

Appraising the Institutional Context of Urban Regeneration and Slum Upgrading Initiatives in a Developing Country: Zongo and Inner-Cities Regeneration and Development Programme in Ghana

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Abstract

Urban regeneration and renewal institutions are far less well developed in Ghana, like many other developing countries. Moreover, the state of institutionalisation in the urban sector is fragmented, poorly co-ordinated, with budgetary resources split up across many agencies and organisations. And urban regeneration, renewal and development are complex in conceptual and practical, as in institutional terms. However, several countries in the global South and many jurisdictions in the North demonstrate useful and instructive cases in urban regeneration and development institutionalisation and governance. This scenario and situation are focused on the case of the Zongo and Inner-Cities Regeneration and Development Programme, aimed at upgrading the slum Zongo communities and inner-city areas and improving conditions therein, in Ghanaian towns and cities. Programme management is under two main structures: Zongo and Inner-Cities Development Secretariat; and the Zongo Development Fund Secretariat. Operations and relationships of these raised issues about their collaborative, harmonious, co-ordinative, co-operative and communicative engagement as well as the possibility of integration and the general situation of the urban transformation processes was focused on appraising and interrogating these issues and implications for the re-organisation of the sector.

Keywords: Urban regeneration, urban development, slum upgrading, urban transformation institutions, Zongo & Inner-Cities Development Secretariat, Zongo Development Fund Secretariat, urban policy

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1. Introduction

Strategic and local institutions for urban development, regeneration, planning and the governance of these, apart from the national planning system, is not yet really established in Ghana. Comparatively, institutionalisation of regional development and planning has been much more forth-going than in the urban sector. Regional Development Corporations (RDCs) were established in 1973 in all administrative regions of Ghana to bring about rural and regional development in the country (Republic of Ghana, 1973). By 1997, they had hardly delivered and were rolled out. Thirteen years later, the Savannah Accelerated Development Authority (SADA) was created to bring about socio-economic, physical and environmental development in the northern regions of the country, including the Northern, North East, Savannah, Upper East and Upper West Regions and the savannah parts of the Bono and Bono East Regions in Southern Ghana (Figure 1). This vast stretch of territory covered some 40 per cent of Ghana and contained about 30 per cent of its population, the most rural and disadvantaged territory of the country (Republic of Ghana, 2010). However, SADA became ineffective and was rolled out in 2017. Subsequently, the current Development Authorities were established in the same year: the Northern, Middle-Belt and Coastal Development Authorities (Republic of Ghana, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c), managed at the national level by the Special Development Secretariat, formerly a Ministry. Each of these is a multi-regional development authority, catering to a set of political administrative regions. A commonality of all these institutions is that they were created as exogenous regional development agencies (Ofori, 2021). The only endogenous regional development institution and which has outlived the RDCs and SADA is the Central Region Development Commission (CEDECOM) which was established, from scratch, by the political leadership of the Central Region, subsequently receiving government's formal recognition (Ofori, 2021). This section is only meant to serve as backcloth to the actual focus of this study.

The urban sector is not so fortunate, yet, to have a national/regional strategic urban development institution, that is outside the Land Use and Spatial Planning Authority (LUSPA), established under the Land Use and Spatial Planning Act, 2016 (Act 925) (Republic of Ghana, 2016a) as part of the statutory planning system. However, more recently, a few local and project-targeted urban development and regeneration agencies have been created. One is the Ga Mashie Development Agency (GAMADA), which started as an informal

organisation to lead the regeneration and development of Old Accra, covering James Town and Ussher Town in south-central coastal indigenous Accra, a largely inner-city slum community. However, it has since received Government recognition and been placed under Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA). Currently, the only urban development and regeneration institutions that have a fairly national strategic character are the Zongo and Inner-Cities Development Secretariat (ZICDS), formerly the Ministry of Inner-Cities and Zongo Development (MICZD) and the Zongo Development Fund Secretariat (ZoDFS), under the Zongo and Inner-Cities Regeneration and Development Programme (ZICRDP). The Zongo Development Fund (ZoDF) was established under the Zongo Development Fund Act, 2017 (Act 964). ZICDS was previously the Ministry of Inner-Cities and Zongo Development (MICZD), until 2020 when it was re-designated.

This study aimed to explore and appraise the institutional context of urban regeneration and development, generally, the real relationship between the ZICDS and ZoDFS, in particular and implications for the ZICRDP. In this regard, the status and effectiveness of both structures is addressed in relation to the ZICRDP and as to whether their context constitutes a fragmentation, integration, focused co-ordination or other institutional form. Other objective was to identify any challenges of this institutional context and to make some suggestions as to how these might be ameliorated. Methods of the study included literature review relating to specialised urban development, regeneration and planning institutions in the global South, generally, to an extent, the global North, and in particular, Africa and Ghana; apart from the concepts of urban regeneration. Actual field study involved face-to-face in-depth interviews with key actors in the national and strategic development sectors, which yielded entirely qualitative data. Respondents included the former Director-General of the National Development Commission (NDPC), the former Policy and Planning Director of the erstwhile MICZD - now ZICDS - and the current Senior Research, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer of the ZoDFS. First, the concept and meaning of urban regeneration are explained. Second, the global context of urban development institutionalisation and governance is surveyed to inform practices in Ghana. Third, the context of the ZICRDP is set out. Fourth, the actual appraisal of the ZICDS and ZoDFS is made. Fifth, conclusions are drawn, based on the whole study, including recommendations for ameliorating the identified challenges.

2. Concept and Meaning of Urban Regeneration

Urban regeneration means giving new birth to a declined and degenerated built environment, making it new again, whether wholly or partly. It is a comprehensive, integrated, inclusive, usually partnership-based and sustainable process of the economic, social, physical, environmental, cultural and ecological transformation of the declined towns and cities (Ofori, 1997; Roberts, 2000; Couch and Fraser, 2003; Jones and Evan, 2013; Tallon, 2015; Asante et al., 2015). So, it is a determined and deliberate process that seeks to reverse urban decay and degeneration (de Beer, 2018). And the built environment may cover formal and both recognised or unrecognised informal settlements and slums (Hassan, 2012; United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2003; African Planning Association and UN-HABITAT, 2013; Adama, 2020), as occurs extensively in the global South (Deuskar, 2019). Some writers tend to emphasise, generally, fewer sectors of urban regeneration (Roberts, 2000; Couch and Fraser, 2013; Republic of Ghana, 2016) and mostly, less explicit about the cultural dimension, which limits sustainability in conceptual and practical terms. Others are more comprehensive and explicitly indicate all sectors of urban regeneration (Jones and Evans, 2013; Tallon, 2013). Because of its multifaceted nature and citywide implications, it must involve all stakeholders in the area under regeneration and, therefore, include their full participation. Indeed, urban regeneration is, best, partnership-led. So, urban regeneration is conceptualised and defined in the present study as: a process of comprehensive, integrated, sustainable, participatory and sustainable remaking of degenerated towns and cities for economic, social, cultural, physical, environmental, ecological transformation of these, through the design and implementation of appropriate policies, projects, programmes, plans and strategies.

Commonly, however, urban regeneration is distinguished from urban renewal but many practitioners and writers tend to mix the two concepts and expressions (e.g., Republic of Ghana, 2011, 2012; Egolom and Emoh, 2017; Oyinleye et al., 2017; Amoah et al., 2018). However, urban renewal tends to take more of a physical form, sometimes including environmental elements. It is a sub-mode of urban regeneration and, itself, has its sub-modal forms. These include redevelopment, renovation, revitalisation, redevelopment, reinvigoration, rehabilitation, rejuvenation as well as community and slum upgrading broadly within the framework of urban regeneration (African Planning Association and UN-HABITAT, 2013; Adama, 2020). However, the various urban transformation modes may also be used at different times/stages of historical urban development interventions in particular contexts, depicting the varying conceptual emphases over the periods (Roberts, 2000; Tallon, 2013; Hall, 2014). In the present context, urban renewal is seen as: a strategic process of physical intervention and change in derelict and degenerated built environments through replacement and reviving of worn-out or non-existent fabric and infrastructure, making uses and spaces new, improving or upgrading the quality, function and conservation or preservation of these, through implementation of appropriate plans and projects. However, delivering urban regeneration and renewal is absolutely dependent on a focused and

committed institutional and governance structure and agency.

3. Urban Transformation Institutions

One argument made in this study is the need to establish an appropriate national/regional/local institutional vehicle and specialised agency for delivering urban development and regeneration as exemplified in the GAMADA, ZICDS and ZoDFS and practised in many countries in the global North and South. A few cases, globally, are reviewed to illustrate the importance of such urban transformation institutions (Khaoya, 2011). In the late 1980s, a Land Development Corporation (LDP) was created in Hong Kong for comprehensive urban development in a sector that had been private sector-dominated in urban renewal programmes. Hong Kong's LDP aimed to quicken private sector redevelopment in targeted areas; encourage landowner participation; improve the quality of economic development benefits, through effective land assembly; ensure equity treatment of tenants, reduce government subsidies and improve resettlement practices (Khaoya, 2011). In 2000, Hong Kong replaced its LDP with an Urban Renewal Authority, with the mandate for a more improved renewal of decayed urban areas. However, the Authority was challenged in addressing the scarcity of redevelopment sites and land assembly processes; adequate re-housing arrangements; effective community and resident participation.

Similar efforts were made in Seoul, South Korea in the 1960s and in Tokyo, Japan in 2004. In the former, urban transformation intervention aimed to undertake slum clearance and ensure arrangements for compensation and resettlement. But Seoul's experience indicated the very politically sensitive nature of urban clearance due to the violence it tended to attract, compensation and resettlement issues. In Tokyo, a City Revitalisation Panel was created under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister, to make urban regeneration and renewal plans for cities like Tokyo and Osaka. Similar to Hong Kong and Seoul, regeneration and renewal were given the high-level political attention of the ruling government because of power-relations, electoral and wealth politics. In other jurisdiction, Singapore established an Urban Redevelopment Authority in 1990, with responsibility for town planning and policy, land acquisition, urban formation and sales of developed properties. The initiative aimed to redevelop 2-3 storey century-old shop houses, which involved the mass relocation of original residents and businesses, with effective arrangement made for their temporary accommodation. Examples in Africa include local Urban Development Agencies in Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town in South Africa (Ntshona, 2013; Republic of South Africa, undated).

Illustrating, further, with a European experience in the UK, Urban Development Corporations (UDCs) were established in 1979 and operated in targeted, more declined areas till 1997. In 1999, the UDCs were replaced with Urban Regeneration Companies (URCs), which were created to generate property-based form of economic development. The URCs depended more on public-private interests and were also staffed by urban regeneration professionals. Both UDCs and URCs tended to cross boundaries between Local Authority areas but the URCs operated mostly within these. However, some of the URCs were later transformed into City or Economic Development Companies (CDCs/EDCs) in the mid- to late 2000s (Henderson (S. R.), 2014). Furthermore, various versions of the EDCs were created, depending on the urban policy of the government in office. These included Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs), Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) and Local Partnerships (LPs) (Henderson (S. R.), 2014). The third structure was more focused on partnerships, greater attraction of private and investor interests, creation of businesses and jobs. Upon their limited effectiveness, the URCs were rolled out. In the partnerships, however, project officers gained skills more through learning than being led by legally defined functions and they 'became more confident', more flexible and realistic about project design responsibilities (Henderson (S. R.), 2014: 652).

However, a commonality of all the noted urban transformation institutions is on the reversal of urban degeneration, decline and decay, in the case of the global South, including slum upgrading, which tends to be more typical due to the spontaneous nature of urbanisation in the developing countries (African Planning Association and UN-HABITAT, 2013). And most of the urban regeneration and renewal initiatives were also under established partnerships/partnership agencies and equally area/project-targeted.

3.1 Urban development institutions in Ghana

In the case of Ghana, a number of institutions share in urban policy, regeneration and renewal and development interventions, making the sector fractured or fragmented. Leading organisation is the NDPC, which advises the President on matters of development planning and policy and acts as a co-ordinating structure for all hierarchical and sector development and planning functions, including urban policy and transformation interventions. Second, the LUSPA, responsible for human settlement planning and development, under the Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology and Innovation, which has provisions for making urban regeneration interventions in blighted and declined built environments. Third, the MLGDRD, which has responsibility for the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies - Local Authorities - & the Regional Co-ordinating Councils, unelected regional governance bodies, the Rural and Urban Development Unit (RUDU) as its main urban policy co-ordination structures. Fourth, Ministry of Works and Housing, with its Housing and Hydrology Directorates.

Fifth, Ministry of Sanitation and Water Resources, with its Water and Sanitation Directorates. Sixth, the erstwhile Ministry of Special Development Initiatives, now the Special Development Initiatives Secretariat, which has responsibilities for the Development Authorities, in turn, focused on the electoral constituencies as their programme areas. Seventh, the ZICDS and ZoDFS. Eighth, the Ministry of Roads and Highways and under it, the Department of Urban Roads and Ghana Highways Authority. Ninth, Ministry of Transport, including the Urban Transportation (Infrastructure and Services) Department and Department of Feeder Roads. However, at the time of writing in September 2023, Government has initiated efforts to establish a Ghana National Roads Authority (GNRA) and integrate the existing Ghana Highways Authority, Department of Urban Roads and Department of Feeder (mostly rural roads) within it. Tenth, Ministry of Railways Development and under it, the Ghana Railways Company and several urban rail stations. Eleventh, Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, with responsibility for publicly-owned urban lands. Twelfth, the National Disaster Management Organisation (NADMO). And there are various Non-Governmental, Civil Service, Community-Based and private sector organisations operating in the urban sector.

A field interview with the ex-Director-General of the NDPC exposed some challenges of the urban sector in Ghana. Rightly, he indicated that ‘the whole urban sector is unprogressive and far behind any initiatives and efforts to move it apace’ (Interview, January 2021). Indeed, UN-HABITAT (2009: 6) similarly observed about Accra metropolis that:

‘It is common knowledge in that physical development “runs faster” than planning. In this light, there are some areas which are basically unplanned or where inadequate planning has been carried out by the land owner who sometimes attempt to integrate it into the statutory land use plan of Accra. The problem has contributed to the haphazard development and slum conditions in some areas of Accra.’

The respondent was also emphatic about the situation across the country, the fact that ‘most of the towns and cities were unplanned originally’ (Interview, January 2021).

In relation to the urban development sector, the former NDPC Director-General observed that it was ‘deeply fragmented in institutional and governance terms.’ He recounted that the LUSPA, formerly Town and Country Planning Department has, historically, changed institutional/establishment context some 18 times. And that ‘its current placement within the Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology and Innovation was’, itself, the outcome of ‘lobbying by leaders of the Authority’ (Interview, January 2021), indicating the political influence involved in the creation of the LUSPA. Respondent also suggested that LUSPA would be best within the Ministry of Local Government, Decentralisation and Rural Development. However, it appears that LUSPA feels operationally more comfortable being under its current Ministry.

The ex-NDPC Director-General also indicated that the slow pace of the urban development sector was, generally, due to its fragmented nature and the complexity of urban policy, generally, in the country. In the case of a lower-middle income and African country, like Ghana, such institutional fragmentation is a huge challenge to the governance of urban regeneration and renewal processes and practices. This situation also deeply affects the financing of urban intervention initiatives and the co-ordination of these, in the context of split-up budgetary allocations. Moreover, ‘despite the existence of LUSPA as the central organisation responsible for urban planning, it is always far behind the issues’ (Respondent, January 2021). Such weakness is further illustrated in both the slow implementation of Regional Development Frameworks and Structure Plans and the fact that some of these ‘have been made and yet not being implemented’, mainly due to lack of funding (Respondent).

Interaction with the ex-NDPC Director-General also revealed the equally ‘weak, virtually non-existent community participation practices’ (Interview, January 2021), despite the fact that section 40-48 of the Local Governance Act, 2016 (Act 936) (Republic of Ghana, 2016b) provides for participatory governance in the local planning process. Respondent cited the experience of some residents of Nima, an inner-city Zongo community and slum, where a housing regeneration project was executed. First, the residents were relocated during the project and rehoused on completion. But ‘it changed the livelihood sources not for the better’ (Respondent). Before the housing regeneration, their residences were connected to their various livelihood sources, such as artisan work and trading spaces but on commissioning, these were denied them and they were given just the physical residential unit. It meant that the effectiveness and consultative planning processes under the project were limited and also ‘amounted to an economic displacement’ (Respondent). Further, this experience indicated that such displacement may be sector and space related, worst when residents are denied both (Respondent).

In Ghana, the Land Use and Spatial Planning Act, 2016 (Act 925) provides a formal definition of urban regeneration in the Interpretation section only. However, section 103 of the Act provides for the redevelopment of an area of blighted properties, land, including vacant land by the District Planning Authority or landowner for the purpose of improving and renewing the environment (sub-section (4)). The need for redevelopment is determined in terms of several criteria, including irregularity of plots or parcels, inadequate streets, lack of spatial accessibility, diversity of use constraining development control, incompatibility with existing planning instruments, adverse environmental impacts, overcrowding and population density effects, sanitation and drainage problems, incidence of crime due to the nature of the area, constraints on other legitimate users (sub-

section (3)). And although the Act also defines “planning entity” in the Interpretation section as ‘the Authority, Regional Coordinating Council, Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies, Ministries, Departments and Agencies and Special Development Authorities’, it does not explicitly provide for the establishment of a specialised urban development and regeneration agency. However, this provision indicates that such an institution could be created, like the cases of GAMADA, ZICDS and ZoDFS.

4. Zongo and Inner-Cities Regeneration and Development Programme

Zongos are strangers or immigrant settler quarters in most West African towns and cities. In Ghana, formation of these started in the early 1800s, initially by Hausa traders from northern Nigeria. Generally, however, some settlers originated from other Sahelian countries, including Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, etc. Since then, rural-urban migrants in Ghana and many more immigrants from neighbouring countries have also settled in the Zongos. Today, the Zongo is home to the poor, low and some middle-income groups from virtually all ethnic and religious groups in Ghana. Majority of the Zongos is located in the inner-city areas. Statutorily, ‘Zongo community’ means a heterogeneous community comprising various ethnic groups with different religions where (a) the predominant religion is Islam; (b) the predominant language is Hausa; and (c) the community is characterised by poor living conditions’ (Section 31, Act 964) (Republic of Ghana, 2017d).

Historically, most inner-city areas in the global South, especially in Africa, have become declined and degenerated due to the lack of investment, activity and population congestion, poor attention to orderly development and weak planning systems. And the Zongos, mostly in the inner-cities, are the most deprived, degenerated, disadvantaged and poorest communities, with the most vulnerable and excluded people and neglected parts of the towns and cities. Thus virtually all Zongos are slums. There are between 1,000 and 3,000 Zongo communities in Ghana, depending on the reporting source, and they contain a total population of between 4.6 and 5 million residents (Republic of Ghana, 2019; Jafaru, 2020). Like most inner-cities areas, globally (Ribera-Fumaz, 2009), Zongos have become politically and electorally attractive to the political elite in the contemporary era. In 2018, the sector Minister at the time stated that (Graphic Online, 2017): ‘Over the years, these communities have been left behind in development planning and their needs have been poorly identified, leading to inadequate and sometimes inappropriate interventions in the provision of social services as well as physical infrastructure.’ The ex-Minister also cautioned against any future government scrapping the new Zongo development institutions (GhanaTrade.com.gh, 2018). Similarly, in January of the same year, the President declared that (GhanaWeb, 2017; ATLFM, 2018): ‘The deprivation and under development of people in the Zongo is not something that healthy society can tolerate.’

As one of its flagship policies, the ruling government launched the ZICRDP, with the establishment of the erstwhile MICZD (e/MICZD) in 2017 but re-designated it into the ZICDS, due to financial challenges in 2020. Allied to this, government also created the Zongo Development Fund under Act 964, with its Board and Secretariat (ZoDFS) as a technical wing and fund-raising arm of the ZICDS and both secretariats report directly to the Office of the President. The relationship between the two structures is somewhat unclear and it appears that they operate as parallel agencies. So, this study aimed to explore and clarify the functional and institutional contexts and relations of both Zongo and inner-city transformation structures.

4.1 Functions of the Zongo and Inner-Cities Development Secretariat (ZICDS)

The ZICDS was established by statutory proclamation. Its *mandate* is ‘to formulate and oversee the implementation of policies, programmes and projects to alleviate poverty within Zongo and inner-city communities and ensure that these communities become inclusively developed and prosperous’ (ZICDS, 2022a). Second, its *goal* is ‘to facilitate a broad-based infrastructure, social and economic development of inner-city and Zongo communities within the context of inclusive, resilient, safe human settlements and sustainable urban development’, reflecting the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), Goal 11 on cities and other human settlements (United Nations, 2015; Republic of Ghana, 2019: 1; ZICDS, 2022b). Third, ZICDS’s *vision* is ‘to have prosperous, integrated, inclusive, and sustainably developed Inner-City and Zongo Communities’ (ZICDS, 2022b). Fourth, its *mission* is ‘to coordinate, collaborate, and facilitate critical interventions through affirmative actions that progressively address social, economic, and infrastructural deficits to promote and transform the socio-economic development of the Inner-City and Zongo Communities’. Under its mission, ZICDS is further required to effectively co-ordinate, supervise and monitor activities of the ZoDFS. It also provides policy directions to the Fund, apart from serving ‘as the interface between the President’ and the Fund (ZICDS, 2022a). So, it ‘transmits the President’s vision to the Fund and reports activities of the Fund to’ him (Interview with Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, ZoDFS, August 2022).

ZICDS’s policy direction is, therefore, guided by the SDGs, particularly Goal 11 and the National Medium Term Development Policy Framework (NMTDPF), which was known as ‘Vision 2020: First Step’ in the 1996-2000 periods; ‘Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy I’, 2003-2005 periods; ‘Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy II’, 2006-2009 periods, and since 2014, as the ‘Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda’

(GSGDA). The NMTDPF/GSGDA is issued every 4-year period as the national strategic development and planning policy framework. Itself, is derived from the Comprehensive Programme of Economic and Social Policies (CPESPs), which is provided by each new government, on assuming office, covering its term, usually two 4-year terms.

NMTDPF/GSGDA has 7 main policy goals. First, enhancing inclusive and equitable access to, and participation in education, generally. Second, providing skills, training and employment opportunities for the youth. Third, upgrading existing slums and preventing the occurrence of new ones. Fourth, promoting behavioural change for enhanced development outcomes, e.g., Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) practices. Fifth, developing and maintaining sports and other recreational infrastructure. Sixth, promoting sustainable tourism and preservation of historical, cultural and natural heritage. Seventh, enhancing peace and security (Republic of Ghana, 2019). Importantly, the GSGDA provides the cascading context for the preparation of the 4-year district and national development plans, apart from, regional, sector and plans. And the ZICDS strategic programmes and projects are also constituted on the same basis (Table 1) (LinkedIn, 2021).

4.2 Functions of the Zongo Development Fund Secretariat (ZoDFS)

Unlike the ZICDS, the ZoDFS is established under formal statutory legislation, the Zongo Development Act, 2017 (Act 964). It is managed by a Board of Trustees, including a chairman, representatives of the Ministry of Finance, National Chief Imam, National Council of Zongo Chiefs, National Council of Muslim Chiefs, National Christian Council, National House of Chiefs, the Chief Executive Officer of the Fund and 2 others, including a woman (Section 7, Act 964; Republic of Ghana, 2017). Its sources of finance include allocations by Parliament; grants, loans, other voluntary contributions; Internally Generated Funds (IGF); further lawfully payable monies (section 5) and it can also raise funds (section 8, sub-section (2) (g), Act 964). Main function of the ZoDF is ‘to provide financial resources to develop and transform the social and economic conditions of Zongo communities; and to provide for the management of the Fund and for related matters’ (Preamble, Act 964). Act 964 has 6 specific objects and these have been recognised into the physical, environmental, social, economic and cultural dimensions of urban regeneration and development (Table 2) in this study. The Act is also meant to cover the inner-city areas but these are not specifically and explicitly provided for; even the sector Minister is referred to as ‘the Minister responsible for Zongo Development’ (Section 31, Act 964). However, generally, the ZICRDP is under the responsibility of a National Co-ordinator.

5. Institutional Fragmentation, Integration or Focused Co-ordination?

This section explores and appraises which of fragmentation, integration, focused co-ordination, all these or other condition pertain to the institutional design and reflect the effective functioning of the ZICDS and ZoDFS and implications for the governance of the urban regeneration and slum upgrading sector in Ghana, generally, the ZICRDP in particular. Virtually, the ZICDS and ZoDFS report independently to the Office of the President and as the latter’s respondent indicated that ‘Administratively, the ZoDF reports to the Office of Government Machinery’ and ‘to the Ministry of Finance’ (Interview, August 2022). In itself, this links the institutional structures directly to political and administrative power at the highest level, which has an enhanced chance of promoting or ensuring programme success. However, the respondent admitted that these arrangements make the ‘Fund and Secretariat relationships fairly complex’, principally due to the fragmentation of agencies (Interview, August 2022). But administrative link between ZICDS and ZoDFS is supposed to be through the Co-ordinator who leads the former, and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the latter and its Board. However, ZICDS holds responsibility for the ZoDF Board through ‘directives issued by the President’s Office’ (Interview, August 2022). This means that the fragmentation of ZICRDP institutions limits the institutional effectiveness of the the sector.

Indeed, ‘the Co-ordinator of the ZICDS has called for a closer collaboration between the ZoDF and the Secretariat for a “harmonious” and smooth working relations to achieve the President’s vision and mandate’ (LinkedIn, 2022). Obviously, fragmentation of the agencies results in the lack of of ‘closer collaboration’, causing rather disharmonious and less ‘smooth working relations’ between them. And the Co-ordinator added that ‘since the two organizations are working on the same vision and goals, working in sync would enhance effective delivery of the policy outcomes’ (LinkedIn, 2022), still underlining the lack of effective collaborative, co-ordinative, unified and simultaneous delivery between the two agencies. Such lack of effective co-operation between them is also reflected in the fact that their projects tend to be duplicitous (Table 1 and 2). This may be justified, however, on the grounds of the sheer population of Zongo and inner-city communities and the huge challenge of developing and regenerating these. So, it would not seem that the two structures were ‘independent as such’ (Interview with Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, ZoDFS, August 2022). And it is to avoid such difficulties that they set up a ‘Joint Project Committee’ (Respondent). One objective was ‘to reduce conflicts of focus’ (Respondent). Second, ‘to develop new programmes and properly brief, to reflect the President’s vision’ (Respondent). In practice, however, agency adherence to operating this joint structure is less effective than intended, despite the realisation of both organisations of the strategic need to achieve this aim.

Ineffective collaboration, co-ordination and harmonious delivery of the ZICDS and ZoDFS, certainly affects the joint and group performance of the sector's governance. Thus Co-ordinator of the former 'explained that a teamwork will ensure that the two organizations are singing from the same page and "wave length" on all issues' (LinkedIn, 2022). A factor accounting for such ineffective 'teamwork' is because the ZoDF is 'not fully under the Secretariat but the Office of the Co-ordinator is much higher than the Office of the Chief Executive Officer of the Fund, who reports through the Office of the Chief of Staff' at the Office of the President (Interview with Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, ZoDFS, August 2022). Immediately, this means that the ZICDS and ZoDFS are not equal partners and they report through somewhat different channels to the Office of the President. So, they tended to communicate at different "wave lengths". Indeed, the limited collaborative, co-ordinative and teamwork engagements between them also affected the effectiveness of their communicative processes and practices.

It would seem, therefore, that there is a kind of conflict between ZICDS and ZoDFS. However, the respondent Monitoring and Evaluation Officer of the latter indicated that 'the separation between the Secretariat and the Fund' did not affect the latter's work (Interview, August 2022). Although, 'previously work retarded but not now; the system now more efficient' (Respondent). Retardation was due to the 'quick change' between the e/MICZD and the ZICDS and the Fund during the 2017-2022 periods, which 'came all of a sudden and it took time to adjust to it' (Respondent). Delays in the institutional re-designation tended to cause some temporary tension between the two agencies. It appears, however, that there is some competition between them, again considering the details of Table 1 and 2 and their pursuing, virtually, the same projects across the Zongo communities. Once more, this may still be due to the enormity of the regeneration and development challenge. Nevertheless, it still contributed to creating a duplicitous situation in project delivery. However, the respondent indicated that 'no competition or conflict at the moment' (Interview, August 2022). But respondent was emphatic about the delay in establishing the Fund:

'Originally, President said it took time to establish the Fund. Political imperative was such that Ghanaians were not patient with it - i.e. the Ministry playing a political role. So, when the Fund became established because the Ministry had prepared for it, so now the Fund now delivers politically; i.e. according to the vision of the Government.'

The e/MICZD was established, then it prepared the grounds for initiation of the Fund. Delays in the institutional change, however, did not really cause any conflict between the two structures. However, it underlined the political expectation of the affected communities for a faster response to addressing their challenges, which response was slow and limited, if not constrained.

Processes of the institutional change and actual delivery sounded out the relationship between the 'political' and 'technical' functions of the ZICDS and ZoDFS, respectively. According to the latter's Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, the 'Secretariat' is a 'political and administrative office'; the 'Fund' is 'the technical arm of the Secretariat' (Interview, August 2022). However, the 'ZoDFS does best to implement the President's vision' because 'the utility of the Fund has the political vision to focus on the work' (Respondent). The whole programme is part of the political agenda of the ruling government and the ZICDS is the main political channel with the Zongo community. Such political functions included mediating ethnic and/or tribal and religious conflicts and managing the peace in the Zongo and inner-city communities. This included promoting stakeholder relations, including those between and among supporters of the various political parties in the communities. By its technical mandate, the ZoDFS is meant to focus mainly on needs-based surveys, project planning and implementation processes. But nothing really prevents the ZICDS from doing same, which tended to contribute to the duplicitous delivery between the two agencies.

Being the political channel and arm of the programme, ZICDS would seem to be more susceptible to political influences or interference. However, the ZoDFS Monitoring and Evaluation Officer indicated that equally, they tended to experience much of such political interference. Often, Assemblymen and Assemblywomen, District, Municipal and Metropolitan Chief Executives and Members of Parliament wrote to them and made other forms of contact 'lobbying' for certain projects and developments in Zongos and inner-city areas within their electoral constituencies (Interview, August 2022). Such non-programmatic project distribution has received the attention of other writers, including Akanbang (2018), Korah et al. (2018), with Deuskar (2019) on slum communities in the developing countries, generally, as part of the political economy of urban planning and development (Flyvbjerg, 1998; 2003). In whatever case, such political interference limited participation and inclusiveness (Respondent). It also created tendencies for short-term, less fair and realistic decision-making. However, as a matter of political economy of the decisions and enactments of politicians, these may not seem unrealistic decision-making to them (Drazen, 2002; Flyvbjerg, 2003; Ribera-Fumaz, 2009; Mosco, 2009; Henderson (T.), 2015; Adetoye, 2016; Acheampong, 2019; Frieden, 2020). Nevertheless, ZoDFS recognised that avoiding such political interference called for more 'empirical' and 'needs-based' approach and involvement of 'other stakeholders', which also created 'the scientific basis and the role of political judgement would reduce' (Respondent).

Discussions and analyses relating to the institutional and broad governance effectiveness of the ZICRDP raised issues relating to the need for a solidly effective integration of the two agencies. In the view of the ZoDFS's Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, 'if the two were brought together, they would worry about politics', more because of the political character of ZICDS, through which any political constraints were likely to flow from, with the political elite and other such actors behind these (Interview, August 2022). But the respondent indicated that 'if an integrated agency would increase efficiency, yes' (Interview). As noted previously, the constraints of limited collaboration, co-ordination and communication raised serious issues of institutional efficiency. An organisational integration would promote an improvement in these institutional functions and more evidence-based programme delivery, including a professional project planning, which would also significantly reduce 'political judgement', if not eliminate it. Otherwise, the respondent seemed to indicate that it would be best to keep ZICDS and ZoDFS apart, 'as they are at the moment' (Interview) only due to likely relational and operational constraints.

Issues of the possible integration of the ZICDS and ZoDFS should also be seen within the wider context of the explicit institutionalisation of the urban development and regeneration sector as pertains to other jurisdictions cited previously, and, generally, in Ghana. The case of GAMADA is also seen as having the potential of a demonstration effect on the other Local Authorities to create their urban development and regeneration agencies. In Ghana, such an institution, could be linked to the Rural and Urban Development Unit of the Ministry of Local Government, Decentralisation and Rural Development (MLGDRD), Land Use and Spatial Development Authority (LUSPA) and/or National Development Planning Commission (NDPC), in which case, the RUDU would require re-designing. Otherwise, a specialised national urban development and/or regeneration, including slum upgrading functions could be established as an umbrella institution for the sector as practised in other realms, including Hong Kong/China, South Korea, Singapore and South Africa, for example. It could also be placed under the Special Development Secretariat, like the Regional Development Authorities. Such urban institutional development could be justified in terms of efficiency and effective co-ordination, collaboration, co-operation, communication and evidence-based programme management.

The ZICRDP is a political plus for the ruling government because it is a novel and unique flagship urban policy and programme. In this regard, it provides an enviable ray of image and prestige for the ruling political party and government. Indeed, the Zongo and inner-city communities became a sensitive part of the electoral and political constituencies of the ruling political actors and elite. For these reasons, it is likely to create a political ballgame among political parties who would like to dribble it among themselves and in their own way. One of the tactics, in this case, is likely to be a justification for the re-organisation of the regeneration programme and implementation agencies on this basis or according to the political economy of their own urban policy. Politics of efficiency is likely to be perceived as effective integration of the ZICDS and ZoDFS or some other institutional re-designing of the two agencies. In relation to the future and succession of the ZICRDP, the previous sector Minister 'warned that "any future government who scrapped the Zongo ministry" was simply an "enemy to Zongo people"' (GhanaTrade.com.gh, 2018). He 'added that he never expected any government to change the status quo since that amounts to doing a disservice to the Zongo folks' GhanaTrade.com.gh, 2018). However, it is likely that any future political party and government might want to justify reform and re-organisation in terms of financial efficiency, budgetary co-ordination, effective planning and programme implementation, apart from the political economy of their own policy agenda, otherwise roll out the intervention and institutional structures (Henderson, 2014; Frieden, 2020; Adhikari, 2021).

6. Conclusions

Focus of the study was on the need to reform the institutional context of urban policy, generally, urban regeneration and renewal in particular, based on lessons learned from other jurisdictions and experiences in Ghana, especially those of the ZICDS and ZoDFS, under the ZICRDP. Urban regeneration is complex because of its comprehensive nature, including urban renewal, which has its sub-modes, including redevelopment, renovation, rehabilitation, revitalisation and community/slum upgrading. Therefore, its institutional and governance context is similarly complex. While such complexity also characterises the regional development sector, however, its institutional development has, historically, been better than in the urban sector.

The urban development sector in Ghana is highly fragmented among a multiple public sector institutions and organisations, all aimed at achieving transformation of the built environment. Second, urban sector institutions are tardy in responding to urban change, including trends of degeneration, decline and decay, with the existing institutions lacking the design, funding and responsiveness to manage such change. Third, the urban institutional sector lacks co-ordination, co-operation and collaboration in tackling urban change, generally. Because of these constraints, the available budgetary resources are equally split up and not used through unified agency and interventions.

Urban regeneration and development institutions in some global South and North countries were instructive. These included the UK, Hong Kong in China, South Korea, Japan, Singapore and South Africa. In the case of

South Africa, there were both local and national focus on urban regeneration and development institutions. Apparently, these urban sector institutions also changed through reform, with change in the regeneration trends and transformation processes. Urban regeneration and development institutional character in Ghana and some other developing countries is less flexible, apart from other typical constraints indicated previously. At the local level, only Ga Mashie Development Agency (GAMADA) exists as an urban regeneration, slum upgrading and transformation organisation. It started as an informal institution and was later officially recognised and placed under Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA). However, it promises potential demonstration effect in other towns and cities of Ghana as, for instance, exemplified in the case of South African cities. At the national level, the only equivalent of a strategic urban regeneration and development initiative is the ZICRDP, which is managed by the ZICDS and ZoDFS. Although Act 925 includes broad provisions for the creation of specialised national urban development and regeneration organisation, authority or agency, no such attempt has been made, yet.

Meanwhile, the ZICDS and ZoDFS focus on only the Zongo and inner-city communities but provisions relating to the latter are far less explicit, all focused virtually on the Zongos only. However, these portray the urban sector institutional challenges noted previously and raise issues about their character and effectiveness. Although the ZICDS is supposed to co-ordinate the ZICRDP and have responsibility for the ZoDF and its Secretariat and Board, the two structures tend to operate somewhat independently; they are less co-ordinated, collaborative, co-operative, each reporting to the Office of the President. However, as in the other jurisdictions referred to, both structures are functionally linked to the highest level of political power, the ZICRDP being a flagship initiative of the ruling government, a context that promises resources and promotes delivery. Nevertheless, the existing institutional arrangement or design constraints and complicates programme delivery, the two structures virtually competing or conflicting in their delivery. Although they created a “Joint Project Committee” to deal with such issues, this was less effective in programmatic terms and driving a unified and really joined-up delivery. Their operations and engagements were, therefore, fragmented and sometimes duplicitous. Against the sea of challenging slum upgrading interventions, duplicity in project planning and implementation between different Zongo communities was not a bad thing. However, an effectively focused programme would promote the targeting and time-scale of programme delivery and coverage. This would also achieve wider visions, goals and more synchronised interventions.

Lack of effective team-working of the ZICDS and ZoDFS also affected communication between them, as if they sang from different song sheets. This was also reflected in the ‘political’ nature of the ZICDS and ‘technical’ nature of the ZoDFS. Political character of the ZICDS included managing relations between sections in Zongos, between Zongos and the Government and mediating any ethnic, tribal and religious conflicts within the communities. Technical character of the ZoDFS was essentially focused on needs-based assessment, project planning and management. However, both structures and engagements were susceptible to political manipulation and interference by political actors, including local and national politicians and Local Authority leadership. This tendency and situation and the other challenges noted previously justify the need to physically and administratively integrate the two structures in an effectively unified agency or authority. Of course, such political challenges tended to undermine empirically-based and programmatic delivery. Otherwise, the two structures could represent two clearly separate or different aspects of the ZICRDP than currently. But in view of the fact that both would still be linked and report to the Office of the President, apart from other statutory institutions, effective and efficient integration of the two structures would likely be more worthwhile. Such integration would also ameliorate the challenges of less effective co-ordination, collaboration, co-operation, communication, team-working and address the noted fragmentation in their delivery.

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Table 1 Statutory functions of the Zongo and Inner-Cities Development Secretariat

<i>Main Functions</i>	<i>Specific Responsibilities</i>
Economic Empowerment (Economic and Social Regeneration)	Local business promotion; economic development and support; business service centres; market facilitation; innovation and technical hubs ('Zongo Valley'); educational facilities.
Infrastructure and Sanitation Enhancement (Physical and environmental regeneration)	Access and drainage; alley pavement; water, sanitation and hygiene; bailey bridges.
Heritage Preservation (Cultural Regeneration)	Documentation of local history; cuisine promotion; ethnic-religious dialogue.
Security and Crime Control (Physical, Social and Environmental Regeneration)	Street lighting; peace workshop; Alternative Dispute Resolution processes; inter- and intra-faith dialogue; Community, political and social relations.

Source: Author's tabulation and revision from LinkedIn, 2021.

Table 2 Structure and dimensions of the Zongo and Inner-Cities Regeneration and Development Programme

<i>Main Dimensions of Act 964 Provisions</i>	<i>Specific Interventions</i>
Physical regeneration and slum upgrading (Section 2, sub-section (2) (a))	Roads, streets, lanes, bailey bridges, street lighting, basic amenities and services, surface drains and drainage system.
Environmental regeneration and slum upgrading (section 2, sub-section (2) (a))	Sanitation, waste management, water systems, community security and safety, greening, fire protection, inter-ethnic/inter-tribal conflict and peace management.
Social regeneration and slum upgrading (Section 2, sub-section (2) (b), (h))	Educational facilities, educational sponsorship and scholarships, technical and vocational education, teacher accommodation facility, healthcare facilities, social protection, social empowerment.
Economic regeneration and slum upgrading (Section 2, sub-section (2) (c), (d))	Supporting local businesses; creating jobs; improving incomes and lives of residents; financing youth employment training; skills development; investment management.
Cultural regeneration and slum upgrading (Section 2, sub-section (2) (e))	Promotion of culture and arts; promoting sports development; supporting cuisine development; promoting traditional and religious festivals; promoting development and preservation and material heritage; promoting religious tolerance.

Source: Author's tabulation.




Figure 1 Map of Ghana: Political-administrative regions

Source: Central Regional Office, Land Use and Spatial Planning Authority, Cape Coast