

Local Government Participatory Budget System in Zimbabwe: The Case of Harare City Council, 1995-2013

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Abstract

The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of the prevailing contextual variables on the implementability of participatory budgeting (PB) system in Zimbabwe's local authorities with special reference to the Harare City Council (HCC). This study was undertaken against the background that the PB system had produced intended results in some local authorities and unintended results in others. This was mainly due to the fact that the PB system was transplanted from elsewhere where it recorded success stories and replicated in other different settings without taking into account different prevailing contextual factors. The main objective of the study is to examine how contextual variables affect the implementability of PB system in HCC. The study revealed that the prevailing contextual variables in Zimbabwe generally and HCC specifically are inhospitable to the successful implementation of the PB system.

Keywords: participatory budgeting, Harare City Council

1.1 Background of the Problem

In Zimbabwe, the participatory budgeting (PB) system in local authorities was introduced through an Act of Parliament called the Urban Councils Act: Chapter 29:15 of 1995. Sec 288 (1) of the Act reads:

Before the expiry of any financial year the finance committee shall draw up and present for the approval of the council estimates in such detail as the council may require of the income and expenditure on revenue and capital accounts of the council for the next succeeding financial year. When the estimates presented in terms of subsection (1) have been approved by the council and signed by the mayor or chairman of the council, as the case may be, the council shall ensure that—(a) copies of the estimates are forthwith made available for inspection by the public.

The Act stipulates that all local government budget proposals are to be published in three issues of any newspaper so as to give the public a chance to scrutinise the budget (Chikerema 2013:3). Chikerema further notes that PB as a legislative creature was introduced as:

...part of the overall strategic effort to promote local democracy in local authorities and its main objectives are: to promote civic interest and participation in local governance, to involve the community in generating self-sustaining livelihoods options as well as to promote accountability and transparency in local public finance and budgeting (2013:3).

In terms of PB origination, there is a widespread consensus that it started in Brazil's city of Porto Alegre in 1989 (Wampler 2000 and 2003, World Bank 2008 and Oxfam 2005). It was then transplanted and replicated in other Brazilian cities like Belo Horizonte. Later on PB initiatives were further exported to Europe, North America, other Latin American countries, Africa and Asia with or without adjustments. However, in these different contextual environments the results of PB vary from place to place and across time. In some countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, the implementability of PB usually points to unsatisfactory results mainly due to the fact that the prevailing contextual variables were not hospitable to the PB blueprint. In this respect, anecdotal evidence suggests that PB is difficult to implement in HCC precisely because the policy context is not conducive. Thus the implementability of PB is anchored on a hospitable policy context within which implementation is carried out.

According to the PB Unit (2010:15), PB has eight ingredients as its internal policy anatomy. These are effective community engagement, adequate resources, money, sound leadership, effective communication, sound planning, learning and support. On a related note, the PB Unit (2008:17; and 2010:16) states that for successful implementation of PB system there should be key success factors in place. Chief among them are the following: political will and bureaucratic buy-in, favourable legislative and policy frameworks, democratic governance systems, inclusiveness in participation, PB adaptability to suit local environments, good communication and

effective meeting structures as well as bottom-up approaches. To this extent, the World Bank (2007) cited in Shah (2007:24) labeled PB as the “best practice one size-fits-all” solution to all local authorities’ problems relating to budgetary processes.

Also the time designed to conduct PB meetings by the HCC (normal working hours from 08:30 to 04:00 during the week) is not convenient for rates and rent payers because they are also at work at that time (Harare Residents Trust 2008:45). According to the PB Unit (2008:21 and 2010:24) for successful implementation of the PB system, it should be a “bottom-up’ exercise rather than a top-down” approach. Therefore, PB has a people-driven orientation as its essential attribute. However, in the case of HCC this does not apply primarily because it is being implemented as a statutory requirement, hence it is a blueprint from the higher order authority (the central government). To this extent, there appears to be no bureaucratic support, buy-in and commitment on the part of HCC City fathers of which their support is indispensable to the success of any PB initiative in the Council. Thus, HCC is presenting a different and difficult context for the implementation of PB system. This then accounts for the widespread variance between the goals of PB and the results actually realized.

To this extent, the success of PB initiative in HCC has to do with the support, strategies and interests of those in power. This is largely because if the initiative is being advanced by those without power, influence and authority it is doomed to fail without achieving its intended results. This is the case in HCC in which PB initiative is being advanced by the civil society organizations such as Combined Harare Residents Association (CHRA), Harare Residents Trust (HRT) and Urban Councils Association of Zimbabwe (UCAZ). Pursuant to this contextual factor, PB initiative is bound to fail in HCC because the contextual environment is not conducive for its successful implementation. Cognizant to the institution and regime type, HCC can be deemed undemocratic, unresponsive to public demands and closed system. This is precisely because even budgetary consultations are conducted stakeholders are complaining about how the Council had crowded-out their contribution since usually their demands and priorities will not be reflected in the final budget (HRT 2008:37). Thus, HCC is an inhospitable environment for effective implementation of PB system.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The implementation of PB in HCC is failing to produce intended outcomes. This is mainly due to the fact that it is being implemented as a blue-print transplanted from the success stories of Brazil, Britain among many without taking into account varying contextual variables. Thus, implementing PB system as a one-size-fits-all approach without taking into account different contextual variables is questionable. To this extent, Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) note that a case should be made for the re-conceptualization of implementation as an exploratory rather than an unquestioning, instrumental, and even subservient type process. However, in the context of HCC, the PB is being implemented as a blueprint from the central government learned from elsewhere where PB recorded success stories without taking into account different policy contexts. The assumption was that PB could be successfully transplanted from the success stories of Brazil, Britain among others and successfully replicated in Zimbabwe, in this case HCC, and produce similar desired outcomes. To this extent, those who introduced PB in HCC erred in the sense that they relied much on the content of the PB policy and did not seem to have paid sufficient attention to the policy context. As a result there appears to be an incongruent relationship between the desired outcomes of PB system and the actual ones courtesy of the impact of contextual factors on its implementation. Pursuant to this, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) cited in Grindle (1980:3) notes that different contextual factors can account for the “often imperfect correspondence between the policies adopted and services actually delivered.”

1.3 Objectives of the Research

1. To examine the internal anatomy of the participatory budgeting system.
2. To examine how contextual variables affect the implementability of participatory budgeting system in Harare City Council.
3. To survey the suitability of strategies currently being used by Harare City Council in the implementation of participatory budgeting system.
4. To proffer recommendations on how to strengthen participatory budgeting policy analysis, management and governance in Harare City Council.

1.4 Significance of the Study

The research is an attempt to fill the gap of knowledge existing between theory and practice in relation to how policy context determines either the success or failure of a given policy. Special emphasis will be placed on examining the viability of implementing PB policy content in the context of HCC. Conclusions and recommendations on how PB policy context determines its success or failure may be helpful to PB policy makers and implementers. Thus, this study will enrich the existing body of literature on the nexus between

policy content and policy context generally and how the prevailing contextual factors in HCC affect the implementability of the PB system specifically.

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This section reviews the literature on the conceptualization of the Participatory Budgeting (PB) system and contextual variables affecting its implementation. Critical-success factors, both internal and external, necessary for effective PB implementation in local authorities are discussed. The theoretical framework on how contextual variables affect policy implementation in general and PB in particular is also discussed.

2.1 Conceptualizing Participatory Budgeting

PB has been defined and conceptualized differently by different authorities. To PB Unit (2010:8)

PB directly involves local people in making decisions on the spending priorities for a defined public budget. This means engaging residents and community groups, representative of all parts of the community, to discuss spending priorities, make spending proposals and vote on them.

Wampler (2000:2) cited in Shah (2007:21) notes that:

Participatory Budgeting is a decision-making process through which citizens deliberate and negotiate over the distribution of public resources. Participatory Budgeting programs are innovative policymaking processes...that citizens have the opportunity to allocate resources, prioritize broad social policies, and monitor public spending. These programs are designed to incorporate citizens into the policymaking process, spur administrative reform, and distribute public resources to low-income neighbourhoods.

In this respect, it can be argued that PB in local authorities is the embodiment of participatory democracy. Cunha et al. (2011:1) argue that, "PB is amongst the cardinal essential features of participatory democracy." This is mainly because it prioritises the participation of those who are bound to be affected by the policy decision. It is built on the essential principle of mutating from "government-to-you" to "government-with-you" (Bourgon 2012:13). This is to say users of local authorities' goods and services are not mere passive beneficiaries and recipients but they are active participants in their production and provision through the PB system. Through PB local residents are crowded-in their contribution in the formulation, adoption, execution and evaluation of municipal budgets.

In its birth place, Brazil, Wampler (2000:2) and Shah (2007:23) argue that PB was implemented against the background of "confronting Brazilian undemocratic political legacies of clientelism, social exclusion, and corruption by making the budgetary process transparent, open, and public." On this, the World Bank (2005:23) cited in Shah (2007:21) notes that:


Participatory Budgeting programs are implemented at the behest of governments, citizens, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and civil society organizations (CSOs) to allow citizens or residents to play a direct role in deciding how and where resources should be spent.

PB has its intellectual and philosophical parentage from participatory democracy. By borrowing extensively from participatory democracy, PB has public participation as its central essential feature. In this respect, it is regarded as a "mechanism through which the historically excluded social groups" (Wampler 2000:2, Shah 2007:21 and World Bank 2005:34) or "those who are willing but unable to participate" (Shah 2007:22) who are usually the hard-to-reach or hard-to-engage stakeholders are "crowded-in" (Bourgeon 2012:14) in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of municipal budgets. Linked to the idea of PB is the incorporation and institutionalization of a culture of good corporate governance issues. These are transparency, accountability, openness, integrity, honesty and inclusive in the mobilization, management and allocation of municipal funds. On this, Oxfam (2005:2) cited in Shah (2007:23) argue that "PB allows the empowerment and involvement of citizens or residents in areas traditionally considered the 'preserve of experts' (budgetary processes)."

2.2 The Anatomy of the Participatory Budgeting System

According to the PB Unit (2010:31) the general policy content of PB comprises the involvement of stakeholders in the formulation, adoption, implementation and evaluation of the Council's budget. In this case, these stakeholders are the general citizenry, residents' representatives, private sector, church organizations, civil society organizations and other public institutions with a direct or indirect dependency with the local government. This means that the PB outreach consultation meetings should be undertaken effectively at designated meeting points and objections to the budget draft to be freely expressed by the stakeholders. In this respect, the voices of stakeholders should not only be heard by the Council officials but also influence decision making in the ensuing budget. To this extent, the final budget draft ought to reflect the demands, priorities and needs of the stakeholders who are bound to be affected by the budget. The PB cycle is illustrated in Figure 2.1 below.

Figure 2.1: Participatory Budgeting Cycle



Source: UN-HABITAT (2008a:34)

The preparatory stage is basically the design stage of the budget cycle (UN-HABITAT 2008a:33). It involves mainly the distribution of information, the initial discussion of policies and priorities by citizens in their localities, estimation of revenue, establishment of the general resource allocation or budgeting criteria and methodology, putting in place the relevant participatory structures and the election and establishment of the number of elected representatives (ibid:33). To this end, this stage is characterized by the following steps: (a) informative plenary sessions in the City Wards or Zones, (b) situation and problem analysis meetings in each Ward or Zone, and (c) capacity building, training of citizens and key PB stakeholders (UN-HABITAT 2008a:33). The first step of informative plenary sessions in the City Wards or Zones entails the Council to explain PB process to local residents and key stakeholders. To this extent, City fathers (Mayors, Town Clerk, City Treasurer, City Planners, and Chamber Secretary among others) are supposed to chair these meetings. The main thrust of these meetings is for the Council staff to collect information on the previous year's audited results, budget performance for the half year and the projected performance, including capital projects implementation status and projections to the year end ((UN-HABITAT 2008b:33). At the end, the Council explains to the stakeholders the financial position for the current year, the financial performance of the previous year, the basis of revenues and expenditure, how resources were spent, what was realized and the potential constraints for the ensuing fiscal year (ibid:33). Revenue and expenditure forecasts are also presented so as to make residents acquaint with the potential budget limitations. During these meetings the City fathers explains to stakeholders the Council's budgetary matrix and the participatory budgeting process as a vehicle of public participation in decision-making. Videos, films and several communication tools are used to explain the PB process (UN-HABITAT 2008a:34). Cases in point where informative and plenary sessions in the City Wards or Zones were conducted are the Brazilian cities of Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte, and Entebbe Municipality of Uganda.

The second step of situation and problem analysis meetings in each Ward or Zone is intended to assist residents and key stakeholders with problems and needs identification (ibid:34). The Ward or Zone councillor is supposed to chair these meetings. In this step Council officials together with the councillor help to identify problems and needs of the locality, defining residents' demands and priorities and to assess the technical and financial feasibility of possible solutions (UN-HABITAT 2008b:41). This will go a long way in institutionalizing the idea of participatory planning and formulation of the Council's budget. The third step of capacity building, training of residents and key stakeholders is about capacitating residents and stakeholders in

the technical terms and procedures of budgeting. This helps in making all stakeholders well versed with the intricacies and complexities of the Council's budget. This is essential in institutionalizing the culture of participation in all budget deliberations in the Councils.

According to UN-HABITAT (2008a:34) the participatory budget formulation and approval stage "is concerned mainly with setting priorities and allow citizens, directly or indirectly through their representatives, to set priorities and decide on project investments." The stage is also characterized by the convening of the Budgeting Committee Meetings and the debating and voting of the budget proposal by the Committee (:34). Thus, policies, programs, plans and projects that will be executed in the ensuing fiscal year are analysed. This helps in making PB stakeholders familiar with the budget issues which are bound to affect them. This stage has three steps, namely Ward or Zone deliberative and decision-making plenary session, PB Committee meetings, and debate and voting of the budget proposal (UN-HABITAT 2008a:34). The first step of Ward or Zone deliberative and decision-making plenary session entails the decision and prioritization of the problems to be tackled first which were identified during situational and problem analysis. The stage involves mainly the convening of Participatory Budgeting Committee Meetings and the debating and voting of the budget proposal by the committee or an equivalent institution. Its main activities include prioritization criteria, the prioritization matrix and decision-making mechanisms for priorities.

UN-HABITAT (2008a:36) argues that "the participatory budgeting implementation stage is the actual problem solving stage; all that was planned and agreed on in the participatory planning meetings are being worked on." The budget implementation process is arguably conducted throughout the fiscal year. On participatory budget implementation stage, the International Observatory of Participatory Democracy (2006:28) argues that:

At this stage the budget implementation process usually involves the complex process of contracting services or public works that include detailed planning, writing the terms of reference, calls of interest, tendering, tender opening and selection, awarding of tenders, signing of memoranda of understanding with winning bidders and then execution of the projects.

The participatory budget monitoring and evaluation stage is about giving periodic budget performance reports to citizens (ibid: 28 and UN-HABITAT 2008a:36). These reports will state project implementation status and problems encountered. To this end, periodic participatory site visits to inspect projects can also be organized as a way of project implementation (ibid). Some of the tools mentioned below can be used for monitoring and evaluation of project implementation at the municipal level: "Participatory site inspection and supervision, reporting, and use of community score cards - this is a hybrid process of the techniques of social audit, community monitoring and citizen report cards" (UN-HABITAT 2008b:50). Also Ward councillors and citizens monitor the budget implementations, on-site monitoring and evaluation of project implementation at this stage (UN-HABITAT 2008a:36). This is done in a participatory manner to ensure that implementation is done as proposed in terms of meeting deadlines and targets as well as consuming the planned resources. Further, this stage also helps to adjust the implementation plan especially when contextual variables dictate otherwise (UN-HABITAT 2008b:51).

Further, the participatory budgeting monitoring and evaluation stage is about "local authorities giving periodic budget performance reports to citizens" (UN-HABITAT 2008a:37). Against this background these reports will state project implementation status and problems encountered therein. In doing so the Council or municipality can use, among other tools, participatory site inspection and supervision, reporting, service delivery surveys, preparation of socio-economic profiles and use of citizen report-score cards involving the use of questionnaires (UN-HABITAT 2008b:43 and UN-HABITAT 2008a:37). More importantly, at this stage Councils or municipalities supplies detailed information on a regular basis about the way budget is being implemented. Thus, the City fathers prepare clear budgetary reports which can be easily understood by citizens. Linked to this is that stakeholders can also inquire about specific issues and demand supplementary information in order to authenticate how budget was implemented at a particular point in time (UN-HABITAT 2008a:37).

2.3 Conceptualizing Policy Implementation

"Implementation literally means carrying-out, accomplishing, fulfilling, producing or completing a given task" (Paudel 2009:1). To Edwards (1980:vii), public policy implementation is:

The stage of policy making between the establishment of a policy such as the passage of a legislative Act, the issuing of an executive order, the handing down of a judicial decision, or the promulgation of a regulatory rule- and the consequences of the policy for the people whom it affects.

This definition concurs with the one suggested by the founding fathers of implementation, Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) who define it with reference to a policy as laid down in official documents. To them, policy implementation may be viewed "as a process of interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared to achieve them" (Pressman and Wildavsky). To this extent, policy implementation encompasses those actions by public and private individuals or groups that are directed at the achievement of objectives set forth in policy

decisions (ibid: xxi-xxii). These include both one-time efforts to transform decisions into operational terms and continuing efforts to achieve the large and small changes mandated by policy decisions (Meter and Horn 1975:447 and Paudel 2009:1). Moreover, in her discussion Grindle (1980:12) suggested the determinants of successful policy implementation which define the success or failure of a given policy. These are (a) power, interests and strategies of actors involved, (b) institution and regime characteristics, and (c) compliance and responsiveness. Cognizant to the first factor Grindle argues that:

Frequently, the goals of the actors will be in direct conflict with each other and the outcomes of this conflict and consequently, of who gets what, will be determined by the strategies, resources and power positions of each of the actors involved. What is implemented may thus be the result of a political calculus of the interests and groups competing for scarce resources, the response of implementing officials, and the actions of political elites, all interacting within given institutional contexts (1980:12).

To Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983:20-21) “policy implementation is the carrying out of a basic policy decision, usually incorporated in a statute, but which can also take the form of important executive orders or court decisions.” They suggested three critical-success factors that affect implementation process; namely the tractability of the problem(s) being addressed, the ability of the statute to favourably structure the implementation process, and the net effect of a variety of political variables on the balance of support for statutory objectives. Thus, policy implementation is a dependent variable to the nature of the problem being addressed and prevailing contextual factors.

O’Toole (2003:266) defines policy implementation as “what develops between the establishment of an apparent intention on the part of government to do something or stop doing something and the ultimate impact of world of actions.” Linked to this definition is the one given by Howlett and Ramesh (2003:13) who postulate that “as part of policy cycle, policy implementation concerns how governments put policies into effect.” Against this backdrop “failures of implementation are, by definition, lapses of planning, specification and control” as Elmore (1978:195) argues. In this respect, this failure is accounted for by failing to conduct an environmental scan in order to determine the impact of the contextual factors, both internal and external, which can either enhance or inhibit the implementation process. Resources, implementers’ dispositions, characteristics of the implementing agencies, bureaucratic structures and communication fall under the internal factors. While on the other hand socio-economic and political environments are the external.

2.4 Contextual Variables Affecting the Implementation of Participatory Budgeting

Contextual factors affecting the implementability of public policies in general and PB in particular may be endogenous or exogenous or both. To Edwards (1980:vii) there are “four sets of categories; namely communication, resources, dispositions or attitudes of implementers and bureaucratic structures, all of which may contribute to or inhibit the implementation of public policy.” Edwards further elaborates that “in implementing policy as well as in its formulation, accommodations must be made to political interests, scarcity of resources, and the nature of our bureaucracies and our political systems” (1980:147). To Edwards these contextual factors can affect policy implementation both individually and collectively. In addition to the above factors Meter and Horn (1974) in their implementation model added two external factors; namely socio-economic and political environments and one internal, namely characteristics of the implementing agencies. Meter and Horn (1973) cited in Kaufman (1973:43) said the implementation of the programme may be hindered by many factors such as lack of trained staff, heavy workload, limited information, lack of financial resources and time constraint. Badarch (1977)’s game metaphor, whereby he sees the implementation process like a machine where a number of elements are brought together to perform a particular function, also concurs with the views of the above authors. The metaphor

...directs us to look at the players, what they regard as stakes, their strategies and tactics, their resources for playing, the rules of play ..., the rules of fair play ..., the nature of the communications ... among the players, and the degree of uncertainty surrounding the possible outcomes. The game metaphor also directs our attention to who is not willing to play and for what reasons, and to who insists on changes in some of the game’s parameters as a condition of playing (Badarch 1977:70).

Pursuant to this, different contextual factors account for the production of different policy results in different environments. Hence, when PB is implemented in Zimbabwe, HCC in this case, as a blueprint where contextual variables are different, different outcomes are bound to be produced. As rightly argued by Meter and Horn (1975) cited in Grindle (1980:3) “such factors can account for the ‘often imperfect correspondence between policies adopted and services actually delivered.’” Cognizant of this, PB success stories cannot be successfully transplanted from one setting and successfully replicated into another setting with different contextual factors and produce similar results. Thus, labelling PB as a ‘best practice one-size-fits all’ approach is questionable. This is mainly because in Brazil (Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte), Britain and other countries which recorded success stories on PB, the environmental factors were conducive to its success. In the case of Brazil, the PB initiative was heavily supported by the incumbent Mayor of Porto Alegre, Worker’s Party and the incumbent

President Lula. PB has sound budgetary allocation, planning, leadership, policy and legislative frameworks in Brazil, Britain and United States of America (USA). This is in contrast with what is happening in HCC in the sense that the prevailing contextual factors are different both in scope and nature to those of Brazil, Britain and USA.

Below is the categorization of these contextual variables as internal and external. Internal factors focus on how the internal arrangements, strategies, characteristics and attributes of the organization affect policy implementation process. External factors focus on how the external environmental milieu affects the implementability of public policies, in this case PB system.

2.5 Internal Contextual Variables

This section discusses the internal factors which either enable or inhibit the implementation of public policies. Chief among them include communication problems, bureaucratic structures, resource dearth and dispositions of the implementers.

2.5.1 Communication Problems

Edwards (1980: 10 and 17) elaborates that:

For implementation to be effective, those whose responsibility it is to implement a decision must know what they are supposed to do. Orders to implement policies must be transmitted to the appropriate personnel, and they must be clear, accurate and consistent. If the policies decision makers wish to see implemented are not clearly specified, they may be misunderstood by those at whom they are directed.

To Van Meter and Van Horn (1974:15) standards and objectives of the programme should be clearly communicated between the organizations and the practitioners. In the same vein Sutabri (2005:65) concurs with the above authority when he argues that practitioners are responsible for the achievement of the standards and objectives, and explanation should be provided to them because information is an important source for public organizations. Thus, if there is no clarity on the standards and objectives, it is difficult to make the programme a success. In this respect, with clarity, practitioners of public policy in general and PB in particular know what are expected from them. In most cases there is interference and distortions in the process of transferring policy information between and among organizations dealing with its implementation (Edwards 1980:17). Therefore, if different communication sources give inconsistent interpretations of the standards and objectives, or the same information sources provide the conflicted interpretations, practitioners would have difficulty in implementing the programme. Thus, effective implementation of the programme is determined by accurate, clear and consistent communication to programme practitioners (Van Meter and Van Horn 1974:19). In the case of Brazilian Cities of Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte where PB recorded a success story, (Souza 2001:12) argues, communication between and amongst individuals and agencies dealing with PB implementation was accurate, consistent and clear. This was also the case in Britain's cities of Southampton and Yorkshire. To this extent, it should be noted that accurate, clear and consistent communication between the implementing agencies of PB is key to its successful implementation. Therefore, clear lines of communication provide a hospitable environment for effective implementation of PB in local authorities.

2.5.2 Resources

On the impact of resources on policy implementation, Edwards (1980:10) argues that:

No matter how clear and consistent implementation orders are and no matter how accurately they are transmitted, if the personnel responsible for carrying out policies lack resources to do an effective job, implementation will not be effective. Important resources include staff of the proper size and with the necessary expertise; relevant and adequate information on how to implement policies and on the compliance of others involved in implementation; the authority to ensure that policies are implemented as intended; and facilities (buildings, equipment, land, and supplies) in which or with which to provide services. Insufficient resources mean that laws will not be enforced, services will not be provided, and reasonable regulations will not be developed.

On this, Van Meter and Van Horn (1974:24) acknowledge that resources must also be available in order to expedite the implementation of a policy administration. These resources consist of funds or other incentives that can facilitate the implementation of a policy. Equally important to note is that financial resources are more important than those mentioned above. According to Moyo (1993) finance is the oil of administration. This is mainly because all other resources mentioned above need financial back-up for them to kick-start and sustain.

In this respect, the success stories of PB in Brazil, Britain, North America, Uganda (in Entebbe Municipality) among others are attributable to adequate financial resources committed to the formulation, design, execution, monitoring, evaluation and follow-up of PB initiatives in their respective Councils and municipalities (UN-HABITAT 2008b:6). In the case of Johannesburg City Council in South Africa, PB has its annual budgetary allocation in the Council's annual budget. This is also the case in Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre Councils in Brazil, Entebbe Municipality in Uganda and Bradford City Council in the United Kingdom. Thus, adequate financial resources have provided a conducive environment for the success of PB in these Councils and

municipalities. Therefore, it can be argued that the implementability of PB in any local authority depend upon the availability of adequate financial resources. Lack of or limited funds or other incentives in policy implementation, is a major contributor to the failure of policy implementation (Meter and Horn 1974:24). Thus, lack and the inadequacy of funds and incentives are often cited for the failure of implementation (Derthick 1972:87). It is not only that but the timing of the release of those funds and their use that often influences implementation (ibid: 87).

In terms of human resources, Edwards (1980:61) warns that “it is not enough for there to be an adequate number of implementers to carry out a policy. Implementers must possess the skills necessary for the job at hand... a poorly trained staff can create hazards.” In this respect, PB implementation needs properly trained personnel in order to execute it successfully. In the case of Entebbe Municipality in Uganda, Johannesburg City Council in South Africa and Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre in Brazil, these Councils and municipalities usually contract-out facilitators with hands-on knowledge, skills and abilities from private consultants on PB to broker dialogue with villagers about PB (UN-HABITAT 2008b:6). Also each department of the Council or municipality tends to be well represented by the Head of Department who is knowledgeable about his or her area of specialization at all budget consultative meetings, be it water, sewer, road maintenance among many. To Devas and Etoori (2004:42) in Entebbe Municipality the budgetary process begins with outreach meetings which is an intensive effort involving the mayor, councillors and heads of departments, and representatives of civil society organizations-altogether a group of 30-50 people- visiting each village and sub-ward of their 24 villages for the whole day. Thus, the success of PB is also attributable to the calibre of the personnel involved in its implementation.

2.5.3 Dispositions or Attitudes of Implementers

On the impact of the dispositions of implementers to policy implementation, Meter and Horn (1974:25) argue that:

The success or failure of programmes is often determined by the level of support enjoyed within the agency responsible for implementation. How implementers respond to policies depends on their comprehension of the policy standards, the direction of their response towards them, and the intensity of their response. Policy directives may be clear and very well communicated but implementation may be frustrated by implementers who do not know what to do to go there or they may reject the objectives of the policies. Also negative orientations towards policy may affect implementation.

On a related note, Edwards (1980:89) concurs by arguing that:

If implementers are well-disposed toward a particular policy, they are more likely to carry it out as the original decision-makers intended. But when implementers’ attitudes or perspectives differ from the decision-makers’, the process of implementing a policy becomes infinitely more complicated. Those who implement policies are in many ways independent of their nominal superiors who directly participate in the original policy decision... Because implementers generally have discretion, their attitudes toward policies may be obstacle to effective policy implementation.

In this respect, it should be noted that there should be sound political will from the central government, in this case the Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing (MLGPWNH) and bureaucratic buy-in from the local authorities in order to make PB implementation a success story. Further, cooperation from other stakeholders such as the civil society, the private sector, the residents and the residents’ representatives is essential in the successful implementation of the PB system in local authorities. To this extent, the PB success story in Brazil is the case in point where the attitudes of the implementers and other PB stakeholders were positively skewed to the success of the initiative. Upon its introduction in 1989 in the City of Porto Alegre, the incumbent Mayor of the City and City fathers were the champions and drivers of PB initiatives (World Bank 2008:21 and Wampler 2000:2).

Further, the civil society helped in conscientizing the general citizenry and other stakeholders about the importance of PB and how to participate in it. In the case of Brazil, soon after 2000 elections, the incumbent President Lula stood firm in supporting the idea of PB (ibid:3). This was also the case in Entebbe Municipality in Uganda where the incumbent Mayor of the City, heads of departments in the municipality and civil society representatives were at the fore-front in initiating, implementing and participating in the PB processes (Devas and Etoori 2004:45). According to Moyo (2013:10) “it is an open secret that a strong and dedicated as well as motivated civil service is the key driver of any successes in the implementation of public policies”. Thus, in the final analysis, it can be noted that the implementation of the PB system in local authorities is anchored on the dispositions of implementers toward it.

2.5.4 Bureaucratic Structures

On the impact of bureaucratic structures on the implementation of policies, Edwards (1980:11) argues that:

Even if sufficient resources to implement a policy do exist and implementers know what to do and want to do it, implementation may still be thwarted because of deficiencies in the bureaucratic structure. Organizational fragmentation may hinder the coordination necessary to implement successfully a

complex policy requiring the cooperation of many people, and it may also waste scarce resources, inhibit change, create confusion, leading to policies working at cross-purposes, and result in important functions being overlooked.

Edwards further notes that there are two prominent characteristics of bureaucracies which inhibit effective execution of public policies: namely standard operating procedures (SOPs) and organization fragmentation (1980:125). SOPs are developed as an internal response to the limited time and resources of implementers and the desire for uniformity in the operation of programmes and widely dispersed organizations and they often remain in place mainly due to bureaucratic inertia (Van Meter and Van Horn 1974:26; Edwards 1980:12). Organizational fragmentation emanates mainly from pressures outside bureaucratic units such as from legislative committees, pressure groups, executive officials, state constitutions and city charters, and the nature of broad policies influence the organization of public bureaucracy (ibid:12). To Edwards these bureaucratic irregularities:

They often inhibit changes in policy, waste resources, generate undesired actions, impede coordination, confuse officials at lower level jurisdiction, result in policies working in cross-purposes and cause some policies to fall between the cracks of organizational boundaries (1980:125).

To this end, the success stories on PB implementation in such countries as Brazil, U.S.A., U.K., and Uganda among many were largely attributable to the hospitable and conducive environments presented by their bureaucratic structures. Conversely, where PB system is a failure, the prevailing bureaucratic structures of both the central government and the Council or municipality were arguably inhospitable for its effective implementation.

2.6 External Contextual Variables

These are the external factors affecting the implementation of public policies which are beyond the control of the implementing agency.

2.6.1 Socio-Economic Environment

Public policies are not independent variables implemented in an environmental vacuum independent of the prevailing external contextual variables. Often, the implementation of policies is a dependent variable to the external socio-economic variables. Van Meter and Van Horn (1974:30) elaborates that the general socio-economic conditions of needs and resources influence the chances of successful implementation of policies. Thus, in the case of PB implementation some countries have conducive and hospitable socio-economic conditions necessary for effective execution of the PB system whilst others have not. In this respect, the success stories of PB in Brazil's local councils of Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre, Uganda's Entebbe Municipality and Britain's Southampton and Yorkshire are attributable to the hospitable socio-economic conditions prevailing at the time. However, the failure of PB in such African countries like Mozambique is also attributable to unsustainable socio-economic conditions. UN-HABITAT (2008b:70) argues that the Dondo Municipal Council of Mozambique's Sofala Province failed even to kick-start the PB system mainly because the social and economic environment was unfavourable for its effective implementation.

2.6.2 Political Environment


On the impact of the political environment on the implementation of public policies, Edwards (1980:147) argues that "in implementing policy as well as in its formulation, accommodations must be made to political interests, scarcity of resources, and the nature of our bureaucracies and our political systems." Against this backdrop the political environment ought to be favourable to allow effective implementation of public policies, in this case PB system. On this, Van Meter and Van Horn (1974:30) note that implementing agencies need political support. Thus, the extent of political support or opposition influences implementation efforts and results irrespective of the attitude and the quality of the agency (ibid). To this extent, it is believed that the PB success story in Brazil had political support as the major contributor. According to Wampler (2000:3) PB initiatives was heavily supported by the incumbent Mayor of Porto Alegre, Worker's Party and the 2000 incumbent President Lula. This was also the case in Britain, Uganda and U.S.A. where their political leaders supported PB initiatives.

2.7 Meter and Horn's Systemic Model of Public Policy Implementation

Van Meter and Van Horn (1974) proposed a model which suggested seven contextual variables that affect the implementability of public policies. These are: standards and policy objectives, communication, resources, attitudes or dispositions of implementers, characteristics of implementing agencies, social environment, economic and political environment. In this respect, the implementation of PB as public policy in local authority can be studied and practised using this model. Cases in point are the Brazilian Councils and Municipalities such as Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre, Ugandan municipality of Entebbe and the South African City of Johannesburg which recorded success stories in PB. The model clearly defines the standards and objectives of the policy to be implemented, effective communication between and among key stakeholders involved in the implementation process and adequacy of resources to be committed on the implementation process (Meter and Horn 1974:30). Additionally, the model stressed that attitudes of implementers should be directed toward

successful implementation of the policy and the implementing agencies should possess all the essential attributes of sound bureaucratic structures that can expedite implementation process (ibid). Further, the model emphasises the need for a favourable socio-politico-economic environment in which implementation process can be done effectively and efficiently (Van Meter and Van Horn 1974:30). In this respect, it can be noted that the success stories of PB initiatives in Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Johannesburg and Entebbe local authorities were anchored on possessing most of the essential attributes of the model. The model is shown in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2.2 Systemic Model of Public Policy Implementation



Source: Meter and Horn (1974:54).

2.5 THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.6 Contingency Theory of Implementation

The theory was developed by Ingram (1990:21) and further developed by Matland (1995:15) and Scheberle (1997:32) in order to counter the 'one best practice implementation model.' On this, Goggin et al. (1990:171) argue that:

They (Matland 1995:15; Scheberle 1997:32) sought to explain why behaviour varies across time, across policies, and across units of government and by predicting the type of implementation behaviour that is likely to occur in the future. In a word, the objective of contingent theory which is embodied in the third-generation implementation research is to be more scientific.

To DeLeon and DeLeon (2002:5) the theory was developed as a way of adapting to the obvious complexity of implementation studies. In this respect, rather than make one shoe fit all, implementation scholars such as Matland (1995:15), Ingram (1990:21) and Scheberle (1999:32) offered a '2x2 matrices', which suggested that different conditions might require different implementation strategies. On this note, DeLeon and DeLeon (2002:5) argue that:

The most important observation to be gleaned from Matland and other contingency theorists is that there is no single best implementation strategy, that the appropriate strategy is very much contextual in terms of what are the contingencies surrounding the policy issues and how they can best be addressed in terms of implementation.

This was supported by Garrett (1993:1249) who observes that "there is ... much scepticism among students in this field about the claims of rational management concerning a 'holy grail' that defines the implementation process." Therefore, according to the Contingent Theory of Implementation there is no one-size-fits-all approach to implementation. To this end, DeLeon and DeLeon (2002:5) argue that "there is little reason to require one

shoe to fit all situations.”

Thus, all public policy blue prints should be adjusted or even completely changed to suit the contextual variables of any country or society designated as its policy context. In the case of PB implementation in HCC, what Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) suggested should be adopted, that is “a case can be made for the re-conceptualization of implementation as an exploratory rather than an unquestioning, instrumental, and even subservient type process.” This means that any attempt to successfully transplant PB system from the success stories and successfully replicate it into another different environment like HCC is questionable, if not unfounded, mainly because HCC have different contextual variables altogether.

Thus, the implementability of PB is a dependent variable to the prevailing contextual variables (independent variables) in a given local authority. This explains the varying degrees of success or failure of PB system in different Councils and Municipalities the world over. For instance, the success of PB system in Latin and North America, Britain and other European countries is attributable to the hospitable environment presented by the prevailing contextual variables. Resources in terms of human, financial, information, time and material were adequate; and communication between key stakeholders was effective and efficient. Also dispositions of implementers and politicians were positively skewed to the success of PB and the bureaucratic structures were hospitable to the success of PB. However, in the case of HCC none of these contextual variables are present. This means resources are scarce, communication between stakeholders is in deplorable condition, there is limited political will and bureaucratic buy-in towards the success of PB. Also the bureaucratic structures in both the MLGPWNH and HCC are believed not conducive for effective implementation of PB. Thus, contextual variables as independent variables to the implementation of policies, in this case PB system, have a strong bearing on their success or failure.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Research Design

The study adopted a triangulation approach or a mixed method approach which was defined by Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004:17-18) “as the class of research where the researcher mixes or combines qualitative and quantitative research methods in a single study.” The researcher used both probability and non-probability sampling techniques in the selection of units of analysis. Key informant interviews were used to collect qualitative data while survey questionnaire to collect quantitative data. The researcher also used the documentary search to collect both qualitative and quantitative data. Data collected through key informant interviews were presented and analysed thematically and those from documentary search were analysed via content analysis. Quantitative data from surveys were presented and analysed through descriptive statistics aided by Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). Qualitative illustrations were used to further explain the meaning of quantitative data.

3.3 Target Population

Target population according to Burns and Grove (1997:236 and Bell 1990:145) is “the entire aggregation of respondents or subjects that meet the designated set of criteria.” In this study the target population comprises of Harare residents, HCC City fathers, government officials in the Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing (MLGPWNH), PB and policy implementation academics, and residents’ representatives. Social artefacts such as books, journals and reports were also analysed.

3.4 Sampling Procedure

To Peil (1982:23 and Boyce and Neale 2006:90) sampling “is the selection of a part of the population small enough to represent the whole.” In this study the researcher used both non-probability and probability sampling techniques in the selection of units of analysis. Probability sampling techniques used in this study are cluster sampling, systematic sampling and simple random sampling. Purposive sampling was used in this study under the non-probability sampling. Cluster sampling was used to select residential areas (hereinafter referred to as enumeration areas or EAs) where interviews were conducted with residents using questionnaires. In this respect, the researcher grouped the EAs into clusters, namely low density cluster, medium density cluster and high density cluster. Simple random sampling was used to select EAs from these clusters.

Systematic sampling technique was used to select households from which the researcher conducted interviews with residents. In this study the researcher used a 5/10 interval pattern to select a household. This means that the researcher selected the 5th household for the first interview after counting houses on both right and left sides from the starting point. After the first interview, the researcher continued on the same direction and this time selected the 10th household from the 5th one where the first interview was conducted. Purposive sampling was used to select the respondent mainly because the researcher was targeting the landlords only since they are the rate payers who understand fully the HCC budgeting processes. This is in line with the definition of this sampling procedure according to Babbie (2010:193) who views it as:

The selection of a sample basing on the knowledge of a population, its elements, and the purpose of the study. It is a non probability sampling method in which the units to be observed are selected on the basis of the researcher's judgment about which ones will be most useful or representative.

In light of the above definition of purposive sampling, the researcher also used it to select respondents who were interviewed as key informants. Thus, the researcher purposively selected the Chamber Secretary, Town Clerk and the Mayor of HCC, public policy and PB academics, high ranked officials in the residents' associations and MLGPWNH due to their unique knowledge of the phenomenon under investigation, PB system in this case. The usage of this technique was mainly due to the fact that some units of analysis were deemed more useful and possessed the much needed unique information in the area under study than others. Further, snow-balling sampling was also used to interview other key informants whom the researcher knew through other key informants.

3.5 Methods of Data Collection

3.5.1 Documentary search

A series of textbooks, articles, resolutions, policy documents, ministerial policy statements, internet sources, reports, newspapers and journals to do with contextual variables affecting public policy implementation in general and PB in particular in different environments were scrutinized. To this extent, documentary search was used primarily to respond to the objectives of examining the contextual variables affecting PB implementation process and examining the internal anatomy of PB. This is precisely because the internal ingredients of PB and the contextual factors (critical success factors) affecting its implementation were extensively dealt with by other authorities.

3.5.2 Key Informant Interviews

This method was used to respond to the research objective of examining the nature, scope and magnitude of the contextual variables affecting the implementability of PB system in HCC. A semi-structured key informant guide was used to solicit information from key informants. These key informants were purposively selected courtesy of their unique knowledge about HCC's PB processes. The sample size of key informants in this study was initially 12 respondents. However, due to irregularities occurred in the fieldwork, they dropped to 10 with which most of those interviewed were not on the interview list. To this end, six key informant interviews were conducted at the HCC instead of two and no interview was conducted at the MLGPWNH and Urban Councils Association of Zimbabwe (UCAZ) instead of two planned for each. At Combined Harare Residents Association (CHRA) and Harare Residents Association (HRT) the researcher managed to interview one respondent from each despite the two planned for each. Finally, two academics from the University of Zimbabwe (UZ) were also interviewed as key informants.

3.5.3 Survey Questionnaire

The researcher administered the questionnaires to Harare residents who were drawn from all residential settlements in Harare that is from low, medium and high density suburbs. The researcher used face-to-face questionnaire administration approach. The sample size of the survey research in this study was 60 respondents. For representative's sake, the researcher administered 40 questionnaires to the EAs in the high density suburbs, 10 to the medium and 10 to the low.

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

4.4 Conceptualizing Participatory Budgeting System

Inquires from various key informants, from the survey carried out with residents, and data drawn from documentary sources generally points to a consensual definition of PB. It was viewed as a multi-sectoral approach that involves all stakeholders in the formulation, adoption, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the Council's budget for the ensuing financial year. It was revealed that in HCC the implementation of PB is entrusted to the Treasury and Public Participation departments. A key informant highlighted that PB should be a system that is inclusive and responsive to residents' needs and aspirations.

This was supported by the Acting Director of CHRA who observed that:

PB is a bottom-up approach whereby residents' priorities, needs and aspirations define the budget of the Council. In this regard, PB consultations to all stakeholders (residents, corporate world, church organizations, civil society, central government and civil society) have to be done right from formulation up to evaluation and follow-up stages. (Interview conducted on 23 November 2013).


The key informant interviews with the HCC Management Accountant in the Treasury Department and the Public Affairs and Protocol Manager concurred with the above definitions of PB. Further, this was also supported by the survey carried out which established that most of the residents are of the view that PB system involves all stakeholders in the planning, formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and follow-up of the budgeting processes in the Council. However, 20% of them did not know. On this, PB Unit (2008:8) noted that:

PB directly involves local people in making decisions on the spending priorities for a defined public budget. This means engaging residents and community groups, representative of all parts of the community, to discuss spending priorities, make spending proposals and vote on them. From the findings of the study, it can thus be noted that respondents interviewed were in agreement in viewing PB as a budgeting process that involves all stakeholders in the planning, organizing, leading, controlling, coordinating, monitoring and evaluation of Council's budget.

4.5 The Essential Features of Participatory Budgeting System

The essential elements of PB system are embodied in its cycle shown in Figure 4.1 below. These elements were given by various respondents such as two academics at the UZ, HCC Management Accountant and Acting Director of CHRA among many.

Figure 4.1: Harare City Council's Participatory Budgeting Cycle



4.6 Participatory Budgeting Cycle in Harare City Council

Most respondents pointed out that there is a disconnection between ‘what ought to be’ and ‘what is’ in as far as PB cycle is concerned. In this respect, inquires from the HCC Chief Committee Officer when asked about the existence of the PB cycle in HCC acknowledged that:

Outreach PB consultations with residents are a mere ‘rubber stamp’ of what has been formulated... precisely due to the fact that HCC usually has its final budget draft before going into the field and consultations are merely for procedural reasons (Interview conducted on 16 November 2013).

A key informant the UZ concurs by saying that the HCC treasury department consults their stakeholders “in order to shut them up” because there is a great disparity between what is found in the final budget and the input from the stakeholders. Thus, it can be underscored that there is a variance between what is on the ground and what the cycle dictates. This is mainly due to the fact that stakeholders are said to be consulted after the Council has their final budget. Further, a survey conducted revealed that 70% of residents denied the existence of such essential elements of PB such as participatory formulation, planning, implementation, M&E as well as follow-up. This is shown on the Table 4.3 below. They acknowledged that the outreach budget consultations conducted by HCC, their attendance turnouts were less than the acceptable quorum. One resident in Budiriwo 5 illustrated that “nothing is being done by the Council about PB despite the fact that we are the rate payers.” On this, Zinyama (2012:78) noted that, pursuant to the 2013 HCC budget:

In total 34 pre-budget consultation meetings were supposed to be held in the communities. From the published schedule, some of the wards were paired for example wards 3 and 4 (Mbare), 11 and 12 (Mbare National), 25 and 26 (Highfield), 39 and 40 (Dzivarasekwa). The pairing of wards brought confusion to the residents who intended to attend the meetings. There were several changes and shifts to the initially published schedules for example in Greendale, Mandara, Waterfalls, Mabvuku and Tafara. This gave confusion to the residents as they would reach venues where there was not even a single council official. A total of fifteen meetings were held as scheduled out of the publicized thirty-four (34). Eight other meetings were held after they had been postponed. Percentage wise, there was 44% adherence to the published schedule. Several meetings were cancelled due to poor planning and poor attendance.

However, the HCC Public Affairs and Protocol Manager had a different assessment. He asserted that “PB cycle is being implemented smoothly since all stakeholders are given the chance to be heard in all stages and their voices are key to PB decision making.” Therefore, despite this dissenting view, it can be argued that the PB cycle exists in theory but practically irrelevant largely because stakeholders are complaining about their exclusion.

Table 4.3: Level of Stakeholder Participation in the Participatory Budgeting Cycle

	Agree	Disagree	neither agree	disagree or don't know	Total
Frequency	8	42	8	2	60
Percent	13	70	13	3	100

Question: “Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the existence of PB formulation, implementation, M&E and follow-up HCC.”

Table 4.3 shows that 70% of the residents interviewed denied the existence of PB cycle in Council. Thus, findings from the study are revealing that PB cycle is not being followed as planned. This is mainly due to the fact that the stakeholders indicated a lot of irregularities in the conduct of budgeting activities by the HCC. To this extent, there seems to be a consensual viewpoint amongst respondents that PB is not being implemented as planned.

4.7. Factors Affecting Participatory Budgeting System in Harare City Council

This section presents the internal factors which either enable or inhibit the implementation of public policies. Chief among them include communication problems, bureaucratic structures, resource dearth and dispositions of the implementers.


4.7.1 Resource Constraints

Inquiries from HCC respondents when asked about the impact of resource constraints on the implementability of PB system revealed that resource constraints is one of the major deterrents to its effective implementation. The Management Accountant noted that “the issue of resource constraints is unequivocally the major stumbling block to all development projects in the Council, including PB system.” HCC Chief Committee Officer revealed that the issue of resource constraints in the Council has been further compounded by the debt cancellations to all rate payers who failed to meet their obligations since the inception of the Government of National Unity (GNU). She further noted that no central government transfer was done to compensate these losses. This negatively affected PB implementation mainly because of resource starvation to PB activities. On this, Moyo (1993) noted

that money is the fuel of administration.

However, some respondents including the academics and residents (87% as shown in the figure 4.3 below) are of the dissenting view. They indicated that resources in HCC are in abundance. Thus, basing on what these respondents said, it can be noted that misappropriation of resources account for the Council to neglect PB. To this end, this explains why the inquires from residents associations and residents revealed that “corruption is now rampant in the Council to the extent that more than 70% of the revenues collected are ‘illegally’ diverted to salaries and more than 70% of that salary/wage bill is consumed by the management of which service delivery and development projects are in dire need of radical surgery” (according to a resident in Goodhope). Thus, it is difficult to implement PB system when Council officials are allegedly diverting most of the revenues to salaries whilst initiatives such as PB system are starved of resources.

Figure 4.2: Perceptions on the Adequacy of PB Resources in the Council



Question: Please tell me whether you agree or disagree that resources are adequate in HCC to successfully implement PB system

Given all these contestations on resource availability in HCC, it can be noted that there emerged two contesting views fighting for explanatory supremacy with each having its own disciples and adherents at organizational, local and national levels. For instance, the HCC officials are complaining about resource dearth whilst on the other hand, stakeholders such as residents and NGOs are pointing fingers at the misuse of public resources in the Council. Against this backdrop, PB as an ‘all-stakeholders game’ these contestations are a barricade in their own right towards the successful implementation of PB system in the Council. On this, UN-HABITAT (2008b) alluded to ‘role conflicts’ between the Council and its stakeholders on how revenue ought to be expended. Thus, PB system cannot thrive where there is no mutual understanding between and among stakeholders.

In respect human resources, inquires from residents associations, two academics at UZ and two respondents drawn from the HCC (Chief Committee Officer and Public Affairs and Protocol Manager) revealed the gap between ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be’ in terms of both the quality and quantity of the personnel in HCC. The Acting Director of CHRA illustrated that numerically, the size of employees manning the treasury and public participation departments is insignificant to successfully implement PB. In support of this, the Founder and Coordinator of HRT said that in terms of implementers’ technical competency, their credibility is questionable in so far as budgeting processes is concerned. He further noted that the recruitment and selection at HCC is not always talent-based but patron-clientele mainly because a certain fraction of HCC employees are Ministerial appointees. However, it should be noted that for PB system to be successfully implemented there should be adequate and qualified personnel. On this, Edwards (1980:61) warned that “a poorly trained staff can create hazards.” Thus, from the findings, it can be argued that competent human resources are essential towards the success of PB system in HCC.

4.7.2 Bureaucratic Structures

When asked about the impact of bureaucratic structures on PB implementation, an informant described HCC structural arrangement as “bureaucratic malaise.” This means that the bureaucratic structures at the Council are associated with delays, duplication and overlapping of duties. On this, Ruwende (2014) noted that presently there are 45 middle managers, many departments and an overall workforce of 6 348. However, the HCC was directed by the MLGPWNH to streamline their workforce and departments in order to be efficient. Ruwende noted that departments were downsized from 12 to 6, middle managers from 45 to 35 and overall workforce from 6 348 to 1 190. This will go a long way in harmonizing the departments and workers in the Council. In the

same vein, Edwards (1980: viii) revealed that:


In the public sector there are many agencies, doing too many things, overlapping too often, coordinating too rarely, wasting too much money- and doing too little to solve real problems.

Edwards further noted how bureaucratic deficiencies thwart policy implementation. He noted that:

Organizational fragmentation may hinder the coordination necessary to implement successfully a complex policy requiring the cooperation of many people, and it may also waste scarce resources, inhibit change, create confusion, lead to policies working at cross-purposes, and result in important functions being overlooked (Edwards, 1980:11).

In HCC cases abound that point to bureaucratic pathologies and organizational fragmentation as the “everyday realities” as observed by the Founder and Coordinator of HRT. He noted that there are no clear-cut definitions of duties and responsibilities among the 12 departments in the Council. To this extent, it should be noted that PB system cannot thrive in such an environment because it calls for mutuality of goals, common vision and synchronization between and amongst departments. The survey carried out shown in Figure 4.4 below found that 45% of residents have acknowledged the negative characteristics of PB implementing agencies are the major deterrent to PB implementation.

Figure 4.3: The Major Deterrent to PB Implementation



Question: What do you think is the major deterrent to a full PB system in HCC?

From the findings, it can be noted that the bureaucratic pathologies between and among various departments entrusted to implement PB are negatively affecting its effective implementation. Thus, bureaucratic red-tape is inhospitable to smooth implementation of PB system in HCC.

4.7.4 Political Environment


The survey carried out clearly indicated that 86% of residents when asked about the impact of the existing political environment in the country on the implementability of PB system in HCC felt that the unstable political system in Zimbabwe is affecting negatively PB implementation in HCC. This is shown on Figure 4.4 below. A resident in Westlea noted that “there is limited democratic space and high political polarization in Zimbabwe.” It is generally accepted that the political environment in Zimbabwe is polarized and unpredictable to the extent that implementing PB system is not guaranteed. This is mainly due to the fact that PB system can only thrive in an open and democratic political environment. In this environment citizens are free to express their views and even to critique the government publicly without fear of victimization. Therefore, the perceived undemocratic political system in the country is viewed by other stakeholders as not conducive to freedom of expression; hence critiquing HCC publicly on financial management seems to be difficult to them.

This was supported by the responses from CHRA and HRT. The Acting Director of CHRA said the

political situation in Zimbabwe is highly polarized to the extent that stakeholders cannot freely express their views in HCC budget deliberations without fear of victimization. She further noted that the outreach budget consultations are turned into political rallies, hence speaking of freedom of expression remains a mirage. HRT Founder and Coordinator acknowledged the existence of undemocratic political environment in Zimbabwe. Further, this was also supported by the two councillors who complained that Zimbabwe’s political environment is “extremely harsh” to all meetings that call for freedom of expression, freedom of speech and critiquing the government.

Therefore, basing on these findings, it can be underscored that the prevailing political environment in the country is not hospitable to effective implementation of PB system in the Council. This is despite the fact that respondents from the HCC treasury department had a dissenting opinion that the politics of the country today is stable. On this, Public Affairs and Protocol Manager noted that “the political environment in the country is stable.” Thus, it can be argued that the political context has a strong bearing on the success of the policy content.

Figure 4.4.



This figure represents the views from the research question that sought to decipher whether respondents agreed or disagreed with the way the political environment is negatively affecting PB implementation in the Council. The majority agreed with that perception.

4.7.5 Negative Dispositions of Participatory Budgeting Implementers

Inquires from the HCC Public Affairs and Protocol Manager and the Chief Committee Officer established that PB implementation in the Council is entrusted to the Treasury and Public Participation departments. They asserted that the actual implementation of PB is done by the middle and low ranked personnel from these departments. However, the Founder and Coordinator of HRT when asked about the impact of implementers’ dispositions on the implementability of PB system in HCC has acknowledged that:

Informed sources in the Council say 70% of money meant for salaries is going towards hefty salaries for senior managers in Grade One up to Grade 4, while thousands of City employees from Grade 5 to Grade 16 have to share a mere 30% of the salaries. That is unfair. That is irresponsible and unaccountable management of public affairs (Interview conducted on 2 December 2013).

PB implementation is entrusted to the middle and low ranked employees (those in grade 5-16) in the Treasury and Public Participation departments. However, their dispositions towards it seem to be low. This is because they are not well disposed and this resulted to several strikes that thwart PB implementation as noted by the two councillors and the two academics interviewed. This was supported by Edwards (1980:89) who noted that:

If implementers are well-disposed toward a particular policy, they are more likely to carry it out as the original decision-makers intended. But when implementers’ attitudes or perspectives differ from the decision-makers’, the process of implementing a policy becomes infinitely more complicated. Those who implement policies are in many ways independent of their nominal superiors who directly participate in

the original policy decision... Because implementers generally have discretion, their attitudes toward policies may be obstacle to effective policy implementation.

In the same vein Meter and Horn (1974:25) also noted to that:

The success or failure of programmes is often determined by the level of support enjoyed within the agency responsible for implementation. How implementers respond to policies depends on their comprehension of the policy standards, the direction of their response towards them, and the intensity of their response. Policy directives may be clear and very well communicated but implementation may be frustrated by implementers who do not know what to do to go there or they may reject the objectives of the policies. Also negative orientations towards policy may affect implementation.

Thus, it can be argued that PB implementation cannot thrive in a situation where the actual implementers are not well disposed towards their job. Thus, it can be argued that the negative dispositions of implementers have a strong bearing on the success or failure of PB in HCC.

4.7.6 Flawed Legislative Framework

Inquires from the leaders of residents' associations when asked about the impact of the existing legislative framework on the implementability of PB system in HCC revealed that the Urban Councils Act (*Chapter 29:15*) and other legislative instruments governing local authorities are in favour of the priorities of the Minister and HCC. For instance, according to the Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29:15) Section 314 the Minister may reverse, suspend, rescind resolutions and decisions of the council, appoint members of the government board, approve local authority budgets, may appoint commissioners to act as councillors, and approves all subsidiary legislation passed by municipality. On this, the Acting Director of CHRA noted that:

Flawed legislations are being used by HCC officials as loopholes to be involved in excessive corruption but with impunity. The case in point is the recently suspended and reinstated HCC Town Clerk, Dr Tendai Mahachi.

This was supported by the Founder and Coordinator of HRT who revealed that:

All HCC technical bureaucrats are Ministerial appointees such as the Town Clerk and the Chamber Secretary. To this end, these officials are supposed to act in tandem with the Ministerial directives no matter what. Conversely, councillors have no executive powers. This means that all the decisions they may make can be vetoed by the Town Clerk who have the prerogative of submitting any issue to the Minister (Interview conducted on 20 November 2013).

Moreover, interviews with the two councillors have established that stakeholder apathy is now affecting the attendance turn-out at all PB consultative meetings. This is mainly because even if stakeholders participate in PB decision making processes, their contribution will subsequently crowded-out in favour of the priorities of the Minister and HCC. However, inquires from the HCC Management Accountant and Public Affairs and Protocol Manager suggested a different assessment. They acknowledged that laws are clear and they were not enacted to serve the interests of a certain group in society. On this, Management Accountant said "the Urban Councils Act: Chapter 29:15 and any other legislations governing local authorities in Zimbabwe were enacted for the public interest, hence they are citizens-driven." The Public Affairs and Protocol Manager concurs by saying that:

There is no law in Zimbabwe enacted to serve the interests of the law makers and policy implementers but rather to serve the citizens, hence Urban Council's Act is not an exception (Interview conducted on 23 November 2013).

From the findings, it can be underscored that the flawed legislative framework is compromising the implementability of PB system in the Council. This is mainly because many respondents acknowledged the skeweness of legislation towards the priorities of the Minister and the Council at the expense of those of the stakeholders. To this extent, it can be noted that whether stakeholders participated during PB deliberations, their priorities will be subsequently crowded-out. This is notwithstanding the fact that respondents drawn from the HCC denied this of which this can be accounted for by the need to protect the image of their organization. Thus, it can be argued that the flawed legislative context is negatively affecting the PB implementation in HCC.

4.7.7 Good Corporate Governance

General lack of transparency, accountability, legitimacy, openness, responsiveness and stakeholder participation in the management of HCC was cited by most respondents as an obstacle to successful implementation of PB in the Council. The Acting Director of CHRA described the poor corporate governance bedeviling the Council as "the Berlin Wall (that) barricaded smooth execution of development programmes including PB system." The HRT founder and coordinator also expressed concerns on the negative impact caused by lack of transparency and accountability to PB implementation. Thus, PB implementation is likely to fail if the Council is not transparent and accountable in its handling of issues, especially those to do with finance, and if it is unresponsive to stakeholders' priorities.

4.7.8 Corruption and Participatory Budgeting Implementation

Generally, findings of the study revealed that corruption is one of the deterrents towards the effective implementation of PB in the Council. Inquires from the HRT Founder and Coordinator, Mr. Precious Shumba,

revealed that corruption is adversely undermining PB implementation in the sense that the funds allocated for implementing PB activities such as participatory planning, formulation, monitoring and evaluation are gobbled by the hefty salaries earned by the executives. On this, Ruwende (2014) acknowledged that the HCC “18 directors were gobbling over US\$500 000 in salaries monthly at a time service delivery has plummeted to levels where the municipality cannot even replace street light bulbs.” Hence, PB implementation is one of the initiatives being compromised because of this pandemic corruption in the Council. This was supported by the Chairman of RUP department at the UZ who revealed that the “top-heavy management” personnel are pocketing hefty salaries of \$40 000, \$38 000 or so as their monthly basic salaries whilst service delivery is in deplorable condition. Further, two councilors interviewed pointed out that corruption at HCC has become the “cancer” haunting the Council today. On this, Newsday (2014) revealed that corruption in HCC is now like “the demon hampering quality service delivery.” Therefore, basing on these findings PB implementation is found wanting because no money is left for its execution.

Further, when asked about the impact of corruption on implementing PB system in HCC, the Acting Director of CHRA pointed out that “corruption is undermining the viability of PB system because most of the revenues collected are meant for salaries and not development projects.” To this extent, it can be argued that the funds meant for PB implementation are vanishing away through corrupt activities of the HCC officials. Cognizant of this pandemic, Ruwende (2014) has acknowledged that the Chairperson of HCC Finance Committee has recently “resigned from his post over the non-disclosure of executive salaries and general unaccountability at Town House.” In his resignation letter to the Mayor of HCC, the Chairperson of the HCC Finance Committee (Councilor Norman Markham) revealed that:

For over six months we have been waiting for contracts for grade one to four employees. This scope, like all the grades is overstaffed for our resources, but the packages are extraordinary. This band alone accounts for nearly 10 percent of our wage bill. We have no control over contracts, benefits drawn (Ruwende 2014:16).

However, inquires from the HCC Management Accountant and the Public Affairs Manager were of the dissenting view. They claim that there is no corruption of any sort existing in the Council but mere unfounded allegations. However, this can be attributable to the need to protect the image of their organization.


4.8 The Indirect Effects of Factors to Participatory Budgeting System

Apart from affecting PB implementation directly, each and every contextual variable is affecting it indirectly as shown in figure 4.5 below. For instance, it has been established from the key informant interview that there is an intricate link between related factors this has a bearing on affecting either positively or negatively the smooth implementation of PB system in HCC.

For instance, resource constraints can lead to irresistible corruption among PB implementers in the Council which then subsequently leads to stakeholder apathy because the Council is not responsive to their priorities. This is mainly due to the fact PB implementers are not adequately remunerated, and this is compounded by erratic salaries since they belong to grades 5-16. This then has the bearing on their dispositions to work effectively and efficiently. To this end, good corporate governance issues tend to be compromised by resource constraints in the Council. Thus, collectively this inter-dependence subsequently affects negatively the implementability of PB system in HCC.

Further, the absence of effective stakeholder participation is affecting the attendance turn-out at all PB consultation meetings, hence this leads to an increase in stakeholder apathy to all PB activities. This then leads to role conflicts between and among stakeholders themselves and the HCC officials. These role conflicts usually manifest in areas not limited to the following; priority ranking, expenditure management, revenue mobilization modalities, salary/wage bill, rates ceiling, areas to be prioritised in the ensuing financial year among many. To this end, mutual trust, cooperation and co-existence are compromised of which these are key towards the successful implementation of PB in the Council

Figure 4.5: Direct and Indirect Impacts on PB Implementation



CONCLUSIONS

Findings of the study revealed that the PB consultations are carried out as a way of rubber stamping the already formulated budget. Most respondents acknowledged that all PB consultations regarding the budget's formulation, execution, monitoring and evaluation are carried out after the final budget has been formulated. To this extent, it is one of the conclusions of this study that the PB cycle is not being followed according to the plan. This is mainly due to the fact that most respondents pointed out that the cycle is not being followed since it is believed that budget consultations are carried out after the budget has already PB Implementation

It was established from the findings that there is a limited fiscal space in HCC and to this extent; this has a strong bearing on the implementation of PB system. This is mainly because few resources are availed towards the implementation of the PB system. It is therefore one of the conclusions of this study that resource constraints is compromising the effective implementation of the PB system in the Council.

It was established from the findings of the study that the Urban Councils Act: Chapter 29:15 and other legislative instruments governing local authorities in Zimbabwe are heavily tilted against the interests and priorities of the Council and in favour of the Minister of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing. This is mainly because according to the Section 314 of the Urban Councils Act the Minister may reverse, rescind and suspend the decisions of the Council which may serve the interests of the stakeholders. Thus, it is the conclusion of this study that the flawed legislations are negatively affecting the implementability of PB system in the Council.

Findings of the study acknowledged that the political environment in the country is highly polarized, undemocratic and unpredictable. PB system as a tenet of participatory democracy is difficult to implement in an undemocratic political environment. Thus, it is one of the conclusions of this study that the political environment in the country today is not favourable to the smooth execution of PB system.

Recommendations

PB Cycle must be followed according to the Plan

Against such an account of not following PB cycle according to the plan, this study is recommending for the establishment of enforceable rules and regulations that should guide the implementation of PB system in the Council by following the cycle according to the plan. This will go a long way in institutionalizing the culture of stakeholder involvement in the planning, execution, monitoring and evaluation of the Council's budget.

Availing Adequate Financial Resources to the PB System

Against such an account of limited fiscal space in the Council and starvation of resources to the PB system, this study is recommending for availing adequate financial resources to the PB system. This can be done through financial capacity building. To capacitate local government financially, they should be given the power to borrow money without the approval of the parent ministry. Also, if possible, this can be done through revising upwards the budgetary vote allocation of the PB system in the Council and outsourcing funds from other stakeholders such as the civil society organizations, private sector, other government departments among many. Moreover, financial resources can be availed to the local councils by shifting the responsibility to collect some taxes from the central government to local governments. Financial capacity can also be established through the process of public-private partnerships (PPPs) with the corporate world. Cognizant of this, the enabling legislations, such as the Urban Councils Act and the Rural District Councils Act, should be amended so as to give these local authorities full autonomy in as far as revenue generation is concerned. This will go a long way

in implementing the PB system effectively and efficiently in the Council mainly because financial resources are key in implementing policies.

Providing Adequate PB Implementers in HCC

Against the background of lack of adequate personnel (in terms of both the quality and quantity) in the Treasury and Public Participation departments, the study is recommending for the increase in the number and quality of workers in these departments. This can be done through outsourcing and or contracting-out technical experts who can train and develop PB implementers in the Council. This will help effective implementation of PB system in the Council in the sense that the human resources will be adequate to deliberate PB issues in different residential areas in Harare. Also, the study is recommending for the merit-based recruitment, selection and promotional policies. This will help in improving the quality of workers entrusted to implement PB in the Council. Further, against this backdrop of lack of adequate credentials among the personnel manning the Treasury and the Public Participation departments, the study is recommending for the capacity building of employees within these departments through training and development so as to make them conversant to the PB processes. This is against the background that unskilled or untrained personnel create hazards at work of which at HCC this is further compounded by giving politics primacy when recruiting or selecting new employees

Strengthening the Institutional Capacity of the HCC

The study is recommending for the institutional capacity building by strengthening the institutional capacity of the Council. This can be done through streamlining the Council's bureaucratic structures which are believed to be heavily characterized by inertia, red tape, ponderous routines among others. To this extent, the bureaucratic structures in the Council should be synchronized in order to harmonize, integrate and coordinate the fragmented departments. Against this backdrop synchronization, alignment and harmonization of departments will go a long way in coordinating departments which is key to ensure effective execution of PB system in the Council.

Motivating PB Implementers

Against such an account of negative dispositions of PB implementers, this research is recommending that PB implementers should be motivated, either financially or non-financially. This will go a long way in thwarting various strikes engaged by these implementers. To this end, PB system will be smoothly and effectively implemented mainly because the people entrusted to implement it will be well disposed towards executing their jobs.

Need to amend the Local Government Legislative Framework

The legislative framework governing local authorities are believed to be skewed against the interests of the Council of residents and in favour of the Minister of Local Government. Against this backdrop, the study is recommending the amendment of the legislative framework governing local authorities in Zimbabwe so as to accommodate the interests of the stakeholders. This will go a long way in implementing PB system effectively and efficiently mainly because the interests of the stakeholders will be well expressed in the legislative framework.

Establishment of the Anti-Corruption Department in HCC

Against such an account of pervasive corruption haunting the HCC today, the study is recommending for the establishment of an anti-corruption department with enforceable rules and regulations within the Council whose mandate is to act as a watchdog to all Council's financial deliberations. This will go a long way in thwarting corruption bedeviling HCC today which is leaving initiatives like PB in a financial predicament.

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