

# Africa and the Crises of Democratisation: A Dialectical Analysis

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## ABSTRACT

The crises of democratisation in Africa have not been properly focused on in its primacy, the economic dynamics of democracy. As such this study focuses on the economics of democratisation which is out of the agenda of most African countries. Although Africans and Western do-gooders of democracy pretend to offer Africa the liverages of economic development, they have always done the contrary with the assistance of their local collaborators. The global regime of capital has always worked against Africa's democratisation as it undermines Africa's economic progress which strengthens Euro-American democracy in its fundamental of material base. Thus capitalist law of uneven-development which aids the realisation problem of advance capital strengthens democracy in Europe and North America and underdevelops democracy in Africa. This is the logic of the crises of democratisation in Africa and can only be overcome by a home or African grown development processes and the stoppage of flight of capital to Europe and North America.

**Keywords:** Democratisation, alienation, dialectics, liberalism, underdevelopment.

*"Every generation out of relative obscurity discovers its mission, fulfils it or betrays it" – Frantz Fanon*

*"Every onlooker is either a coward or a traitor" – Frantz Fanon*

*"I would want to sleep! But the indolence of this generation would not allow me to sleep" – Cheik Anta Diop*

## INTRODUCTION

Democracy is being discussed, especially, by Western liberal scholars as if it has always been a product only of the Greek direct democracy and that of the contemporary liberal world. This has been done to shield democracy from its linkage with egalitarianism or society of the pristine order, the primitive communal system or primitive communism. One should not be frightened by this concept which has become a 'spectre' to the other side of the world, the Western or Northern hemisphere. Primitive communal system or primitive communism is being your brother's keeper. One supposes that this is not strange to Africa or the other parts of the South. It is quite closer to the social democracies of the Scandinavian countries that is deeply welfarist. The primitive communal system had a naturally-grown democracy based on the gentile constitution that grew out of society that knew no internal contradictions, and was adapted only to such a society. It had no cohesive power except public opinion. However, a society that succeeded it came into being by force of all its economic conditions of existence, had to split into freemen and slaves, into exploiting rich and exploited poor; the society that is not only incapable of reconciling these antagonisms, but had to drive them more and more to a head (Engels 1977:165).

The reconciliation of these antagonistic relations since civilisation has been the basis of politics and indeed democratic politics in the contemporary historical process since the age of imperialism or the age of the emergence of advance capitalism. These countries mostly from Western Europe and North America claim to be the citadel of democratic culture. We accept the position that democracy and its politics of representative electoral process are still transitional even in the advance democracies of the world. Francis Fukuyama's position that Western liberal democracy is "The End of History" is not tenable in the circumstances of democratic transition or democratisation. As such we prefer the term democratisation which stresses the dynamic aspect of a still-unfinished process to the term "democracy", which reinforced the illusion that we can give a definite formula for it. Amin (2009:6-7)

stresses further this position thus:

*Democracy is a modern concept in the sense that it is the definition of modernity – if...we understand by modernity the adoption of the principle that human beings individually and collectively (that is societies) are responsible for their destiny. Before they could formulate that concept, people had to free themselves from the alienation characteristic of the forms of power that preceded capitalism, whether they were the alienations of religion or whether they took the form of “traditions” conceived as permanent transhistorical facts. The expression of modernity and of the necessity for democracy that it implies dates from the age of enlightenment. The modernity in question is, therefore, synonymous with capitalism and democracy that it has produced is limited like the rest, like capitalism itself. In its historical bourgeois form even though they are the only ones known and practiced so far – it constitutes only a ‘stage’.*

We cannot, therefore, look at one side of global dialectics of democratisation and we applaud that those people are perfect and that we have to “import” democracy as given. We are falling into this trap because we are very gullible people. The dialectics of democracy is anchored on the premise that the whole world is democratising. It further stresses that humanity lost democratisation when the pristine primitive democracy collapsed after the emergence of property relations of the slave mode of production. This was followed by the feudal oppressive property relations. From the collapse of the primitive communal system when man lost his pristine freedom and was held in chains by each epoch of dominant property relations, the struggle of man has been to regain this lost freedom. This lost freedom has enhanced freedom for owners and controllers of private property throughout history and put other propertiless classes in chains.

Samir Amin said that “for democracy to be properly conceptualised, people have to free themselves from the alienations of the form of power that preceded capitalism, whether they were the alienations of religion or whether they took the form of ‘traditions’ considered as permanent transhistorical facts. This is what Schumpeter (1955:65) refers to as “atavism in the social structure”. These atavistic social relations of earlier epochs, man must free himself from their clutches. It presents itself as the dialectics of the democratic struggles of *The Long View of History* (Novack 1979). We accept the fact that there is the atavism of the social structure. Joseph Schumpeter was not saying something new but a common historical fact. Marx (1984:21) said, “No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society.”

In other words, no social formation is pure but contains remnants of the old society or social formation it has displaced. This is also true of democracy which should be seen as always in transition, hence democratic transition is more appropriate. Democratisation has moved from property franchise through adult male to universal suffrage now still based in the control of wealth or property which is plutocracy (Novack 1979:43-4), a government or democracy based on the wealthy people controlling power. Lenin (1985:84) said, despite the fact that differences arose in the slave-owning state or epoch between monarchy and republic, between aristocracy and democracy that the differences did not deviate from the basic social structure of the slave-owning state. It is from this atavistic hangover of history that we would examine our theoretical framework.

## **THE PLACE OF THEORY**

In the down to earth definition of democracy always attributed to Abraham Lincoln; it is seen as “The government of the people, by the people and for the people.” If democracy is government of the people, by the people and for the people, it therefore, signifies in a nutshell popular rule. It should embody fundamental human rights such as freedom of expression, right to life, right to dignity of the human person, right to personal liberty, free press, peaceful assembly and association, freedom of movement, political participation, right to fair hearing, right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and others (Oddih 2007:147-8). Nzongola-Ntalaja (2000:14) clearly explains democracy as a process of continuous promotion of equal access to fundamental human rights. He stressed that democracy cannot be negotiated as a new bargain to developing nations, rather it has to be richer than the liberal variance and should be capable of leading to a development strategy that is homegrown, people-centred

towards eradicating poverty.

The itemisation of those freedoms which liberal societies hold on to as the tenets of democracy would not reflect the realities of capitalist societies. The elite theory of democracy as propounded by Gasset (1968:61) states that the masses, "...by their very nature cannot and must not manage their own existence, let alone govern society". In consonance with Jose Ortega J Gasset, Gaetano Mosca cited in Meisel (1958) said, "the elite are better organised and have intellectual and moral superiority over the masses." Curtis (1934) said that Vilfredo Pareto was upholding the view of the absolute right of the elite to manipulate the masses and freely dispose of the wealth created by them. According to Kerimov et al. (1979:108), Mosca himself never attached much importance to elections, but other theoreticians of political elitism, like Joseph Schumpeter stressed in the concept of democracy the opportunity of the people to pick their elite. In his theory, Schumpeter opined that there are always several elites in society vying with each other for the electors' votes. Thus he concludes, 'Democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them' (Schumpeter 1959:269, 284-5).

In a critical observation, Kerimov et.al. (1979) said that the elite model only sees the public at large enter the political arena at election, outside of which they have no opportunity for bringing any pressure to bear upon the elite. In the same vein Lippmann (1954) said the man-in-the street should not take part in politics for two reasons. First he said the man-in-the street has inability to understand politics properly, because idea that people have in their heads do not automatically correspond to reality and so their judgment is distorted; secondly people are inclined to think in stereotypes. The elite, he believes, should enjoy a fair degree of independence from the people. It gives people "not what they want but what they will learn to want" (Lippmann, 1929: 282-3).

The elite theoreticians of democracy at least present us with the class character of democracy which their modern incarnate deny. According to Kerimov et.al. (1979: 109), these modern incarnates of post-World War II liberal theorists of democracy "...try to draw a veil over the class nature of power relations in capitalist society. But the other theoreticians, despite their reservations and comments, nevertheless recognise the obvious fact that political power in society is closely linked with economic power and that the man that possesses property and wealth is by the virtue of this, the man of power. Many of these moreover recognised that a basic condition for membership of an elite is high economic status and income superiority. Novack (1979:43-4) calls this type of rule of the wealthy or elite, plutocracy or organised wealthy class which has been exposed by the current economic depression or what they tagged "global financial meltdown" since 2008.

Macpherson (1973:5-6) said, "Democracy originally meant rule by the common people, the plebeians. It was very much a class affair; it meant the sway of the lowest and the largest class. That is why it was feared and rejected by the men of learning, men of substance, men who valued civilised ways of life. Democracy as a leveling doctrine was rejected by Plato in the Fifth Century B.C. and no less explicitly by Cromwell in the Seventeenth Century A.D. It was even rejected by Cromwell's left-wing allies in the English Civil War, the so-called Levellers who split from him on the issue of who to have the vote. Even they did not think of extending the vote to the two-third of the nation who were either wage-earners, or recipients of poor relief, or both. Such men they held were dependent on others, and so are not entitled to a political voice. Even the chief nineteenth century apostle of liberalism, John Staurt Mill, who realised that the common people had now to be treated as people, proposed a system of voting that would prevent the 'labouring class having a majority voice.'

The foregoing as we have noticed elsewhere gave rise to property qualification, a carry-over from feudalism of the Middle Ages to liberalism of the current capitalist epoch. We still have to rely on Macpherson (1973:1-2) who said, "Democracy used to be a bad word. Everybody who is anybody knew that democracy, in its original sense of rule by the people or government in accordance with the will of the bulk of the people will be a bad thing – fatal to individual freedom and to all the graces of civilised living. That was the position taken by pretty nearly all men of intelligence from the earliest historical times down to about a hundred years ago. Then, within fifty years, democracy became a good thing. Its full acceptance into the ranks of respectability was apparent by the time of the First World War, the war which the Western allied leaders could proclaim was fought to make the world safe for democracy."

## **BLUNTING THE RESOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC QUESTION**

Why was it hard to proclaim democracy? Why did it take such a long time to actualise not until after a

devastating intra-European War called World War I? It was because men of property and also men of learning were against it throughout history. The roles of the plebeians or mob were feared as a spectre which Thomas Hobbes referred to as the state of nature which was a very hostile one because there was no industry, no arts, no “society” (no community – my emphasis); and which is worst of all, initial fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short (Nisbet 1983:27). It was for this reason of endemic and internecine conflict or turmoil that made men to surrender individual authority to a central sovereign which became a monopoly of force. Thus the initial emergence of the liberal society was anti-democratic, but it was liberal in the economic sphere but autocratic in the political sphere, hence the absolute monarchies of the 17<sup>th</sup>, 18<sup>th</sup>, and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. In this respect Macpherson (1973:5) said:

*In our Western society the democratic franchise was not installed until after the liberal society and the liberal states were firmly established. Democracy came as a top dressing. It had to accommodate itself to the soil that had already been prepared by the operation of the competitive, individualist, market, society and by the operation of the liberal state, which served that society through a system of freely competing, though not democratic political parties. It was the liberal state that was democratised, and in the process, democracy was liberalised.*

Why was something that was so hated and feared, a spectre to the nascent liberal society and state, became its darling in the twentieth century? It was because the revolutionary tradition of democracy was cubed and its mass base was blunted. This tradition of liberalism of blunting the edge of the resolution of the *national democratic question*, that is, becoming a fetter to the revolutionary transformation of society makes it impossible to arrive at the higher stage of democracy. As a result, the so-called advance democracies still need democratisation. The advance democracies are still in purgatory! Blunting the edge of democratisation can be gleaned from Marx (1979:7) thus:

*Thanks to economic and political development of France since 1789, Paris has been placed for the last fifty years in such a position that no revolution could break out there without assuming a proletarian character; that is to say, without the proletariat, which had bought victory with their blood, advancing its demand after victory. But the demand itself, however indefinitely it was couched contained a threat to the existing order of society; the workers who put it forward were still armed; therefore the disarming of the workers was the first commandment for the bourgeois, who were at the helm of the state. Hence after every resolution won by the workers, a new struggle ending with the defeat of the workers.*

The cowing of the vast majority, particularly the workers had to be properly registered as a sign in fatal warning to the working class in France and European proletariat who would dare to attempt radical transformatory democratic demands. They should demand “not what they want but what they will learn to want” according to Walter Lipmann, the elite democratic philosopher of this brutal arrogance of the bourgeoisie. Marx (1979:7-8) said:

*...as soon as bourgeois republicans in control felt something like firm ground under their feet, their first aim was to disarm the workers. This took place by driving them into the insurrection of June 1848 by direct breach of faith, by open defiance and the attempt to banish the unemployed to a distant province. The government had to take care to have an overwhelming superiority of force. After five days of heroic struggle, the workers were defeated. And then followed a blood-bath among the defenceless prisoners, the like of which has not been seen since the days of the civil wars which ushered in the downfall of Roman republic. It was the first time that the bourgeoisie showed to what insane cruelties of revenge it will be goaded the moment the proletariat dares to take its stand against the bourgeoisie as a separate class, with its own interests and demands. And yet 1848 was only a child's play compared with the frenzy of the bourgeoisie in 1871.*

It was the foregoing horror that created the birth of liberalism that made Marx (1978:11) remarked, “But unheroic as bourgeois society is, it nevertheless took heroism, sacrifice, terror, civil war and the battle of nations to bring it into

being.” These brutalities and terrors of nascent liberal societies pricked the conscience of the democrats and forced on the agenda the resolution of the democratic question not for the interest of the working people but to protect the bourgeoisie and its state or the capitalist social formation. It was to find solution for a partial resolution of the *democratic question* and indeed the *national question*. It was only C.B. Macpherson, a liberal scholar, who came close to Karl Marx’s position on why democratisation became the only option for the liberal societies of the West. And he said:

*What the addition of democracy to the liberal state did was simply to provide constitutional channels for popular pressures, pressure to which government would have to yield in about the same measure anyway, merely to maintain public order and avoid revolution. By admitting the mass of the people into the competitive party system, the liberal state did not abandon its fundamental nature; it simply opened the competitive political system to the entire individual who had been created by the competitive market society. The liberal states fulfill its own logic. In so doing, it neither destroyed nor weakened itself; it strengthened both itself and the market society. It liberalised democracy while democratising liberalism (Macpherson 1973:11).*

In this respect, therefore, the democratisation of liberalism is incomplete without the *resolution of the national question* in advance liberal societies. The issue of the *resolution of the national question* becomes important because of the oppressive material relations of liberal society against the working people. The dialectics of the *resolution of the national question* would free liberalism from its material oppressive relations within and without. It would in the final analysis result in the global democratic revolution which has been held at bay by imperialist extension of its version of democratic liberalism and its autocratic export of democratisation through its International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and Multinational Corporations, all known as the Washington Consensus autocracy expressed through their conditionalities. A new list is now added to the Washington Consensus before loans or aid are given, “...the human rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) persons globally” (New African, January 2012:8-9).

What is the *national question*? It is the product of the nationalities that are unable to develop the material conditions to become nations. Such states that are unable to develop their nationalities into a nation are hindered by internal and external oppressive relations and inequalities instigated by imperialism and their local cohorts (Fedoseyev et.al. 1977:47). The *national question*, therefore, is an outcome of the cleavages arising from national disunity occasioned by economic disarticulation, underdevelopment and backwardness. Its resolution, therefore, is the realisation of freedom from oppression, striving for self-determination to overcome oppressive material relations for independent economic, social and political development. From what we have seen, imperialism is at the centre of global oppressive material relations. It has a two edged sword: (i) The *national question* still unresolved in the advance capitalist democracies hence the need for further democratisation and; (ii) The crisis of the *national question* in the backward societies hence the need for a second independence and true, unhindered democratisation.

## **AFRICA AND THE DIALECTICS OF GLOBAL CRISES OF DEMOCRATISATION**

The dialectical resolution of the national question is dialectical because the oppressor is also being oppressed by its arsenal of oppression. That is why those who want to export democracy must equally be forced to democratise because global tyranny of capital and its oppressive material relations is antithetical to democratisation. Frolov (1984:285) stressed that “...not all nationalities grow into nations. As a rule, the consolidation of nationalities and their growth into nations are hindered in the dependent countries oppressed by monopoly capital of the imperialist countries.” Cabral (1980:116) warned thus “...as long as imperialism is in existence, any independent Africa state must be a liberation movement in power, or it will not be independent.” However, the development of the local rentier bourgeoisie gave birth to and strengthened our illusion that imperialism was progressive and an agent of development or the advancement of the historical process of the backward people (Tedheke 2005:432). The contrary, however, is the case!

This is why a firmer grasp of history, indeed contemporary global history, and the political economy of that history will give us a clearer view of our place in that history and therefore of democratisation. Ake (1981) said that capitalism was struggling to overcome its internal contradictions at the time capitalist imperialism came to

Africa. The capitalist nations were struggling to realise surplus value as a result of over production and under consumption hence the importance of Africa as a market and as a source of raw materials for the industrial use of the advance capitalist nations of Europe and later US and Japan. Secondly, there is also the struggle for surplus value of the labour of the dependent colonial and neo-colonial territories. This informs the import of globalisation or imperialism given the advance capitalist countries the leverage to scoop the surpluses of the Third World and moreso now in Africa leaving them in economic and social crises (Tedheke 2005:432) resulting in failures of democratisation and indeed states.

The struggle for realisation of surpluses and the importance of Africa for the Euro-American civilisation still remains intact. As such Africa remains a junior partner in the international division of labour which is the eternal source of its economic crisis and indeed crisis of democratisation. In reference to the crises generated in England but had much devastating impacts in continental Europe, the periphery of capital in Karl Marx's time is informative of our own crises both in economy and democratisation in Africa and the Third World. Marx and Engels (1977:289) said:

*While, therefore, the crises produce revolution in the continent, the foundation of these is nevertheless, always laid in England. Violent outbreak must naturally occur rather in the extremities of the bourgeois body than in its heart, since the possibility of adjustment is greater here than there.*

The crises that are more intense in the periphery or extremities of the bourgeois body than its heart (core) are products of two stealings or what Karl Marx calls robbery. One is the robbery in the name of profit from the labour by advance capital, and two are the robberies from the backward societies, the surplus value of their labour making it impossible to dispose off the accumulated surplus value of advance capital. This is why they have to write off the funny debts of Africa so that Africans can now have the capacity to purchase their manufactures for them to realise their surplus value or market their goods. This is the limit of liberalism, that is, fetters imposed by the realisation problem holding back the development of the productive forces, thus limiting and restricting democratisation at the core of capital and in the periphery of capital. The resultant crisis leads to social and economic devastations in the periphery, snuffing out any democratic experiment since independence to date in Africa. The philosophers of capital knew that if this relationship is not maintained capital would die. Adams Smith and David Ricardo knew it hence they theorised the master-servant theory of *comparative advantage*. This theory sentenced Africans and the rest of the Third World as junior partners in the international division of labour.

The logician of capital is at it again in the neo-liberal framework to advance Adam Smith. De Soto (2000) said: "...in the business of the West, there is a growing concern that the failure of the most of the rest of the world to implement capitalism will eventually drive the rich economy into recession." But that is not the logic of capital! The logic of capital is uneven-development. The logic of capital makes capital to be authoritarian and dictatorial within and without and still pretends democratic at home and also pushing distorted democracy. It has no option because its fingers were badly burnt during the continuous revolutions in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries' Europe. We have noted earlier that given the vote did not mitigate the logic of capital, it rather strengthened capital hence democratising in the advance societies was useful, very useful for the transformation of capital or liberalism. However, in most of the underdeveloped world, capitalism penetrated, left old structures intact but converted them to serve the interest of metropolitan capital through the enthronement of capitalist structures (Marx, 1984:202-3).

The bane of the Africa situation, therefore, is that colonialism created a caricature and a steel born capitalism that was based only in trading or merchant capital and indeed extractive industries that would not revolutionalise industry, production and the productive forces. Thus the crisis of stunted growth and development are aiding the interest of imperialism in enhancing and deepening their exploitation of the African people. What has aided the ongoing scenario is that whereas the metropolitan bourgeoisie were the architect of their own state, in the colonies and neo-colonies, however, it created state apparatus through which it could exercise dominion over the indigenous social classes (Alavi 1979:1). It went further to create classes which form the tail of imperialism making Africa junior partners in the international division of labour. In this respect Cabral (1979:56) said:

*There is a misconception held by many people, even on the left, that imperialism made use enter history at the moment it began its adventure in our counties. This preconception must be*

*denounced: for somebody on the left and the Marxists in particular, history obviously means the class struggle. Our opinion is exactly the contrary. We considered that when imperialism arrived in Guinea, it made us leave our history. We believed that history in our country is the result of class struggle, but we have our class struggles in our country; the moment imperialism arrived and colonialism arrived, it made us leave our history and (we) enter another history. Obviously we agreed that the class struggle has to continue but it continued in a very different way; our whole people is struggling against the ruling class of imperialist countries, and this gives a completely different aspect to the history of our people.*

When Cabral said that we were removed from our history, or our class struggles, it means that we were removed from home grown productive processes. Noting that we lost our history and became an appendage of another history, that of European and American civilisation. According to Shivji (2006:18) this is why, "...we hire a de Soto to tell us that we are too stupid to recognise 'the mystery of capital', and understand 'why capitalism triumph in the West and fail everywhere else.' The South Commission observed why this globalisation of productive capital fails in other parts of the world apart from Europe, North America and Japan. In its more restrained language it said, 'The widening disparities between South and North are attributable not merely to differences in economic progress, but also to an enlargement of the North's power vis-à-vis the rest of the world (The South Commission 1990:3 cited by Shivji 2006:18). The South Commission discovered that "...in recent years, developing countries have had to make net debt-related transfers of nearly \$40 billion per year to developed countries, and there is little prospect of a reversal of this perverse flow of capital from poor to the rich," (The South Commission 1990:19).

From the foregoing, it is better to situate the crises of democratisation in Africa on the crises of North- South relations in global politics. There are a lot of contradictions in this relationship, which are structural, that is, our linkage with the Western imperialist countries. The South Commission has revealed one of such to us that of financing the rich industrial countries by nearly \$40 billion a year by 1990. Our greatest problem is that we ignored this structural contradictions, product of crises of hegemony of capital which promotes upheavals, violent crises, thereby prompting military coups and counter forces (Nwankwo 1987:23). An aspect of the structural contradictions is Africa's dependent, very weak peripheral capitalism based on enclave economies which perpetuates centrifugal forces. Another aspect of the structural contradictions is the rentier/landed classes that are heavily dependent on imperialism that has evolved heavily asymmetrical relations of exploitation leading to economic crises that resulted in failures of democratic transitions in dependent capitalist social formations in Africa and most other third world countries,

Some of the dialectical forces or contradictions that have made it impossible for unity within the states in Africa could clearly be understood when we examine the various nature of the dialectical contradictions that confront the African states' unity projects. Firstly, is the dialectical contradiction between the precolonial and the colonial political economy or social formation. The emergence of the colonial social formation in Africa and indeed other colonies was to impose a metropolitan commercial and local landed bourgeoisie that created state apparatus through which it could exercise dominion over all indigenous social classes in the colony (Alavi 1979:40-1). This exercise of dominion over all the indigenous social formations or classes has created a problem of national economic and political integration in Africa. It has made it impossible for the emergence of centripetal forces and thus centrifugal forces are entrenched working against progressive economic integration and democratisation.

There is also the dialectical contradiction between the dependent Africa comprador bourgeoisie and international capital or metropolitan bourgeoisie. We have noted earlier Marx and Engels (1977:289) position that the crises in the heart and extremities of the bourgeoisie body first produce revolutions and crises in the extremities because the possibilities of adjustment is greater in the heart (metropole) than in extremities (peripheries). Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels' used the concept of extremities to describe the mainland Europe (periphery) and England which they saw as the heart (core) of the bourgeois body of their time. The Third World and its dependant political economy in today's world can now be likened to the extremities of the bourgeois body and indeed the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) comprising Euro-America and Japan as the heart. When there is no economic stability it becomes impossible democratising. We shall discuss this issue in the next sub-theme.

There is also the contradiction between the remnants of feudal and semi-feudal relations and the colonially

created comprador bourgeoisie. In order to transform the precolonial structure to solve the problem of realisations of surplus value and the accumulation of capital, the colonial revolution was only half realised. It was half realised because it was a mere strengthening of the integration of Africa into global capitalism without structural transformation. It merely strengthened Africa as the junior partner in international division of labour. It therefore, solidified the feudal and semi-feudal relations and stopped the embourgeoisification at the comprador level. The transformation did not go as far as creating an industrial transformative bourgeoisie thus the contradiction between the comprador bourgeoisie and the feudal and semi-feudal social formations of precolonial Africa. This is a hindrance to democratisation in African post-colonial society and indeed in the post-Cold War Africa.

We cited earlier Claude Ake who said that capitalism was struggling to overcome its internal contradictions at the time capitalist imperialism came to Africa. The internal contradiction was the realisation problem and Africa was central to the realisation of surplus value by imperialism or advance capital. Even today Africa is still central because capitalism is no capitalism without fulfilling its law of uneven-development. As such it has to create a lot of bottlenecks for the backward societies and indeed Africa in order to resolve the realisation problem. The solution of the realisation problem is anti-democratisation hence the crisis of democratisation in Africa and indeed the backward societies. The crisis of democratisation is the global dialectics of the democratic crisis which is a democracy of the “sourcerer’s choice.” You know the sourcerer as a vampire lives on blood and the blood enriches its strength and power. It would not want its victim to die because its death would mean its starvation and possible death. The sourcerer would, therefore, make it possible that its victim survives a terrible and excruciating survival. This is what has been imposed on Africa hence democratising must include the democratisers, the Western do-gooders which form the global dialectics of democratisation.

### **THE CRISES OF DEMOCRATISATION IN AFRICA: THE SOURCERER’S CHOICE**

For International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or World Bank), Western view and the so-called democratising Third World, the issue is that of corruption, lack of transparency, lack of free and fair elections, authoritarian rule, lack of accountability, among others, are the banes of democratisation in Africa. In their view, the foregoing results in the lack of good governance and as such the crises of modernisation which school states that non-Western countries are backward because they are traditional societies. In their view, traditionality prevents them from moving to modernity and so, modernisation or opening up to the Western values including democracy will bring development. As a result of relentless criticism of this school in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s the apostles of modernisation pretended to be abandoning their postulates but reincarnated it in structural adjustment programme (SAP) and now globalisation that are anti-democratisation. This is nothing but the evolutionary process of this Western sourcery in the name of development.

Novack (1979) said “...at the critical point in the accumulation of the changes outside and inside an organism, the conflicting elements that compose it break up the old form of its existence, and the progressive formation passes over, by the way of a leap, to a qualitatively new and historically higher state of development. This is true not only of organic species but also social formations and systems of thought as well, But it is much harder for many people to accept such a conclusion when it comes to the transformation of a lower social organisation into a higher social organisation. This reluctance to apply the teaching of evolution consistently to all things, and above all the social system in which we live, is rooted in the determination to defend powerful but absolute narrow class interest against opposing forces and rival ideas that aim to create a genuinely new order of things.”

Offiong (1980) has stated the crises that led to the termination of the first democratisation in the immediate post-colonial Africa. He said it was based on the collapse of Africa’s international commodity prices. It affected those who supported the dictates of imperialism and those who did not. For Ghana and other exporters of primary commodity producers, those who believe in something called comparative advantage, the more they produced, the less they gained from Europe and North America. The very glaring example was that of Ghana which produce a little over 200,000 tones of cocoa and earned a little over \$200 million dollars. As Ghana was tutored and she believed in that theory called comparative advantage, she produced and increased her cocoa tonnage by over one hundred percent. She received from the do-gooders of democracy just a little above \$200 million as she got from her previous production of a little above 200,000 tones. As she increased to over 400,000 tones, the West, the theoreticians of *comparative advantage* messed Ghana up by giving her a pittance in the name of international trade.



This was the origin of the post-independence Ghana crisis resulting in the 1966 coup.

The changes in imperialist demands for our raw materials or primary products as a result of changes in the technological development led to the progressive collapse of the Nigeria economy in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It resulted in the crisis between the metropolitan bourgeoisie and their local Nigerian collaborators or the comprador bourgeoisie. This crisis of 1955/56 spread to 1960s. According to Bangura, Mustapha and Adamu (1986:176) "The first of such crises occurred in 1955/56, following the Korean War boom (after) which prices of key Nigerian commodities experienced a slump leading to a reduction in revenue which was not enough to meet expanding cost of government expenditure, the high cost of import bill and the foreign exchange requirements of local and foreign companies." The consequent short falls in regional revenue and the appreciation of the revenue of the federal centre from crude oil and custom duties led to the intensification of intra-class and inter-class struggles of the 1960s. It resulted in the workers strike in 1965, the coup of the 1966 and consequently the Civil War (Tedheke 2007).

The same thing occurred in other African countries and also with the politics of Cold-War resulting into many coups and counter coups in Africa. What affected negatively the first democratisation wave in Africa in its early neo-colonial setting was not totally internal, it was a product of neo-colonialism. It has been a product of those "democrats" of the West, that is, Europe, North America and Japan who thought us the so-called theory of *comparative advantage*. This theory was made by Adam Smith, the author of *The Wealth of Nations* in defence of nascent capital. This theory based on capitalist law of uneven and spasmodic development in consonance with capitalist global practices has made Africa the junior partner in the international division of labour. It has made Africans the hewers of wood and drawers of water in the global regime of capitalism from the 16<sup>th</sup> century to date. First we provided slaves in the trans-Atlantic *chattel slavery* and later in something called legitimate commerce; we have been providing raw materials from colonialism to neo-colonialism and now globalisation. This global murderous material relations is what Museveni (2009:13) expressed thus:

*Another strategic bottle-neck that has kept African countries in a third world status has been the export of raw materials such as unprocessed coffee or unrefined crude oil. I have many times pointed out that when you export a kilo of unprocessed bean coffee you get US\$1. When somebody like Nestle processes this kilo of coffee in London, he gets US\$20. Therefore, Uganda donates US\$19 in every kilogramme of coffee to the United Kingdom.*

Since the so-called legitimate commerce, we have been in this killer range regime of capital since the cessation of the murderous trans-Atlantic slave trade or better known as chattel slavery. We cited somewhere Howard Zinn's postulate that: 'History is important because if you don't know history, it is as if you were born yesterday and if you were born yesterday anybody up there and in the position of power can tell you anything (cited by Tedheke 2009:2). In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, a French anarchist Proudhon roared, property is theft'. Karl Marx corrected him, that originally property was not only theft but robbery. That is, stealing accompanied by force as lawyers would define robbery. Marx (1986) called it *primitive accumulation* in the sense of the original accumulation of capital. One cannot really say that robbery has stopped! If it is seen to have stopped, what about the military bases around the world that capital has weaved around us? What about the capital backed by military diplomacy? Ask the Afghanistans, Iraqis and Libyans! The sourcerer, that is, advanced capital is not giving the economics of democracy and indeed of democratisation which dehumanises the Africans and other third world countries.

Charles Soludo cited Prezeworski et.al. (1990) who said that level of economic development or level of per capita income has very significant role to play in democratisation. According to him, Prezeworski said that "...once a country has (a) democratic regime, its level of economic development has a very strong effect on the possibility that democracy will survive. Democracy can be expected to last an average of about 8.5 years in a country with per capital income under \$1,000; 16 years in one with per capita income between \$1,000 and \$2,000; 33 years between \$4,000 and \$6,000. Above \$6,000 democracies are impregnable and are expected to live forever. No democratic system has fallen in a country where per capita income exceeds \$6,055." Huntington (1996:9) said that, "between \$1,000 and \$3,000 per capita GNP is where unsuccessful coups occur, while successful coups (occur) in countries with per capital GNPs is under \$500."

From the African political economy perpetuated by imperialism, there are myriads of evidence that the sourcerer, the purveyor of democratisation did not really want Africa to democratise. The internal infrastructure of

neo-colonialism and indeed globalisation are not helping matters. The African collaborators, that is, the African ruling class or what some call the political class because of lack of indepth study of the dynamics of class formation in Africa is a case in point. We have noted earlier Isa Shivji who cited the South Commission that said, “In recent years, developing countries have had to make net debt-related transfers of nearly \$40 billion per year to developed countries and there is little prospect of a reverse of this perverse flow of capital from poor to rich. Shivji cited various sources thus:

*Consultancy gobbles up billions of dollars annually. Action Aid says almost one-fifth of total aid goes to pay consultants and so-called experts. Donors employ 100,000 technical experts in Africa. Tanzania pays US\$500 million annually to foreign consultants, more than three times what it receives annually in direct foreign investment between 1994 and 1999 (Shivji 2006:16).*

## CONCLUSION

This crisis of democratisation is crisis of underdevelopment. It is the crisis of raw material and mineral production that is paid for at Euro-American price. It is the crisis that has placed the African as the junior partner in the international division of labour. It has placed the African at the receiving end of the historical process of the international political economy or economic relations. We have seen that the economy is very important in democratisation. The do-gooders of democratisation want to give the form of democracy (political) with their right hand and take away the content (economy) with their left. This is what one would call the sourcerer’s choice.

The fact that our rulers are corrupt is of particular political economy. The current capitalist economic crisis since 2008 has shown us gargantuan corruption in the West in what they called financial crisis which is only the secondary perspective of that crisis. Engels (1977:173) said, “Naked greed has been the moving spirit of civilisation from the first day of its existence to the present time; wealth, more wealth and wealth again; wealth not of society, but of this shabby individual was its sole and determining aim.” It is the naked greed by imperialist capital and their local collaborators that is the bane of democratisation in Africa.

This naked greed of imperialism and its local African collaborators is the greatest enemy of democratisation. Cabral (1980:70) warned long ago that, “our struggle demands enlightened leadership...the best sons and daughters of our land must lead.” He also stressed (Cabral 1980:207), “The pace of our struggle depends basically on our capacity for analysis, decision and initiatives, and on efforts and sacrifices we are determined to make.” The crises of democratisation in Africa can be overcome if we overcome economic stagnation by rejecting the Western model of development which has been a sourcerer’s choice!

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