

TRANSFORMATION OF THE ABANGAN GROUP TOWARDS RADICAL STUDENTS (Study of the Dynamics of Islamic Radicalism in abangan society in Solo, Central Java)

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Abstract

Since the New Order until now, Solo has had a reputation as a base for religious radicalism. In fact, the people of Solo tend to abangan culture based on Javanese ethics rather than students. In fact, Islamic radicalism can emerge and exist in this region. In addition, there was also a transformation of abangan groups and groups of thugs into radical students. For this reason, the purpose of this study is to analyze and describe in depth the emergence and existence of Islamic radicalism in abangan society and the transformation of the abangan group into radical students. The type of research used is a qualitative method with a descriptive phenomenological approach. The results showed that the emergence of radical Islamic movements in Solo began during the New Order regime which was repressive towards its people. The presence of ustaz figures Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakr Ba'asyir is a symbol of local resistance to the regime. Some people, who are disappointed with the government, consider the two figures as patrons. Islamic radicalism in Solo is able to exist because of its supporters. Supporters of this movement are not only from the student group, but also the abangan group. The occurrence of this transformation is a paradoxical thing, because the relationship between abangan and santri is a dichotomy. In fact, there are abangan groups who are interested in being part of the radical students due to the local political situation.

Keywords Islamic Radicalism; Abangan; Laskar

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INTRODUCTION

So far, Indonesia is known as the country with the largest number of Muslims in the world, and is widely regarded as having a good reputation for religious tolerance. Its religious leaders are known to reject militant or radical interpretations of Islam (Chalmers, 2017:331). With a muslim majority population, Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world. However, Islam is often the target of suspicion from the state (Sukma, et al, 2007:1). In the context of modern socio-historical contexts, the emergence of religious radicalism in Indonesia is represented by the DI/TII movement led by Kartasuwiryo during sukarno's reign.

However, in the era of different generations, this group of DI/TII radicalism or jihadism still has supporters in

order to continue the ideals or ideas about the Islamic state. They still have an instrumental relationship with Darul Islam, which aspires to establish an Islamic state in the 1940s (Chalmers, 2017:331). During the reign of Suharto, the radicalism movement continued to exist in the midst of a repressive government. This fact can be shown by the jihad command (1976-1981), the hijacking of the Woyla aircraft by a group of fundamentalist pilgrims Imron bin Muhammad Zein (1981), the Tanjung Priok incident (1984), the explosion of Borobudur temple by a Shia group led by Hussein al Habsy (1985), The Waridi-led Lampung Security Vandal Movement / GPK (1989) as well as several other cases. According to Martin van Bruinessen, the struggle of radical Islamic groups in Indonesia is often associated with the formalization of Islamic sharia in Indonesia.

During the New Order government, it was very conducive to the emergence of Islamic radicalism movements in Indonesia. This is due to pressure on Muslims at the beginning of the birth of the New Order, which ignited resistance movements (Wildan, 2014: 274). Although, the character of the New Order government at that time was not merely to exert pressure on the Islamic radicalism movement but pressure was carried out against all socio-political movements that were critical and opposed towards the government. Islamic radicalism is considered the most critical and opposing social group against the New Order regime.

With the fall of the New Order regime and the emergence of the Reformation Period, there is another space and opportunity for the Islamist movement to be active again in the discourse of the debate on the foundation of state ideology as before the independence of the Republic of Indonesia. For supporters of radicalism, the fall of the New Order was considered a consequence of a government that distanced itself from Islamic values. In such a transitional situation, the radical group Islam intensively offers thoughts on the ideal concept of society, nation, and state based on Islamic law.

So far, Indonesia is known for its very large Muslim population. However, the number of supporters of Islamic radical groups is actually only small (Chalmers, 2017:332). Nonetheless, this small number of supporters of radicalism remains a major problem, given that the ideology and actions of radical groups have a major influence in various aspects of life. After all, the principle of radical groups is contrary to the general principles of society, nation, and state.

If you look at the phenomenon of Islamic radicalism movements in Indonesia, Solo city or Surakarta in Central Java is considered a fertile area and has prominent activities compared to other regions. The area of Solo city and its surroundings since the New Order until now is known as the most prominent base of Islamic radicalism groups in Indonesia (Fananie, et al, 2002; Hasan, 2008; SETARA Institute, 2012; Ricklefs, 2013; Wildan, 2014; Hadiz, 2019). In fact, the Laskar Jihad mass organization, which was once phenomenal at the beginning of the reform, although the organization led by Ja'far Umar Talib was centered in Yogyakarta but the initial phase of recruiting members, the majority of which was also carried out in Solo (Hasan, 2008: 236-237). Thus, the Solo area is indeed special if it is associated with radicalism movements even though its people tend to have an abangan culture.

Apparently, the local situation and conditions in Solo as well as the presence of radical Islamic figures such as Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir accelerated the emergence of radical groups in this region (Wildan, 2014: 274). The era of Islamic radicalism in Solo began to emerge in the early days of the New Order government or since the mid-1970s when the world situation was still engulfed in the Cold War. This shows that this movement is in no way related to Samuel Huntington's concept of The Clash of Civilizations.

Solo is the basis for a nominal Islamic community that is closely associated with syncretic religious patterns (Baidhaw, 2018:47). Actually, the emergence of Islamic radicalism in Solo city is a paradox. This is because, generally, the people of Solo tend to be in abangan culture compared to students. Of course, this notion of "abangan" has undergone a shift in meaning from the term Geertz used about the trichotomy of Javanese society. In the present context, abangan to mention Muslims or nominal Muslims.

People in the Solo area tend to be abangan, and the influence of students is only limited, the fact is that radicalism movements were able to emerge and develop in Solo. This Islamic radicalism movement can exist in a society that lacks mastery of religious science. Moreover, its society is known to uphold social ethics that avoid violence, on the contrary, radicalism is synonymous with violence. Such a phenomenon has shown a paradox between the Javanese ethical abangan group and the development of students who have a radicalism ideology.

Actually, historically the transformation from the abangan group to the students in Java was commonplace. The process of moving from abangan beliefs and practices to santri has occurred throughout Java, which has been carried out by Muhammadiyah and NU, when these two organizations were established. In Solo, with the majority of abangan and abangan traditions taking root, the pattern of the Islamization process becomes very

important (Wildan, 2014: 309). Thus, islamization of abangan is common because abangan is still Muslim but has not or is not religiously observant. This becomes something interesting when this transformation leads to a radicalism movement.

ABANGAN GROUP CHANGES TOWARDS RADICAL SANTRI IN SOLO

If you refer to the concept of radicalism that is understood together, the understanding of radicalism cannot be juxtaposed with a certain group of people or religions. Radicalism as a religious understanding that grows within each individual, in responding to something with extreme movements and actions. Religious understanding will have a very strong influence on the attitudes of its adherents (Piliang, 2021). If so, the potential for religious radicalism may emerge in every religion. Although since the last few decades, religious radicalism has been synonymous with adherents of the Islamic religion. As a result, the radicalism in question is often labeled with Islamic radicalism. This radicalism when associated with Indonesia, the Solo region or network is often considered a fertile area with radicalism. In fact, this region has historically been the successor of the Islamic Mataram Kingdom, which tends to syncretic Islam and its people are abangan. In a certain period of time, there has been a transformation of the abangan group towards radical students. The following is an explanation of the transformation process which consists of transformation in the New Order Period, and transformation in the Reformation Period.

The Transformation of the Abangan of the New Order Period: Resistance to the National Socio-Political System

Between the 1970s and 1990s, the government's accusations against the "Political Islam" group were very vociferous by labeling them such as "extreme right", "NI", "establishing an Islamic state", and "anti-Pancasila" (Kuntowijoyo, 1997: 199). As a result, this government's attitude caused disharmony between the New Order rulers and political Islamist groups. For this reason, the New Order further narrowed the Islamic political movement. According to Ricklefs, the government saw the potential for the resurgence of modernist Islam to create new problems, which are reminiscent of the Darul Islam uprising and Masyumi's support for the PRRI uprising in Sumatra in the late 1950s (Ricklefs, 2013: 2009).

When the political "struggle" of Islam is hampered in the realm of formal politics, it eventually gives rise to groups of struggle outside formal politics regarding the ideals of implementing Islamic law. The constitutional channels for coloring the state based on Sharia are increasingly closed. From such a situation, a new religious radical movement emerged in the era of the New Order government. The radicalism movement here is not just a thought but already in the form of action or extremism.

Referring to his thoughts and movements, radical Islamic movements during the New Order period can be seen from the events of the Jihad Command (1976-1981), the hijacking of the Woyla aircraft by a group of fundamentalists of imron bin Muhammad Zein pilgrims in 1981, the Tanjung Priok Incident (1984), the explosion of borobudur temple by a Shia group led by Hussein al Habsy in 1985, the Security Vandal Movement / GPK Lampung led by Warsidi (1989). At the time, the term radical Islam was not yet widely used. The New Order government identified such a movement as extreme right, a term as the opposite of communism labeled extreme left.

The birth of the extreme right attitude strengthened because the New Order government launched the idea of making Pancasila the only principle for all socio-political organizations in Indonesia (Muhammad, 2013: 44-45). Based on this rule, all socio-political organizations are mandatory and must rely on the ideology of Pancasila. With the establishment of Pancasila as the only principle for political and social organizations, religion no longer serves as a tool of political integration. The role that religion once played as a tool of political integration has been replaced by the principle of Pancasila (Sjamsuddin, 1989: 26). However, the application of the single principle of Pancasila during the New Order period as an ideological intervention to counter the development of religious radicalism.

Among the radical Islamic movements in some regions and cases of extremism in some places in Indonesia during the New Order government, the Solo or Surakarta regions of Central Java are considered its base. Solo is an area that historically succeeded the Islamic Mataram Kingdom, namely Kasunanan Surakarta and Praja Mangkunegaran. Both kingdoms are labeled As Islamic, although they lean less heavily on Islamic values because both tend to be pre-Islamic syncretic.

When it comes to religious radicalism, the Islamic radicalism movement in Solo emerged and developed since the late 1970s or early 1980s, when the world was still engulfed in the Cold War. This means that the emergence of the movement is unrelated to Samuel Huntington's frame of mind about the clash of civilizations. In the local

context in Solo, Islamic radicalism is associated with the character of the New Order government which seeks to suppress opposition groups including Islamic movements.

For a long time, Solo was considered a hotbed of social radicalism in its various forms. This radicalism is manifested in various forms of movements with complex ideologies. At the beginning of the 20th century the radicalism of the people of Solo manifested itself in the form of an anti-Chinese movement driven by the Sarekat Islam (SI) and then the anti-colonialism, capitalism, and feudalism movements under the PKI. In the middle of the 20th century radicalism in Solo took the form of an anti-swaprāja movement that succeeded in abolishing the power of the palaces of both Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran. Furthermore, in this era of independence, the PKI managed to build a solid base in Solo so that Solo was known as the "red area". After the destruction of the PKI and the end of the Guided Democracy regime there emerged again one other form of radicalism, this time under the banner of Islam. In the late 1970s there emerged a case of "Jihad Command" that dragged a number of Islamic figures in the city to the court table on charges of subversiveness, continuing with the emergence of the usroh movement in the 1980s which became the forerunner of Jama'ah Islamiyah or JI (Fahrizal, 2020:63).

When it comes to religious radicalism, the Islamic radicalism movement in Solo emerged and developed since the late 1970s or early 1980s, when the world was still engulfed in the Cold War. This means that the emergence of the movement is unrelated to Samuel Huntington's frame of mind about the clash of civilizations. In the local context in Solo, Islamic radicalism is connected with the difference between the implementation of Javanese culture and the puritanical View of Islam and the emergence of Christianization missions in Solo after the events of the G-30-S in 1965. Some of these puritanical groups are transforming in radical ideology.

Based on the course of history there was a time before the New Order regime came to power, the PKI became the dominant political organization in Solo. This socio-political condition can be analyzed from the previous situation, namely the strength of political parties based on the results of the first election in 1955. The character of voters in elections in Java, Central Java province, and Surakarta City can be a comparison as well as an analysis of the local political situation at that time. The dominance of the PKI in Surakarta was natural, because the PKI mass power movement had started long before the 1955 elections. Before Indonesia became independent, namely during the national movement, the PKI had found momentum in this region. This momentum occurred when the large organization Sarekat Islam based in Solo experienced a decline in role, while radical leftist figures emerged such as Mas Marco Kartodikromo, Semaun, and the phenomenal figure Haji Misbach. As is known, Haji Misbach is a controversial and unique local figure. He has a background in lectures and is educated in Islamic boarding schools but is known as a local communist figure who is very influential.

During 1965, along with the fall of the PKI's role in national politics, it affected the local PKI, including in Solo. Thousands of PKI supporters in Solo were killed and imprisoned. With the weak influence of the PKI in this region, Islamic proselytizing developed in Solo and paved the way for the growth of various Islamic groups with characteristics that differed from one another (Fahrizal, 2020: 64). In such a situation, the development of the reforming Islamic movement seems to be unimpeded. Moreover, the Masyumi party had been disbanded by Soekarno, so that his sympathizers or supporters who were in Solo sought proselytizing grounds through various non-political religious activities. Finally, the world of proselytizing in Solo became more lively with such a situation.

The proselytizing activities of the former Masyumi administrators were also carried out in order to block the pace of the Christianization program. In his speech in the late 1960s, Muhammad Natsir visited Solo, and asked his ex-Masyumi colleagues to establish more Islamic boarding schools and hospitals in Solo as a form of resistance to Christianization. The establishment of Pesantren Al-Mukmin, Ngruki and the construction of Islamic hospitals such as Kustati Hospital and Yarsis Hospital, were answers to Natsir's request (Wildan, 2014: 275).

Islamization efforts in Solo were intensified by holding various recitation activities more carried out by Islamic modernists. In contrast, traditional Islam such as NU from that time until now does not stand out. In the early stages, Pesantren Jamsaren with its character Kiai Jamaluddin (died 1995) was a very influential figure. However, Abu Bakr Ba'asyir did not consider his innocence because Kiai Jamaluddin was considered a "rationalist" so he relied too much on reason to understand supernatural things (Ricklefs, 2013:300-301).

In the later period, radical Islamic establishments such as Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir were more "calculated" because they were able to bring the phenomenon of the puritanical Islamic "minority" in Solo into a force calculated by the ruling regime. The thought and concept of views of both are considered "local thorns" for the New Order government. This is because, the government at that time emphasized the policy of political stability and security.

According to Ustaz Abu Bakr Ba'asyir, his critical attitude towards the ruler if it is associated with national and local conditions. The national problem, related to the relationship between Islam and the state, is the ideal of implementing Islamic law. Local problems, related to the situation and conditions in Solo after the G-30-S incident in 1965. These problems are the cause of the birth of progressive Islamic forces in Solo.

If you look at the work of the two figures between Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, in the early 1980s, the most prominent figure was Actually Abdullah Sungkar. When speaking, the figure of Abdullah Sungkar is very keen to arouse the enthusiasm and emotions of his listeners. The lecture material presented is about tawhid, which is connected with problems in society, nation, and state. In contrast, Abu Bakr Ba'asyir tended to be quiet and calm, although very firm in his tenure in his tenure. With such characteristics, Abdullah Sungkar has his own charisma and magnetism for his admirers so that it is easy to get followers.

The New Order government tended to be repressive towards the forces that interfered with it. Despite this, Ustaz Abdullah Sungkar and Ustaz Abu Bakr Ba'asyir still dared to face the ruler with all his risks. This is what his followers admire and are able to attract the attention of ordinary people or abangan groups. This abangan group is certainly not from among the students at pesantren Ngruki. They are ordinary people who participate in religious studies or proselytizing safaris outside the pesantren. The abangan faction was attracted by the proselytizing content and critical attitude of Ustaz Abdullah Sungkar. This is the initial phase, why Islamic radicalism was able to be born in the abangan community in Solo, Central Java.

For the abangan faction, in this context Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakr Ba'asyir were able to give hope to the people, at a time when they were pressured by the New Order regime. The regime's pressure on critical opposition was usually by labeling it as a supporter of the PKI. This labeling is the most feared of the abangan group, because labeling has very severe legal sanctions and social sanctions consequences. However, when the abangans became the second followers of the ustaz, they felt safe and spared over the labeling. After all, the students were the main enemies of the power of communism in Indonesia so that the ruling regime would not be able to carry out the labeling in question.

However, the Muslims as the most instrumental force for the birth of the New Order faced with the power of the PKI. It seems that, when the New Order came to power, they had forgotten the Muslims. In any case, the presence of Ustaz Abdullah Sungkar and Ustaz Abu Bakar Ba'asyir who are critical of the government as a "reminder" for the government to be on the right track and a fair position towards its people. Although the kedua ustaz was not regarded as Ratu Adil or Imam Mahdi, the abangan faction leaned its hopes for its courage against repressive power.

To some extent, religious radicalism is relatively easier to accept to those who have little or no mastery of religion (Qodir, 2013: 89). Based on this information, religious radicalism is relatively easier to develop in societies with minimal religious mastery, as an incomplete concept. In a society with this kind of character, an ideological development is largely determined by other complementary variables, namely a person's shoplifting and the condition of the local community. The ketokohan in question, of course, the figures of Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakr Ba'asyir, is in the condition of the society in question related to people's unrest against the ruling regime. Such a fact occurs in the Solo region, where Islamic radicalism can develop and exist in abangan society. In fact, the abangan faction was interested in being part of the radical "santri", who were critical and oposan towards the New Order rulers

Transformation of the Reformation Period: A Critique of the Local Socio-Political Situation

The fall of the New Order became a new chapter in politics in Indonesia, including in Solo. At the beginning of the reform, there was euphoria from the people of Solo because they felt free from the pressure of regime power. This euphoria is celebrated by some people excessively such as drunkenness on the street, motorcycle convoys, as well as other means that disrupt order. This has an impact on people's behavior that tends to deviate from social norms. As a result, toxic activities such as gambling, drunkenness, and criminal acts have increased sharply. Moreover, their attitude tends to be unfriendly to elements of society that criticize their negative euphoric behavior.

In the midst of such a situation, a young man named Muhammad Kalono appeared. He was a young mosque activist who felt that the birth of reform, in its development, was more favorable to secular groups, and less favorable to Muslims. At that time, there were fears of the return of communist power in Indonesia, which had long been devastated to exist again by taking advantage of the momentum of reform. Faced with such conditions, Kalono and his friends founded the Forum Komunikasi Aktifis Masjid (FKAM) on July 15, 1998 at the Al-Amin Mosque, Tegalrejo, Sondakan, Solo, Central Java. FKAM was born from mosque youths who care about the condition of the people. The establishment of this organization is directly related to the local political situation in

Solo, after the fall of the New Order.

At the beginning of the reform era, Solo became the scene of the emergence of a large number of Islamic vigilante groups (anti-toxicate movements) with relatively large numbers and more active (Bruinessen, 2014:45). Vigilante groups are formed in a forum for Islamic army organizations whose members are mostly young people with varied social backgrounds. Islamic youth forces in Solo that initially emerged before or after the New Order fell included the Jundullah Army, the Surakarta Islamic Youth Front (FPIS), the Hizbullah Brigade, the Barisan Ta'lim AL-Ishlah, the Bismillah Barisan, the Kaaba Youth Movement (GPK), the Hezbollah Army Sunan Bonang (Fananie, et al, 2002: 37-38).

After the reforms in the Solo region, like other regions in Indonesia, the tap of freedom is increasingly wide open. Actually the expression of freedom is tolerable, it is part of the remnants of the euphoria of reform. Nevertheless, the freedom of society leads to social liberalism. Many individuals and groups' freedoms are expressed in negative acts such as gambling, drunkenness and other things that are categorized as toxicity. Local governments seem unable to do much about addressing this problem. It is also possible that there is a neglect of such behavior, due to conflicts of interest, namely the perpetrators and the dissidents of the racial as part of their constituents or supporters of political parties. At that time, a movement on behalf of Islamic organizations with the main goal of amar ma'ruf nahi munkar emerged to the fore, in the form of an organization of Islamic warriors.

Facing such a local situation, FKAM is present with proselytizing activities, social activities, and actively doing amar ma'ruf nahi munkar or inviting in kindness and preventing acts of ugliness. FKAM actively advocates and campaigns against issues that harm Muslims on a local, national, and global scale. FKAM also has a security task force or organizational wing under the name Laskar Jundullah (Ahyar, 2015: 14). Laskar Jundullah received a welcome from various circles, not only the student group but also the abangan group. For some students, this army is indeed needed in facing an uncertain situation after the fall of the New Order. For the abangan faction who support Laskar Jundullah thinks, this army is able to be a counterweight to the political power of the local situation in Solo. This new mass organization has received enough support from student community leaders. Some local muslim leaders often give briefings on leadership training, physical training, and religious studies. For others, the existence of this army is considered a radical Islamic movement.

In a fairly short period of time, Laskar Jundullah received a significant number of members, with heterogeneous membership from various circles, including from young students, young people of the abangan group, and former thugs. For certain circles, it is considered an implementation of intolerant and radical thinking if it is associated with its actions and activities at the beginning of the Reformation. This is because, these warriors often do sweeping of the maximality and also hold physical exercises, such as martial arts and the like.

Moreover, in 1999 the Surakarta City Hall Building was burned by a mob, when Megawati failed to become President in the General Assembly of the PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY. In the General Assembly, Abdurrahman Wahid was elected president of Indonesia. Some elements of the community questioned the less stringent legal process against the perpetrators of the burning of the local government building. In a situation of chaos, it is indeed not easy for law enforcement officials to carry out legal proceedings, considering that this is related to mass riots with a very large number.

Another Islamic youth force that emerged in Solo at the beginning of the reformation was the Hezbollah Brigades. The organization served as an underbouw of the Islamic-based party the Star Moon Party (UN) thus functioning like a party task force. Actually, this army was born as a metamorphosa of the Sunan Bonang Hezbollah Army, an organization known before the independence of the Republic of Indonesia. The joining of the Hezbollah Army in the sub-ordinate of the Star Moon Party, is not solely the army he leads affiliated with the party that was once dubbed neo-Masyumi.

In terms of membership, Hezbollah is different from FKAM or Laskar Jundullah. If at first, members of Jundullah came from the taklim youth association of the mosque, on the contrary, members of the Hezbollah Brigades came from the general public. The membership of the Hezbollah Brigades is quite heterogeneous among students, abangans, and even former thugs. Nevertheless, its members are known to be very militant. Its members feel drawn to joining varied motives, despite the similarities of purpose between them. They felt uncomfortable with the behavior and arrogance of the masses from among the people who felt that the Solo area was "theirs", especially after the fall of the New Order. But the more generic goal of this mass organization is to protect the interests of Muslims, not just the interests of political parties. Anyone who comes, will be helped and protected if they really need help.

One of the events that is impossible to forget, when Megawati failed to become president in 1999. At that time, there was tension between supporters of the Bulan Bintang Party in Solo and the masses who claimed to be

megawati supporters. The Hezbollah brigades felt that the "red" mob intimidated UN administrators and cadres in Solo. This is as a result of the dynamics of national politics during indirect presidential elections. At the time of the election, there were actually three presidential candidates, namely Gus Dur, Megawati, and the head of the UN party, Yusril Ihza Mahendra. Along the way, the UN Chairman resigned. In his resignation speech, the person concerned expressed his support for Wahid to occupy the presidency. Akhinya, Wahid defeated Megawati in the presidential election vote.

With Megawati's defeat, the masses of Megawati's supporters in Solo assumed that the defeat of her "jago" was due to the resignation of Yusril Ihza Mahendra. As a result, matters related to the Star Moon Party in Solo, such as administrators, cadres, sympathizers, and even the UN Office were "targeted" and intimidated certain mobs. This intimidation was mainly aimed at the area around Laweyan. When there is a mob that is about to intimidate by trying to burn down the house of a UN party activist, then the consequences are very "poignant". One of the mobs, wearing an identity wearing a T-shirt that showed him as a supporter of Megawati, died tragically. His head was off his body because he was slashed by the sword by the mob of the opposing group. This murder, was not solely the intention of the victim who was going to burn down the house. However, the person concerned attempted to burn the flag and other identities, indicating if the coat of arms or image was identical to that of Muslims, namely the "Moon and Stars" emblem.

The incident of the killing of a mob of Megawati's supporters, did not reach the realm of law even though it was a serious criminal act. The reason is that those involved in beheading are willing to be punished according to the applicable rules. However, law enforcement officials did not proceed to the courts, because un administrators and cadres also demanded to the law enforcement that the perpetrators of the incendiary of the Surakarta City Hall complex were also wanted and punished. In an uncertain transitional situation of government, all these problems are not pursued by legal channels.

Another class-kart mass organization at the beginning of the reform in Solo was the Surakarta Islamic Youth Front (FPIS). This Islamic vigilante group (anti-maksiat movement) is in no way related to similar mass organizations, namely the (Islamic Defenders Front) FPI. FPIS has a close network with the Gumuk Jama'ah group, which is located in the Gumuk area, Mangkubumen Village, Banjarsari District, which is located in the center of Solo and the location of this group's mosque. Gumuk pilgrims are easily identified for their fashion style which is similar to that of salafist groups although it has no connection with the wider salafist movement. Most of its members come from poor families in the suburbs of Solo and generally have abangan backgrounds (Bruinessen, 2014:45; Wildan, 2014:290).

According to another source, at the beginning of the reform he was part of the youth element involved in celebrating the euphoria of democracy. However, to some extent he felt that new seeds of arrogance had emerged on a local scale. Ostensibly, Solo City is only owned by a certain group. The injustice he felt, prompted the source to want to join this radical opposition group. In dealing with this problem, only the army group is able to resist all this arrogance. The source admitted that he was only an abangan or Islamic KTP. Suddenly, there was a desire to join the Islamic youth organization. Eventually, he joined an Islamic army organization. He and his new community organization friends often sweep the forms of toxicity that exist around him, such as gambling, drunkenness, and other activities in society that are felt to be troubling to the community. Any increase in this form of toxicity as a negative result of the reforms. The activeness of the resource person in this army organization resulted in him being visited several times by law enforcement officials, to be unearthed for his involvement in various sweeping actions in Solo City.

Since the reform, politically the Solo region has been dominated by the PDI Perjuangan. The masses of this party are known to be solid, loyal, militant and truly "brother" (red), and not just abangan. With the prevailing local political conditions, the leadership of the Solo region has always been held by PDIP cadres or individuals supported by the PDIP. One of them is Joko Widodo, the Indonesian president who once led Surakarta City as mayor for two terms. Along with the change of government to the reform government, it turned out that the Solo area was growing radical Islamic movements. This movement formed a veiled opposition to the dominance of the PDI Struggle in local government. For radical groups, forming the opposition from these students needs to be done as a balancing force for the dominance of politicians from the "brother" politicians and the masses of their supporters. This kind of opposition was formed at a time when the parties that carried the Islamic banner in the Solo DPRD were only a minority.

This covert opposition movement also often reproduces the issue of inter-religious relations, where since the Reformation important figures in the PDI Of Solo Struggle are non-muslims. These politicians occupy positions in the management of the PDIP of Surakarta City, as well as sitting in the executive or legislative institutions.

For the position of party administrators and executive agencies in question, of course, F.X. Rudyatmo. Rudyatmo occupied the post of chairman of the Surakarta City PDIP for a long time. Positions in the executive institution, namely deputy mayor of Surakarta for the period 2005-2010 and 2010-2012 accompanied Joko Widodo. In 2012-2015, Rudyatmo became the Mayor of Surakarta, continuing the leadership of Jokowi who became the Governor of DKI Jakarta.

Although F.X. Rudyatmo is a minority in Solo, namely Catholicism, it turned out that in the 2015 regional elections, he was elected mayor with a convincing vote defeating his rival. His position ended in February 2021, and his position was replaced by Joko Widodo's son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka. It seems that this issue of inter-religious relations has gradually dimmed on its own as political dynamics and time travel. The Mayor and Deputy Mayor of Surakarta were elected as a result of the 2020 regional elections, namely Gibran Rakabuming Raka and Teguh Prakosa, both of whom are Muslims. Thus, the issue of political Christianization and bureaucracy in the Surakarta City Government is no longer relevant if it is still used as a local political issue by interest groups in reproducing radicalism groups.

CONCLUSION

The existence of Islamic radicalism in Solo, Central Java, which emerged since the beginning of the New Order government, cannot be separated from the existence of Pesantren Al-Mukmin, Ngruki in Sukoharjo with its main figures Ustaz Abdullah Sungkar and Ustaz Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. Although so far the people of Solo tend to be identified as abangan, radical Islamic understanding has been able to develop in a society that prioritizes Javanese ethics, an ethic that upholds subtle behavior and manners. When radical Islam was able to develop in the Solo area, there were elements of society who were not groups of students, but were interested in the movement. This element of society is the abangan group.

In the Reformation era, in the midst of the socio-politically dynamic local situation in Solo, the tendency to transform the abangan group towards radical students increased sharply. This radical student has a container in the form of local mass organizations in the form of Islamic warriors. The transformation of abangan into a radical student is certainly paradox. This is because, in general, the relationship between santri and abangan is a dichotomy and sometimes even diametrical. This abangan group eventually transformed into radical "students" with various backgrounds and reasons.

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