

The Correlation between Social Violence and the Comments of Nigerian Politicians during Electioneering Campaigns: A Political Marketing Study

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ABSTRACT

This study undertook a critical appraisal of the utterances and speeches of some Nigerian leaders/politicians during electioneering campaigns and their correlations to the level of social and political crisis witnessed in the country so far. It was motivated by the high level of violence and social crisis that greeted the 2011 general elections and the intractable social crisis in the country since independence. The objectives of the study therefore included to: ascertain the degree of correlation between the negative comments and the violence that followed the 2011 presidential election in Nigerian; determine the degree of correlation between the negative comments and the heightened insurgency social crisis in the country; and examine the potency of political marketing tools as panacea for the problem. For the methodology, our primary data were sourced through opinion survey of Nigerian masses views on the comments/speeches by Nigerian politicians during the 2007 and 2011 electioneering campaigns. The data were statistically analyzed with Likert's 5-points scale and Spearman's correlation coefficient. Results obtained show a high degree of correlation between those negative comments and the political/social crises in the country since then, and that political marketing strategies packaged and professionally delivered by public relations experts would serve as effective panacea for such problems in future.

Key words: Political violence, social violence, negative comments, electioneering, political marketing.

1. Background to the Study

Election violence or election-related violence is understood as violent action against people, property or the electoral process, intended to influence the electoral process before, during or after elections (Atuobi, 2010; Odigbo, 2014). Electioneering campaigns in Nigeria have always been characterized by political violence of unimaginable proportions. The nature and manifestations of election violence in Africa according to the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Centre for Conflict Research (2001), and in Nigeria according to Ugwu (2014) include:

- Murder/Killings;
- Looting, destruction and damage of property;
- Political assassinations, kidnap, assault and death threats;
- Pre- and post-election bombings; as like the Boko-Haram cases;
- Fighting among political parties' supporters;
- Arbitrary detentions and arrests of journalists and political opponents
- Intimidation of voters during elections, and many more.

Sanctions against all these electoral offences are duly provided for in the various Nigerian electoral laws. Yet, the violence continued, threatening the nation's democracy, social peace and national unity. Some sane and highly disciplined men and women in the country have blamed it on the pre-election utterances of notable Nigerian leaders/politicians (Vanguard, 2013). It is their views that a greater percentage of the electoral violence in the country are often ignited by inciting speeches by politicians, opinion leaders or 'bought-over' religious leaders.

For instance, before the 2007 general elections, the country was over-heated over feuds between the then President, Olusegun Obasanjo, and his Vice, Atiku Abubakar, accusing each other of corruption and counter-

corruption. There were also agitations from notable northern politicians that power must return back to the region. The worst of it all was President Obasanjo's avowed stance that the election will be a do-or-die affair, borne out of annoyance over his failure in the alleged bid to manipulate the legislatures for a constitutional amendment that would allow him a third term in office, hence, began to act like a bull in a china shop (Awowole-Browne, 2007). Thus, the post-election period was fierce as killing of political opponents including PDP chieftains who displayed contrary opinion was witnessed. The roll call of the casualties included the then Attorney General and Minister for Justice, Chief Bola Ige, Harry Marshal and many more (Academia.edu, 2013).

Then, according to Bekoe (2011), despite a more transparent election in Nigeria in 2011, 800 people—mainly in Kaduna—were killed in three days and 65,000 people were displaced (Human Rights Watch, 2011). Muslims burned churches and attacked Christians and southerners in their homes, businesses, schools, and on the streets. Christians soon retaliated. Two commissions were established in May, following the elections, to examine the factors leading to the violence. Late Governor Patrick Ibrahim Yakowa established a 12-person commission in Kaduna, and nationally, President Jonathan established a 22-person commission. According to the commission, Buhari's warning of an "Egypt-style" revolt if the elections were not free and fair was not good. His declaration that going to court to contest the elections would be a waste of his time was alleged to have also provided his supporters with the unspoken alternative to take their protests to the streets (The Punch, 2011; Suleiman, 2011). It was again reported that on the day of the presidential elections, Buhari claimed that the ruling party had rigged the election and violence started soon after INEC declared Jonathan the winner (Bekoe, 2011; Lartey, 2011). Hence, Muslims and Christians in northern Nigeria clashed violently. And with 800 fatalities in three days, the 2011 elections were the most violent in Nigeria's history (about 100 people died in 2003, and 300 died in 2007), reported Bekoe (2011).

All these are but few examples of political utterances consequently igniting wide scale national violence in Nigeria's political history, hence, the promptings for this study.

2. Statement of the Problem

Upenn (2003) observed that from history, political violence increases in Nigeria before elections. According to Human Rights Watch (2003), various governments in the country have not really done enough to prevent the wave of political violence in pre-election periods. Politicians across Nigeria have used violence as a tool to acquire or retain political support, wealth and influence, (Human Rights Watch; 2003) adds. To worsen matters, some of the politicians often make comments that unwary youths and their supporters latch on to unleash violence on other political opponents' supporters. As earlier captured, former President Obasanjo's do-or-die statement that preceded the 2007 general elections and Gen. Buhari's Egypt-style revolution over the 2011 general elections are good cases in point. Both elections produced violence of unprecedented proportions in which over 1,500 lives of innocent citizens were lost.

Some of the politicians were even reported to have boasted that they would make the country ungovernable for whoever wins them in the 2011 general elections. Surprisingly, since after that election, the country has been on the boil, with heightened cases of insurgency bombings here and there, arson, kidnapping of innocent school girls (CNN, 2014; [The Independent](http://TheIndependent.com), 2014), wasting of lives in hundreds and destruction of valuable property (ABCnews, 2014).

Takirambudde (2013) pointed out that a successful election means more than just keeping the country from falling apart. It means that voters must be protected from intimidation and violence aimed at silencing their voices. It means that candidates must be able to stand for office without fear of bloodshed. Nigerian electorates are fast losing their hopes on all these. In the north-east and north-west parts of the country, some politicians are alleged to be using religion and ethnicity to galvanize political support or opposition, stirring up sentiments that sparked the recent violence in Nigeria (Takirambudde, 2013). It is being alleged, albeit with denials and counter-accusations, that the utterances of such politicians and opinion leaders fuel the present social crisis in the country.

3. Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the study were to:

- i. Ascertain the degree of correlation between the negative comments and the violence that followed the 2011 presidential election in Nigerian.
- ii. Determine the degree of correlation between the negative comments and the heightened insurgency social crisis in the country.
- iii. Examine the potency of political marketing tools as panacea for the problem.

4. Research Questions

The following research questions were formulated to help find the answers:

- i. Is there a significant degree of correlation between the pre-election negative comments of some politicians and the violence that followed the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria?
- ii. What is the degree of correlation between the negative comments and the heightened insurgency social crisis in the country?
- iii. Could political marketing tools provide significant panacea for the problem?

5. Hypotheses

The following null-hypotheses were tested in the study:

Ho: There is no significant correlation between the pre-election negative comments of some politicians and the violence that followed the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria.

Ho: The degree of correlation between the negative comments and the heightened insurgency social crisis in the country is not significant.

Ho: Political marketing tools would not provide significant panacea for the politics of bitterness in the country.

6. Significance of the Study

This study was designed to help unravel some of the remote and immediate causes of the mind-burgling social crisis in Nigeria that has continued to claim the lives of innocent citizens in the country every day, and made the people psychological prisoners in their country. As at the time of conclusion of this report, 234 secondary school girls alleged kidnapped by Boko-Haram are still being held hostage in the wild forest of Sangisa, while another bombing has taken place in Nyanya motor park, claiming many lives. It is expected to help all stakeholders in the project Nigeria understand that violence does anyone no good. In the long run, there are bitter prices to pay by all, in terms of destroyed infrastructures, destroyed relationship and trusts, destroyed image, businesses, employment opportunities and foreign investments.

7. Scope of the Study

This study was restricted in scope to a survey of the opinions of informed select Nigerians in the two most politically notable cities of the country: Abuja the present Federal Capital territory and Lagos the former Federal Capital territory. The criterion for the choice of the two cities was because Nigerians of all social persuasions, ethnic backgrounds and political cleavages live there. It is also the country's 'political capital' and base of all diplomatic offices in the country. The target group for the study included:

- ✓ Nigerian politicians,
- ✓ Civil Servants,
- ✓ Select ordinary citizens on the street,
- ✓ University students and Lecturers,
- ✓ Journalists,
- ✓ Members of select Professional Bodies.

8. Methodology

Opinion survey technique was employed in gathering data for the study with structured questionnaire and interview schedule as the main instruments. The data so gathered were analyzed with Likert's 5-points scale and Spearman's correlation coefficient. With an estimated population size of 1.92million, Taro Yamane's formular for finite populations was used to determine the sample size of 399 for the study at a 5% margin of error and 95% level of confidence. Proportionate sampling technique was used to distribute the questionnaire to the target publics of the study in the 2 cities in Nigeria.

9. Review of Related Literature

9.1 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical construct for this study hinges on the "image repair theory." According to Eriksson & Eriksson (2012), the Image repair theory is founded on two essential assumptions: communication is a goal-directed activity, and preserving a positive image is one of its central objectives. Benoit (1995:68) had observed that "wrong-doing is a recurring feature of human behavior", therefore, human beings should necessarily and recurrently be involved in communication aimed at repairing the sour points of their image and thus maintaining a favourable reputation. This theory identifies a typology of communicative strategies that actors involved in image repair work could make use of in crisis communication situations. Eriksson & Eriksson (2012), categorized them into five broad categories: denial, evading responsibility, reducing offensiveness, corrective actions and mortification.

Denial: Most accused politicians in developing countries usually deny their wrongs or their role in committing it. This is the situation with the Boko-Haram problem where the search for the sponsors continues, and no one has owned up to it.

Evading Responsibility: When people are unable to deny performing the wrong act in question, they usually attempt to evade responsibility, through various ways like:

Scapegoating: They may claim that the act was committed in response to another wrongful act, like the claim that Boko-Haramism is borne out unemployment and hardship in the country.

Defeasibility: The wrong-doer may plead a lack of knowledge or control about important factors related to the offensive act, like President Obasanjo's denial of the third term bid that nearly tore the country apart politically.

Making Excuses: The wrong doer may make an excuse that the factors were beyond his control, and may ask not to be held fully responsible, based on his good, rather than evil motives in committing the act.

Reducing Offensiveness: The accused may attempt to reduce the degree of negative feeling experienced by the audience, through bolstering, minimization, differentiation, transcendence in which the act is placed in a less offensive frame of reference; attacking accusers and compensation in which the accuser pleads to settle the victims of the act.

Corrective Action: Here, the accused accepts his fault and offers to redress the victims of the action to offset negative feelings towards him. He also makes promise to make changes to prevent its reoccurrence in future.

Mortification: Here, the accused admits responsibility and asks for forgiveness.

Even though Benoit (1997), pointed out that politicians are less willing than business leaders and celebrities to use mortifications as an image repair strategy, because most politicians strongly feel that to publicly admit their mistakes would put them at a disadvantaged political position (Sheldon and Sallot, 2009: 27), it is still the duty of the political marketer to use the persuasive tools of public relations image repair strategies to get him to accept and tender apology to the offended public, because nobody is perfect and the public already know the truth (Fearn-Banks, 2009; Coombs, 2006). Hence, denial would damage his image and credibility even more. Political marketers will therefore help such politicians to repair their damaged image through well-packaged public apology outing, change of heart and publicly-acclaimed good courses.

9.2 Concept of Electoral Violence

Eldridge et al (2012), report that election violence is a sub-category of political violence that is primarily distinguished by its timing and motive. It is a coercive and deliberate strategy used by political actors – incumbents as well as opposition parties – to advance their interests or achieve specific political goals in relation to an electoral contest. It may take place in all parts of the electoral cycle: in the run-up to elections, on the day of elections, and in the post-election period. Election-related violence is not limited to physical violence but includes other coercive means, such as the threat of violence, intimidation and harassment (Eldridge et al, 2012). Anifowose (1982:4) defines political violence as the use or threat of physical act carried out by an individual or individuals within a political system against another individual, or individuals, and or property, with the intent to cause injury or death to persons and/or damage or destruction to property, and whose objective, choice of targets or victims, surrounding circumstances, implementation, and effects have political significance. It is intended to modify the behaviour of others in the existing arrangement of power structure that has some consequences for the political system. Election-related violence is also defined by Atuobi (2010), as political violence aimed at the electoral process. It is sometimes geared towards winning political competition of power through violence, subverting the ends of the electoral and political process (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Centre for Conflict Research, 2001).

The causes of electoral violence are multifaceted, and can be divided into two broad categories: first, structural factors related to the underlying power structures prevalent in new and emerging democracies, such as informal patronage systems, poor governance, exclusionary politics, and the socio-economic uncertainties of losing political power in states where almost all power is concentrated at the centre; second, factors related to the electoral process and the electoral contest itself, such as failed or flawed elections, election fraud and weak or manipulated institutions and institutional rules governing the electoral process (Eldridge et al, 2012; Gillies, 2011). Electoral violence may also create a humanitarian crisis and halt or reverse socio-economic development

programmes. In extreme situations, it may increase the risk of armed conflict or civil war. Election-violence can also go beyond the societies where it occurs and affect neighbouring states by displacing large border populations, introducing a humanitarian crisis, and increasing the circulation of arms as well as armed violence, which may contribute to instability in already volatile regions (Eldridge et al, 2012; Collier, 2009).

USAID (2013) advised that conducting free, fair, and peaceful elections requires that candidates and their supporters believe that others will not manipulate and/or have not manipulated the outcome through nondemocratic means. This is because even if no party has cheated, creating the belief that it has happened may be sufficient for postelection violence to occur. Losing candidates, for example, may have an incentive to incite their supporters if they believe that creating doubt about the outcome of the election may be advantageous (USAID, 2013).

9.3 Nigeria's Experience in Electoral Violence

Ademoyega (1981) observed that the genesis of political violence in Nigeria started with the federal election of December 1959 which was meant to usher in the political independence of Nigeria. That very election was marred by violence. The popular party of the north, the Northern People's Congress (NPC), did threaten that if the Southern parties allied to capture power at the Federal level, the North would secede (Ademoyega, 1981:6). The NPC in that election won the majority of the seats and formed the government in alliance with the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC), the Eastern party. The Action Group (AG), the Western party was in opposition.

In 1962, there was chaos in the Western Region, arising from a violent disagreement within the Action Group (A.G.), between the supporters of Chief Awolowo and those of Chief Akintola. Due to the very fierce dimension of the violence, a state of emergency was declared in the region. The 1964 Federal election ushered in another round of political violence. This election was characterized by fraud and malpractice. The violence was witnessed most in Tivland where supporters of the two political parties engaged each other. In the West, it was the usual Awolowo vs Akintola clashes. This produced another round of violence during and after the parliamentary elections of October 1965. The series of political violence during the first republic culminated in the 1966 coup, which was another violent political action. The Prime Minister, Finance Minister and Premiers of Northern and Western Regions were killed in the coup.

The Second Republic was also alleged to be bedeviled by series of political violence, especially during the 1983 elections. The Shagari's administration in the Second Republic was characterized by high scale of gross mismanagement, corruption, bribery, impropriety ethnicism, nepotism, embezzlement, misappropriation of public funds, election malpractices as well as alarming rate of inefficiency and redundancy in the public (Uzuegbunam, 1997:45). The Babangida's inconclusive Third Republic was also marked by high scale violence, primarily resulting from the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election. Many Nigerians died in the imbroglio. Political assassinations were also a prominent feature in the polity.

Then, according to Odigbo (2014), the 2003 general elections in Nigeria were adjudged as greatly flawed by the International observers, but because it presented in the history of the nation's the first peaceful civilian transition to civilians, many Nigerians and the international community decided to accept it, if not for anything as better than a military rule. It was mindful of this, that the slogan "the worst civilian administration is better than the best military rule" rented the air then. However, according to the European Commission election observers, there were rampant election-related malpractice in a number of states in the Middle Belt, the South East and the South-South (European Commission, 2003). The Commonwealth Election observers also reported that the election outcomes were fixed. They noted that voter turnout for the April 2003 elections was very low in many polling stations, yet, the election results declared for most constituencies indicated a 90-100 percent voter turnout (Mole, 2003). Generally, the election recorded extraordinary questionable high turnout figures nationwide in excess of 90 percent. The Independent National Electoral Commission was reported not to be in control according to the Human Rights Watch which also monitored the election and rigging, violence and intimidation were so pervasive (Human Rights Watch, 2004). The pre-election period saw more than 200 people killed in election related clashes all over the federation and by the time election ended, the body count has surpassed 300, reported the Human Rights Watch (2004).

Most of the registered political parties that contested the elections variously rejected the results as announced by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). This led to many petitions at the various Election petition tribunals that over-saddled the judiciary and shut the doors against trial of many civil cases pending in the courts. Other political parties who didn't have much faith in the election tribunals threatened "mass action"

to pressure the government to quit power in line with the trends in some other countries. Many described what was witnessed in that period as “presidential authoritarianism” through allocation of positions to preferred candidates (Nwokeke and Jayum, 2011). All these heated the polity and there were fears of serious threat to the survival of constitutional democracy in the country.

The 2007 election was also a record in violence. It was though the first time when a third consecutive presidential election took place and the first time when one elected leader succeeded another in the history of Nigeria’s election. Before that election, the country was over-heated over feuds between the president, Olusegun Obasanjo, and his Vice, Atiku Abubakar, accusing each other of corruption and counter-corruption. There were also agitations from northern politicians that power must return back to their region. The worst of it all, was president Obasanjo’s alleged moves to manipulate the legislatures for a constitutional amendment that would allow him a third term in office. The country’s political mine field was hot and fragile (Odigbo, 2014).

Luckily for the country, however, President Obasanjo failed in his bid for third term, which was good for constitutional democracy, but out of annoyance began to act like a bull in a china shop and warned all who cared to listen that the forthcoming election was going to be “a-do-or-die-affair (Awowole-Browne, 2007). The post-election period was fierce as killing of political opponents including PDP chieftains who displayed contrary opinion was witnessed. The roll call of the casualties included the then Attorney General and Minister for Justice, Chief Bola Ige, Harry Marshal and others (Odigbo, 2014).

9.4 Political Marketing Concept and Practice

According to O’cass (2001) political marketing is the analysis, planning, implementation and control of political and electoral campaigns through the application of marketing principles. Ormrod (2005) defined it as the adoption of the marketing orientation by political parties in their relationship with the electorates. In the same vein, Niffenger (1989) posits that political marketing is the use of marketing tools to influence target audience to vote for a particular person, party or proposition. Political Marketing is intrinsically linked with political campaigns, winning elections and maintaining leadership positions, using marketing techniques (Henneberg, 2003).

Political marketing include communication and public relations (Olafemi & Ogunro, 2013). It is electioneering that deploys a set of marketing strategies and tools to trace and study public opinion before and during an election campaigns, to develop campaign communications and to assess their impact, by keeping constant interaction with voters, as well as effective internal marketing. It focuses on effective relationship with relevant target public of a political party like the party members, the media as well as the electorates. Political Marketing Orientation takes into cognizance the marketing-mix which include:

Products: Candidate, policy ideology and good governance (LeBaron, 2008; Nazar et al., 2010).

Price (Cost): This includes actual costs, psychological costs, opportunity costs in decision making and voting influence costs. It is imperative, that these costs must be minimized, most especially, on the part of the voters (Niffenger, 1989).

Promotion (Communication): This is concerned with information dissemination to the relevant target publics.

Place (Distribution): Henneberg (2003) concluded that distribution in PMO refers to the way and manner the products are made available to the target market (voter) and these are campaign delivery and offerings popularly termed the dividends of governance.

In line with the above concept of marketing mix in politics, one may conclude that political activities are based on the exchange theory (Olafemi & Ogunro, 2013). Thus, political parties seek voters support in exchange for good governance (Djakeli & Tshumburidze, 2012). Hence, with the effective application of political marketing, system of governance is expected to improve (Gbadeyan, 2011). Political marketing concerns the whole set of activities applied by political candidates or parties in the political arena, in order to build positive political/social relationship with the electorates and other target publics (Perdigão, 2010). Rebaz et al (2012) pointed out that the rise of political marketing could be considered as the result of integration of marketing and political knowledge.

10. Data Presentation and Analysis

Data from the field indicate that 59.12% of the respondents were male, while 40.88% were female; 24.32% were in the age bracket of 21 to 30 years, 32.16% in the age range of 31 to 40 years; 28.77% in the age bracket of 41 to 50 years, while the remaining 14.75% were 51 years or above. 7.76% were politicians, 13.137% were government officials, 2.35% were foreigners/diplomats working in Nigeria, 11.89% were journalists/media practitioners, while the remaining 64.87% were electorates.

Table 1: Assessment of whether there is a significant degree of correlation between the pre-election negative comments of some politicians and the violence that followed the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria

Options	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Agree (SA)	134	33.58%
Agree (A)	187	46.87%
Undecided (Und)	29	7.27%
Disagree (D)	25	6.27%
Strongly Disagree (SD)	24	6.02%
Total	399	100%

Source: Field survey, 2013.

A graphic display of this result is shown on figure 1 below:




Fig. 1: Assessment of the correlation between the pre-election negative comments of politicians and the violence that greeted the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria.

Table 2: Assessment of the degree of correlation between the negative comments and the heightened insurgency social crisis in Nigeria

Options	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Agree (SA)	154	38.60%
Agree (A)	177	44.36%
Undecided (Und)	17	4.26%
Disagree (D)	27	6.77%
Strongly Disagree (SD)	24	6.02%
Total	399	100%

Source: Field survey, 2013.

See a graphic display of this result on figure 2 below:




Fig. 2: Degree of correlation between the negative comments and the heightened insurgency social crisis in Nigeria.

Table 3: Assessment of whether political marketing tools could provide significant panacea for the problem

Options	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Agree (SA)	133	33.33%
Agree (A)	147	36.84%
Undecided (Und)	33	8.27%
Disagree (D)	27	6.77%
Strongly Disagree (SD)	59	14.79%
Total	399	100%

Source: Field survey, 2013.

See a graphic display of this result on figure 3 below:




Fig. 3: On whether political marketing tools could provide significant panacea for the problem.

Table 4: Assessment of the viability of political marketing media in the country

Options	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Agree (SA)	129	32.33%
Agree (A)	139	34.84%
Undecided (Und)	37	9.27%
Disagree (D)	50	12.53%
Strongly Disagree (SD)	44	11.03%
Total	399	100%

Source: Field survey, 2013.

Test of Hypothesis One:

Ho: There is no significant correlation between the pre-election negative comments of some politicians and the violence that followed the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria.

Hi: There is significant correlation between the pre-election negative comments of some politicians and the violence that followed the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria.

Test Statistics = Spearman Correlation Coefficient (r_s)

Table 5: Statistical Test of Hypothesis 1

Options	Data 1	Data 2	Rank 1	Rank 2	D	d ²
Strongly Agree	134	133	4	4	0	0
Agree	187	147	5	5	0	0
Undecided	29	33	3	2	1	1
Disagree	25	27	2	1	1	1
Strongly Disagree	24	59	1	3	-2	4

Adapted from tables 1 and 3. Source: Field Survey, 2013.

$$\sum d^2 = 0 + 0 + 1 + 1 + 4 = 6$$

$$\text{So } r_s = 1 - \frac{2 \times \sum d^2}{n(n^2-1)}$$

$$r_s = 1 - \frac{(2 \times 6)}{n(n^2-1)}$$


$$r_s = 1 - \frac{2 \times 6}{5(5^2 - 1)}$$

$$r_s = 1 - \frac{12}{124}$$

$$r_s = 1 - 0.096$$

$$r_s = 0.904$$

Fig. 5: Interpretation of the Result of the Spearman Correlation Coefficient:



Decision

Since the result of the Spearman Correlation Coefficient ($r_s = 0.904$) shows a strong positive correlation, we hereby reject the H_0 and accept the H_1 which says that “there is significant correlation between the pre-election negative comments of some politicians and the violence that followed the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria.”

Test of Hypothesis Two:

H_0 : The degree of correlation between the negative comments and the heightened insurgency social crisis in the country is not significant.

H_1 : The degree of correlation between the negative comments and the heightened insurgency social crisis in the country is significant.

Test Statistics = Spearman Correlation Coefficient (r_s)

Table 6: Statistical Test of Hypothesis 2

Options	Data 1	Data 2	Rank 1	Rank 2	D	d ²
Strongly Agree	154	133	4	4	0	0
Agree	177	147	5	5	0	0
Undecided	17	33	1	2	-1	1
Disagree	27	27	3	1	2	4
Strongly Disagree	24	59	2	3	-1	1

Adapted from tables 2 and 3. Source: Field Survey, 2013.

$$\sum d^2 = 0 + 0 + 1 + 4 + 1 = 6$$

$$\text{So } r_s = 1 - \frac{2 \times \sum d^2}{n(n^2-1)}$$

$$r_s = 1 - \frac{(2 \times 6)}{n(n^2-1)}$$

$$r_s = 1 - \frac{2 \times 6}{5(5^2 - 1)}$$

$$r_s = 1 - \frac{12}{124}$$

$$r_s = 1 - 0.095$$

$$r_s = 0.905$$

Decision

Since the result of the Spearman Correlation Coefficient ($r_s = 0.905$) falls within the strong positive correlation region, we hereby reject the H_0 and accept the H_1 which says that “the degree of correlation between the negative comments and the heightened insurgency social crisis in the country is significant.”

Test of Hypothesis Three:

H_0 : Political marketing tools would not provide significant panacea for the politics of bitterness in the country.

Hi: Political marketing tools would provide significant panacea for the politics of bitterness in the country.

Test Statistics = Spearman Correlation Coefficient (r_s)

Table 7: Statistical Test of Hypothesis 3

Options	Data 1	Data 2	Rank 1	Rank 2	D	d ²
Strongly Agree	133	129	4	4	0	0
Agree	147	139	5	5	0	0
Undecided	33	37	2	1	1	1
Disagree	27	50	1	3	-2	4
Strongly Disagree	59	44	3	2	1	1

Adapted from tables 2 and 3. Source: Field Survey, 2013.

$$\sum d^2 = 0 + 0 + 1 + 4 + 1 = 6$$

$$\text{So } r_s = 1 - \frac{2 \times \sum d^2}{n(n^2-1)}$$

$$r_s = 1 - \frac{(2 \times 6)}{n(n^2-1)}$$

$$r_s = 1 - \frac{2 \times 6}{5(5^2 - 1)}$$

$$r_s = 1 - \frac{12}{124}$$

$$r_s = 1 - 0.095$$

$$r_s = 0.905$$

Decision

Since the result of the Spearman Correlation Coefficient ($r_s = 0.905$) indicates a strong positive correlation, we hereby reject the H_0 and accept the H_1 which says that "Political marketing tools would provide significant panacea for the politics of bitterness in the country."

11. Summary of Results and their Implications

A summary of the results of this study shows that:

- i. There is significant correlation between the pre-election negative comments of some politicians and the violence that followed the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria.
 - ii. The degree of correlation between the negative comments and the heightened insurgency social crisis in the country is significant.
 - iii. Political marketing tools would provide significant panacea for the politics of bitterness in the country.
- The implication of the above results is that politicians should have at the back of their minds, at all times, the fact that comments they make influence the actions of their followers either positively or negatively. Making comments that make their followers to take up arms against other political opponents is not only unpatriotic, but also inhuman. Life is sacred, no man can make it and no man reserves the right to take another person's life. People that want to rule must exhibit from their conducts that they have ample value for human life, which is a major yardstick for measuring how they would treat the citizens of the country, when they come into power. Anyone that has little value for human life while questing for power will also have little value for human life when he chanced into power.

Today, Nigeria has been plunged into untold social crisis replete with insurgency and terrorism the magnitude of which has never been witnessed in the history of the country. Innocent lives are being brutally snuffed out in cold blood every day, just because some youths were misinformed and misdirected by aggrieved politicians. The situation is getting out of hands, and no one is spared. The physical, emotional and psychological costs will take many years to be healed, if at all. The economic costs in terms of lost investments, destroyed infrastructure and the consequent unemployment cannot be imagined. Power comes from God and He entrusts it on whoever He wills. Politicians must therefore accord Him that respect as the owner of power they are asking for, by exhibiting enormous regard for the sanctity of human life. Nigerian citizens have suffered enough at the hands of their leaders.

12. Conclusion

Empirical evidence point to the fact that a greater percentage of the political and social crises that have engulfed Nigeria in the past and present are offshoot of some ill-advised comments from the country's politicians. The attendant social, economic and political costs are too dear to bear. The mindless killing of innocent citizens over quests for power is anachronistic to all civilized cultures and humanity.

13. RECOMMENDATIONS:

- i. Nigerian politicians should guard their utterances at all times.
- ii. Political marketing experts should be consulted to undertake nationwide programme of enlightenment on public speech writings and deliveries to politicians. The Federal Government should fund this, and also make it mandatory for all top members of the various political parties in the country.
- iv. Stiffer penalties should be spelt out in the laws of the land against politicians, opinion leaders, religious leaders and indeed anyone who directly or indirectly incites violence against innocent citizens of the country.
- v. The nation's security agencies should be better trained in the early warning detection of comments or issues that are likely to blow-up into violence and nip such in the bud.
- vi. All those fingered to be behind violence in Nigeria in the past, should be brought to book, as a deterrent against others.
- vii. Nigerian politicians should on their own try to secure the services of public relations experts on how best to deliver speeches with substance, that would be potent tools for winning elections without frictions.
- viii. Let all concerned, as a mark of respect for their Creator, forgive one another and turn back the hands of blood, mindful of the fact that whatsoever anyone sows, that he shall also reap.

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