preceding analysis, that the 1996 elections marked an important point in what Jeffries (1998) has described as a crucial stage in completing Ghana's "incomplete transition to full multiparty democracy." We concur with Jeffries' argument on Ghana's incomplete transition process to democracy with respect to Ghana's founding elections of 1992 (Bratton, 1998). The next part examines what we describe as the era of Ghana's post-founding elections.

2.1 Ghana's Post-Founding Elections

The 2000 general elections marked the third major elections in Ghana's Fourth Republic since 1992. It is considered as one of the most important elections in the country's political history. Ayee (2002) underscored this point when he noted that the December 7, 2000, elections and the presidential run-off, which was held on 28 December 2000, was won by J.A. Kufuor of the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP). The general elections were the "most important since independence in 1957 and marked an important landmark in Ghanaian political history and democratic development" (Ayee, 2002, p. 149). Ayee (2002) offers three reasons for his "most important" idea about the elections. First, he noted that the 2000 elections marked a major departure of Jerry Rawlings from Ghana's political terrain as the longest Head of State in Ghana's political history. In addition to his three months as head of the AFRC military regime in 1979, Rawlings also served as Head of State for about eleven years in the PNDC era and two terms (eight years) as democratically elected President in the Fourth Republic, bringing his total years to almost twenty years in power (Ayee, 2002). Second, the 2000 elections, as Ayee (2002) has also observed, marked an important moment for Ghana as power was peacefully transferred from one political party to another through the ballot box for the first time in the country's history. Third, unlike the 1992 and 1996 general elections, the 2000 elections did not produce a clear winner in the first round which prompted a presidential run-off between the two strongest candidates from the NDC and NPP (Ayee, 2002). Other works have articulated similar ideas on the 2000 elections. Anebo (2000), for example, argued that the nearly 9.8 million registered voters who went to the polls in December 2000 delivered the first test of the workability of Ghana's democratic rule on issues of constitutional limitations on presidential term and the prospect to achieve a peaceful change of power through the ballot box. For others, the way in which the stakes were high in the 2000 elections as Ghanaians were not sure if Rawlings would abide by the constitutional term limit on the presidency after he had been in power for almost twenty years also made the 2000 elections unique.

EC declared John Agyekum Kufuor of the NPP the winner of the December 28, 2000, presidential run-off with 57% of the votes cast while his opponent, the incumbent Vice-President, John Atta-Mills of the ruling NDC won 43% of the votes cast (Gyimah-Boadi, 1994; Anebo, 2000). With a successful first turn-over election

in 2000 and Rawlings' adherence to the constitutional term limit after he handed power peacefully, Ghana received praise from the international community for its efforts at democratic governance/consolidation. The second turn-over election occurred in 2008 when the ruling NPP government was defeated by the opposition NDC. John Atta Mills of the NDC won the closely contested presidential run-off election, marking what Gyimah-Boadi (2009) has described as another step forward for Ghana's democratic consolidation. In their work on Ghana's general elections, Jockers et al. (2010) stated that the country's successive/competitive elections since 1996 resulted in two peaceful transfers of power between the two rival political parties in 2000 and 2008 marking great progress for the country's democratic consolidation. The third turn-over election occurred in 2016 when Nana Akufo-Addo and the opposition NPP defeated John Mahama and the ruling NDC government (Abdulai and Crawford, 2020). With the fourth turn-over election which occurred during the 2024 general elections, it could be argued, from a theoretical standpoint, in this case, Lindberg's (2006) conceptualization of the "democraticness of elections" (Lindberg, 2006), that Ghana is on the right pathway to democratic consolidation. Lindberg's (2006) work on elections and democracy in Africa advances the argument that competitive multi-party elections not only serve beyond the practice of elections as formalities of transitioning from authoritarian regimes to democracies, but repetitive and competitive elections, even when flawed, can also serve as mechanism for strengthening transitional democracies (Lindberg, 2006, Kumah-Abiwu and Darkwa, 2020; Kumah-Abiwu, 2023). Ghana's conduct of regular and repetitive multi-party elections since 1992, even when "flawed" in some respects, provide credence to Lindberg's argument on the optimistic perspective of elections in Africa.

3. A Critical Assessment of Ghana's 2024 General Elections

Contesting Parties and Candidates

Like previous elections held in the Fourth Republic (Addae and Foli, 2024), the 2024 general elections were competitive among the political parties and the candidates. A total of twelve candidates participated in the 2024 presidential election. Eight of them contested on the ticket of their political parties while four contested as independent candidates. Former President John Dramani Mahama from the opposition NDC and Dr. Mahamudu Bawumia from the ruling NPP were from the two dominant parties. Candidates from the minority parties were Nana Akosua Frimpongmaa from the Convention People's Party (CPP), Hassan Abdulai Ayariga from the All People's Congress (APC), Daniel Augustus Lartey Jnr from the Great Consolidated Popular Party (GCPP), and Christian Kwabena Andrews from the Ghana Union Movement (GUM) (Electoral Commission 2020). The rest were Kofi Akpaloo from the Liberal Party of Ghana (LPG), and Mohammed Frimpong from the National Democratic Party (NDP). Nana Kwame Bediako, Alan John Kwadwo Kyerematen, Kofi Koranteng, and George Twum-Barimah-Adu contested as independent presidential candidates (Electoral Commission 2024). We should note that Madam Akua Donkor, founder and candidate of the Ghana Freedom Party (GFP), was the thirteenth candidate but she suddenly passed away before the 2024 general elections. Despite her passing, the Electoral Commission still kept her name on the ballot. Removing her name would have caused financial and administrative inconvenience to the other parties and the EC. The incumbent President Nana Akufo-Addo of the NPP was ineligible to run because he had served the maximum two-term limit which explains why Vice President Mahamudu Bawumia was chosen as the candidate for the NPP.

Most of the political parties and candidates who contested in the 2024 elections also took part in the 2020 elections, except for the four new independent candidates. John Mahama (NDC), Christian Kwabena Andrews (GUM), Hassan Ayariga (APC), Percival Kofi Akpaloo (LPG), and Madam Akua Donkor (GFP) all contested in the 2020 elections under the same party platforms as the 2024 elections (Electoral Commission 2020). In 2020, the CPP was represented by Ivor Kobina Greenstreet, while Henry Herbert Lartey contested on the ticket of the GCPP. Nana Konadu Agyeman Rawlings, the spouse of former President Rawlings, also contested the 2020 presidential election on the ticket of the NDP. In 2024, however, the above political parties were represented by different presidential candidates (Electoral Commission, 2024). In the parliamentary race, there were 801 candidates, made up of 682 males and 119 females, who contested for the 276 seats in Ghana's parliament. The number of parliamentary seats had increased from 275 to 276 in 2024 due to the creation of the Guan constituency in Oti Region which has no parliamentary representation between 2021 and 2024 (Electoral Commission, 2024). This was due to a technical issue concerning the creation of districts and constituencies that the Executive arm of government and the EC failed to coordinate in 2020. Out of the 801 parliamentary candidates, there were 111 independent candidates, while the rest were party-sponsored candidates (IFES, 2024). The gender aspect of the 2024 elections is another interesting revelation worth noting. EC data indicates that a total of 119 female candidates contested in 100 out of the 276 constituencies in 14 out of the 16 regions. It was only in Ahafo and North-East that had no female candidates. Of this number, candidates from the various

political parties were 106 in total (i.e., 40 from the NDC and 36 from the NPP; the rest from the other parties), and 13 were independent candidates (IFES, 2024; Electoral Commission, 2024).

3.1 The Campaign

The political campaigns for the 2024 elections were largely peaceful and focused on important electoral issues affecting the voters. For some observers, the electoral playing field for the 2024 elections was not entirely even, given the significant financial and resource challenges that faced smaller opposition parties as compared to the NPP. The Coalition of Domestic Election Observers (CODEO) noted that incidents of incumbency abuse, where candidates and government officials misappropriated public resources for campaigning (CDD-Ghana, 2024). Unlike other smaller opposition parties, the NDC was comparatively well-funded and was sometimes able to match the ruling NPP's campaign efforts (CDD-Ghana, 2024). Despite the disparities in campaign resources, all eight political parties and four independent candidates addressed the pressing concerns of the Ghanaian electorate. Issues such as the economy, unstable exchange rates, rising inflation, cost of living, youth unemployment, job creation, growing public debt, corruption, and illegal mining (galamsey) were addressed (CDD-Ghana, 2024).

The economic challenges that emerged in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic took center stage in the campaign messages. COVID-19 pandemic pressing issues like soaring inflation, currency depreciation, and youth unemployment impacted the ruling NPP's campaign in the 2024 elections. Discontent and dissatisfaction among the Ghanaian public grew as the election campaign intensified. The ruling NPP's poor economic management and its inability to effectively address the environmental issues stemming from illegal mining were raised by the opposition parties, especially the NDC (Myjoyonline, 2024b). The NPP also struggled to promote its 'breaking the eight' slogan, a reference to the tradition of alternating power every eight years between the NPP and the NDC since 1992. By campaigning on 'breaking the eight' using the mantra 'It is Possible,' the NPP was expecting to retain power after being in power for eight years (2017 and 2024) (New Patriotic Party-NPP Manifesto, 2024). In contrast, the NDC's central campaign message capitalized on the public dissatisfaction against the NPP. Former President John Mahama's campaign, for example, centered on alleviating the economic hardships of Ghanaians and advocating for improved governance. After eight years in opposition, the NDC presented its vision of "The Ghana that We Want" as a better alternative to the NPP's message of continuity. The NDC was successful in evoking its past economic performance to that of the NPP for Ghanaians to decide which economy was better performing. The NDC also introduced a "24-hour economy" policy proposal by pledging to combat corruption, create jobs for the teeming unemployed youth, and restore public trust in state institutions (National Democratic Congress-NDC Manifesto, 2024).

On the part of the NPP, their campaign message touted the successes of President Nana Akufo-Addo's Free Senior High School (SHS) and Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) initiatives, claiming these programs helped millions of students to access secondary education for free. While cognizant of the criticisms faced by these initiatives, the NPP reassured Ghanaians of their readiness to improve the effectiveness of these programs when elected. They promised to revitalize the economy, alongside initiatives for digital skills training, job creation for the youth, and tax incentives for small businesses (New Patriotic Party-NPP Manifesto, 2024). Meanwhile, the New Force, under the leadership of Nana Kwame Bediako, promised to transform Ghana with a comprehensive initiative dubbed the "12 Pillars of Economic Freedom." Their slogan, "Anidasoo aba" (Hope has come), seems to have resonated well with the youth, as the party promised to harness Ghana's untapped natural and human resources for development (Ebo-Hawkson, 2024). The election campaign also witnessed an interesting dimension as the Movement for Change, led by Mr. Alan Kyerematen, who broke away from the NPP, presented his Great Transformational Plan (GTP) to the electorate. He vowed to start an industrial revolution that would create job opportunities, especially for the youth. Alan Kyerematen noted that his campaign message is grounded on innovative concepts he claimed were lacking during his previous association with the NPP (Myjoyonline, 2023).

Another issue that was featured during the 2024 campaign season was the discourse on Artificial Intelligence (AI). As the case in other nations such as the United States, Great Britain, and Brazil among other countries, technology emerged as a crucial instrument for candidates and political parties. According to Osae-Kwapong (2024), advanced technological innovations, including AI was deployed for positive and negative purposes throughout the 2024 election campaigns. Social media platforms became vibrant arenas where candidates displayed their technological skills and strategies to tailor their messages to resonate with their audiences. AI technology was also misused during the campaign as some political actors resorted to spreading disinformation/misinformation on social media to tarnish the reputation of their opponents (Osae-Kwapong, 2024).

Other candidates harnessed technology as a means of combating such deceit by deploying AI to flag false information in real-time. This initiative was supported by stakeholders, including the EC, political parties, civil society organizations, and media outlets. For example, a coalition known as the Ghana Fact-Checking Coalition became the nerve-center in utilizing AI to flag false information (Myjoyonline, 2024b). A good example of a political disinformation that had occurred during the 2024 election involved Oheneba Nana Asiedu, a known NPP member and a radio presenter. In November 2024, he was arrested for broadcasting inaccurate claims regarding the election process. Asiedu falsely asserted that voters would be required to cast their ballots for presidential candidates on different days, which was a blatant false statement. The National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) condemned his statement as false/misleading which can create confusing among the public on the electoral process (National Commission for Civic Education NCCE, 2024).

Like other previous elections, the 2024 elections were not devoid of political prophecies, polls, and other predictions. Numerous “religious leaders” proclaimed who they believed would emerge victorious in the presidential race, claiming to convey messages from God. While political prophecies are not new to Ghana’s politics, the rising surge in these religious prophecies drew criticisms from several observers. These observers argued that such actions not only pose huge risks to the electoral process, but to Ghana’s democracy itself. Haynes (2024a) argued that religious prophecies could heavily influence voter behavior, leading them to cast their ballots in a predetermined direction. When religious figures assert having received “divine insights” regarding elections tend to shape not only the behavior of voters, but they also impact public perception. This, he argues, undermines the principle of free and fair elections, which ought to represent the will of the people rather than being swayed by alleged “divine interventions” (Haynes, 2024a).

In addition to these prophetic predictions, numerous polls/forecasts emerged from organizations such as Fitch Solutions and Global InfoAnalytics (IFES 2024). Many of these analysts predicted a victory for the opposition NDC, while a select few leaned towards the ruling NPP, with some suggesting the possibility of a run-off election. It is important to note that while prophecies, polls, and predictions shape electoral outcomes, their effects are not uniform. For Quaye and Duodu (2024), scientific polls offer empirical insights, whereas prophecies are rooted in superstition which could adversely impact voters, particularly those who are less informed. Under Ghana’s 1992 Constitution and the Political Parties Act, 2000 (Act 574), political campaign financing is largely regulated. Political parties may receive donations from individuals and organizations, although non-citizens are prohibited from contributing. While there are no limits on campaign expenditure or donations, parties are required to disclose their funding sources and usage to ensure transparency and accountability (Political Parties Act 2000). Breaches of these regulations can lead to fines, the forfeiture of certificates, and possible deportation of non-citizens should they be caught contributing to Ghana’s political parties. However, the EC lacks the means to detect funding from non-citizens, allowing parties to raise unlimited amounts of uncategorized funds. Additionally, while the political parties’ code of conduct forbids campaigning within 48 hours of the polls, there is no regulated campaign season in Ghana (Political Parties Act 2000).

The infiltrating of opponent’s campaigns was another issue that emerged in the 2024 election season. In a lead to the elections, political party supporters employed a strategy of infiltrating opponent’s campaigns. A good example occurred at an NPP rally in Accra on December 5, 2024, when a woman dressed in NPP gear later revealed her true identity as she shouted “eye zu” (NDC’s slogan) in response to a journalist’s question. Similarly, prophet Stephen Adom Kyei Duah publicly declared “eye zu” after praying for the NPP’s presidential candidate, Dr. Bawumia. On a similar issue, the NDC’s presidential candidate, John Mahama claimed that many NPP supporters told him privately they intended to vote for the NDC due to their dissatisfaction with the ruling NPP (Modern Ghana News 2024). As the case with previous elections, Ghanaians are often worried about possible outbreaks of violence during elections. As a result, they tend to find many ways to mitigate election-related violence before, during and after general elections. The signing of a Peace Pact among political parties is one of the trust and consensus-building strategies. All twelve presidential candidates signed a Peace Pact on November 28, 2024, to ensure peaceful elections. The Peace Pact was organized and led by the Ghana National Peace Council in collaboration with the Institute of Democratic Governance (IDEG) (Hawkson, 2024). The NDC set six conditions to be met before they could participate in the Peace Pact. They include a) implementation of recommendations from the Ayawaso West Wuogon by-election, b) prosecute those responsible for the 2020 election-related violence, c) ensure justice for the deceased, d) accountability for ballot paper irregularities, d) investigate missing EC IT equipment, and e) secure public commitments from key national figures (Korankye, 2024).

Like previous elections, accusations and counteraccusations from political parties were also part of the 2024 campaign. For instance, NDC accused the EC of attempting to manipulate the voter registration data to favor the NPP. They based their claims on five key issues with the provisional voter register: a) the alleged illegal addition of 243,540 transfers to the 2024 voter's list; b) over 15,000 untraceable voter transfer paths believed to stem from fraudulent registrations; c) their complain that 3,957 voters registered in 2023 were removed from the 2024 list; d) 2,094 voters allegedly transferred to different polling stations were missing from the Absent Voter List; and e) EC has allegedly corrupt files lacking names and photos of registered voters. The NDC demanded a forensic audit to address these concerns (Osei, 2024).

It is important to note that the NDC was not the only opposition party to express concerns about the EC. Interestingly, both the NDC and the NPP have supported the EC when in power but seem to accuse the EC of bias when in opposition. Part of the growing mistrust between the NDC and the EC could be attributed to the way the EC Chair and Deputies were appointed following the removal of the former EC Chair, Charlotte Osei by President Nana Akufo-Addo in 2018 (Kumah-Abiwu and Darkwa, 2020). In their response to the concerns raised by the NDC, the EC stated that the voters' register for the 2024 election was provisional and urged parties to assist in cleaning it, insisting they had nothing to hide. The EC acknowledged the issues raised by the NDC and said they had identified and addressed many of them. At the request of the NDC, the EC held an Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) meeting, which was open to media coverage, the first of its kind as part of the efforts to maintain high levels of transparency in the electoral process (Arthur, 2024). We should note that EC was unable to carry out a forensic audit of the provisional voters' register before the 2024 elections for two reasons. First, the EC noted that the timeline between mid-September and the 2nd of December date for the special voting was insufficient given the extensive number of polling stations—40,976 across 276 constituencies—and 261 district offices that need to be covered. Second, they maintained that by law, the EC is responsible for collaborating with political parties and other stakeholders to clean the register, rendering the forensic audit unnecessary. The NDC remains unsatisfied with this explanation and embarked on a nationwide protest, dubbed the “Enough is Enough Demo,” which took place on Tuesday, September 17, 2024 (Arthur, 2024).

4. Analysis of the 2024 Election Results

The NDC won a decisive victory in the 2024 presidential and parliamentary elections. The official results indicate that out of a total of 11,683,483 valid votes cast, John Dramani Mahama of the NDC received 6,591,790 votes, representing 56.42 percent. His main contender, Mahamudu Bawumia of the NPP, garnered 4,877,611 votes, translating to 41.75 percent. The remaining ten candidates collectively received 214,082 votes, or 1.83 percent. As shown in Table 1, the NDC won in thirteen regions, while the NPP won in only three regions. This sizeable margin highlights the NDC's dominant performance, particularly in the regions it won. It is no wonder their massive win became known as the “green wave” (i.e., green is part of the NDC's colors) of the 2024 elections (EC Election Results 2024). In terms of parliamentary representation, the NDC won a significant 183 seats out of 275, while the NPP secured only 88 seats. Additionally, four seats were claimed by independent candidates, with no other political parties gaining any representation, as illustrated in Table 2 (EC Election Results 2024). Table 3 details the regional distribution of seats among the competing political parties, reinforcing that the NDC was the dominant party across thirteen regions, leaving the NPP with a presence in just three. Notably, the two political parties each obtained three seats in the North East Region, and independent candidates won single seats in Ashanti, Central, Eastern, and Northern Regions respectively as per Table 2.

The results from the 2024 general elections further emphasize the entrenched dominance of both the NDC and NPP in Ghana's political landscape. Together, they accounted for over 98 percent of the valid votes cast in the presidential race. Similarly, in the parliamentary elections, the two parties controlled more than 98 percent of the available seats, with only four seats (1.45 percent) going to independent candidates. It is significant to note that these independent candidates were aggrieved members of the NDC and NPP who chose to run without party affiliation. Furthermore, the unresolved seat in the Ablekuma North Constituency is yet to be determined between the NDC and NPP. The analysis presented in Table 3 reveals that the NDC holds approximately a two-thirds majority in Parliament, which is constitutionally required for a ruling party to effectively implement its policies. This marks a stark contrast to the 2020 elections, where the NPP and NDC were deadlocked with 137 seats each, resulting in the first hung parliament in the Fourth Republic. Notably, there were 275 parliamentary seats contested in 2020 compared to 276 in 2024. A comparative examination of the electoral performances of the NDC and NPP in 2020 and 2024, as shown in Table 4, uncovers intriguing insights. The NPP suffered a loss of 1,898,455 votes compared to its 2020 totals. Conversely, the NDC increased its vote count by only 326,524.

In percentage terms, the NPP experienced a decline of approximately 28 percent in its vote share, while the NDC improved its share by just 5 percent.

The NPP's losses were evident in all sixteen regions, with the exception of the North East Region, which is Bawumia's home region. In stark contrast, the NDC gained votes in ten of the sixteen regions comparative to its performance in 2020. Of particular interest is the NDC's gain of 43,927 (697076 - 653149) votes in the Ashanti Region, traditionally a stronghold of the NPP, while it experienced a drop of 22,274 votes in its own stronghold, the Volta Region. Further analysis shows that the NPP experienced its greatest loss of 571,644 votes from the Greater Accra Region, constituting around 30 percent of its total vote drop. Additionally, the NPP lost 429,024 votes in its stronghold, the Ashanti Region, making up 23 percent of its total losses, and 258,827 votes in the Eastern Region, its second stronghold, accounting for 14 percent of the overall decline.

Table 5 provides a comparative analysis of voter turnout during presidential elections from 1992 to 2024. The findings indicate that when an incumbent party or candidate is likely to win, both national and regional voter turnout rates tend to rise. This trend has been consistently observed in each election where the incumbent has competed. For instance, in 1996, when Jerry Rawlings (NDC) was re-elected, the national voter turnout increased from 50.2 percent in 1992 to 77.9 percent in 1996 (Ayee, 1997). This pattern continued in 2004 with John Kufuor (NPP) as the incumbent, where turnout surged from 61.6 percent in 2000 to an all-time high of 85.1 percent in 2004. This trend was similarly replicated in 2012 and 2020 with Mahama and Nana Akufo-Addo as incumbents, respectively. Conversely, in elections where an incumbent candidate appears likely to lose, voter turnout tends to decrease. This analysis sheds light on the changing dynamics in Ghana's political arena and further emphasizes the remarkable outcomes of the 2024 elections.

4.1 Why Did Mahama and the NDC Win the Elections?

The NDC secured a decisive victory in the 2024 elections for several reasons. A primary reason or explanation was the widespread dissatisfaction with the NPP's handling of the economy. Under the NPP, Ghana faced what experts from civil society organizations like the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) labelled as one of the worst economic crises in the Fourth Republic. Inflation surged to its highest level in 21 years, reaching 54 percent in 2023 and remaining around 40 percent at the beginning of 2024, only to be reduced to 22 percent in June. The economy experienced multiple downgrades from credit rating agencies, and the national debt surpassed \$55 billion, compelling the government to seek a \$3 billion bailout from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Bruce, 2023). Between December 2021 and October 2022, the exchange rate for the Ghanaian cedi against the US dollar jumped from GHS 5.9991 to GHS 13.015 per the Bank of Ghana Exchange rates, with even higher rates seen in the forex bureau and black markets. On October 25, 2022, a faction of the ruling NPP government's Members of Parliament held a press conference demanding the resignation of Finance Minister, Ken Ofori-Atta and Minister of State Charles Adu Boahen, citing economic mismanagement, rising inflation and the depreciation of the Ghanaian cedi. Allegations of conflict of interest against Ofori-Atta further fueled their calls for his dismissal. Despite these growing concerns, the President requested Mr. Ofori-Atta to remain in his position to complete the IMF negotiations (Appiah-Osei, 2023).

Amid the economic turmoil, the government attributed its failures to external factors such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the COVID-19 pandemic, which could be considered as a fair explanation for the serious economic challenges faced by the ruling NPP government. However, by November 2024, the dollar was trading at GHS 16.3082 and the Vice-President, who is also the ruling party's presidential candidate, once lauded as an economic savior, shifted focus from economy-related issues to digitization, drawing criticism for his perceived incompetence. The NDC was quick to highlight this shift and linked him to the economic crisis. Previously, he lambasted the previous Mahama administration for the cedi's decline when the exchange rate was around GHS 5.00 in 2016. The significant depreciation of the cedi increased the cost of living, borrowing rates, and inflation, causing widespread hardship for many Ghanaians. The NDC seized the opportunity to compare its management of the economy to the NPP and asked Ghanaians to give it another chance to reset the economy, leading to its proposed "24-Hour Economy" policy idea as a suitable solution to Ghana's economic problems (NDC Manifesto, 2024). Youth unemployment also played a major role in shaping the outcome of the 2024 election results. While the NPP ruling government had well-intended job creation projects, their inability to meet their high job creation promises increased public dissatisfaction for the party due to the high unemployment across the country. Pre-election surveys indicated that unemployment consistently ranked among the top concerns for the youth. For example, the 2023 Ghana Household Income and Expenditure Survey reported unemployment rate of 14.7 percent. Young voters, aged 18 to 35, made up a substantial 55 percent of the total registered voters, totaling 10,343,810 out of 18,774,159 (EC Election Results, 2024).

NDC seized the opportunity to launch its Youth Manifesto in August 2024, focusing on job creation, skills development, and the abolition of academic fees for first-year students at public universities. The manifesto also included provisions for supporting young entrepreneurs with funding and mentorship program (NDC Manifesto 2024). The widespread perception of corruption within the NPP government further alienated voters. Reports involving ministers and officials signing questionable deals increased significantly. Civil society organizations such as the CDD-Ghana, IMANI Africa, and Citizens Movement Against Corruption raised alarms about President Akufo Addo extending favors to his “family and friends” in government appointments (Jehoney, 2024). Ahead of the elections, in August 2024, the NDC held a press conference accusing the government of bypassing public procurement processes to award contracts. Corruption allegations against the Akufo-Addo government also included the controversial Agyapa Royalties Deal, Power Distribution Services (PDS) scandal, procurement of the Sputnik V Vaccine, and issues related to COVID-19 expenditures. In response, the NDC pledged in its manifesto to establish Operation Recover All Loot (ORAL) to reclaim misappropriated state funds and prosecute offenders, which resonated with many voters (Afrane, 2024). The National Cathedral Project was a private promise that was reported to have been made by President Akufo-Addo to God during his 2016 election campaign. After taking office, he transformed this personal commitment into a state project without proper legislative approval. Despite criticism from the NDC and others who are opposed to the questionable issues surrounding the project, Akufo-Addo and his government dismissed those concerns. Over \$58 million was allegedly spent on the cathedral project, which many viewed as unnecessary, especially during a period of financial crisis in the country (Haynes, 2024b; Myjoyonline, 2023). Notwithstanding the \$58 million that has already been spent, the project is still at the foundation level (Haynes, 2024b; Haynes, 2025). After the minority in Parliament raised issues of procurement breaches and conflict of interest issues linked to the project, many members of the Board of Trustees of the project, including Bishop Dag Heward-Mills, Dr. Mensa Otabil, and Archbishop Nicholas Duncan-Williams resigned. It could be argued that the opacity of the National Cathedral project and the misconduct associated with it in combination with other factors such as the economy might have contributed to the electoral defeat of the NPP (Haynes, 2025; Myjoyonline, 2023).

While illegal mining or *galamsey* has been a lingering problem in Ghana, including the era of the NDC government, the activities of illegal mining surged under the NPP government in many parts of the country. Ghanaians have expressed concerns on the pollution of water bodies, forest reserves and the ecosystem causing health and environmental harm from illegal mining, but the government was less effective in addressing the issue. The government finally responded to the public outcry and established the Interministerial Committee on Illegal Mining (IMCIM), chaired by Professor Kwabena Frimpong-Boateng. The establishment of the IMCIM appears to be a commendable step by the NPP government, but the situation worsened with allegations of ruling party officials, including Charles Bissie, Chairman Wontumi, and MP Eugene Boakye Antwi, being involved in the same illegal mining activities their government is fighting against (Arthur, 2024). The report that was published by Frimpong-Boateng detailing alleged government complicity was quite revealing, but no concrete action was taken on the report. One could further argue that the public displeasure about the *galamsey* issue and the alleged involvement of government officials partly contributed to the NPP’s defeat in the 2024 elections (Arthur, 2024).

Additionally, the NPP had internal political conflicts which seem to have affected their party cohesion. For example, over 80 MPs from the ruling NPP urged the President to dismiss the Minister of Finance alongside Charles Adu Boahen. Instead, several of the NPP MPs and their spokesperson, Andy Appiah Kubi, the MP for Asante Akyem North, and Professor Frimpong-Boateng were reported to have faced persecution by some members of the party. It is likely, as this article observes, that the widely circulated internal conflicts within the party may have caused their supporters not to participate in the elections, leading to low voter turnout experienced in traditional NPP strongholds such as the Ashanti region. While mindful of other explanatory factors, the NPP parliamentary candidates that lost in constituencies they have held for decades further support the argument of the low turnout from their supporters in their strongholds. The impact of the low turnout of the NPP supporters in their strongholds is illustrated when comparing the party’s electoral performance in 2020 with 2024. According to Table 4, the NPP suffered a loss of 1,898,455 votes, plummeting from 6,776,066 votes in 2020 to 4,877,611 in 2024. Conversely, the NDC witnessed a gain of 326,524 votes, increasing from 6,591,790 in 2020 to 6,265,266 in 2024 (EC Election Results, 2024).

It is apparent, as this article observes, that the NDC’s victory in the 2024 elections can be attributed to a combination of factors. Factors such as widespread dissatisfaction with the NPP’s economic management, high youth unemployment, alleged complicity of government and party officials in *galamsey*, and growing concerns over corruption. It is fair to also argue that the NDC also mounted a strong electoral campaign which helped the party win the election. At the same time, as shown in our analysis, the economic condition of the country did not present a good outcome for the NPP to retain power. As inflation soared and the national debt escalated,

Ghanaians found themselves struggling under the weight of a faltering economy, prompting the NDC to propose a fresh start with its “24-hour economy” policy. The party’s focus on job creation and support for young entrepreneurs in its Manifesto appear to resonate with the electorate, particularly the large youth demographic. Moreover, as this paper argues, allegations of corruption within the NPP, including questionable government contracts and the contentious National Cathedral Project, seemed to further alienate voters from the party.

As revealed in the analyses, the 2024 elections appear to mirror Ghana’s previous elections in many aspects in terms of electoral issues, electoral processes such as competitive campaigns, contesting parties and candidates. It also worth pointing out that electoral violence (Kumah-Abiwu, 2016) which has consistently marred previous elections occurred during the 2024 elections. Reports indicate of widespread vandalism of properties belonging to political parties, the police service, and the EC. There were reports of the destruction of ballot papers and pink sheets at various Collation Centers. The EC offices in both the Damango and Ayensuano Constituencies were set ablaze with reported deaths (CDD-Ghana, 2024). The Coalition of Domestic Election Observers (CODEO) recorded six fatalities related to the 2024 elections, among them Haruna Shaibu, a 31-year-old steel bender, who was shot at the Nyankpala lorry station in the Tolon Constituency, and Mukila Ziblim, aged 35, who succumbed to a stray bullet during the collation in Damongo (CDD-Ghana, 2024). A report by the Ghana Center for Democracy and Development (CDD-Ghana) reported the death of eight people during the 2020 elections, highlighting a disturbing trend. Despite numerous calls for accountability on these issues, justice remains elusive for most victims. Some experts have also proposed a depoliticization of the appointment of security heads as a positive step to help address the issue.

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

The successful conduct of the 2024 general elections has once again shown the resilience and commitment of Ghanaians to sustain their democracy. As the analyses have revealed, competitive multi-party elections are still central to the country’s democratic life, as the case in other democracies. The 2024 general elections, as earlier noted, not only marked the ninth election with two presidential run-offs in the Fourth Republic, but it is clear that democracy is gradually being consolidated in Ghana. The discussions have also revealed that the electoral issues and processes, such as the pre-election campaign and the management of the elections seemed to be generally consistent with previous elections, with some incremental changes for the better. On the emerging electoral issues and the factors that shaped the outcome of the 2024 elections, our analyses have also revealed that the NDC and its presidential candidate, former President John Mahama, were not only formidable in their campaign messaging and the promises made to Ghanaians, but the alleged questionable issues confronting the Akufo-Addo government have arguably also contributed to their loss. Issues such as the National Cathedral Project, the surge in illegal mining (galamsey) and poor economic performance, among others. On the broader implications of the 2024 elections on Ghana’s democratic future (Kumah-Abiwu and Darkwa, 2024), one key lesson that needs to be highlighted is the need to ensure a more level playing field for all political participants. Strengthening the regulatory framework around campaign financing is another important area that can help prevent the influx of ‘black money’ in the electoral process (Arthur 2016).

The appointment process of the EC Chair and Deputies requires a thorough review to eliminate any perception of bias. This can involve broader consultations with key stakeholders, including political parties, civil society, and independent bodies, to help build trust in the EC. Equally important is the need to address the perennial electoral violence often associated with Ghana’s elections. It would be useful to also set a specific campaign season, akin to the practices in other democracies to create a structured electoral process/environment for political parties. This would allow for clearer guidelines and expectations for all party candidates while minimizing the potential for campaign irregularities. The ongoing dialogue about the role of incumbency in elections is crucial for sustaining democratic norms. Measures should be implemented to curb the misuse of public resources for political gain, fostering a fairer electoral landscape where candidates can compete on equal footing. By addressing these issues and implementing recommended actions, Ghana can safeguard its democracy, reinforcing the principle of fair competition while continuing to engage citizens in the political process. These steps will be vital not only for the current electoral cycle but for the future of democratic governance in Ghana.

Table 1 2024 Presidential Elections – Results by Regions

Region	Registered Voters	Total Votes Cast	Total Valid Votes	Turnout (%)	Mahama's Votes	Mahama's (%)	Bawumia's Votes	Bawumia's (%)	Others' Votes	Others' (%)
Ahafo	359,284	252,575	247,675	70.30	130,106	52.53	113,851	45.97	3,718	1.50
Ashanti	3,295,275	2,135,973	2,106,108	64.82	697,076	33.10	1,366,800	64.90	42,232	2.01
Bono	719,926	448,957	438,486	62.36	235,681	53.75	192,773	43.96	10,032	2.29
Bono East	672,833	358,005	347,040	53.21	216,691	62.44	124,811	35.96	5,538	1.60
Central	1,752,162	992,477	965,551	56.64	562,620	58.27	382,749	39.64	20,182	2.09
Eastern	1,810,438	983,362	961,885	54.32	453,234	47.12	493,234	51.28	15,417	1.60
Greater Accra	3,765,494	1,999,786	1,977,079	53.11	1,260,832	63.77	681,535	34.47	34,712	1.76
North East	339,885	258,387	249,351	76.02	111,051	44.54	134,800	54.06	3,500	1.40
Northern	1,210,798	938,146	914,722	77.48	529,456	57.88	370,928	40.55	14,338	1.57
Oti	410,700	281,496	272,970	68.54	182,470	66.85	86,489	31.68	4,011	1.47
Savannah	342,437	202,081	195,109	59.01	134,563	68.97	56,774	29.10	3,772	1.93
Upper East	741,293	494,525	477,526	66.71	361,597	75.72	106,700	22.34	9,229	1.93
Upper West	518,546	349,015	339,548	67.31	242,852	71.52	89,906	26.48	6,790	2.00
Volta	1,023,957	658,131	648,354	64.27	584,234	90.11	56,699	8.75	7,421	1.14
Western	1,289,154	735,721	718,067	57.07	423,245	58.94	275,231	38.33	19,591	2.73
Western North	521,977	341,954	332,011	65.51	202,689	61.05	124,024	37.36	5,298	1.60
Adjustments*		492,001	492,001		263,393		220,307		8,301	
Totals/National	18,774,159	11,922,592	11,683,483	63.51	6,591,790	56.42	4,877,611	41.75	214,082	1.83

Source: Electoral Commission, Accra, 2025 (Provisional Results)

* This represents the vote difference between the regional totals of the candidates' votes on the EC's website and the declared votes also on the EC's website as at the date of writing.

Table 2 2024 Parliamentary Elections results

Party	Number of Seats
NDC	183
NPP	88
Independents	4
Outstanding (Ablekuma North Constituency)	1
Total	276

Source: Electoral Commission, Accra, 2025 (Provisional Results)

Table 3 2024 Parliamentary Seat per Party by Regions

Region	NDC	NPP	Independent	Total
Ahafo	5	1	0	6
Ashanti	7	39	1	47
Bono	11	1	0	12
Bono East	10	1	0	11
Central	18	4	1	23
Eastern	8	24	1	33
Greater Accra*	28	5	0	33
North East	3	3	0	6
Northern	11	6	1	18
Oti	9	0	0	9
Savannah	6	1	0	7
Upper East	15	0	0	15
Upper West	11	0	0	11
Volta	18	0	0	18
Western	15	2	0	17
Western North	8	1	0	9
Total Seats	183	88	4	275

Source: Electoral Commission, Accra, 2025 (Provisional Results)

Table 4 Comparative Analysis of 2020 and 2024 NPP and NDC Electoral Performance

Region	Mahama (2024)	%	Bawumia (2024)	%	Nana Addo (2020)	%	Mahama (2020)	%
Ahafo	130,106	52.53	113,851	45.97	145,584	55.04%	116,485	44.04%
Ashanti	697,076	33.10	1,366,800	64.90	1,795,824	72.79%	653,149	26.47%
Bono	235,681	53.75	192,773	43.96	292,604	58.23%	203,279	40.45%
Bono East	216,691	62.44	124,811	35.96	199,720	42.33%	265,728	56.32%
Central	562,620	58.27	382,749	39.64	613,804	52.31%	538,829	45.92%
Eastern	453,234	47.12	493,234	51.28	752,061	60.80%	470,999	38.08%
Greater Accra	1,260,832	63.77	681,535	34.47	1,253,179	48.15%	1,326,489	50.97%
North East	111,051	44.54	134,800	54.06	122,742	51.33%	112,306	46.97%
Northern	529,456	57.88	370,928	40.55	409,063	45.61%	476,650	53.14%
Oti	182,470	66.85	86,489	31.68	103,865	35.88%	181,021	62.53%
Savannah	134,563	68.97	56,774	29.10	80,605	35.19%	144,244	62.97%
Upper East	361,597	75.72	106,700	22.34	170,340	32.84%	335,502	64.68%
Upper West	242,852	71.52	89,906	26.48	121,230	32.80%	238,972	64.65%
Volta	584,234	90.11	56,699	8.75	100,481	14.05%	606,508	84.83%
Western	423,245	58.94	275,231	38.33	439,724	50.93%	398,549	46.16%
Western North	202,689	61.05	124,024	37.36	175,240	46.41%	196,556	52.05%
Adjustments*	263,393		220,307					
Total / National	6,591,790	56.42	4,877,611	41.75	6,776,066	51.26	6,265,266	

Source: Electoral Commission, Accra, 2025 (Provisional Results)

* This represents the vote difference between the regional totals of the two contending candidates in the 2024 elections on the EC's website and the declared votes also on the EC's website as at the date of writing.

Table 5 Comparative Analysis of Presidential Elections Turn-out and its Relations with Incumbent's Performance (1992-2024)

Region	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012	2016	2020	2024
Percentage	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Ashanti	50.5	79.8	65.1	88.7	73.6	84.9	75.8	82.9	64.8
Brong Ahafo*	46.6	71.8	58.4	83.0	68.5	81.1	71.3		
Central	47.7	74.3	63.7	84.4	69.1	78.3	67.5	76.7	56.6
Eastern	51.0	81.1	63.0	82.2	67.3	80.7	68.7	77.1	54.3
Greater Accra	46.0	78.4	59.5	84.4	67.1	77.1	66.7	74.7	53.1
Northern	50.7	73.7	64.1	88.0	74.9	79.5	75.3	88.6	77.5
Upper East	51.5	79.8	60.3	81.6	70.7	75.7	71.9	82.3	66.7
Upper West	51.0	75.8	59.9	81.2	68.9	80.8	71.0	82.2	67.3
Volta	62.4	81.8	60.3	87.6	67.1	75.7	61.8	79.1	64.3
Western	47.8	74.5	58.9	83.6	67.3	76.5	64.8	74.6	57.1
Ahafo**								85.3	70.3
Bono**								79.0	62.4
Bono East**								81.9	53.2
North East**								86.5	76.0
Oti**								83.6	68.5
Savannah**								80.5	59.0
Western North**								82.9	65.5
National	50.2	77.9	61.6	85.1	69.5	79.4	69.6	79.5	64.0

Source: Authors' compilation with data from the Electoral Commission

* In 2019 Brong Ahafo Region was calved into three to form Ahafo, Bono, and Bono East Regions.

** In 2019, Oti, Savannah, and Western North were created making a total of 16 regions to contest the 2020 elections.

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