

Combating Terrorism: Approximating the Operational and Intelligence Vulnerability of The Nigerian Police Force, 1999-2010

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Abstract

Various, tangible efforts have been invested by the Nigerian Police towards combating internal terrorism. Yet, adequate security of lives and properties has remained elusive. This study adopts qualitative descriptive mechanism. We argue that the Nigerian Police has not been able to effectively guarantee the security of lives and properties of Nigerians. Major institutional, operational and intelligence limitations are at the root of the security crisis in Nigeria. On these grounds, we submit therefore, that the government should fundamentally equip the Police Force, and provide intelligence architectures, so as to better reposition the Force towards effective securitization.

Keywords: Police, Security, Intelligence, Arms Tracking, Terrorism, Bombs, Corruption, Conflicts

Introduction

One important lesson one can learn from Maslow's hierarchy of need is the ultimate importance attached to the issue of security. Other principal philosophers of antiquity, including Hobbes had also stressed the vitality of security and its centrality in the purpose of government. Hence, the need for governance to guarantee objective and subjective security, or root out real hazards as well as conditions stimulating paranoia and other kinds of irrational fear amongst the populace it struck a social contract with. In this direction, the Nigerian state through its constitution made provision for the creation of the Nigerian Police Force. Section 214(1) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria states that "There shall be a Police Force for Nigeria, which shall be known as the Nigerian Police Force, and subject to the provisions of this section no other police force shall be established for the federation or any part thereof. By this establishment, the Nigeria Police Force becomes the primary law enforcement agency responsible for maintaining law and order in the country. It therefore plays the prime role of ensuring internal security of the nation. Part of this internal security purpose is the containment of illegal arms, which in itself dangerously undermines the safety of the country, especially when wielded by outlaws. However, too many criticisms have trailed the force, especially in its contribution to the deteriorating security system of the country. For instance, Onu and Biereenu-Nnabugwu stated this about the Force: Another way of explaining the problem of inefficient security system is the police force itself. These include indiscipline, poor training, lack of expertise in specialized field, poor pay, illiteracy, and lack of willingness to learn. It also includes lack of patriotism, lack of regard for dignity of labour and blind eye to what is obtainable in developed countries of the world. The problem of corruption and dishonesty is an acceptable tradition (Onu and Biereenu-Nnabugwu, 2007)

Particularly, the disruption of Nigeria's 50th Independence Anniversary on October 1, 2010 by the shelling of Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND); the shattering of Nigeria's Force Headquarters in Abuja, on the 16th of June, 2011; and the dismantling of the United Nations House, Abuja, on the 26th of August, 2011, both by the explosives of Boko Haram Islamic sect, among other numerous cases, climaxes the ineffectiveness of the Nigerian Police Force. In all, over 100 explosives have been detonated so far by illegally armed groups and persons in Nigeria between 1999 and 2011, with innumerable thousands of important lives blown off in the process (Vanguard, July 8, 2011). Therefore, this study seeks to link between the Nigeria Police operational and intelligence capacity and the steady expansion of the activities of illegally armed groups and persons in the country.

The Problematic of Non-Implementation of Arms Tracking System in Nigeria

The security dilemma pervading the Nigerian state can easily be calculated upon the operational and intelligence limitation of the Nigerian police force. In simple trace, the Nigerian Police leadership has not been able to implement the law, stipulated in the Article 5 of the Code of Conduct of the ECOWAS Moratorium, which among other things includes 'the registration and control of the movement and use of legitimate arms stock' (ECOWAS, 1998). The import of the exercise, as Diarra noted, is to introduce a sort of "identity card" for weapons, by identifying them with a number on their bodies in order to make them easier to trace, either when they are taken from one country to another or when they are sold or borrowed (Diarra, 2005). Hence, it is a sort of solid identifiable label or tag on all legitimate weapons been imported or legitimately produced in Nigeria with an accompanying central office file. This Register, compiled and maintained at the local level, not only contains details of the identity of the weapons (registration number, date of manufacture, terms of acquisition, etc.), but also "tracks" them when they circulate (transfer following the death of the owner, sale, loan, theft etc.). Moreover, marking requirements are also included in both the Firearms Protocol within the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime of 2001, as well as the OAS Conventions (Cukier and Chapdelaine, 2001). Also, in 2005, Nigeria further adopted the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (Erlandsson and Weitsch, 2008). But there has not been any responsible effort taken to this effect. Unfortunately, in Nigeria, people do not get penalized or questioned for not implementing the law. The problem with this inaction, however, is that there are but little, or even empty, intelligence on the totality of legal weapons accumulated in the country over period. Nigeria imports arms from a number of sources including; United States: US-cartridges of about USD 246,007 between 1999 and 2002; UK: shotguns, cartridges and parts of about USD 90,953 between 1999 and 2002; Italy: revolvers and shotguns of about USD 49,074 in 2001; Germany: revolvers/pistols, about USD 13,062 in 1999 (Cross, Catherine and Mclean, 2004). Several thousands of AK-47s has also been fabricated by the Defense Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) located in Kaduna. In all these, there are no comprehensive and reliable documentation on the stockpiles of the Nigerian armory, as well as importations and local production of legitimate arms in the country (Hazen and Horner, 2007). The point being made here is that most weapons that have now become illegal were once legal in the time of their importation or use by the security agencies and other legally authorized persons. Cukier and Chapdelaine further stated that: Unlike illicit drugs which are illegal from production, through distribution and

consumption, virtually every illegal weapon which is misused began as a legal commodity. They may be diverted from licit to illicit markets through a variety of means including: theft, illegal sales, reactivation etc. Thus, the emphasis that both domestic and international efforts to regulate firearms and reduce illicit trafficking and misuse rest on the ability to track individual firearms. Firearm manufacturers often serve both commercial and military markets and so the issue of marking is of interest to both those concerned with preventing crime and those focused on monitoring the sources of illegal weapons (Cukier and Chapdelaine, 2001).

The implementation of this marking standard by the Police and other security agencies would have enabled the identification of the point of departure (local station where the arms are assigned) of most of the various illegal arms used by illegally armed groups and persons, who normally obtain these weapons by fowl means, from assorted legitimate sources. With this information, there could have been an effective checkmating and control of legal arms traded or given out, as sympathetic support to a cause or belief by official sources, to several illegally armed groups and person in the country. Therefore, the mere warning issued by the former Inspector General of Police, Mike Okiro during a meeting with Mobile Police Force Squadron (PMF) Commanders, in Abuja, that policemen whose guns attached to them are stolen or nowhere to be found will be held responsible and face stiffer punishments (*Daily Trust*, December 11, 2008) is never sufficient. This is because the uncontrollable penchant for illegal sales by serving and retired security personnel poses a major concern with regard to the circulation of illegal weapons. This problem was publicly acknowledged by President Obasanjo in December 2002, when he stated that “the majority of small arms and light weapons circulating in Nigeria were either sold or rented out by, or stolen from, the country’s security agencies” (Ginifer and Ismail, 2005). Obasanjo further stated that, “Most of the ammunition we have found in wrong hands have come from security agencies...the police, the military...Only recently, we found that 3000 rounds of ammunition were sold here in Abuja by the police and in 10s by the military (Erlandsson and Weitsch, 2008). In fact, this shows that security officials have lost quantum of their weapons through theft and sabotage. Security officials have provided weapons to ethnic militias in their home areas, with one customs official claiming the donation of 16 G3 rifles as his “contribution to the Niger Delta cause” (Ebo, 2006). To give vent to this thrust, a content analysis of about 11 national dailies that featured on the International Firearms Injury Prevention and Policy daily gun policy review confirmed that over 15 army officers and about 30 police officers has been involved in the sale of hundreds of AK-47s and Machine Guns to rebels between 2007 and 2010^[13] Some of these sales were reported to have taken place in the police station. An important illegal trade of all history was the sale of over 7,000 military weapons belonging to the Nigerian armory to a militant group, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) by Major Sulaiman Alabi Akubo and five other soldiers, which fetched them a windfall of over N100 million and a reprisal of life imprisonment (*The Punch*, November 28, 2008; *Leadership*, November 19, 2008; *Voice of America*, November 19, 2008).

A survey of an armed group members conducted in Bayelsa state also revealed that the majority of respondents received assistance from the police (30.4 per cent), the mobile police (14.7 per cent), and the military (24.5 per cent) in obtaining small arms (Isumonah., Tantua and James, 2006). Beside this, there is also some evidence of diversion or recycling of weapons from decommissioning exercises into the illegal trade. Soldiers returning from peacekeeping missions have also sold small arms in the black market, providing ‘a ready source of assault weapons’ for the

Nigerian population, and in addition provided training to militants. Thus, the armed groups in the Delta have displayed “superior strategies and tactics using better training and organization” (Hazen and Horner, 2007). All these speaks for the absence of attention focused on ways of tracing and preventing weapons that moves from legal to illegal users which is mainly controllable through effective tracking of legal weapons. This can only be made possibly through effective arms marking scheme.

More disturbing, however, is the fact that these legitimate weapons being traded often ends up in the illicit arms market where they are further resold to other dangerous users. This trend has not been impeded by the police over the years. Also, local blacksmiths that couples other illegal weapons which flood the illicit markets have not been effectively checkmated by the police. Several hidden places in Nigeria have been doted as sites of local fabrication of these illicit arms. Hazen and Horner further stated that “production techniques applied in local productions is mainly rudimentary. No machines are used in the production process. Vises, steel saws, manual drills, and files are employed in the fabrication process, with small makeshift furnaces used to heat the metals” (Hazen and Horner, 2007). This fabrication of craft weapons usually takes place in producers’ homes or backyards. In addition to production of craft arms, these blacksmiths often produce other tools, such as hunting traps, gardening implements, and machetes. And the materials used in the process are all sourced locally. Table 1 depicts that there is still an uninterrupted illegal craft production of small arms in Awka, the capital city of Anambra state. While table 2 shows few other manufacturers of illegal arms that the police were able to arrest between 2006 and 2010. It is quite odd that only a few of these illegal productions have been interrupted by the police from the available records. This is because, until several years ago, craft producers had marked their weapons with numbers and symbols of recognition. These identifying marks were used by police to trace weapons used in crimes. This led to the prosecution of craft producers whose weapons had been implicated in criminal activities, and consequently a halt to the practice of marking. Currently, craft weapons are not marked with individual identifiers (Hazen and Horner, 2007). And this makes it very difficult for the police to trace. Therefore, these productions have continued to thrive. The significance of the local production of illegal weapons can be observed in table 2, where the data presented indicates that border security agents confiscated very small quantities of arms each year, but by contrast large numbers of rounds of ammunition. While this would be expected, as more ammunition is required than weapons, the number of weapons according to the table is disproportionately small compared to the amount of ammunition seized. This gross discrepancy in the balance of the flow of illegal weapons in favour of ammunition over firearms clearly suggests that local productions have considerably been filling the gap of most of the demands for illegal firearms by illegally armed groups and persons. Since perhaps, local fabricators lacked relevant technology for making more ammunition.

A respondent had claimed in December 2003 that every village in Nigeria had between 20 to 100 AK-47 assault rifles in its community armouries (Yacubu, 2005; WAC Global Services, cited in Hazen and Horner 2007). For instance, in Warri, an oil-rich town in the Delta, youths have openly hawked pistols and automatic rifles referred to by local dealers as ‘pure water’. Pistols can be much cheaper. The high cost of purchasing an AK-47 in the Delta suggests that there is scarcity value. In Nigerian price terms, a double-barreled shotgun costs between 50,000 and 65,000 naira, a single-barreled shotgun between 25,000 and 30,000 naira; the price of pistols ranges between 3,000 and 7,000 naira, depending on the model, the seller and the place of sale. A suspect arrested in September 2001 by

the Plateau state police for unlawful possession of firearms admitted that two of the weapons in his possession had been purchased two years previously for 55,000 and 75,000 naira (Yacubu, 2005). Some informants suggested that prices rises during escalation of conflicts (Ojudu, 2007). A number of towns are known for the availability of weapons, including Asaba, Benin City, Aba, Onitsha, Enugu, Owerri, Awka, and Port Harcourt (Small Arms Survey, 2007a). However, table 3 below shows a nosedive in price index of illegal weapons traded in the illicit markets in Nigeria between 2003 and 2007. This suggests that more illicit guns are made available to the illicit markets during this period.

The Problematic of Weak Internal Policing

An important area where the police have not effectively performed towards the containment of the sources of illegal arms is in the area of weak internal policing. The point being made here is that illegal arms are not mostly used or fired from their very sources, whether smuggled or locally manufactured. Illegally armed groups and persons normally move these weapons from one place to the other in order to make meaningful use of them. Therefore, the porousness of the Nigerian roads caused by weak internal policing facilitates this movement. This, in essence, sustains the linkage between the sources and the consumers. However, some factors are responsible for this, among which are inadequate distribution of police stations in the country, poor motivation of police officers, and insufficient weapons and intelligence equipments.

For instance, a police reform proposal put up by the former Minister of Police Affairs, General David Jemibewon recommended that police deployment needs to take into consideration some important factors including, political settings, population, crime-rate and land mass. According to this proposal, the police formations in divisional, area, state, zonal and force headquarters should be aligned to correspond with local government, senatorial districts, states, the six geo-political zones and the federal government as they presently exist. A police post was recommended at the ward level and about three to five police posts to constitute a police station (*Thisday*, February 9, 2002). The problem with this formation however, is that in the end, there are several incongruities in the distribution of the police offices across the country. For instance, the allocation of about 204 Village Posts to Bayelsa state of about 1.7 million population, and only 1 Village Post to Abia state with well over 2.8 million population, is absolutely unacceptable. And in reality, as Nigeria is presently constituted, there may not be a 'hot crime zone' per se, as everywhere constitutes potential insecurity. Table 4 below clearly highlights this incongruity and inconsistency. Of course, this explains why various localities are not effectively policed thereby giving cover to local manufacturers of illegal weapons. Again, a comparism of 2006 and 2007 figures shows a downward trend especially in numbers of Village Posts where internal surveillance is needed most. In the end, both the local producers and the consumers of illegal weapons are not interrupted. But more disappointing is the fact that those constables who mount on the highways lacked important surveillance equipment with which to detect arms while in transit. Only appropriate intelligence facilities can help in an effective way to identify the groups and individuals that are engaged in the manufacture, sale, storage, transfer, possession and distribution of these illegal weapons. This calls for sophisticated intelligence equipment such as electronic communication facilities, bomb detectors, scanners, digital fingerprinting machines, radios, intercoms, computers and more importantly the Close Circuit Television (CCTV).

In fact, there is no reason why Nigerian police should not have the CCTV in each station or even adequate weapons detectors spread on the highways in order to effectively monitor movement of illegal weapons and concealed bombs. In Nigeria, there are too many checkpoints though, but the mobile police men on duty have never been on top of the situation because they lacked important surveillance equipment.

The Corruptive Tendencies Sweeping off the Nigerian Police Force

Most alarming is the custom of settlement which has overtaken the actual place of thorough searching. In this regard, several persons have lost their lives for refusal to part with the contentious '20 naira' compulsory settlement fee. For instance, among many other cases, innocent pilgrims coming home from a pilgrimage were indiscriminately shot dead in Anambra state, after a protracted argument on why someone coming from a religious purification should not offend his God by giving 20 naira bribe. Also, another husband and wife lost their lives in Anambra state over this issue of 20 naira (Onu and Biereenu-Nnabugwu, 2007). And regrettably, no effective measures have been taken so far to salvage the mobile police men from extorting 20 naira from vehicles on the highway. It gets so worst that when they collect they give change.

The long term implication of this operational misconduct is that as the motorists cue compulsorily for the informal daily contribution, the day to day socio-economic life of our cities are indirectly disrupted and at the same time, motorists held bound in such gridlock run the risk of being cheap targets for intentional or inadvertent terrorist attacks. Moreover, in most cases, those motorists and commuters delayed are unavoidably led into night journey where there are life threatening risks of accident and armed robbery attacks. The deployment of mobile drive-through vehicle scanners could have been mitigated these risks and as well decipher the contents of vehicles plying the roads from safe distances and alerts triggered for appropriate counter-terrorism action whenever necessary. In all, the actual function of containing the movements and flows of illegal weapons is not achieved. Hence, the police have not done much in containing the movement of these illicit weapons. Table 5 show the little police was able to seize between 2000 and 2010. This figure shown is a pittance when compared to the over three million illegal weapons still circulating in Nigeria today. Perhaps, one should blame the weak police structure for this. Nigerian police personnel are poorly remunerated. An agency that handles such enormous task of internal peace and security of lives and properties of citizens should never be subjected to miserable conditions if they must carry out their functions effectively. Table 6 shows the breakdown of salaries of Nigerian police officers.

The Operational Capacity and Vulnerability of the Force

Beside the issue of motivation, however, the police have always resorted to curative than preventive measures in an effort to contain the circulation of illegal arms in the country. Most often, the police open fire on armed groups and persons when they are in action without doing much to contain the routes through which such weapons are transmitted and exchanged. And in most cases, the police have not been succeeding. In fact, in most of these confrontations, as the tolls of armed persons shot down are being counted, so as that of the police officers as well as other unsuspecting innocent but ill fated citizens, who lost their lives along the line are being counted. The difference, perhaps, is that in the case of the later, the issue of paying enormous sacrifice for the nation is mostly chanted, even ignorantly celebrated.

This is mainly because the force itself lacked sufficient sophisticated weapons to effectively confront some of these illegally armed groups. Table 7 depicts the quantum and the level of sophistication of stockpiles of the Nigerian Police Force. This number of weapons can hardly be sufficient for use for over 450,000 officers of the police force. And definitely, many of these numbers above may not actually be in usable condition. However, only about 40,000 (forty thousand) pieces of AK-47 rifles with 20,000,000 (twenty million) rounds of 7.65x 39mm ammunition; 10,000 pieces of Pistol Beretta with two million rounds of .9mm and other ammunition, totaling about 80,000 Guns, 32 Million Bullets were later procured in 2007 by the Nigerian Police due to the April General Elections as stated by the then Inspector of Police, Mr. Sunday Ehindero (*Daily Champion*, March 7, 2007).

The Impact on Security of Lives and Properties

Of course, the consequential impact of these security leakages and inadequacies on effective containment of local production and internal movement of illegal weapons is multi-layered. First, the activities of the various armed groups have well spread beyond their usual coverage, spreading to various parts of the country uninterruptedly. The following tables 8 and 9 shows the progressive expansion of the militant groups in the Niger Delta and a rise in the diversity of their attacks respectively.

Bad Governance, Excruciating Poverty, as Trigger Effects

The situation even becomes worst when added to the fact that there are too many disarticulating variables in the Nigerian system that could as well prompt people to take up arms. This is because from all indications, the Nigerian project has not been well executed over the past one decade or so. Ikejiani-Clark complain bitterly that Nigeria is deeply in trouble, and elsewhere worries that “poor leadership has contributed to a situation where Nigeria ranks amongst the poorest in the world in terms of human capital developments, resulting to frustration and instability, with militants agitating and invading the territorial space of Niger Delta” (Ikejiani-Clark, 2007).. She eventually concludes that “Nigeria itself is a contradiction...” in the sense that she suffers dangerous lack amidst plentitude of natural gifting (Ikejiani-Clark and Ezeh, 2008). An Action Congress governorship candidate in Oyo state in 2007 election, Prof. Taoheed Adedoja once noted that the future of an average Nigerian youth appears helplessly gloomy and blank (*The Nigerian Tribune*, May 8, 2008). If indeed as the National Bureau of Statistics (2010) summated, that the percentage of the employable age but unemployed persons in Nigeria alone are well over 20% in 2009, of the estimated 149 million population, then there is a serious trouble in the country. Therefore, *The Nation*, summarizes that: Today, Nigeria’s democracy is the antithesis of every creed, every principles and every tenet of the universe. It is the travesty of incompetent and visionless governments nationwide backed by a power greedy but empty party and supported by compromised security and defense forces. That should worry the most patience and enduring of souls (*The Nation*, June 27, 2011. p. 1).

Though, our effort here is not to embark on a lengthy examination of literature but to simply establish one point. That is, that lack, destitution, politics of exclusion and its accompanying frustrations has become a difficult phenomenon that can never be easily disentangled or distilled from the Nigerian system. Hence, it is our utmost contention that in spite of this numerous internal contradictions, the government has on top maintained a too porous, loose and permeable security details. The outcome of this reality is an overwhelming hike in criminality and an upsurge in the

expansion and intensity of the activities of illegally armed groups and persons which have ensured in the period of the study. Table 10 shows an upward trend in armed robbery activities between 2002 and 2007, while table 11 displays a considerable rise in kidnapping in Nigeria between 2002 and 2007. Both cases involve use of illegal weapons.

Approximating the Impacts on Internecine Conflicts

More to this is the high scale of ethnic/communal violence in the country. Bishop Mathew Kuka, in Onu and Biereenu-Nnabugwu noted that “It is the federal and state government and their policies of alienation that have led to the resuscitation of latent communal identities as a tool for bargaining with a hostile and alien state. It is here that we can locate the source of crises that befell our communities across the land” (Onu, and Biereenu-Nnabugwu, 2007). Hence, the plethora of ethno-religious militias such as MASSOB, MOSOP, AREWA, OPC, HISBA, Egbesu Boys etc. has used illegal weapons to promulgate these crises. But more importantly, however, this study is particularly concerned that almost all of these clashes have been mostly fought with locally fabricated firearms (Hazen and Horner, 2007). The impact of these illegal weapons has been an unacceptable loss of lives of innocent citizens. Thus, over 100, 000 lives have been lost to internecine violence in Nigeria since 1999 (Agboton-Johnson, Ebo and Mazal, 2004).

The Rising Bomb Attacks, Acts of Terrorism

In another aspect, the unhindered availability of illegal weapons has largely contributed to a rise in intensity of the attacks of illegally armed groups in the country. The most dreaded of these attacks is the incessant use of explosives and grenade launchers to blow up the country and its people. This act is the hallmark of terrorism and is mostly perpetrated by the Movement of the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) and the Boko Haram Islamic sect, located in the Northern part of the country. Though, the bombing trend is not new in Nigeria but our utmost concern is that such awful and dangerous act has progressively become more incessant, calamitous, and disastrous in recent times especially within the period of study. Table 12 confirms that the bomb tradition is not new in Nigeria, but has become increasingly more incessant and lethal within the period of study. The above statistics do not only threaten the national security in a dangerous way but has also shown that the nation is unwontedly but gradually falling to the status of a failed state. On the rising bomb acclimatization in the country, former Inspector General of Police, Mr. Sunday Ehindero lamented: This is an ugly trend that must be swiftly tackled with all seriousness. That was how terrorism started in the Middle East; it is a trend that must not be allowed... Before now, the nation was only experiencing robbery, which later developed into kidnapping and now bomb blast. Just like kidnapping became a difficult menace to handle, my fear is that, if not properly checked, bombing may become another phenomenon that will be difficult to combat (*The Nation*, June 27, 2011. p. 1).

We are not joining the debate though, but an important factor here is that the government and its ‘security system’ are on the weak side. A police officer has succinctly captured the vulnerability of members of the force. He had this to say: Our lives are no longer safe in the performance of our lawful duties. Whether it is the broad day light or at night, you have to be praying to God to save your life as you put on the uniform and set out for work. Being a police man has become a danger in itself, because apart from the fact that you are not loved by the members of the society, the

Boko Haram and armed robbers are waiting for you out there to put you out of circulation. The worst part is that we do not even have the required weapons to confront them. And our men are dying like chicken everyday in large numbers. It is a sad development (*Daily Sun*, December 8, 2011. p. 7).

Of a truth the activities of Boko Haram had taken its toll on the Nigerian Police force. According to the data gathered on death benefits paid by various insurance firms to families of the deceased at the Force Headquarters, Abuja; as much as 602 police officers and men were killed in just 5 months in the country, between May and September 2011. The details are as follows: May – 156; June – 143; August – 122; September – 119 and November – 62 (*Daily Sun*, December 8, 2011. p. 7).

Conclusion

The study examined the operational and intelligence vulnerability of the Nigerian Police Force. The Nigerian Police has not been able to effectively conquer the emerging security threats in the country. More importantly, the Nigeria Police which has the key responsibility of maintaining internal peace and security in the country, lacked sufficient weaponry and necessary surveillance equipment to execute their job effectively. Besides the observed poor remuneration, contributing immensely to the chronic institutional corruption, there is a lopsided structure in the distribution of police stations, and in effect police personnel across the country. All these, therefore, form the bases for the expansion of the activities of unauthorized armed groups and persons in the country. On these grounds, we submit therefore, that the government should fundamentally equip the Police Force, and provide intelligence architectures, so as to better reposition the Force towards effective securitization.

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Table 1: Craft-Produced Small Arms in Awka

Weapon	Features	Ammunition	Cost
Pocket single-shot handguns	Approximately 13 cm long; steel muzzle to wooden stock; extremely rudimentary hammer requiring cocking; effective only at a distance of 1–2 m; uses single shotgun cartridge	Various calibers of Shotgun cartridge	NGN 4,000/ USD 32
Four-shot revolver	Available in manual and automatic configurations	9 mm, 7.5 mm, or 8.5 mm	NGN 8,000/ USD 64
Eight-shot revolver	Available in manual and automatic configurations	9 mm, 7.5 mm, or 8.5 mm	NGN 12,000/ USD 96
Single shotgun	Breech-loading; safety cocking mechanism	Various calibers of shotgun cartridge	NGN 10,000– 11,000/USD 80–
Horizontal double-Barrel shotgun	Breech-loading; one trigger for each barrel; safety cocking mechanism	Various calibers of shotgun cartridge	NGN 25,000– 30,000/USD 200– 240
Vertical double-Barrel shotgun	Automatic configuration firing both rounds without need for cocking; breech-loading	Various calibers of shotgun cartridge	NGN 45,000/ USD 360

Source: Hazen, J.M., and Horner, J. (2007).

Table 2: Cases of Arrested Illegal Local Arms Producers Across Nigeria Between 2006 and Sept. 2011

Date of Arrest	Name of manufacture(s)	Factory site	Illegal weapons produced
-	Soloman Akpus, and his master, Mgbebe	Egato, Nasarawa	Seven locally manufactured pistols and 17 live ammunition
April 10, 2006	Mr. Cyprian Okeke, 57 years old, together with Obinna Eze, 22 years old, and Sunday Ude, 20 years	Udi LGA, Enugu state	-
June 3, 2007	Ahmadu Magaji	Pandogari Village, Rafi LGA, Niger state	40 pistols
October 24, 2007	Mr. Saliu	Katam Village, Akko LGA, Gombe state	-
March 2, 2009	Baushe Makeri	Kotorkoshi Village in Bungudu, Zamfara state	11 guns
April 19, 2009	Malam Bala Joji, 83 years	Kano	Several weapons
April 12, 2010	Abdussamad	Barkin Akawa, Dadin Kowa, Jos South LGA	explosives
October 17, 2010	Solomon Mantep, Dorcas Habila and Jummai Gyang.	Kuru, Jos South LGA	Three pistols, seven multipurpose guns, AK47 bayonet, three hand drilling machines, a filling machine and live ammunition
September 21, 2011	Paul Odunze, and Nwanne Ifiodu (arms convener/driver)	Umudioka, Dunukofia L.G.A, Anambra State	100 bags of live cartridge, 15 pump actions, 12 double Barrel guns

Sources: Compiled from, *Thisday*, May 15, 2006; *Thisday*, June 4, 2007; *Daily Champion*, October 25, 2007; *Daily Trust*, April 21, 2009; *Leadership*, March 4, 2009; *Weekly Trust*, November 20, 2010. *Radio Nigeria*, September 22, 2011.

Table 3: Reported Prices of AK-47 Assault Rifles in Nigeria, 2003–2007

Date of Purchase	Price
Late 2003	USD 1,000–1,500
December 2004	USD 1,000–1,500
May 2005	USD 3,000–4,000
November 2006	USD 1,000–1,500
December 2006	USD 1,500–2,500
March 2007	USD 4,000–5,000

Source: Hazen, J.M., and Horner, J. (2007). * Prices vary depending on whether the weapon is new or used.

Table 4: Total Number of Police Area Commands, Divisions, Stations, Posts and Village Posts, 2006-2007

States	2006					2007				
	No. of Area Commands	No. of Divisions	No. of Police Stations	No. of Police Posts	No. of Village Posts	No of Area Commands	No. of Divisions	Police Stations	No. of Police Posts	No. of Village Posts
Abia	2	29	22	32	1	2	29	22	32	1
Adamawa	3	24	65	102	199	3	24	65	102	199
A/Ibom	3	32	41	Na	Na	3	32	41	Na	Na
Anambra	3	34	52	43	132	3	34	52	43	132
Bauchi	3	24	38	99	55	3	24	38	99	55
Bayelsa	3	10	19	30	204	3	28	37	137	204
Benue	3	28	37	137	61	3	10	19	36	61
Borno	3	37	42	100	178	3	37	42	100	179
C/River	2	23	55	23	103	2	23	55	23	103
Delta	3	33	67	Na	100	3	33	67	Na	100
Ebonyi	3	13	29	10	69	3	13	29	10	69
Edo	3	29	31	43	151	3	29	31	43	151
Ekiti	3	20	21	54	Na	3	20	6	54	Na
Enugu	3	23	6	50	79	3	23	21	50	79
Gombe	3	29	34	74	129	3	29	34	74	129
Imo	3	30	63	38	134	3	30	63	38	134
Jigawa	3	27	27	120	179	3	27	27	120	179
Kaduna	3	36	59	105	202	3	36	59	105	202
Kano	3	67	17	104	45	3	67	17	104	45
Katsina	3	Na	38	103	3	3	Na	38	103	3

Kebbi	3	24	9	133	na	3	24	9	133	na
Kogi	5	32	123	79	137	5	32	123	79	137
Kwara	3	46	7	85	141	3	46	7	85	141
Lagos	8	na	128	78	298	8	na	128	78	298
Nasarawa	3	17	317	118	45	4	36	60	118	45
Niger	4	36	60	115	171	3	17	39	115	171
Ogun	5	31	25	65	10	5	31	25	65	10
Ondo	3	31	36	26	93	3	31	36	26	93
Osun	3	33	47	32	170	4	47	50	32	170
Oyo	4	47	50	47	130	3	33	47	47	130
Plateau	2	25	101	174	256	2	25	101	174	256
Rivers	3	38	34	63	103	3	38	34	63	103
Sokoto	2	26	3	44	75	2	26	3	44	75
Taraba	3	17	71	123	33	3	17	71	123	33
Yobe	3	18	19	70	20	3	18	19	70	20
Zamfara	3	36	35	62	136	3	36	35	62	136
FCT/Abuja	3	16	11	44	7	3	16	11	44	7
Railways	5	9	30	Na	44	5	9	30	Na	44
PAP	2	7	7	4	20	2	7	7	4	20
Airport	1	3	Na	2	6	1	3	Na	2	6
Total	126	1,040	1,576	2,631	3,919	126	1,040	1,598	2,634	3,820

Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2008:114). Note: na= not available

Table 5: Small arms seized by police, 2000–2010

Year	No. of arms seized
2000-2001	1,941
2002	3,150
2003	3,451
2007	About 2,098
2010	over 1,283

Source: *Vanguard*, July 7, 2004; *Thisday*, February 14, 2007; *Leadership*, July 5, 2010.

Table 6: Salaries of the Nigerian Police Officers Per Month and Per Year

S/No	Rank	Salary per month	Salary per annum	\$ Equivalent per month	\$ Equivalent per annum
1	CP	#39,649.00k	#475,788.00k	\$287.3	\$3447.6
2	DC	#34,993.00k	#419,916.00k	\$253.5	\$3042
3	AC	#31,605.00k	#379,260.00k	\$229	\$2748
4	CSP	28,801.00k	#345,612.00k	\$208.7	\$2504.4
5	SP	26,197.00k	#314,364.00k	\$189.8	\$2277.6

6	DSP	#22,565.00k	#270,780.00k	\$163.5	\$1962
7	ASP	#19,594.00k	#235,128.00k	\$141.9	\$1702.8
8	INSPR	13,002.00k	#156,024.00k	\$94.2	\$1130.4
9	SGT	#8,370.00k	#100,440.00k	\$60.6	\$727.2
10	CPL	#7,104.00k	#85,248.00k	\$51.4	\$616.6
11	PC	#6,455.00k	#77,460.00k	\$46.7	\$560.4

Source: Afe Babalola, in the *Nigerian Tribune*, December 17, 2001.

Table 7: Nigerian Police Force Small Arms and Ammunition

Types of arms	Present holdings	Estimated Requirements over the next five years
Rifles (various models): K2; FWC; SMG Model 12; SMG Beretta; Sterling; Beretta; pump-action shotgun; sub-machine gun; AK-47	65,000	510,500
Pistols (various models): Revolver 38 mm; revolver chief special shot; Browning 9 mm; revolver 38 mm chief long; Browning DA; Browning 32mm; Beretta 9 mm	8,524	20,000
Ammunition: 5.56 mm for rifles 9 mm for rifles	(Rounds) 65,000 434,000	(Rounds) 5,000,000 100,000

Source: Small Arms Survey (2007a) *Security Agencies, Small Arms, and Violence in Nigeria*. Switzerland: Small Arms Survey.

Table 8: Profiles of the Armed Groups in the Niger Delta

Name	Year formed	Membership	Sources of Weapons/ Stockpiles	Funding/Support
The Bush Boys	1999	Over 3,000	Purchases from illegal arms dealers	Politicians and Chiefs of the Okrika community, including former governor Ada George and Chief Sergeant Awuse, the Rivers state 2007 gubernatorial candidate
Deebam (aka. Klansmen Konfraternity (KK))	1991	3,000 in Tombia, Degema LGA; 2,500 in Bukuma, Degema LGA; and 6,000 in Port Harcourt	Purchases from illegal arms dealers	Sir Celestine Omehia, Kenneth Kobani; and Chief Fred Barivale Kpakol, chairman of Gokana LGA.
Deewell	Late 19	Over 4,000 member	Purchases from illegal arms dealers	Allegedly Rotimi Amaechi, Sir Celestine Omehia; Gabriel Pidomson Jr. etc.
Icelanders (also known as Germans and ND)	Created the Rivers Government in Mid-20	10,000 members in Rivers and Bayelsa states (A PDP family)	AK-47s, 7 general purpose machine guns, 8 other machine guns, locally made craft pistols, and both 7.62 mm and 5.56 mm ammunition; AMD 65s; 12 59/M66s; and several Type 65-1s, Beretta BM59s, FN FALs, and AK-47s.	Allegedly from Governor Peter Odili and Transport Minister Dr Abiye Sekibo
MEND (Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta)	January 2006	Over 2,000 fighters	AK-47s or their derivatives, RPGs, and UK 59 Rachot machine guns	Mainly self sufficient
NDPVF (Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force)	2003	About 5,000 member	-	Proceeds from illegal oil bunkering
NDSF (Niger Delta Strike Force)	2004	About 60 members (but with other Supports numbers Over 600)	RPGs and dynamite at its disposal, as well as Russian-made AK-47s, or variants of the AK, and PK machine guns.	Allegedly funded by the Action Congress governorship candidate for Rivers state in the April 2007 elections Prince Tonye Princewill and others.
The Outlaws	2004	4,000 throughout Rivers state	RPGs, sub-machine guns, and AK-47 derivatives	Allegedly PDP Rivers State

Source: Adapted from Hazen, J.M., and Horner, J. (2007) “Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in Perspective” in *Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper 20*. Switzerland.

Table 9: Activities of Various Militant Groups Operating in Niger Delta from January 2006-July 2009.

Date	Incident	Location	Casualty
Jan. 11, 2006	Attack on Royal Dutch/shell's oil facilities	Offshore field Rivers State	4 foreign workers kidnapped
Jan. 11, 2006	Explosion on major crude oil pipeline operated by Royal Dutch/Shell	Forcados, Delta	-
Jan. 15, 2006	Royal Dutch/Shell facilities was attacked by MEND	Port Harcourt	17 soldiers killed
May 10, 2006	An executive with US based oil company, Baker Hughes was shot and killed	Port Harcourt	1 death occurred
June 2, 2006	A Norwegian offshore rig was attacked	Port Harcourt	16 crew members kidnapped
Aug. 21, 2006	Clash between MEND and security agencies	Bayelsa	10 MEND fighters killed
Sept. 12, 2006	Militants attacked Chevron offshore oil field	Delta	1 worker killed
Oct. 2, 2006	MEND fighters attack Nigerian soldiers patrol boat	offshore	10 soldiers killed
Oct. 2, 2006	A Nigerian/Royal Dutch Shell convoy was attacked	Port Harcourt	Some officials wounded
Oct. 3, 2006	Western oil workers taken hostage	Bayelsa	7 Western oil workers Taken hostage
Oct. 4, 2006	Nigerian soldiers stormed a militant camp	Rivers	9 soldiers were killed
Nov. 22, 2006	Clash between Nigerian soldiers and some militants When soldiers stormed a militant camp to rescue Kidnapped oil workers	Rivers	1 soldier died
Dec. 7, 2006	Kidnap of foreign oil workers	Rivers	4 foreign oil workers Kidnapped
Dec. 21, 2006	Obagi pumping station attacked	Delta	3 guards killed
Jan. 16, 2007	Militants attacked an oil vessel near Bonny Island	Bonny Island, Rivers	-
March 4, 2007	Major spill at a pipeline feeding the Bonny export terminal due to sabotage	Rivers	-
May 1, 2007	Six expatriate workers from an offshore facility Owned by Chevron were seized	Funiwa, Delta	6 oil workers kidnapped
May 3, 2007	MEND fighters seized eight foreign oil workers from an offshore vessel	Rivers	8 foreign oil workers Held hostage
May 4, 2007	Saipen site was attacked causing shuts in production	Okono/Okpoh	Several oil workers Wounded
May 7, 2007	Protests caused Chevron to shut down the Abiteye flow station that feeds Escravos export terminal	Abiteye, Delta State	-
May 8, 2007	Three major oil pipelines (one in Brass and two	Brass/Akasa,	-

	In the Akasa area) run by Agip were attacked	Bayelsa State	
May 10, 20	Protesters occupied the Bomu pipeline system Causing S shut-in production feeding Bonny Light export route	Bomu, Rivers	-
May 16, 20	Gunmen attacked the country home of the Vice Presiden (now President Goodluck Jonathan)	Ogbia, Bayelsa	-
May 28, 20	Protests at Bomu pipeline system made Shell to Shut-in production through its Nembe Creek trunk	Bomu, Rivers	-
June 14, 20	Gunmen stormed the Ogainbiri flow station operated by Eni Petroleum	Ogainbiri, Delta	24 workers taken hos
June 18, 20	Militants overran the Chevron-Eni Abiteye flow station causing shut-in crude oil production	Port Harcourt	30 innocent citizens died in the attack
Aug. 3, 20	Militants attacked Port Harcourt city destroying some pu properties such as the NNPC mega filling station and ra station	Port Harcourt	30 innocent citizens died in the attack
Sept. 20, 20	Gunmen claiming to be MEND kidnapped 11 Members the ruling PDP	Southern Ondo State	11 persons kidnappe
Oct. 20, 20	MEND attacked a Columbian oil worker	-	1 death
Oct. 26, 20	Six oil workers attacked	-	Six oil workers kidna
Oct. 30, 20	Naval warship, NNS Obula, deployed to rescue the EA Field belonging to Shell was attacked	Offshore, River	1 death and five othe Sustained serious inj
Oct. 31, 20	MEND attacked a naval officer	Rivers	1 naval officer killed
Nov. 12, 20	35 militants engaged naval officers manning the Qua Iboe terminal of EXXON Mobil	Iboe, Akwa Ibo	A pregnant woman K and 25 persons wou
Nov. 15, 20	MEND attacked Shell facility	Rivers	-
Nov. 25, 20	JTF clashed with MEND near a natural gas facility of SH	Soku, Rivers	-
Dec. 4, 20	MEND attacked Exxon Mobil	Rivers	1 killed
Dec. 31, 20	Militants invaded two police stations at Trans Amadi and Borokiri	Port Harcourt	4 police men and 11 Others lost their lives
Jan. 11, 20	Petroleum tanker ship was attacked at the Nigerian Ports Authority by Freedom Freelance Fighters (FFF) of MEND	Port Harcourt	2 persons injured
Feb. 3, 20	MEND attacked a military house boat stationed At the Shell Petroleum Tara manifold	Tara Manifold Bayelsa	2 killed
Feb. 11, 20	Gunmen attacked a supply vessel belonging to Total Oil Nig Ltd. MV Patience at Buoy 35	Kalaibama, link Bonny island	-
Feb. 11, 20	Militants attacked a naval gunboat belonging to the Pathfinder Naval escorting NLNG boats From Port Harcourt at Bonny	Rivers	4 people killed
March 19,	Exchange of fire between militants and oil Industry sec	Rivers	-

2008	ship		
March 21,	MEND attacked naval ship causing explosion	Rivers	-
April 2, 20	Two oil flow station belonging to Agip Oil Company located offshore Forcados were blown off	Rivers	-
April 13, 2	Agip vessels bombed	Forcados, Rivers	10 naval officers died Some militants
April 15, 2	Serial attacks launched on pipeline belonging to NNPC	-	-
April 19, 2	MEND fighters crippled Shell Adamakri crude flow stat	Delta/Edo	6 people killed
April 21, 2	MEND in 'Operation Cyclone' attacked two Major pipeline of Shell Soku-Buguma and Buguma-Aklakri	Adamakri	10 killed in the clash
April 24, 2	MEND sabotage a major oil pipeline of Shell at Kula	Rivers	6 expatriates kidnapped
May 2, 20	Bayesa State Shell facility attacked, key facilities damaged	Bayelsa	5 persons kidnapped
May 13, 2	Chevron oil vessel hijacked	Kula, Rivers	-
May 26, 2	Assault on Rivers State Shell pipeline, forcing Closure	Rivers	8 hostages taken
June 9-10, 2008	Clashes between security forces and militants	Delta	6 militants and 29 soldiers reportedly died
June 19, 2	MEND struck Shell's Bonga facility on deep Offshore field	Rivers	Over 100 deaths
June 20, 2	Chevron facility attacked by militants	Rivers	-
June 28, 2	Clashes between militants and soldiers	Delta	-
July 16, 20	Clashes between militants and security forces	Rivers/Bayelsa	-
Jul. 24/26, 2	Foreign oil workers attacked and kidnapped	Rivers	-
July 28, 20	Two major attacks on Shell oil pipelines		-
Aug. 8, 20	Militants attacked Ondo State Oil Producing Development Commission (OSOPADEC) and 4 others	Ileje, Ondo	-
Aug. 12, 2	Militants destroyed oil gas pipeline in Rivers State	Rivers	-
Aug. 19, 2	Oil pipeline destroyed in Delta State	Delta	-
Aug. 24, 2	Oil vessel at Bonny Island, Rivers hijacked	Rivers	-
Aug. 30, 2	Militants and security forces clashed	Rivers	-
Sep.13-15, 2008	Kula oil platform operated by Chevron and Alakri, and flow station operated by Shell were attacked	Rivers	-
July 12, 20	MEND attacked Atlas Cove Jetty with caliber machine gun	Lagos	4 Naval officers

Source: November 2008 Report of Technical Committee on Niger Delta (See also *Newswatch*, May 4, 2009, Vol. 49 No. 18; *Vanguard*, July 15, 2009).

Table 10: Armed Robbery Statistics Classified into Various Offences/Involvement 2002-2007

Year	Robbery Cases Reported to the Police	Persons Arrested	Persons Prosecuted	Persons/ Cases Awaiting trial	Civilians Killed by Armed robbers	Armed Robbers Killed by police	Armed Robbers Injured By police	Cases Pending Investigation
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2002	2,968	2,907	353	817	371	317	99	1,708
2003	2,949	3,814	1,026	1,048	335	544	190	1,525
2004	3,184	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
2005	2,325	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
2006	2,916	2,946	135	303	233	329	28	1,208
2007	2,506	na	na	na	na	na	na	na

Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2008:122). Note: na= not available

Table 11: Cases of Missing Persons/Kidnappings, 2002-2007

Year	Number of Missing Persons	Number of Persons Traced	Number of Persons not Traced
2002	1,334	886	448
2003	1,273	772	451
2004	1,316	548	768
2005	1,080	575	505
2006	1,374	931	443
2007	867	446	421

Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2008:134-136).

Table 12: Chronicles of Bomb blasts in Nigeria Since 1986

Date	Incidence/Target	Group Respons	Victims/Damages
October 19, 1986	Letter bomb	-	Dele Giwa lost his dear
March 31, 1995	Lauch of Miriam Abacha's family support program	-	-
January 18, 1996	Darbur Hotel, Kaduna state	-	Bagauda Kaliho (press died
April 25, 1996	Air Force Base, Ikeja, Lagos	-	-
January 20, 1996	Aminu Kano International Airport	-	Olushola Omoshola (and Nelson Gbolahor Kasim
December 16	Colonel Buba Marwa Convoy	-	-
December 18, 1996	Lagos state Task Force bus	-	-
April 22, 1997	Evans square, Lagos state	-	3 died and several injurie
May 13, 1997	Fed. Min. of Works, Ibadan	-	-
December 13, 1997	Nnamdi Azikiwe Int. Airport	-	Lt. Gen. Oladipo escapes death
January 20, 2002	Ikeja Military Cantonement, I state	-	600 persons died
May 28, 2005	Residence of Ikono Head of Council Area, Ikono, Akwa Ibom st	-	-

November 25, 2006	PDP Secretariat, Bayelsa state	-	Building destroyed
November 28, 2006	Owan East LGA, Edo state	-	Godwin Aigbekhai died
December 5, 2006	Then Governor Goodluck Jonathan Campaign Office, Bayelsa	-	-
December 11, 2006	Ndudi Elumelu Campaign office, Delta	-	-
December 23, 2006	Government house, Port Harcourt	MEND	-
March 18, 2009	A farm in Ikeja Military cantonment	-	A student blown to pieces
July 12, 2009	Atlas Cove Jetty oil Facility, Lagos	MEND	five
December 22, 2009	Letter bomb targeted to Superscreen Television	-	-
April 11, 2010	Dandin Kowa, Jos, Plateau state	Bomb maker	Chopped off both hands of Abdulsalam Mohammed
March 16, 2010	Near the arena of Post Amalgamation Dialogue organized by Vanguard, Warri, Delta state	MEND	1 killed
May 2, 2010	Close to Dep. Gov. Peremobowei Ebebi, Bayelsa	-	-
May 3, 2010	Mechanic workshop, Warri	-	-
October 1, 2010	Close to Eagles square, Lagos independence	MEND	12 died, 36 injured
December 27, 2010	Barkin Ladi, outskirts of Jos	Boko Haram	-
December 24, 2010	Jos city	Boko Haram	30 died
December 31, 2010	Mogadishu Mammy Market, Abuja	-	4 died
April 7, 2011	Polling booth, Unguwar Maiduguri	Boko Haram	More than 10 injured
April 8, 2011	INEC Office, Suleja	Boko Haram	11 youth corps members
April 15, 2011	Maiduguri Council Office of INEC	-	-
April 21, 2011	Bomb makers died, Kaduna	-	2 died
April 25, 2011	Tudu Palace Hotel and Kano motor park, Maiduguri	Boko Haram	-
April 27, 2011	Bomb averted, INEC office, A/Ibom	-	-
May 28, 2011	Mammy market, Shandawanka Barracks, Bauchi	Boko Haram	13 died, 40 injured
May 29, 2011	Zuba, outskirts of Kubua, Abuja	Boko Haram	14 killed, 8 lose limbs
June 11, 2011	Bomb averted, United Methodist Church, Bauchi	Boko Haram	-

June 16, 2011	National Force Headquarters, Ab	Boko Haram	13 died, many p injured, over 70 cars burnt
June 16, 2011	Dambowa, Maidugri	Boko Haram	3 died
July 10, 2001	All Christian Fellowship C Suleja	Boko Haram	3 persons critically injur
August 26, 2011	United Nations House, Abuja	Boko Haram	25 persons died, over injured
September 11, 2011	Twin bomb exploded at Obelende,	Fulani men	none
October 10, 2011	Twin bomb exploded at Maiduguri	Boko Haram	3 soldiers, one killed, burnt

Source: Adapted from *Vanguard*, July 8, 2011; *Vanguard*, July 11, 2011; *Vanguard*, August 27, 2011. *The Punch*, September 12, 2011. *The Nation*, October 11, 2011.

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