The Conduct of Nigeria's Foreign Policy and Global Terrorism: An Assessment

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Abstract

In this study we interrogated whether the conduct of Nigeria's foreign policy has played any significant role in addressing the issue of global terrorism since after the terrorist strike on US in 2001. We focused on the action of elected and appointed government officials, their self interest and the nature of their relations with various client groups. We argued that political actors who make choice in the world of scare resources are influenced by each other, foreign officials, unions, and others who have direct or indirect stake in public policies. The global market is made up of those who damage certain type of public policies and those who supply them. These actors are self-interested. We concluded that, the conduct of Nigeria's foreign policy has not fully grown above ethnic and parochial vagaries in deciding issues of global importance, hence their peacekeeping efforts in Africa is both saddening and embarrassing as economic managers prioritize their selfish interest first before the public interest. **Keywords:** Conduct, Nigeria, Foreign policy, Global terrorism

Introduction

Nigerian's foreign policies like foreign policies of other nations have witnessed instance of both successes and failures. About a decade ago Nigeria's foreign policy managed by the military government was handed over to the civilian government. Since after the change of form of government from "Dictatocracy" to democracy, there appears to be a notable shift in the conduct of foreign policy in Nigeria from authocratization to democratization. However, it is a matter of utmost concern that at the beginning of this new century specially from September 11, 2001, the world has become characterized not by positive results to development efforts especially in the Third World that began since their attainment of independent from colonial rule in the late 50's and early 1960's Damus (1977:13), rather by globalization of terrorism except every other things which has effectively undermined and re-directed the pace and focus of conduct of foreign policy of Nigeria in particular and the rest of the world in general.

Largely, Nigeria's foreign policy is centered on African integration, peace: security growth and development hence, the internal conflicts in Africa have combined with the incidence of 9/11 to make claims on Nigerian economy and her foreign policy. Thus vacillating nature of social reality necessarily makes it expedient for nations to constantly adjust and nurture her polices either locally or internationally in line with the prevailing conditions. Since independence, Nigeria has played a crucial role in the international community through her Afro-Centric foreign policy.

Basically, successive military governments in Nigeria have used Afro-Centric slogan as corner stone to lure like minded African leaders to recognize their illegitimate regimes. By and large, this was the price Nigerians have to pay for tolerating dictatorial regimes. Besides, external and internal interface and interlink combine to reflect conduct of foreign policy in Nigeria such that Nigeria's access to international capital, trade investment or aid becomes blocked. Although foreign policy making is a product of ministry of foreign affair in Nigeria, it is worth noting that internal actors such as President, other ministers, Ambassadors, businesses and individuals are all active player in the process of foreign policy making and implementation.

Meanwhile, terrorists attack in 9/11 on US does not mark the evolution of terrorism as the concept has been in used since 5 BC/. It is an act of inflicting terror on a group of people in order to exert some compliance or make them meet to certain demand. However, the 9/11 attack was significance because of the incidences surrounding the organization and consequences of the attack. In the aftermath of 9/11 attack. US foreign policy was redesired, redirected and reassessed and by president Bush and his crew to be able to predict or avert future similar occurrence to the terrorist storm in 11th September 2001 on Pentagon house and the world trade centre.

In so far as states are interdependent, the US redesigning, redirecting and reassessment of her foreign policy led to re-shifflement of foreign policies of other nations especially the middle East and Africa. Hence Nigeria's foreign policy was re-directed and rearrange in the aftermath of 9/11 because of the strategic position Nigeria occupies in peace keeping processes in Africa: the quantum of Nigeria's economy, population and geographical location at the heart of Africa and thus Nigeria's claims foreign policy focus on Africa.

Religious fanaticisms among the Moslem brothers especially in the Middle East made a statement about the manner of US land her allies / intervention in their politics. Hence that is a deduced as reason for global terrorism that reached its apogee in 2001. Recently, US allies have been on news victims of terrorist attack in

Western Eastern Europe and Africa. Hence global terrorism is on the increase.

Broadly, this study tries to assess the impact of global terrorism on the conduct of Nigerian's foreign policy. Specifically, the study tends to achieve the following: to determine whether Nigerian's foreign policy has played a significance role in addressed global terrorism since 2001. Practically, it will provide the tools for understanding of logic and nexus of foreign policy in Nigeria in the age of globalization for policy makers. It will also arm the policy makers to appreciate the contemporary structure of global politics in the context of post 9/11 era to roll out standard policies and to make alternative policy choice.

An Overview of Nigeria's Foreign Policy

Abati (2002) gives a near complete overview of Nigerian's foreign policy since its independence. He rightly pointed out that Nigeria has been extraordinarily naïve by restricting its foreign policy to Africa as its cornerstone. According to him, it was a laudable goal before 1990's but its evaluation is needed for Nigeria to meet the needs of today's diplomacy as we come into the new millennium. According to him, Africa as the centre piece of Nigeria's foreign policy no longer suffices because a broader perspective is necessary. Although Nigeria has not got the means and might to operate on a more vibrant foreign policy. Abiti failed to take into consideration some current trends in global economic and political relation such as terrorism and human right abuse.

He focuses on the domestic determinants of Nigerian's policy. Abati observed that internal political events usually have impact on the foreign policy and also maintained that military coup d'états as the solution to numerous internal political problems in Nigeria. The solution lies on culture of political dialogue and debates between opponents, he insists. Though Abiti's exposition did not link the question of global terrorism to Nigeria foreign policy. It was able to provide the framework for understanding the dynamics of Nigeria foreign policy.

Chibundu (2003) similarly sees Nigeria foreign policy as a strategy with which institutionally designated decision makers seek to manipulate the international environment in order to achieve certain national objectives. He puts that country's foreign policy is her response beyond her own frontiers or boundaries and that such response could be friendly or unfriendly, aggressive or non aggressive and simple or complex. Hence every state must have a response in order to survive of 9/11. According to him incidence of 9/11 had led to a growing anxiety of our people to review our foreign policy to become more dynamic and responsive to different situation in accordance with Nigeria national interest. To sum Chibundu insists that Nigeria's present status in international relations do not arise from Nigerian's foreign policy rather from the despointed nature of our domestic politics.

In the main, the focus of this chapter is to prove that Nigeria's foreign policy has not played any significant role in tackling the issue of global terrorism between 1999 and 2004. We tried to analyze and capture the complex situation that has informed the specter of Nigeria's role in maintenance of peace in the area and the rest of Africa to order to substantiate or other proves our first hypothesis. This is case that helps to inform us on the adventurism that colored Nigeria's role in similar crisis in the West African sub-region in the recent past, especially in Ivory Coast in Africa and the Nigerian failure in peacekeeping regional peace initiative: a collective action. Nigeria's afro-centric foreign policy and national interest, Nigeria's hegemonic interest in Africa and case for a regional competitor.

Staff Collapse in African and the Nigerian failure in Peacekeeping

To understand the nature of the crises in Africa and it is proper to trace its origin. To do this, we shall discuss the remote and immediate causes. We are tempted to situate the remote genesis of the Africa crises in the artificiality and irreconcilability of the colonially imposed territorial boundaries, which has created the profound leadership crisis that is at the heart of the rebellion in the region. At least, this factor permitted incumbent governments in Africa to practice politics of exclusion where the people are not allowed to participate in political process. This policy is backed mainly by the opposition group Chonghale, (2002). Doyie (2002), Torulagba (2003). These processes sow the seeds of discord that were sown during period owing to baseness (Cherian, 2002:2).

Africa is a mishmash ethic nationalities geo-politically delineated as North South and West. Before now, it enjoyed the status of the most stable economy with a very sound economy whose fortunes were inextricably linked with those of her immediate neighbours. Such was the growing importance and influence given her seemingly stable polity, until the end of colonial rule in Africa engendering a free fall to political turnoil, strife, rebellion and imminent state collapse, power struggle of survival which smacked of exclusion politics and the abuse of ethnic, religious and regional identity to secure and maintain power ensured. And this is commonly used to secure and maintain power (Hara and Ero, 2002:1). Since 1960's till date minority groups have continually voiced out crisis of marginalization which over time accumulated to fuel rebellion against the state today. Nigeria is also a victim of this development in the region. Hence, the interest at stake would be to roll out the log of wood in her eyes before she cold remove the piece of stick in another's eye.

Separately from the struggle for power, which underlies the leadership crisis in Africa the conflict is a

political symptom of the country's economic decline. Since 1990s's the gross domestic product of African states with the exception of few like Mauritania and South Africa have declined steadily by more than 20% and as such rival factions have come into even sharper conflict over the control of the state and the division of its declining wealth. Indeed, a I ranch citizen who grew up in the Ivory Coast observed that "the conflict in Africa end when there is nothing left to loot: (BBC NEWS, World Edition, 2003).

This crises have taken various forms especially in the multi colored States with more large number of foreigners, where they have also started to resent the large presence of foreigners and immigrants who had hitherto, played important roles in the economic boom of the 1960s (Johnson, 2002:1). Multi part elections became a farce and immigrants were blamed for the economic crisis.

Such was the climate the discrimination and senxophobia coupled with military discontent over salary disputes al over Africa has always warranted the "mean men" to struck and seized power (Cherian, 2002:2) in Ivory coast for instance. General Guci turned out to be yet another despot determined to hang on to power at all cost as has always been the ease with military interventionism in Africa politics. General Guci initially accommodated Quattara's supporters in his regime but soon kicked them out and revised the constitution to completely prevent Quattara from contesting further elections. In 2000, General Guci agreed to hold presidential elections. The elections where marred by violence and in the confusion, he declared himself president, but was forced into exile in Benin in the course of the chaos that trailed the elections. In the end, Laurent Gbagbo, a history professor and long standing opposition politician was proclaimed president by a margin that led the rebels to question his victory at the rolls. Gbagbo, like his predecessors, also used the "Ivorite" to maintain his grip on power by promoting members of his ethnic group, particularly in the security forces.

This is the case in most parts of Africa where some disgruntled soldiers stage coups and counter coups to oust incumbents. Sometime, the coup plotters turned their failed attempt into a rebellion. The rebels seize usually seize some parts of the state. They took over the armory and launched several attacks without success to capture more parts; the capital city and over throw government (Ugwuoke, 2004:6). Thus states began to descent to chaos, conflict and an imminent state collapse that has claimed countless casualties including civilians.

Regional Peace Initiative: A Collective Action

Peacekeeping efforts in the region are nonetheless commendable. Conflict resolution Africa receives prompt response of the Economic Community of West Africa State (ECOWAS). It took the regional body 6 months of respond and intervene in the Liberian crisis. But in this case, it took 10 days for the ECOWAS to intervene after its emergency meeting of Head of State from the region on the 29th of September, 2002 in Ghana. In solidarity, South African president Ihabo Mbeki, joined presidents Wade (Senegal). Kaufour (Ghana) and Obsanjo (Nigeria) to try seek an amicable political and diplomatic settlement of the crisis. At their meeting in Dakar, Senegal, in December, 2002 the Heads of State formulated the establishment of an ECOWAS peace-keeping force for the Ivory Coast and appointed Nigeria's. It is therefore illogical, intellectually impure and theoretically imbalanced to accord Nigeria the glory of the whole Africa in peacekeeping efforts.

The special representative of the sub-regions peace-keeping operation under ECOAS Mission in Core d'Ivoire (ECOMOC I) with a charge to monitor the cessation of hostilities, the process of disarmament and demobilization ensured that there was a ceasefire agreement between the warring factions. Apart from the ECOWAS initiatives. France has also intervened in the crises in Francophone countries. It has been rotating its support between the government and the rebels through actions and inaction all in a bid to protect its citizen and imperialists interest in the Ivory Coast. For example, at the early stage of the crisis, it provide logistical supports to the government, boosted its deployment of troops to its military base: but also contradicted this support by not taking decisive actions early enough and even in the face of the terror unleashed by the rebels. According to a French newspaper. Revolution International (RI) report, "many people don't even dare any longer to go to work or go out shopping for food. The French forces have witnessed all of these horrors without taking any action to stop them. Quite hypocritically, French has been gathering evidence of the murder goings-on in the event that it is called to give evidence to any enquiry of the UN High Commission. Nevertheless, the French State cannot hide from the eyes of the world its cynical complicity with the bloody murders that terrorize and kill innocent civilians in the Ivory Coast (RI 2003). The French originally intervened to evacuate Westerners. Their second objective to freeze the frontlines has failed Paris is reported to be exasperated that it has been sucked into a major engagement on behalf of president Gbagbo to disarm the rebels as agreed to in the Linas-Marcousis accord, even after Gbagbo had implemented part of harbouring opposition politician Alassane Quattara in the French Embassy in Abidjan (Global Security, 2003:5).

Also, noting the self-interest of surrounding countries like Nigeria. Mali Burkina Faso, and even those of their imperialist rival in the region, the United States and France decided to strong arm the warring parties to go to Paris for a negotiated settlement amidst ongoing peace negotiations in log. The result of this was the Linas-Marcousis accord which Gbagbo has recently criticized that he signed to under duress and subsequently broke in November 2004 when he ordered government troops to disarm the rebels in the North (Sunday Vanguard

2004:2). In the process, the French claimed 9 of their soldiers were killed and had to attack key military bases in the Ivory Coast including the presidential palace in Yamoussouko in retaliation.

Nigeria's Afro-Centric Foreign Policy and National Interest

Nigeria has always looked beyond its borders. While Africa has been the cornerstone to its foreign policy. Nigeria has seen itself and been perceived by others, as a global player on the world stage. This is evidence from its role in the African liberation struggle to its recent peace keeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. While Nigeria's foreign policy appeared to tilt towards the capitalist west during the cold war era. She has often acted in what she considered to be its national interest an interest we could tag selfish in this study. This can be seen in the significant roles Nigeria played in the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and how she used the arena of the common wealth and the United Nations to advance her national as well as African interests.

Nigeria's approach to both Africa and its immediate neighbours has been based on a policy of decolonization non-integration a commitment to African Unity and more recently. Economic diplomacy and African development. During the 1960's Nigeria's foreign policy towards its neighbours was characterized by regional Hegemonic co-operation development, as seen in the creation of the lake Chad Basin Commission in 1965 and the setting up of the Niger River Basin Commission and subsequently, Nigeria – Benin and Nigeria-Nigeria joint commissions in 1973. However, the Nigerian Civil War of 1967- 1970 brought a fundamental shift in Nigeria relations with its neigbours changing its policy of "benign neglect" towards its neigbours. Thus from then on Nigeria's foreign policy shifted from an Afro-centric thrust to that of Concentricism, which subordinated her external relations to the logic of internal development. In this vein also, the establishment of ECOWAS as an imitative led by Nigeria in 1975, sought among other goals, to provide an institutional framework for managing relations with its West African Neighbours, as well as attempting to reduce their dependence on French. This rising hegemonic profile of Nigeria is one of the sore points in the firstly political relation between Nigeria and France, which guides both countries foreign policy actions towards each other.

Nigeria's ascendancy to regional and continental leadership which is consistent with its four "concentric circle" of her national interest (Gambari, 21) manifested a great deal in the 1990s with her diplomatic and military intervention in Liberia and in Sierra Leone through the instrumentality of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Nigeria-led intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone lasted eleven years and resulted in over 1,000 Nigerian fatalities and cost the Nigerian treasury billions of dollars (Vogt, 1998:105). Although Nigeria was itself enmeshed in its own political, financial and military difficulties, these interventions were the first in the post-cold War era to be launched by a sub-regional organization, ECOWAS. The Liberian missions between 1993 and 1997 were the first time that the UN has deployed peace/keepers alongside an existing sub-regional organization, in general.

Nigeria's involvement in Liberia and Sierra Leone was part of its efforts to ensure stability in the West Africa sub-region. According to Vogle (1998:106), Nigeria went to Liberia to defend core values of its foreign policy protection of its citizens in Liberia, ensuring stability of the West African sub-region as well as preventing conflict contagion. The same reasons also explain her military intervention and peace keeping efforts in Sierra Leon even though in both instances, the personal idiosyncrasies, attitude and beliefs of her leaders and their relations with the leaders of these countries at these points in time could have also influenced Nigeria's actions. To properly understand the point about Nigeria's interest in peacekeeping efforts in the region here we seek did in Liberia and Sierra Leone? Given Nigeria's role in ensuring security and peace in African and the sub-region of West Africa.

Nigerian Hegemonic Interest in Africa

Nigeria's hegemonic role in ECOWAS and AU Intervention efforts so far reflects selfish and sometimes national interest of Nigeria. The following popular considerations are worth exploring in view of further exploring the impact of national interest in peacekeeping effort in the region. During crises situation in states Nigeria considers to be a regional competitor, Nigeria tend to remain neutral which is equally a strategic position in deciding regional or global issues.

Case for a Regional Competitor

The Ivory Coast is a very important country in West Africa. It is a leading member of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) accounting for 41% of the groups combined GDO, UEMOA is composed of 8 West African states (Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Mail, Niger, Senegal and Logo) that share the same currency: the CT A frane. The Ivory Coast is also a member of the 16nation ECOWAS. In September 1998, the Abidjan stock Exchange was replaced by the Bourse Regionale des Valeurs Mobilieres (BRVM) a regional stock Exchange, which serves the member nations of UEMOA. The Ivory Coast was once a model of political stability and economic prosperity nurtured by a good dose of foreign investments

and immigrant participation in the liberalized commodity economy. Ivory Coast ranks first among top Cocoa producers in the world and third in coffee production thus accounting for over 10" of the economy of the entire Francophone West Africa (Ugwoke, 2004:6). By implication, it is the zone's richest country (13£3C NEWS, World edition, 2003). Her primary exports are cocoa, coffee and timber. Together, the revenue from these exports makes approximately 4% of her GDP and approximately 7% of the total export earnings.

However, our interest in this section is to highlight the nexus between her strong economy and its foreign policy. This is because the foreign policy of any nation is determined by a number of factors chief among which include its economy geography and population. These factors determine the activities or passiveness of the nation's foreign policy. The Ivory Coast is a Regional competitor to Nigeria because of her strong economy, which is reinforced by her central geographic position in the region. She shares more than 3000km of land borders with five ECOWAS states: Burkina Faso (584), Ghana (668km), Guinea (610km), Liberia (716km) and Mali (532). At least, 4 million of the 16.5 million inhabitants of the Ivory Coast are immigrants or descendants of immigrants from neighbouring countries, with more than half of these originally from Burkina Faso (2.5million). Others originated from Mali (over 1 million) guinea (300.000), Ghana (200,000) and Liberal (100,000) (UNOW A: 2004) countries such as Senegal, Niger and Nigeria also have many of their citizens living in the Ivory Coast. An overview of her economic and energy profile, which are strong domestic determinants of her foreign policy will suffice.

Nigeria, in addition to its huge population is endowed with significant agricultural, marine and forest resources. Its multiple vegetation zones, plentiful rain, surface water and underground water resources and moderate climate allow for production of diverse food and cash crops. Over 600 percent of the population is involved in the production of food crops. The rain forests have been well exploited for timer and wood products of exotic and popular species. Oil and Gas by value, are the most important minerals. They are exploited and produced in the Niger Delta basin and off-shore on the continental shelf and in the deep sea of the territorial waters. Nevertheless, there are significant non-oil mineral deposits which have been identified and evaluated coal iron ore, gypsum, phosphate, lime stone, marbale, columbite, barite and gold.

The point being made here is that though the Ivory Coast is a significant regional power, a fact which has informed Nigeria's rather cautious role in the crisis. She is still not strong enough to significantly challenge Nigeria's hegemonic aspirations and position. In relative comparison for example, looking at the population of both countries, the Ivory Coast has a higher debt burden than Nigeria on the average. Nigeria also has a higher Gross National Product with of course a higher energy production and reserve than the Ivory Coast. In addition Nigeria remains West African's centre of highest attraction of foreign capital. This equally explains why Nigeria responds to some emergencies I the form of peacekeeping while she does not intervene in the others.

Relations between Nigeria and the West could be stained if Nigeria's interest is not served in peacekeeping efforts in Africa. For instance, France has been characterized from the outset by distrust, hostility and conflict with Nigeria. Apart from the phenomenon of Francafrique, which has been used to describe the negative nature of Franco African relations based on France support for African dictators the reason for the political frictions between Nigeria and France can be traced to Nigeria's big brother role in Africa as the Giant of Africa, just one year after independence over the testing of atomic weapons in the Sahara. Apart from this, Nigeria's geopolitical position in West Africa surrounded by four former France colonies. Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Benin is instructive in this regard. Because of the special relationship that France has establish with its former colonies, she has been seen as being the main obstacle to the fulfillment of France regional interests (Nuamah: 2003). It is in this context that we must understand the role of France in Nigeria's 3 year Civil War where it attempted to break up Nigeria while trying to keep Cameroon intact and more recently, its role in the Nigeria/Cameroon dispute over the Baskassi peninsula. France supported and encouraged the decision to take the Bakassi dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICT) in 1994 knowing that the historical legal evidence for the territory was strong on the Cameroon side (Omogui: 2003).

For instance, Nigeria has been the most potent threat to extending its influence in the region. As has been alluded to earlier, Nigeria's immediate neighbours dependence on France did not go down well with Paris, which had deep economic interests in the post colonial economy and polities of it former colonies. In the Ivory Coast specifically, France imperialist interests cover Cocoa Coffee, Electricity, Railways, petrol and financial sectors which are the main-stay of the economy. For example, till date, France guarantees the CF A France, which is the Ivory Coasts currency. Thus the control of the Ivory Coast one of the main bases for its continuing domination in this region is an important strategic stake for France imperialism (R.I: 2003:1). It is for this reason that France has taken an active interest in the crisis and has deployed a large number of heavily armed troops into the Ivory Coast. It has also used its strong diplomatic influence with the various armed factions disputing power to bring them to Paris to strong arm them into finding a negotiated settlement which came in the form of the Linas-Marcousis accord Arising from the above. Nigeria views its intervention in the Ivory Coast crisis with caution consequently, she did not contribute troops to the military force deployed by the ECOWAS to replace the France troops in a true agreed to by all the parties in October 2002. One of the major lessons Nigeria learnt from its 3

ears Civil War and which subsequently impacted on its foreign policy was that the country's survival as a sovereign state could not be taken for granted. Based on that and on France sending arms to state secessionist Biafra through Gabon and the Ivory Coast, there was compelling need for Nigeria to have friendly governments in neighboring countries.

However, despite the impact of the lesson on Nigeria's foreign relations, (it brought a fundamental shift to Nigeria's relations with its neighbor changing the policy of "benign neglect" towards its neighbors). Nigeria cannot forget in a hurry the role played by the Ivory Coast in perpetuating the Civil War by supplying arms to the secessionist Biafra, giving them diplomatic recognition and even subsequently granting asylum to the rebels. For Nigeria therefore intervening effectively to end crisis becomes a normal burden. Either way whether the lesson from the Civil War will make Nigeria thread softly in other not to lose the friendship of an important neighbor as the Ivory Coast or whether the bitter experience of Ivory Coast role in the Nigerian Civil War retrains her from actively participating in the peace process to end the crisis, caution is the word.

The second consideration leads its to a devil theory of War in the it could be in Nigeria's regional power interest for the civil war in the Ivory Coast to continue, at least for a while, because of the profound effects it would have on her economy, socio political and military well being. No doubt the war, which has already taken toil on the Ivory Coast economy strategically, reduces her status as a regional competitor in Nigeria.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the conduct of Nigeria's foreign policy have not fully grown above ethnic and parochial vagaries in deciding issues of global importance, hence their peacekeeping efforts in Africa is both saddening and embarrassing as economic managers prioritize their selfish interest first before the pubic interests. This argument captured the under currents and dynamics at play in the Ivory Coast Crisis where Nigeria has acted too cautiously so far

Though this study appreciates the correctness of the assertion about Nigeria as the giant of Africa and the Campion of regional peacekeeping effort, we conclude that Nigeria is rather being unnecessarily selfish like the rest of the West in responding to humanitarian call in the region. This option suggests, a weakness and disappointment to members of the international community who would exploit the opportunity presented by the crises in Africa enrich themselves. This has trapped Nigeria asserting and confirming herself as a regional power which exploits other nations.

We succinctly put that Nigeria should use the opportunity the crisis presents in Africa to establish her hegemonic aspirations in the region by playing a more active role in peacekeeping. In this vein Nigeria's ruling elites urged to be proactive enough to take actions that will forestall a contagion of such crisis because all the factors that underline the remote cause are present in Nigeria.

Recommendations

Based on the empirical study, the recommendations were made as follow;

- The nation should use the opportunity of crisis presents in Africa to establish her hegemonic aspiration in the region by playing more role in peace keeping.
- Conducts of Nigeria foreign policy should be strictly observed for best practices.

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