

# A Comparative Study on Minority High School Teachers Incentive Measures between China and Ghana

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## Abstract

The study was mainly conducted to evaluate the effects of incentive schemes on the performance of teachers in minority high schools between China and Ghana. To ensure job satisfaction and job security among teachers, an analysis was made to determine factors that militate against teacher incentives in these areas. Professional teachers were selected from schools to respond to the questionnaire and the Misener Teacher Practitioner Incentive Satisfaction Scale (MTPISS) was used to analyze their responses. Approximately 79 % and 84 % out of 100 % participated in the survey respectively. This survey yielded a very satisfactory return rate of 68% and 79 %, 40.7 % and 51 % respectively complained about their pay being low. To all other questions, there were no significant differences noted. The results of the study show that there will be a direct positive effect on the performance of both teachers and students; if government review incentives policies and improve on working conditions of teachers. Recommendations to adopt best incentive measures for the present and future research. The study was carried out in two countries and in two regions purposely to save time and the resources to be spent on data collection.

**Keywords:** teacher incentives, minority high schools, measures and performance.

## 1. Introduction

Teachers are the most important agent of change who help to transform students in societies. They are expected love and act as role models to students and the community. Teachers who lack these traits in the class can influence their relationship with students negatively. Effective teachers have significant impact on students' learning and performance in the school environment. In recent years, there has been a rapid decline in academic performance of Senior High Schools (SHS). Many a time, students from rural areas of every country have repeatedly performed poorly in any national or international assessments conducted over the years. China and Ghana are countries dedicated to providing quality education for their citizens. In the past decades, both countries have been working around the clock to achieve a world-class education by the year 2030. In recent years, Governments of both countries have made some educational reforms and interventions to the education system to achieve this goal. The focus is to adopt effective ways of strengthening Minority High Schools (MHS) to bridge the gap between majority and minority high schools in both countries.

This paper examines teacher incentive schemes of high schools in rural areas in both countries. It discusses the main differences between both incentive policies, best strategies to adopt and the effects on productivity of teachers and on the academic achievement of students in rural high schools.

### 1.2 Objectives of the Study

The specific objectives of the Study is to examine teacher incentive schemes of minority high schools in China and Ghana. It is also to determine how these incentive schemes, effect on teacher performance. And purpose is to improve incentive schemes for performance in minority high schools.

### 1.3 Research Questions

The research discusses the following research questions:

1. What are teacher incentives?
2. How do these incentive schemes affect teachers' performance in minority high schools?
3. Which strategies will improve the present situation in both countries?

## 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Teachers are a needed component of education system globally including China and Ghana. Many stakeholders of education in both countries believe that a lot of attention should be paid to teachers especially in rural areas regarding motivation to improve quality education.

## 2.1 Motivation

Motivation is the process that causes an individual to act or what inspires him to work willingly with confidence and satisfaction (Buckler, 2011). Bennell & Mukyanuzi (2005, pg.712) said, "Motivation is what stimulates a person to act in a certain way or anticipated or right response". Also, Guskey & Yoon (2009) argued that motivation is the driving force of peoples' behaviour. Maslow (1987) however defined motivation as the trait that propels teachers to excel at work, so government institutions such as the Ministry of Education and Education services should to motivate teachers with incentive pay. They also agree that Education policies governing teachers must treat the human resource well in the education system (Pearce and Robinson, 2003). Governments view teachers, teacher unions and institutions as partners and the cornerstone to nation-building. In Ghana, the 2008 education act empowered national teaching councils to regulate and coordinate training of teachers in colleges.

## 2.1 Teacher Incentives Policies

Every country has its own policies for teachers incentive pay. Normally, teachers' pay is based on the level of education and performance of teachers in the field. The pay structure in China is same as civil servants and the same system of evaluation is used to reward all government workers. The country's method of motivating teachers is a little bit sophisticated (Ding and Lehrer, 2007b). Teacher recognition and reward is linked to pay increases. Middle school Teachers are assigned five ranks: intern, Middle 3, Middle 2, Middle 1, Middle high level. Everybody in the field is hired as interns irrespective of the background then promoted through the ranks. A promotion comes with a commensurate salary. For a teacher to qualify for a promotion:

- a. he should work for a specified number of years depending on the education level (higher degree means you wait fewer years)
- b. he Should have an 'excellent', or two 'good' evaluation scores in the past five years.

An announcement about scores obtained by deserving candidates is made at annual meetings in the school.

On the hand, Ghana has a unique pay structure called "The Single Spine Pay Structure" based on education levels and ranks. The government considers inputs made by teacher unions and other institutions on incentive schemes. In Ghana, Public school teachers enjoy higher job security over their counterparts in private schools in China and Ghana. Any teacher who has served over five year qualifies for promotion. However, some positions demand a higher qualification. Also, Ghana has an annual award scheme for committed and excellent and committed teachers as well as China. For instance, there is a body in charge of evaluating, select and award the best teacher of the year. The District Assemblies (DA) provide this allocation which ranges from lamps to houses are given to teachers especially to those in deprived areas. Sometimes, promotions for teachers in Ghana delays even when they are due for it. Many get frustrated hence affecting their performance at work. Promotions are tools useful for increasing teachers' productivity at work. Developing countries like China, India, Singapore, and Hong Kong are experiencing rapid growth, between 60 and 75 % of employees' pay is based on performance (Kelly Services, 2013a). Usually, promotions are major source of incentives for teachers in China and Ghana.

Further, when incentives are implemented effectively they lead to satisfaction, self-efficacy, and high outcomes. These help teachers to become creative with teaching methods and skills to improve. Baeza, Chesterfield, and Moreno research work showed the relevance of teacher's attitude on school performance (Mendez, 2011). Bennell and Akyeampong (2007) conducted a study in 12 African and South Asian countries. They identified commitment of teachers as a significant element of affecting performance. They believed that the more teachers are motivated, the better results especially in developing countries and vice versa.

Bennell and Akyeampong said lack of incentives might result in absenteeism, misconduct, poor preparation, and high attrition rates in search for secondary sources of income, shirk responsibilities and lack of creativity in methodology. (What Makes Teachers Tick? A policy research report on teachers' motivation in developing countries 2002). Good incentive packages increase MHS teachers' purchasing power over time. Being able to have control over one's needs brings fulfilment. Additionally, educational goals and objectives are achievable if teachers are well-motivated. They can team up better with all stakeholders of education to meet these expectations.

## 3. Methodology

Two methods were combined to collect data for the study. First, questionnaires were designed and distributed to the selected schools. The second was an online survey made on Sojump.com (<http://www.sojump.com/mobile/index.aspx#page1>). Both questions were divided into three main categories. The International Business Machine Statistical Package for Social Sciences (IBM-SPSS, version 21) program was employed to analyze the coded data. The researcher used frequency tables, and bar graphs for the analysis of the results.

### 3.1 Participants

Five public high schools from each metropolis took part in the survey. The sample consisted of three hundred (N = 300) and three hundred and fifty (N = 350) teachers in Ke'erqin district in Inner Mongolia China and Cape Coast in the Central Region of Ghana respectively. These certified respondents participated in the survey.

### 4. Results and Discussion

The 5-point Likert scale was used to elicit estimated responses from respondents in this study.

Table 4.1.a **Socio-Demographic Characteristics of respondents (China and Ghana)**

Item	China		Ghana	
	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Frequency	Percentage (%)
<b>Gender</b>				
Male	97	32.3	225	75
Female	203	67.7	75	25
<b>Age</b>				
18 – 25	48	28	15	5
26 – 35	147	49	180	60
36 – 50	48	16	105	35
51 and above	21	7	0	0
<b>Work experience</b>				
1-3years	123	41	105	35
4-6 years	117	39	135	45
7 years or more	60	20	60	20
<b>Level of education</b>				
Teachers' Diploma	24	8	75	25
Undergraduate (Degree)	57	19	120	40
Postgraduate (Masters)	201	67	90	30
<b>Level of High School</b>				
Level one	111	37	90	30
Level two	53	17.67	60	20
Level three	61	20.33	60	20
All levels	75	25	90	30
<b>Class size</b>				
10-29	68	22.67	45	15
30-49	117	39	195	65
50-65	102	34	60	20
70 or more	13	4.33	0	0
<b>Subject taught</b>				
English	86	28.67	105	35
Chinese	70	23.33	0	0
Mathematics	60	20	60	20
Science	37	12.33	105	35
Others	47	15.67	30	10
<b>Teachers position</b>				
Inspector	19	6.33	15	5
Head teacher	15	5	0	0
Subject teacher	212	70.67	270	90
Others	54	18	15	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>300</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>300</b>	<b>100</b>

Table 4.1 showed that majority of the respondents from China were females (n = 203, 67.7 %) while a majority of teachers from Ghana were males (n = 225; 75 %), respectively. The age range was between 26-35 years for both China and Ghana (n = 147, 49 %; n = 180, 60 %), respectively (Table 4.1). 41 % of respondents in China have had 1-3 years' experience as professional teachers whereas 45 % respondents from Ghana have had between 4-6 years of professional teaching experience. 67% have a postgraduate level of education from China as compared to their counterpart from who have only 40 % graduates. The implication is that majority of teachers from China have advanced academic qualifications and therefore more professional development opportunities than their counterparts in Ghana. Both have large class sizes (37% and 30%) respectively, and respondents are mostly subject teachers.

**Table 4.2. Incentive Compensation**

Incentive compensation	China						Ghana					
	1	2	3	4	5	Mean	1	2	3	4	5	Mean
Teachers' salaries in advance.	104 (34.67%)	127 (42.33%)	39 (13.00%)	13 (4.33%)	17 (5.67%)	2.04	120 (40%)	150 (50%)	30 (10%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1.7
Extra allowance be paid to teachers in rural areas	59 (19.67%)	129 (43.00%)	67 (22.33%)	32 (10.67%)	13 (4.33%)	2.37	60 (20%)	180 (60%)	45 (15%)	15 (5%)	0 (0%)	2.05
Awards and rewards based on overall school performance	101 (33.67%)	101 (37.33%)	59 (19.67%)	19 (6.33%)	9 (3.00%)	2.08	90 (30%)	105 (35%)	90 (30%)	15 (5%)	0 (0%)	2.1
Bonuses be based on teachers' professional performance	97 (32.33%)	127 (42.33%)	58 (19.33%)	13 (4.33%)	5 (1.67%)	2.01	120 (40%)	135 (45%)	45 (15%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1.75
Incentive pay tied to teachers' enthusiasm	111 (37.00%)	134 (44.67%)	34 (11.33%)	10 (3.33%)	11 (3.67%)	1.91	60 (20%)	195 (65%)	45 (15%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1.95
Regional and school leaders should prioritize teachers' salaries	95 (31.67%)	132 (44.00%)	54 (18.00%)	13 (4.33%)	6 (2.00%)	2.01	75 (25%)	135 (45%)	60 (20%)	30 (10%)	0 (0%)	2.15
The reward system based on teacher performance affect teamwork	84 (28.00%)	114 (38.00%)	76 (25.33%)	20 (6.67%)	6 (2.00%)	2.17	75 (25%)	135 (45%)	60 (20%)	30 (10%)	0 (0%)	2.15
Incentives based on teacher performance promote unity among teachers.	89 (29.67%)	151 (50.33%)	48 (16.00%)	10 (3.33%)	2 (0.67%)	1.94	135 (45%)	75 (25%)	90 (30%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1.85
Teachers' recognition based on student and parental satisfaction	99 (33.00%)	139 (46.33%)	43 (14.33%)	17 (5.67%)	2 (0.67%)	1.94	75 (25%)	180 (60%)	45 (15%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1.9
Pay must be based on teachers' performance assessed by students and supervisors	76 (25.33%)	119 (39.67%)	52 (17.33%)	34 (11.33%)	19 (6.33%)	2.33	93 (31.11%)	145 (48.33%)	52 (17.22%)	10 (3.33%)	0 (0%)	1.93

**Table 4.2.** The result showed, 34.67 % strongly agree that teachers' salaries are paid in advance while 4.33 % strongly disagree with China. In the case of Ghana 40% strongly agree while none disagree. 43.00 strongly agreed to extra allowance while 4.33 % disagreed. 60 % agreed, and none disagreed from Ghana. The issue of whether teachers' 'incentives and rewards should be on overall school performance' 7.33 % and 35 % agreed respectively.

**Table 4.3 Training and Development**

Training and development program	China						Ghana					
	1	2	3	4	5	Mean	1	2	3	4	5	Mean
Further studies for teachers as professional development	75 (25.00%)	164 (54.67%)	45 (15.00%)	7 (2.33%)	9 (3.00%)	2.04	0 (0%)	165 (55%)	75 (25%)	60 (20%)	0 (0%)	2.65
Shorten teacher professional development period	50 (16.67%)	121 (40.33%)	49 (16.33%)	58 (19.33%)	22 (7.33%)	2.6	30 (10%)	165 (55%)	75 (25%)	30 (10%)	0 (0%)	2.35
Professional development is solely the teacher's responsibility	43 (14.33%)	104 (34.67%)	58 (19.33%)	60 (20.00%)	35 (11.67%)	2.8	15 (5%)	45 (15%)	180 (60%)	60 (20%)	0 (0%)	2.95
Promotion of teachers based on performance	80 (26.67%)	149 (49.67%)	49 (16.33%)	15 (5.00%)	7 (2.33%)	2.07	90 (30%)	90 (30%)	120 (40%)	75 (25%)	0 (0%)	2.05
Promotion of teachers based on teaching duration	74 (24.67%)	127 (42.33%)	60 (20.00%)	35 (11.67%)	4 (1.33%)	2.22	60 (20%)	90 (30%)	135 (45%)	15 (5%)	0 (0%)	2.35
Training programs develop teaching skills and competences	99 (33.00%)	140 (46.67%)	39 (13.00%)	5 (1.67%)	7 (2.33%)	1.98	150 (50%)	120 (40%)	30 (10%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1.6
Promote long-term teachers professional development	123 (41.00%)	123 (41.00%)	46 (15.33%)	6 (2.00%)	2 (0.67%)	1.8	105 (35%)	105 (35%)	75 (25%)	15 (5%)	0 (0%)	2
On-the-job training (workshops) are less effective for teachers	91 (30.33%)	125 (41.67%)	52 (17.33%)	26 (8.67%)	6 (2.00%)	2.1	30 (10%)	90 (30%)	90 (30%)	90 (30%)	0 (0%)	2.8
Professional development be limited to specific courses	82 (27.33%)	95 (31.67%)	63 (21.00%)	15 (5.00%)	11 (3.67%)	2.37	45 (15%)	120 (40%)	150 (50%)	45 (15%)	0 (0%)	2.55
No school policy on professional development of teachers	65 (21.67%)	106 (35.33%)	54 (18.00%)	58 (19.33%)	17 (5.67%)	2.52	15 (5%)	150 (50%)	120 (40%)	15 (5%)	0 (0%)	2.45

**Table 4.3.** This study found out that 54.67 %; 40.33 % of respondents from China agreed and 2.33 %; 7.33 % strongly disagreed on further studies for teachers in short periods. 55 % of the respondents from Ghana supported the idea while none said no. 34.67 % agree and 11.67 % believe that 'Professional development should be solely the teacher's responsibility' in minority schools. In contrast, 60% from Ghana were indifferent about it. Majority of respondents from China 49.67% thought that 'Promotion should be based on performance. Nonetheless, the majority of respondents from Ghana have diverse opinions on the issue.

**Table 4.4. Facilities and resources**

Facilities and resources	China						Ghana					
	1	2	3	4	5	Mean	1	2	3	4	5	Mean
Your school is old and worn	45 (15.00%)	116 (38.67%)	76 (25.33%)	50 (16.67%)	13 (4.33%)	2.57	30 (10%)	195 (65%)	60 (20%)	15 (5%)	0 (0%)	2.2
The school lacks basic teaching and learning materials	43 (14.33%)	112 (37.33%)	72 (24.00%)	58 (19.33%)	15 (5.00%)	2.63	90 (30%)	165 (55%)	30 (10%)	15 (5%)	0 (0%)	1.9
The basic infrastructure of the school is outdated	41 (13.67%)	121 (40.33%)	65 (21.67%)	60 (20.00%)	13 (4.33%)	2.61	45 (15%)	180 (60%)	75 (25%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2.1
The administration is indifferent to the school situation	52 (17.33%)	106 (35.33%)	63 (21.00%)	60 (20.00%)	19 (6.33%)	2.62	45 (15%)	165 (55%)	90 (30%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2.15
Teachers enjoy proper housing system	78 (26.00%)	123 (41.00%)	49 (16.33%)	35 (11.67%)	15 (5.00%)	2.29	15 (5%)	120 (40%)	105 (35%)	45 (15%)	15 (5%)	2.75
Lack of amenities, transportation and housing systems	93 (31.00%)	101 (33.67%)	48 (16.00%)	39 (13.00%)	19 (6.33%)	2.3	15 (5%)	195 (65%)	60 (20%)	30 (10%)	0 (0%)	2.35
Teachers walk/travel far to school every day	69 (29.00%)	114 (38.00%)	56 (18.67%)	50 (16.67%)	11 (3.67%)	2.4	60 (20%)	150 (50%)	75 (25%)	15 (5%)	0 (0%)	2.15
Teachers face health and safety issues	69 (23.00%)	117 (39.00%)	62 (20.67%)	41 (13.67%)	11 (3.67%)	2.36	45 (15%)	210 (70%)	15 (5%)	30 (10%)	0 (0%)	2.1
The working environment for teachers is very poor	63 (21.00%)	116 (38.67%)	50 (16.67%)	58 (19.33%)	13 (4.33%)	2.47	60 (20%)	210 (70%)	30 (10%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1.9
Teachers need to improve working conditions	84 (28.00%)	132 (44.00%)	60 (20.00%)	18 (6.00%)	6 (2.00%)	2.1	105 (35%)	180 (60%)	15 (5%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1.7

**Table 4.4.** Respondents (38.67 %; 65 %) from both countries admitted that facilities and resources are old


and worn out respectively. A higher percent 35.33 %; 55 % agree to the indifference on the part of the school administration to their situation. A higher percentage agree that they lack infrastructure and teaching resources to do their work.

**Table 4.5. Community support and participation**

Community support	China						Ghana					
	1	2	3	4	5	Mean	1	2	3	4	5	Mean
Principals support school policy making to improve teaching standards	97 (32.33%)	160 (53.33%)	35 (11.67%)	8 (2.67%)	0 (0%)	1.84	30 (10%)	120 (40%)	120 (40%)	30 (10%)	0 (0%)	2.5
Supervisors provide guidance for schools' improvements as necessary	86 (28.67%)	149 (49.67%)	54 (18.00%)	11 (3.67%)	0 (0%)	1.97	30 (10%)	135 (45%)	120 (40%)	15 (5%)	0 (0%)	2.4
Supervisors are too strict and do not respect teachers' opinions	84 (28.00%)	125 (41.67%)	54 (18.00%)	32 (10.67%)	5 (1.67%)	2.17	15 (5%)	150 (50%)	120 (40%)	15 (5%)	0 (0%)	2.45
Teachers understand and respect the needs of students	116 (38.67%)	134 (44.67%)	43 (14.33%)	7 (2.33%)	0 (0%)	1.81	75 (25%)	165 (55%)	60 (20%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1.95
Financial incentives for teachers have a greater impact on students' performance	102 (34.00%)	129 (43.00%)	60 (20.00%)	9 (3.00%)	0 (0%)	1.92	60 (20%)	195 (65%)	30 (10%)	15 (5%)	0 (0%)	2
Financial incentives effect is reflected in the performance of special student groups	84 (28.00%)	134 (44.67%)	67 (22.33%)	15 (5.00%)	0 (0%)	2.04	15 (5%)	180 (60%)	90 (30%)	15 (5%)	0 (0%)	2.35
Low-performing ethnic minority schools are improving their academic performance	67 (22.33%)	142 (47.33%)	73 (24.33%)	13 (4.33%)	5 (1.67%)	2.16	75 (25%)	135 (45%)	75 (25%)	15 (5%)	0 (0%)	2.1
Community members provide housing and living services to teachers	89 (29.67%)	138 (46.00%)	63 (21.00%)	7 (2.33%)	2 (0.67%)	1.98	45 (15%)	90 (30%)	150 (50%)	15 (5%)	0 (0%)	2.45
Community should help teachers provide quality education	106 (35.33%)	138 (46.00%)	54 (18.00%)	2 (0.67%)	0 (0%)	1.84	30 (10%)	165 (55%)	90 (30%)	15 (5%)	0 (0%)	2.3

Table 4.5. Showed 53.33 % and 3.33 % from both countries agree that their principals support school policy to improve teaching standards. 49.67 % and 45 % from each side agree that Supervisors guide for schools' improvements. Majority of respondents from both areas agrees that their supervisors are too strict and do not respect teachers' opinions; however, none of the respondents (41.67 % 50 %) strongly disagree that 'supervisors are too strict and do not respect teachers' opinions' in both countries respectively.

Most respondents (44.67 %; 55 %) from China and Ghana admit that "teachers understand and respect the needs of students; Moreover, 43.00 %; 65 % agree that 'financial incentives for teachers have a greater impact on students' performance'. Majority of the respondents from both countries (46.00 %; 55 %) agree that 'community should help teachers provide quality education'; while none of the respondents from both countries strongly disagree.



**Figure 4.1. Teacher reward plans**

**Figure 4.1**

Majority of the respondents (24.22 %; 20 %) from both countries respectively said reward schemes be paid to only subject teachers. 68.32; 65 % from each side respectively prefer 'same criteria for incentive compensation for all teachers' a higher percentage indicated their preference for 'incentive compensation based on individual teachers' performance and supervisor's appraisal.

## Discussion

This study confirmed that teaching profession had been dominated by male teachers in Ghana and China for decades although more females are joining this profession in current times. Bennell & Akyeampong (2007) revealed that female teachers constituted about 47.5 % of the entire teaching population in five countries in Africa which is far higher than in this study. Recent studies stated that females dominate the teaching field in minority schools in Asia while males dominate in higher education (Goldhaber, Armond, & DeBurgomaster, 2010). A greater percentage of teachers in this study were within 26-35 years of age suggestive of the youthfulness of these professional teachers. Similar reports were made by Hanushek, & Rivkin (2007); Scherer (2001) and MoE (2002). Also, the study identified the majority of teachers in Ghana to have longer (4-6) years of teaching experience than China (1-3 years) which corroborates the earlier reports of Gaynor (2005); Schneider (2011); Wells (2011). Undergraduate degree holders constituted the highest number of respondents from Ghana while Master degree holders are the highest from China. Thus, teachers in the minority high schools in Ghana have less opportunity for advanced studies compared with their counterparts in China. So in essence, where teacher incentive scheme is qualification-based, teachers in Ghana may be at a disadvantage. A significant number of the respondents from Ghana have limited development programs for teachers across the country unlike their colleagues in China.

The level of classes the teachers handle differ between the two countries. Majority from both countries are either classroom teachers or supervisors. Most teachers in Ghana teach more than one level compared to their counterparts in China. This situation is due to the lack of professional development opportunities for those teachers who are constantly under pressure to keep their classes and complete their lesson plans (Teng, 2002). Class sizes differ between the two countries as a majority of the respondents have class sizes ranging 30-49 in both countries (China 39 % and Ghana 65 %). The English language is the most widely taught subject in Chinese minority schools. Conversely, English and Science (35 %) are the major subjects teachers in minority schools in Ghana teach. Geographical areas and culture differences may account for the trend in both countries. Also, geopolitics and socio-cultural differences have a significant impact on education in any nation (Forojalla, 1993; Zhou, 2000).

Professional development is essential to equip teachers with new skills and knowledge continuously to keep them abreast with information. (Evers, van der Heijden, & Kreijns, 2016). Also, it keeps the teacher informed of endlessly varying practices, and student needs. Thus, teachers are required to be active learners and part of well-organised professional body. Guskey & Yoon (2009) argued that professional development must be collaborative, long-term, and content driven to improve teaching in the classroom. Richardson (2003) also stressed that teachers need career advancement program that is intensive and sustainable to improve teaching and learning.

It is clear from the study that teacher incentives may not necessarily influence teacher behaviour. Badri, Alnuaimi, Mohaidat, Yang, & Rashedi (2016) established a negative correlation (-.705) between teachers' overall perception of training and development needs and impact of training programs. Thus, as the perceived need falls, the perceived effect raises, particularly on minority high schools. In Ghana, the result reflects how teachers' needs for career advancement program are misunderstood. Remarkably, feedback from the focused group realized that teachers in private schools often finance all the professional training programs they took on their own. They did so with the hope of securing better jobs in government schools in the future. Badri et al. (2016) reported that numerous teachers thought that self-financing professional development activities improve their chances of getting employment in public schools in UAE. Thus, management of education should collaborate with teachers or teacher unions on issues of staff training and development priorities, plans and how finance this need.

However, over half of respondents indicated that specific incentive compensation regime; improved facilities and resources; a well-coordinated and funded training and development program; com

munity support and participation and teacher-led reward schemes would be a preferred mix in designing a teacher incentive program for performance measures. Community support and participation is an important factor in both countries because it emphasizes on the need for school wide contribution in developing performance incentive programs. This community involvement boost teachers' confidence to make relevant inputs into scheme design with an independent effect on their attitudes toward such incentive programs.

## 5. Conclusion

- The results of the study showed that majority of teachers in the minority high schools in both countries prefer a mixed teacher incentive scheme and well-coordinated professional development programs with multi-stakeholder inputs. An incentive scheme that offers job security and engenders professional commitment, incorporate schools' infrastructure and resources and promote community support and participation in school programs were highly chosen. Also, the majority of respondents prefer training tailored to classroom management and emerging technology use at the workplace.

A mixed of teacher incentive scheme should aim at policies which support designing reward schemes for

teachers in minority schools was recommended. Also, a well-thought training/professional development programs with properly-managed financing scheme should be considered in policy-making.

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