# Review of the economist debate on airport security: post September 2011 bombings

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**Abstract**

This paper is a review of the *Economist debate* held on March 20, 2012. Central to the debate is the motion that, "*Airport security measures instituted in response to the September 11,2001 terrorist bombings of Towers in USA have done more harm to humankind than good.*' A tripod framework delimiting the review of this debate has been adopted. The review framework will take a pictorial / helicopter's observational position as its first review position. The moderator, two protagonists' and the audience's participation will be viewed from a flat and even platform. This part of the framework will offer not only an even visibility review position but rather a pH 7 treatment of the views of all participants. A mirror / reflective observational position will be the second review position. This position will enable the review process to establish; how far from the principles of argumentation was the debate under review handled and with what conformity the pillars of valid arguments such as issues, claims, reasons, inferences, warrants and conclusions were put across. The third review position will be investigative in nature. Some investigation into the views of protagonists' definitions of issue(s), key meanings of key words and phrases, claims, validity and credibility of reasons supporting conclusions will need some investigative treatment using data triangulation methods. It will also be prudent to investigate whether or not all issues were addressed and whether the conclusions drawn are in any way converging at co-ordinate zero (0) of the motion. That is, whether or not the conclusions answer the original questions (issue/s).

## 1. Introduction

The 09/11 terrorist attacks unsettled world leaders; particularly USA as the victim nation. The USA took a reactive response by taking a number of anti-terrorists measures. At its airports, it established a Transportation Security Administration (TSA). The mandate of the TSA was to ensure zero tolerance to any form of terrorism at the airports. To ensure that the mandate was operational, a budget of USD8 billion was availed six weeks after the bombing. At the airports, the following security measures were undertaken:

- luggage screening was increased;
- cockpit doors were strengthened;
- fremoval of belts and shoes by passengers became mandatory;
- body scanners were introduced; and
- confiscation of explosive and flammable liquids was intensified particularly Hydrogen Peroxide.

The debate was therefore more of an evaluation as to whether or not the security measures put during the post- 09/11 made any positive changes which the pre- 9/11 security procedures had "failed".

## 2. Debaters and the Motion

Defending the motion was Mr. Bruce Schneiner, an expert in the field of security and an author of numerous literatures on security technology. Mr. Bruce holds the view that, *measures taken to beef-up airport security did more harm to passengers than good.*

Opposing the motion was Mr. Kip Hawley; a security administrator and a member of the Transportation Security Administration. A finite arguer who right from the onset says "No" to any arguments contrary to his views that *more good was done by giving the TSA a mandate to carry out security surveillance at the American Airports.*

A bird's eye view shows that the arguers had a basic consensus on the issue or issues but for reasons of personal backgrounds, approached the podium from a much extended obtuse angle. Bruce being out of government systems and being aware that he was defending views that were a direct attack on an Act of Parliament was compelled to be as precise and accurate in his claims and evidence as possible. One would foresee an adoption of the logical judiciary strategy case-building as instrumental in articulating his views. Thus, Bruce comes on the podium imbued with a strong-sense critical thinking approach. On the other hand, Kip Hawley as an insider to the Act of Parliament has a lot of organizational restrictions related to discussions of internal security matters but has to speak for the Federal State in justifying the enactment of the new security policy. As such, Kip is likely to be ethnocentric in his arguments; characterized by deliberate avoidance of detail but instead diffused generalizations of the issues. If this happens to be the case in the review, it has to be

understood that the weak-sense- critical thinking approach adopted is there to save the organizational inertia and memory of the government policy than to present a neutral display of views on the issue. Anything in the contrary could attract disciplinary action taken against Kip. The podium therefore is not as co-operative as are the expectations of classical argumentation and in such cases of uncertainty; conclusions are likely to be based on the views of the audience through votes.

### 3.   Review of Opening Remarks
*Moderator's opening remarks*
Moderating the flow of the arguments was Adams Barns. In his opening remarks he acknowledges that the 9/11 attacks had significantly changed the flight patterns of the Airline Industry in a negative way. He admits that whilst it may not be known what weapons the terrorists used to hijack the four planes used on 9/11, the effects of the attack forced all government to step up security measures particularly at the Airports. In addition to the summary of security measures taken at Airports across America, Adams introduced to the audience the two protagonists; Bruce Schneiner moving the motion and Kip Hawley opposing the motion.

### *3.2 The Proposer's opening remarks-Bruce Schneiner*
Bruce Schneiner starts by presenting a challenging claim that, since the establishment of the Transportation Security Administration six weeks after the 9/11  attack, neither a single terrorists attempt was foiled nor was there any arrest of a terrorist by the new security administration. He further argues that, the "top 10 good catches of 2001" did not have a single terrorist on the list. Instead, the "good catches" were forbidden items carried by forgetful and entirely innocent passengers. These were the sort of guns and knives that were detected many times by pre -9/11 screening procedures.

It must be noted that in tandem with the dictates of argumentation, a military analogy of attacking strategy was carefully thought, delineated and put to pilot testing. Bruce decided to use a provocative fire searching entry into the debate by insinuating that, in a period of ten years, the established TSA had dismally failed to deliver its mandate. Bruce's attack strategy offers him a correct assessment platform of how deep the debate pool was likely to be as his provocation would evoke an emotional response from the defender of the motion. Sensationalizing the podium is typically a court approach to an argument where claims have to be sequentially and logically presented but also making sure that the opponent is always kept at bay by a systematic application of dislodging tactics that put the opponent on defense at most of the times during the argument.

Bruce was aware of the sensitivity of the issue under discussion. He also was aware of the defensive background position of Kip. The only way to catalyze a continuous debate would be to increase the level of adrenaline in the opponent's body system. Under emotions, Kip was likely to give internal information; most of which would be of political nature since Kip was defending a public policy. Such information would be in favour of Bruce than him in the face of the audience. Bruce further trivialized the mandate of the TSA by citing that, "the good catches" were mere small and usual things that the previous security system had managed to handle efficiently before 9/11, so there was no need to have TSA in place. This was expected to infuriate Kip, spurring him to intuitively respond.

Wittingly or unwittingly, Bruce does not divulge the source of the evidence he has put forth to support his claim that TSA had dismally failed to carry out its mandate for the past ten years. The truth therefore is left in the realms of uncertainty. Data triangulation as an investigative tool is put in the rails that, in uncertain situations, the truth is relative to the argument being advanced for it.

Bruce makes a second yet damaging claim. He makes a comparison between the budgets allocated to the airport security versus the specific activities he claims the TSA did for the ten years. Bruce 'accuses' the TSA for leaving its mandate for small activities such as confiscation of home- made electronics, informing the police of people  with outstanding misdemeanour warrants, and arresting people wearing fake military uniforms, against a budget allocation of USD 8 billion. By so claiming, Bruce is inducing the audience (who are the taxpayers) to listen to him more than to Kip who in this case has the toll order of justifying the roles of his department in using the taxpayer's money. Despite coming up with figures of the annual budget allocated to the TSA and the specific activities of the TSA for the period stated, Bruce remains astute by not citing his sources. Whether this was by omission or commission, the reasons to these claims remain incredible only up to the point of substantiation.

Finally, Bruce concludes his opening remarks by categorizing terrorists into two groups; the amateurs who are often sloppy and unorganized. This group can easily be handled by the pre-9/11 security procedures he claims. The second group is the well-informed, well-sponsored and much rarer plotters. This category is lethal and cannot be handled by EDS (Explosive Detecting Systems) and ETS (Explosive Tracing Systems) machines installed in various airports. As such TSA must disabuse itself of failing against professionals (terrorists) by always trailing behind and responding to the next tactics by the terrorists. The TSA must realize that security at the airport is overly specific  argues Bruce. That is, security works only if there is an accurate guess of the next plot and target. Bruce goes on to elaborate that a miss of the two would mean more risks to citizens, waste of

time and money. To illustrate his point he increases the amplitude of the argument by stating that airport security is the last line of defense due to the following assertions.

He asserts that, if there were only a dozen of terrorist tactics and a few hundreds of possible targets, protecting against particular plots would be much easier and make us safer. Conversely, there are millions of terrorist tactics and millions of targets. Spending billions of cash to force terrorists to alter their tactics and plans does not make us safer. It is therefore cost-effective to concentrate our defense in ways that work regardless of tactics and targets. Bruce's closing assertions call for special attention. Bruce deliberately stops addressing Kip. He broadens his call to the general audience. A typical campaigning strategy that seeks to win the hearts of affected listeners. Language plays a crucial role here. He uses clauses such as, *"make us safer", "our defense", "cost-effective" and "billions of dollars"*. The use of such associative and collective clauses in articulating issues in an argument tends to draw the audience away from the opponent's side. This was well articulated. Note was taken that in all his claims and reasons, no sources were acknowledged or cited putting his future conclusions to the need for critical surgery.

### 3.3 The opposition's opening remarks-Kip Hawley.

In his opening remarks, Kip offers a statistical claim that, more than 6 billion consecutive safe arrivals of airline passengers since the attack of America on 9/11 meant that instituted airport security measures had been successful despite any hassles the passenger could have gone through. The statistic however is an isolated one in the sense that it does not point to any historic comparison or any future forecast of a similar nature. To correlate the absence of terrorist attacks to a nominal statistic would be fallacious. Kip did not wait to build a case in order to come to a conclusion. He goes straight to answer the issue with one word. To him, if the question was whether the changes instituted after the 9/11 attack had caused more harm than good, the answer is "no".

Kip places the debating podium into a dichotomous thinking situation. Answers like a flat "yes" or a flat "no" indicate restrictive thinking and rigid position taken by a protagonist. The terminal conclusion is however not validated or supported by any given reasons so remains subject to further scrutiny. As earlier postulated in this paper, Kip is coming into this debate with a weak-sense critical thinking approach that demands him to conserve and preserve the status quo of an existing and enacted public policy.

There appear to be a point of cleavage between the two protagonists. The term "safer" has taken an ambiguous meaning. In Kip's use of the word, being safe means *absence of terrorist attacks even if the security procedures violate passengers' rights.* Bruce understands it as, *prevention of terrorist tactics and upholding the rights of passengers.* The effects of this variance will be established as more presentation of views is developed in the later parts of the debate.

Kip posits the notion that, security management is second nature to TSA. At the airport there is only one equation. *"Payment of cost in convenience and privacy= reasonable certainty that flights are terror free."* He claims that the challenges the security procedures have encountered are attributed to failure by the system to change risk models as was the plan at the inception of TSA. He takes this debate as an opportunity to assure the audience that the problems they may have encountered were just teething problems of security systems that are going through rapid phases of radical transformation. These would be a thing of the past as more refinement of the procedures is done.

Kip further makes the claim that, two years after the establishment of TSA, a comprehensive security system was put in place. This made it possible to prevent suitcase bombings and hijackings. In his view the Mantra - *"Never again"* was a reality. Of the daily streams of al-Qaeda threats he claims to receive, he only cites three. The shoe bomber in 2001, the liquid bomber in 2006 and the underwear bomber in 2009. Note is taken that the cited attempts were all intercepted aboard. The airport machines and staff had missed. The claim here is of a casual nature though no supporting evidence has been given. Still on the same note, Kip further claims that TSA has globalized its activities in the way of intelligence, machine technology and operations networking. In his view, the pre-9/11 security procedures were dangerously static and rigid in the face of highly adaptive enemies.

Kip makes a sudden digression. He goes on to discuss the counter measures that would be ideal to counter any possible terrorist attacks in a more technical manner. These include undercover air marshals, K-9 teams, unpredictable patrols, behaviour-detection specialists and checkpoints operatives. Despite the fact that the issues Kip brings up are of security nature, these are outside the scope of the debate and are requirements that are not even part of his organization yet; hence a non-sequitur situation surfaces here.

Finally, Kip closes his opening remarks by re-emphasizing a casual relationship between the 6 billion safe arrivals and effort put by TSA to prevent terrorist attacks. He reminds the audience that if the question was whether more harm than good was done, the answer remained "no".

### 4    Review of Rebuttal Remarks
### 4.1 Proposer's rebuttal remarks-Bruce Schneiner.

Bruce opens his rebuttal remarks by questioning the validity of Kip's claim that, *more than 6 billion*

*consecutive safe arrivals of airline passengers since 9/11 meant that the security measures had ultimately been successful*. Bruce rubbishes off the claim as an empty one and if anything, the figure indicated the safe arrivals that were before the 9/11 attacks. These were equally safe but without any annoying and obtuse security measures. In fact, Bruce sees Kip as insinuating that, for such a metric success to be achieved, the terrorists attacks must be rare .This being the case, there was no need to have TSA in place.

Research findings by Blalock in 2003 on the effects of TSA's security measures on Airline industry seem to disproportionally divide the views of Bruce and Kip in a relative range of 11%, (Lowest % being 5% and highest % being 16%). Further analysis would show that, pegging the Standard error at 5% significant level, the research findings would be 90% in support of Bruce and 79% against Kip. The findings however must not induce the review process to leap to a conclusion.

A similar research was carried by Compact in 2004. This research study investigated the effects of new security measures on the volumes of originating passengers during two consecutive quarters at John .F Kennedy International Airport, (JFK) and Atlanta Hartsfield international Airport, (ATL). Using the "*difference –in difference model*", the computations were guided by the formula: (OPVJFK4Q2002 – *OPVJKF3Q2002) – (OPVATL4Q2002 –OPVATL3Q2002).*

Volumes from JFK international airport were the experimental sample and those from ATL were the control sample. Despite all the limitations associated with quasi- experiments involving human subjects, the research findings point at two significant areas of this debate; that, the airport security measures made travelling even more dangerous as many travelers switched to the use of automobiles where there is a higher risk of accidents. Second, there was an 8% reduction in the volumes of international passengers, in addition to 16% reduction on domestic flyers. These research findings seem to support the allegations by Bruce that Kip's claim of 6 billion safe arrivals was a nullity.

Bruce goes on to make a demand. He argues that there should be a scientific survey done by TSA to measure the effectiveness of individual security procedures done at the airports. He claims that it was easy at American airports to bypass the photo ID requirement and to fly while on "no fly list" He adds that, it is also easy to bring as much liquid through America's airports and that the body scanners cannot detect the plastic explosive PETN (used by the underwear bomber). Seemingly confirming Bruce' claims are research results of a study done by Burtler and Poole in 2004. The study established that the EDS and the ETS machines had a false identification rate of 30% for screened baggage. This only confirms that the screening system is not 100% efficient. This gives a 3 out of every ten bags chance to pass with explosives or to be delayed by further scanning, this amounting to passenger harassment.

Bruce further increases the amplitude of the argument by asserting that even the standard confiscation fails. He argues that there are two types of contraband. The guns and the bombs. If caught, the TSA hands over to the Police. The second are the small items like knives and liquids. If caught, these are confiscated but you are allowed to proceed. This means anything less than 100% detection is ineffective because the freed terrorist whose liquid was confiscated will continue to try until he /she succeeds.

Bruce draws the podium to a personal testimonial that, this was not the first time he was meeting with Kip on the same issue. He claims that even in their 2007 e-mail interview, Kip had reacted evasively. Kip does not deny or confirm the testimony. Bruce further disputes Kip's claims that TSA had foiled the shoe bomber, liquid bomber and underwear bomber. All the three cases were done on board implying that the security systems had missed argues Bruce.

Drawing towards the end of his rebuttal remarks, Bruce turns the table against Kip. He does this by agreeing with Kip's contribution that it costs the terrorists trivial expenses to alter tactics and targets but the defense incurs huge sums to close new possible targets and tactics. Bruce accuses Kip for not following this line of thinking to its logical end. Bruce alleges that, if Kip had followed this line of thinking to its logical end, he should have realized that large sums of money spent on forcing terrorists to alter their tactics and targets could better be used to develop intelligence, investigation and responding to emergencies.

### 4.2 Opposser's Rebuttal remarks-Kip

Kip changes the podium to an analogy of a "Boardroom" in which he is appraising a Parliament Select Committee on the activities, challenges, regional and international connectedness of TSA since its inception in 2001. He does not at any moment attend to any of the claims raised by Bruce and does not even refer to Bruce throughout the rebuttal remarks. Instead, Kip introduces his rebuttal remarks by building a formidable character of a terrorist Abdulrahman Hilal Hussein and the expanse of this terrorist's treachery and how TSA tirelessly but successfully worked to subdue all terror attempts on American soil by this man.

Kip informs his "boardroom" audience on how TSA had worked with other intelligence organizations in other countries to foil the use of high powered liquid explosives and how the use of X-rays foiled attempts to use shoe-bombs.

He further extends his remarks to the participation of TSA in both regional and international cooperation.

To this end, he stresses that the decision to have TSA in America and other similar security authorities at airports in other countries was a resolution made and agreed by Canada, Britain, America and the EU. In this he seems to say, what is good for the bigger world must of necessity be good for Americans. This is a fallacy of composition.

Kip takes this opportunity to justify why TSA has to continue with its operations. He claims that serious threats continued to exist against Aviation Industry. The audience is reminded that looking at airport security was more than just security. TSA was in fact involved in a series of security activities that a layman may not comprehend.

In his closure of the rebuttal remarks, he contends that he respected the deeply negative comments about the activities of TSA since 9/11 but feels the daily terror threats he has experienced for a decade had made him numb not even to realize the unfavourable handling passengers were going through. He reminds the audience that the safety of airline travelers could not have been possible without the counter actions by TSA and other world organizations. He closes his remarks by referring to the 6 billion safe arrivals as implying correlation and causation.

Kip makes a sharp decline in his dichotomous thinking and begs for cooperation. He pleads with the floor that the question was not a referendum on TSA; but whether or not more harm has been inflicted by security measures since 9/11.His final request was that since many terrorists continued to threaten, it was in his view that people cooperated and map up a common way forward.

## 5. Review of Closing Remarks
### 5.1 The proposer's closing remarks-Bruce.
Bruce opens his closing remarks by giving a recap of his two pivotal statements all stressed in the two previous sessions. One, they were doing wrong things; the focus on airport security at the expense of the broader threats did not make citizens safer. Second, the things which were being done were wrong; the specific security measures put in place since 9/11 did not work. He accuses Kip for not responding to his criticisms with specificity but instead providing anecdotes which are meant to coax listeners trust that TSA and airport security need not be questioned as they know what they are doing. He further challenges Kip that 400ml of an explosive liquid in one container is equally dangerous as four 100ml containers of the same liquid. He blames Kip for trying to convince people that there are 21 000 people on the "no fly list" but are so innocent that they are not arrested.

Bruce is more frustrated than before as is shown in his diction regarding allegations on insider trading of the EDS machines by the former secretary of homeland security. Bruce is read as implying that TSA is a conduit for corruption through backdoor procurement channels. These sentiments are unsubstantiated so he begs the question. After exudation of personal emotions Bruce goes back on the debate track. He argues that after the 9/11, society has lost faith in both airport security and counter-terrorism policies. He demands for open and transparent security policies arguing that the secret security policies being implemented at the airport were harmful to society because of their very secrecy.

Bruce points at Kip as being out of touch with the people when he alleges that the humiliation, dehumanization and the privacy violations are mere costs in convenience. The damage passenger get from being exposed to radiation will live with them for life yet it known that infra -red radiation interferes with individuals' potency.

Bruce goes on to bring back another dimension of economic loss as a result of the measures taken at the airports. He argues that in 2004, the extra average waiting time due to TSA procedures was 19.5 minutes per person. This he argued was a total economic loss of USD 10 billion in America only.

Bruce accuses the TSA for interfering with the liberties of passengers as airports are effectively right-free zones. The fear that the TSA staff instills in the passenger is what Bruce regards as a final harm. In his view the purpose of terrorists is not to kill people but to bring terror. All the bombs and liquids are only missiles meant to bring about this terror. Bruce argues that it is the manner in which we react to the terror that determines the next tactic and plan of the terrorists.

Finally, Bruce gives a prescriptive list of what he thinks must be done:

- systems must be returned to the pre-9 /11 levels;
- getting rid of anything that has to do with amateur terrorists and working on how to work against professional al-Qaeda plots;
- put more savings into the development of Intelligence. Investigation and response to emergencies;
- accept that 100% security is not possible; and
- respond to terrorism not with fear but with indomitability.

### 5.2 The Opposser's closing remarks.
Kip opens his closing remarks by declaring that this was not a debate but a fracture; one that could not be

celebrated or put aside simply because people could not see the danger of terrorist threats and appreciate the effort TSA continued to put to save lives.  He argues that the 9/11 attack united all people against terrorism and that other the asymmetrical political lines dividing people's views on airport security both the **"no"** and "**yes"** votes represented the full commitment people had on fighting terrorism. He admits that the rush in reacting to the 9/11 attack had caused the system to pick up security systems which today were acting against the people. Appreciation was however to be made by travelers that whichever airport they visit in the world; has internationalized security procedures just as those in place in the American airports. This was reality and people must learn to live with it.

To argue that airport security is overly specific is only true if the terrorists' tactic and targets are obvious, but in the contemporary scenario advanced tactics are always put ahead of defense such that predictable overly methods will fall in the hands of the terrorists making our systems ineffective argues Kip.  He claims that system improvement has been a continuous process to the extent that remarkable introduction of new and effective systems are now in place. Using an unsubstantiated event of attempted terrorist attack he argues that the call to put more effort in the development of intelligence, investigation and response to emergences was welcome but a lot had already been done in that respect.

Kip, tells the audience not to give up as a lot has been learnt through mistakes and successes in the fight against terrorism..He appeals for public consensus on the way ford in the fight against terrorism. Kip makes an appeal to the audience that, other than looking back in anger to what we have lost, knowledge from our experiences must bring us to a security strategy that is sustainable and will keep us of future threats.

Finally, Kip says the problem of terrorism needs collective effort. He closes his remarks by a question and answer session:

- *Did security services, including airport security, prevent multiple occurrences of 9/11- scale attacks?-YES.*
- *Has airport security made serious mistakes along the way?  YES*
- *Have we learnt to work in sync across organizations and nations? YES*
- *Is there a critical mass of public demanding better from airport security? YES.*
- *Can we come together and make it happen? MAYBE.*
- *Is it all more harm than good? NO.*

## 6. Conclusion

The conclusion of the review process would not be complete without the alignment and proper reorientation of both protagonists' positions, particularly that of Mr. Kip Hawley. Mr. Bruce as an outsider of Government systems and/or probably as a traveler who could have been infuriated by going through airport security procedures overlooked quite a number of security principles, so demanded a free-flowing articulation of security matters in open online debate. This is in fact a misnomer. The review process recognizes the maturity and security administration acumen consistently displayed by Mr. Kip throughout the debate. A pointer is put to the fact that, only an officer with distinct patriotic traits and a traceable record of loyalty and performance could be appointed to lead the operationalization of an emergency coppice security policy in reaction to a bloody terrorist attack; one that had killed and even humiliated a great nation's security systems. Mr. Kip operates on the NTK (Need to know) principle, so his dichotomous thinking style displayed in the debate must of necessity be regarded as normal.

The review process will subject the arguers' contributions to some investigative analysis. To do so., the contributions from both protagonists have been regrouped to form four thematic issues; *incompetence /inefficiency, violation of passenger rights, Economic loss* and *Way forward.*

### 6.1  Thematic issue:  Incompetence /Inefficiency.

Throughout the session, allegations were raised by Bruce pointing at both incompetence on the part of security staff and inefficiency on the part of security systems and machines**.** TSA is blamed for not having arrested any terrorist or foiled any terrorist plan, the system could be bypassed so easily and the EDS and ETS machines missed at the rate of 30%. Whilst admitting that TSA had its serious mistakes and operational challenges, Kip contests that even with the allegations in place, no human life was lost at any American airport as a result of terrorist attacks for the period in question; so no harm was done as a result of the presence of TSA at the airports. Absence of any successful terrorist attacks is a merit to the security measures taken after 9/11. The two protagonists technically reach a point of convergence. Bruce in his closing remarks reminds Kip that 100% security is impossible. Kip makes a plea that it was a difficult task to change old security systems that are inefficient. The position the review process takes as its conclusion on this contested theme is, *yes, levels of both incompetence and inefficiency were registered but this did not directly cause any harm to passengers.* This credits Kip.

### 6.2 Thematic issue: Economic loss.

Mr. Hawley does not fall into the snare of discussing budgetary figures at the podium. However back of the envelope calculations indicate that losses in passenger volumes and due to increased waiting time amounted to USD 10 billion per year. Mr. Hawley admits that the costs were too large as compared to the blurred benefits. Independent research also confirmed business loss due to airport security measures after 9/11. This theme was not heavily contested hence fell in favour of Mr. Bruce. The conclusion the review process takes on this theme is, *security measures caused economic loss to the Federal State.*

### 6.3 .Thematic issue: Violation of passengers' rights.

Mr. Hawley in his closing remarks made a plea to the audience. He says he had deep respect for the negative comments the citizens had raised against TSA but urged people not to concentrate and continue to be angered by what they had already lost. Bruce alleges that what passengers had lost was faith, dignity and respect of their privacy. Mr. Hawley admits these were some of the collateral damages but this would be a thing of the past since a lot of refinement of security systems was underway. Making a conclusion on such a subjective claim could have been harder if Mr. Hawley had not offered a plea. On the basis that the head of TSA admits that there has been passenger rights violations in his operations, the theme falls in favour of Mr. Bruce. The review concludes that, *security procedures at airports violated passengers' rights.*

### 6.4 .Thematic issue: Way forward

Bruce is for the return to the pre -9/11 security procedures to handle amateur terrorists but respecting human rights. Mr. Hawley agrees that it is hard to move away from the old security measures (practical situation) but on paper views old methods as dangerously static in the face of an adaptive enemy. Practically Mr. Hawley agrees with what Bruce says must be done. Mr. Hawley also admits that more effort is needed in the areas of intelligence investigation and responses to emergencies as was pressured by Bruce. *Therefore, Bruce's way forward takes precedence.* The review process credits Mr. Bruce with three (75%) of the contested thematic issues and Mr. Hawley with one. (25%). Public votes were 87% in favor of the motion and 13% against the motion.

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