

# The Impact of Policing Strategies in Combating Cattle Rustling in Tot Division, Marakwet District

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## Abstract

The people of Kerio valley have for a very long time greatly suffered from Marakwet–Pokot cattle rustling which has defied all manner of interventions from all stakeholders. This study assesses the effects of policing strategies on cattle rustling in Tot Division, Marakwet County. It involved 49 respondents stratified selected from the local youth, women and elders, and 28 police respondents from various police units in the area. Some 14 key informants purposely selected from provincial administration, local churches, NGOs and CBOS dealing with conflicts, participated in the study. Closed and open ended questionnaires, key informant guide and field observations, were used for data collection. Results showed that peace building and restoration, police officers deployment, disarmament, arrest and prosecution, intelligence gathering, stopping illegal arms and livestock trade, laws and policy framework, community policing and free and compulsory education, were used to deter rustling. Cultural support for cattle rustling, political influence, illegal arms and livestock trade, poverty and youth unemployment, were found to impede policing in the area. The study concluded that policing strategies employed in Tot were not very effective and did not adequately address conditions that encourage cattle rustling among pastoralists. The study recommended that the government conduct continuous disarmament and man Kenyan porous borders to prevent fire arms entry so as to guarantee the security of the pastoralists living along the border.

**Key words:** Pastoralism; Cattle Rustling; Policing Strategies; Peace Building; Tot Division; Marakwet District

## 1.0 Introduction

Despite the Kenyan government efforts to build and restore peace, disarm local population, deploy many police officers, stop illegal trade and clamp on illegal livestock business in Tot Division of Marakwet District, cattle rustling activities seem not likely to end soon (Amene, 2009). Records of Kenya Police (2005) show that since the infamous Pokot raid on Marakwet that took place in 1976 the government established a General Service Unit (GSU) camp and a police station in the area, and added an Anti Stock Theft Unit (ASTU) police camp in Chesongoch after the deadly 1992 raid and Mogil police station in 2001 following another heavy raid in the year. The government also has a strong force of armed police reservists and many administration police officers deployed in all chiefs' camps since the 1992 raid. But even with this high concentration of police facilities and personnel that makes the police-citizen ratio of 1:62, the phenomenon of cattle rustling still persists in the area (Kamenju, 2003).

Many researchers agree that cattle rustling is a major cause of insecurity in pastoralist North Rift including Tot Division in Marakwet District (Muiruri, 2009). For a very long time, the activity has led to great suffering to the people of Kerio Valley and it has defied all interventions from the local community, civil society and the state (Kiptoo, 2010). Indeed cattle rustling has existed in the area for countless generations but it took a deadly dimension in 1992 when 700 people including police officers lost their lives, 600 houses put to ashes, 39 schools closed, thousands of livestock stolen and many families displaced. Many of the displaced left the area to settle in safe places in Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu, Keiyo and other parts of Marakwet thus disrupting people's lives and development activities in the area. Since then the activity has become violent and many people have been displaced and farms have been left fallow due to increased intercommunity and cross border raids (KHRC, 2001).

There are several reasons that make it possible for cattle rustling to thrive in the Marakwet District. Amene (2009) attributes this to lack of infrastructural development, high level government presence and availability of

alternative livelihoods beside pastoralism. These conditions suffice in the entire North Rift, Upper Eastern, and North Eastern parts of the country. The pastoralists in these areas also come into contact with cattle rustling communities from neighbouring countries of Uganda, South Sudan and Ethiopia (Mkutu, 2008). The Kenya Agricultural Research Institute classifies 67.7% of Kenya's land mass as arid and semi arid and the major occupations therein as pastoralism and agro-pastoralism (KARI, 2009), but the level of cattle rustling in other areas where pastoralism is practiced like in South Rift, Lower Eastern and North Coast is less intense compared to that in northern Kenya.

But why are raiders highly motivated to steal cattle and even kill people including women and children? The Routine Activity Theory as developed by Marcus Felson and Lawrence Cohen has it that for a crime to occur three things must be present: a motivated offender, suitable target or victim and, lack of capable guardian. In northern Kenya, unemployed youths are willing to raid cattle, livestock businessmen are readily willing to sell arms to the raiders and buy the stolen cattle belonging to pastoralists, and there is no adequate police protection to deter cattle rustlers from committing the crimes. The cattle rustlers are also able to raid the cattle easily because they understand the movement of the pastoralists during the dry and rainy seasons. Hence cattle rustling crimes are likely to continue so long as the police will not effectively protect the pastoralists. This paper is a summary of a study that sought to explore the policing strategies employed by the Kenya Police to prevent cattle rustling in Tot.

### **1.1 The History of Cattle Rustling in Marakwet District**

The Marakwet and the Pokot people have for a long time existed side by side. Before the onset of colonialism, the two shared grazing fields on the lesser arid areas west of the Kerio River. Though they occasionally raided cattle from one another, they were tied through intermarriages and had a common heritage like a common linguistic base and similar age-set system (Cherop, 1976). In fact the cattle raids between the communities were only meant to replenish livestock that were either consumed by drought, diseases and other enemy raids. Besides the only weapons available to the protagonists during those earlier raids were spears and shields, bows and arrows and the fatalities were low. The two communities also had a well laid mechanism for death compensation called 'Labai'. However colonialism deliberately divided the two people and even introduced territorial boundaries such that the only thing that remains common in their social structure is the age-set system (Massam, 1968).

The creation of ethnic boundaries by the British colonial government distinguished the areas into white highlands, native reserves, outlying districts and closed districts helped intensify ethnic consciousness among different groups by promoting feelings of exclusiveness and separation (Pkalya et al, 2004). The colonial administration was however aware that hostilities would ensue among the Marakwet and the Pokot and immediately after creating the boundaries forced the two people to sign the Hosking-Buxton Agreement of 1924, which saw the Kerio River become the boundary between the two communities. This development caused a lot of acrimony between the two communities that had hitherto co-existed and the conflict continued into the post-colonial era, and has shaped the socio-economic and political landscape of the Kerio Valley region (Wako and Daudi, 2005).

Back to the early 1900s and we see that raids between the two communities were common but the colonial administration was not concerned in resolving them (GoK, 1958). The instruments of war available to both sides of the conflict were bows and arrows and the combatants spared women and children whenever they engaged each other in war. Reports by the KHRC (2001) indicate that the Marakwet were more aggressive at war and they emerged winners whenever they engaged the Pokot in cattle rustling but the situation was for sometime reversed in 1976 when the Pokot started using firearms. The Marakwet got an upper hand against their adversaries when they acquired guns after 1993. Henceforth, although the raids conducted by the Marakwet against the Pokot were limited, they displayed superiority in war and were able to outgun the Pokot and state security officers during raids (KHRC, 2001).

But the incident of March 12, 2001 proved that the Pokot were not yet done. In one night more than 1000 Pokot youths attacked Murkutwo location in Tot division within the precincts of the Anti stock theft police unit camp manned by 60 officers and managed to drive more than 100 cattle and 3000 goats after shooting 48 Marakwet people dead and burning 600 houses. The raiders surrounded the camp and pinned down the officers for the

entire period of the raid and prevented any police reinforcement from accessing the area (KHRC, 2001). Successful cattle raids by rustlers in areas where police officers are stationed cast doubts on the ability of the government security agents to prevent cattle rustling.

But Pkalya, et al (2004) have documented that between the year 1992 and 2003 some 32,000 Marakwets, roughly 23% of the entire Marakwet population, and 30,361 Pokots were displaced by cattle rustling in the Kerio valley. Whereas the traditional weaponry such as spears and shields, bows and arrows were used to undertake cattle rustling in the past, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the area has complicated the vice (KNFP, 2006). Due to numerous civil wars in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, and Uganda, thousands of small arms and light weapons are currently in the hands of cattle rustlers (Kamenju, 2003). The easy access of arms, apart from being devastating in terms of loss of human life, has also altered the cultural foundations of many communities as traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms have been defeated by arms wielding youth who neither heed the advice of elders nor fear the police (Thusi, 2003).

## **2.0 Policing Strategies Employed in Preventing Cattle Rustling Crimes**

Some of the methods that the Kenyan government, the local community and the civil society have used to deal with cattle rustling problems in the pastoralist areas include mopping of illegal arms, deployment of more police officers, peace building and restoration, and cutting off illegal arms and livestock trade among other strategies (Amene, 2009). The police is one of the last and most drastic elements of social control that is called to intervene and control social behavior when other less severe and informal agents of social control fail (Williams, 2001). Evidently the police is an objective and rational legal authority whose function is to control people whose actions are a threat to society. Section 14 of the Police Act Chapter 84 laws of Kenya states the functions of Kenya police force as maintenance of law and order, preservation of peace, protection of life and property, detection and prevention of crime, apprehension of offenders and enforcement of all laws and regulations. Cattle rustling like any other crime causes disorder and destruction of life and property; it is therefore the duty of the police to curb it.

Following the 1976 raid the Kenya police set up a General Service Unit (GSU) camp and a police station in Tot. And in the wake of the 1992 attack the Kenya police established an Anti Stock Theft Unit camp in Chesongoch and another police station at Mogil after the 2001 attack. The Anti-stock theft police unit is charged with the duty of combating cattle rustling in Kenya. Its officers are trained to prevent, investigate and prosecute livestock theft cases including violent raids. They work in collaboration with the General Service Unit, Regular Police, Administration Police and Kenya Police reservists. Whenever the police in pastoralist areas sets out to combat modern heavily armed cattle rustlers, all the police units team up to suppress the rustlers who often attack in large numbers (Kenya police, 2009).

The government also recruited police reservists and deployed Administration police officers in all chief's camps in the area after the 2001 raid (Kenya Police, 2005). Police reservists are volunteers from the local community who are armed by the state and assume police powers while on duty. The main function of the police reservists is to protect the local community in areas where police presence is minimal or ineffective (Hiltermann, et al, 2002). But their conduct has worsened the problem of proliferation of small and light weapons in the region as the reservists provide excuse for holding illicit weapons. In addition, the government lacks the capacity to monitor and control how the arms in the hands of Kenya Police Reservists are used, and it is suspected that some of these government guns might have been sold or rented to raiders and other criminals, for use in gun crimes in other parts of the country (NCCK, 2009).

The Kenyan government has on severally occasions conducted disarmament exercises in pastoralist northern Kenya with mixed results (Amene, 2009). The exercises which have focused on collecting all illegal firearms from pastoralists have been both voluntary and forceful. The forceful disarmaments have been conducted jointly by the police and the military whereas the voluntary disarmaments are conducted by the provincial administration and local community leaders. The government has also found useful allies on this in local Non-governmental organizations that persuade the locals to hand over illicit firearms to the government.

However forced disarmaments usually yield very little results compared to voluntary surrender of firearms. Although weapons were surrendered, arms trade remains intact and immediately replenishes the rustlers'

armories because the state neither cuts off the source of arms nor engages the pastoralists in a continuous disarmament exercise (Pkalya, et. al. 2004). The National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons believe that the war against easy access and availability of illicit small arms and light weapons will only be won when civilians become aware and concerned about the situation of small arms in their communities and thereby get willing to play a role in tackling the problem (KNFP, 2006).

The government and the community are using community policing strategy to fight against cattle rustling. Community policing was launched in Kenya in 2005 but was not fully entrenched in pastoralist northern Kenya till 2010 (Kenya Police, 2010). The community policing strategy allows for citizens and police to work together in identifying security problems in an area and also collaborate in seeking workable solutions to the problem (Brogden and Nijhar, 2005).

The local community leaders from Pokot and Marakwet communities have made several peace building efforts intended to stop the cattle rustling phenomenon, with little success (Amene, 2009). Local NGOs and churches have tried to encourage the two communities to co-exist in harmony. Developmental NGOs have also encouraged the two communities to embrace education by helping build schools and paid school fees for children who have enrolled in schools as a means of eradicating cattle rustling. Unfortunately most peace building and restoration efforts are conducted when major cattle raids have occurred and lots of life lost (Kamenju, 2003).

### **3.0 Methods**

#### **3.1 Site Selection and Description**

Tot Division was purposively selected for this study because of its high cattle rustling crimes in spite of high police presence. According to the last Kenyan national population census in 2009 the number of people in the area totaled 37,403 while the police population including police reservists was 600 (KNBS, 2009; Kenya police, 2010). Tot lies in Kerio Valley which is situated 4,500 feet above sea level and extends northward to Lake Turkana (see map below). The width of the valley is approximately 20 kilometres in the South and 40 kilometres in the North, and constitutes an area of approximately 6,000 km<sup>2</sup>, with a population of over 200,000 people (Pkalya, et al 2004). The Cherang'any hills are to the west of the valley and form part of the Elgeyo Escarpment. The valley is an area of intersection between the Pokot, Marakwet, Keiyo and the Turkana people. The Pokots and the Marakwets have occupied the valley since the beginning of 17<sup>th</sup> Century after the second major migration dispersal from Mt. Elgon. The Marakwet community inhabits Tot and Tunyo Divisions, while the Pokot inhabit East Baringo and West Pokot districts (Kipkorir, 1983).





### 3.4 Data Collection

Data for the study was collected through questionnaires, interview guides, and observation of social, economic and cultural institutions in the area. The questionnaires constituted both open-ended and closed-ended questions that were administered directly by the researcher. The interview guide was used to collect information from the key informants. The researcher ensured reliability of the questionnaire by careful structuring and logical sequencing of the questions. The quantitative data was analyzed using SPSS and presented using frequency tables.

## 4.0 Results

### 4.1 Socio-Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents

This research was designed to have a total of 120 respondents but only 97 participated in the exercise. Out of 60 community and 40 police respondents only 49 and 28 in each respective category showed up representing 82% and 70% responses respectively. Similarly 14 out of 20 key informants or 70% responded for the research.

#### 4.1.1 Socio-Demographic Characteristics of local community Respondents

According to the 2009 count of the people of Tot Division majority of the people are between 19-36 years and our sample in this category constituted 49% compared to 35% respondents between 37-54 years and 12% respondents that were 55 years and above. Only 4% respondents were below 18 years (table 1). Some 65.3% respondents were male and 34.7% were females. The research found that males were more accessible than females and women also argued that cattle rustling activities were a domain of men and hence men knew more about it. The education of the respondents was as follows: 14% were not educated; 37% had primary education; 27% had secondary education; 18% had a college diploma; while only 4% had a university degree (table 2).

**Table 1: Age of local community respondents**

Age	Frequency	Percent
Below 18 years	2	4.0
19-36 years	24	49
37-54 years	17	35
55 and above years	6	12
<b>TOTAL</b>	49	100

**Source: Research Data 2011**

More than 61% respondents in this category reported they were married compared to more than 38% who said they were single. None reported to be divorced, widowed or separated because the Marakwet and Pokot cultures that do not recognise separation and permanent divorce. The institution of marriage is highly valued among Marakwets and Pokots and one of the reasons why cattle rustling is practiced is to pay for expensive bride price. Again 69.4% of the local community respondents were not in any gainful employment compared to 16.4% who were teachers while 12.2% were subsistence farmers and 2% were accountants. Majority of the respondents are

not gainfully employed meaning they can easily be recruited to participate in cattle rustling.

**Table 2: Level of education of local community respondents**

Level of education	Frequency	Percentage
None	7	14
Primary	18	37
Secondary	13	27
College diploma	9	18
University degree	2	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source: Research Data 2011**

As stated in section 3 of this paper the respondents of this study were purposively selected so as to give an accurate picture of the research and 94% worked within Tot division, whereas one each worked in Nairobi, Eldoret and Kapsowar (table 3), meaning that majority respondents were involved in pastoralism or agro-pastoralism which is closely linked to cattle rustling.

**Table 3: Place of work of local community respondents**

Place of work	Frequency	Percentage
Tot division	46	94
Nairobi	1	2
Eldoret	1	2
Kapsowar	1	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source: Research Data 2011**

#### 4.1.2 Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Police respondents

Fifty percent of police respondents were in the age bracket of 18-28 years compared to 35.7% in age bracket 29-38 years, 10.7% in age bracket 39-48 years and 3.6% at 49 years and over, (table 4). The police department policy requires young and newly enlisted officers to work in operation areas. All the police respondents were male, because the police department regarded the cattle rustling areas to be quite dangerous to post women officers.

**Table 4: Age of police respondents**

Age	Frequency	Percentage
18-28 years	14	50
29-38 years	10	35.7
39-48 years	3	10.7
49 and above	1	3.6
<b>Total</b>	28	100

**Source: Research Data 2011**

Seventy one percent of police officers had secondary education compared to 25% with college education, and 4% percent with university education (table 5). This data indicates that the older generation of police officers who were enlisted with primary level of education and wealth of policing experience were not in of Tot Division and this weakened police ability to fight cattle rustling.

**Table 5: Level of education of police respondents**

Level of education	Frequency	Percent
Secondary	20	71
College/diploma	7	25
University/degree	1	4
<b>Total</b>	28	100

**Source: Research Data 2011**

Again, 9 police respondents were from the GSU, 6 from ASTU, 5 from Regular police and 4 each from administration police and police reserve. The police units in the area according to the respondents are majorly units dealing with forceful operations and consequently officers from the criminal investigation department (CID) were not deployed there. Fourteen police respondents had served in Tot division for 1-2 years, 8 had served in the area for less than a year, 5 had worked there for 3-4 years, while one had worked there for more than 5 years, meaning that majority did not have adequate experience of the area terrain and people.

#### 4.2 Policing strategies employed in preventing cattle rustling in Tot Division

The objective of this study was to investigate the policing strategies employed in preventing cattle rustling in Tot division of Marakwet District. The strategies employed by police to fight rustling as explained by respondents, are summarized in table 6 below.

**Table 6: Policing strategies employed against cattle rustling in Tot**

Policing strategy	Frequency	Percentage
Peace building and restoration	77	100
Deployment of more police officers	77	100
Intelligence gathering	68	90
Arrest & prosecution	38	57
Community policing	18	32.2
Compulsory free education	20	37.4
Stopping illegal livestock and arms trade	51	87
Legal & policy framework	49	69.2
Disarmament)	77	100

**Source: Research Data 2011**



All respondents said that the government uses peace building, deployment of police officers and disarmament to prevent cattle rustling in Tot. Some 90% and 87 % respondents said police use intelligence gathering and stopping illegal arms and livestock trade respectively, compared to 38% who said police arrest and prosecute offenders to control the vice. Over 32% respondents and over 37% respondents said that the government uses community policing and compulsory free education respectively to discourage cattle rustling in Tot division.

The respondents added that the Kenya government, through provincial administration and the police have been persuading the cattle rustling communities to desist from stealing livestock in order to end hostilities between them; this view was supported by the key informants. The local community respondents said that since time immemorial the Marakwet and Pokot elders met whenever there was a serious raid to reconcile the communities and end hostilities. They added that the two communities had a system called 'Labai' of compensating bereaved family members in case of a raid.

Local community respondents said that since 1992 Marakwet and Pokot elders have met on several occasions to seek an end to the hostilities which have violated cultural rules guiding traditional cattle raids. They added that raids temporarily eased whenever community elders met and suggested that peace building and restoration can prevent cattle rustling if it is done continuously, a view shared by the key informants.

All respondents agreed that the police have deployed more officers to Tot in order to reduce cattle rustling in the area. Both the local community and police respondents said the government set up a general service unit (GSU) camp and a police post at Tot after 1976 the first time raiders used firearms to steal cattle. All respondents added that after the 1992 raid the government deployed anti stock theft unit officers at Chesongoch and administration police officers to all chief's camps and divisional headquarters. They added that during the same period the government recruited 200 police reservists in the area, who according to police act cap 84 laws of Kenya, assumed all police powers and responsibilities while on police duties.

The police respondents told this research that after the 2001 raid, the government established a police station at Mogil and upgraded Tot police post to a police station in order to increase police population in the area. All police respondents and key informants confirmed that Tot division has a police-citizen ratio of 1:62 which is far much higher than the United Nations recommended ratio of 1:450. Police respondents stated that deployment of many police officers led to reduction of cattle rustling in Tot division.

Intelligence gathering is also regarded as a very vital component in reducing cattle rustling and 90% respondents said it was one of the strategies used by police in Tot Division. However the police respondents complained that gathering information related to cattle rustling was hampered by cultural sanctions like oathing and curses which bound people to ensure secrecy of impending raids. The gathering of information that could lead to the arrest and prosecution of the suspects was also made difficult by lack of co-operation from the local people. This view was supported by key informants.

All police respondents also complained that lack of intelligence information made it difficult for the government to mop up illegal small arms and light weapons in the area. The key informants said that the Marakwet and the Pokot consider cattle rustling as legitimate activity and that the curses and oaths administered by elders and seers ensure that it continues. The key informants, on the other hand, lamented that police officers in Tot are usually transferred from their duty stations before they blend with the local community for the purposes of meaningful co-operation and intelligence collection. They suggested that police officers should work in Tot for reasonably long time to allow them understand the local culture and win trust of the local people. They added that failure of the police to deploy criminal investigation officers in the area weakened intelligence gathering process.

Some 57% respondents said arrest and prosecution was one of the strategies used by the government to fight cattle rustling. However local community respondents said they were not aware of any person whom the court had ever punished or imprisoned for participating in cattle rustling in Tot division. Police respondents said that the locals are reluctant to appear as witnesses in courts whenever they made arrests compelling the courts to release suspects for lack of evidence. Police respondents said they were in dilemma for neither can they arrest heavily armed bandits during a raid nor after a raid due to lack of accurate intelligence. The police respondents stated that the local communities are to blame for the perpetuation of cattle rustling for they are never willing to expose raiders to face justice.

Over 32% respondents said community policing was one of the policing strategies used to fight cattle rustling in Tot. Police respondents and key informants told this research that the initiative was launched 2005 as a strategy to fight crime. This strategy which emphasizes on police- community co-operation was however, according to police respondents, key informants and few local community respondents indicated was first utilized to the fight against cattle rustling in Tot in 2010. The respondents indicated that the strategy is still very new in the area and police reservists have been playing the role of liaising between police and the local community.

All respondents said disarmament was a strategy used by police to eradicate cattle rustling in Tot Division. The respondents said the government had on several occasion mopped up illegal firearms through forceful disarmament or voluntary surrender through amnesties. The respondents believe that the use of both methods would have succeeded if the exercises continued for longer periods rather than being one off exercise. The respondents said cattle rustlers replenish their armouries immediately after mop up operations because arms dealers are usually at hand to cash on the business of selling arms. The key informants criticized government policy on disarmament and added that the exercise is done without linking it to border control to prevent new acquisitions.

Some 87% respondents stated that the government had also adopted the strategy of stopping illegal livestock and arms trade in order to fight cattle rustling in the area. Unlike in the past when cattle rustling were carried out to fulfill restocking and cultural demands, most of the stolen cattle are not kept by the raiding community these days. Ninety three percent respondents said that stolen cattle are either sold in urban centers or in foreign countries for beef. They affirmed that unscrupulous business people perpetuate the activity by motivating cattle rustlers through purchase of stolen animals and by supplying them with weapons. This position was shared by police respondents and the key informants. The key informants added that the illegal businessmen were well connected to powerful politicians and senior civil servants which made it difficult for police to arrest and prosecute them.

According to the police respondents and key informants, the policies and laws that are available to fight cattle rustling are inadequate. More than 69% respondents said that legal and policy framework was a strategy for fighting cattle rustling in Tot. They said they were aware of the penal code, firearms act, sexual offences act and the prevention of organized crimes act all of which are used to fight cattle rustling crimes. The police respondents added that the penal code contains laws that take care of crimes like robbery with violence, murder, arson and theft of livestock which are applied against cattle rustling. However these laws are spread in very many books and complicate the drafting of charge sheets whenever police officers prefer charges against suspects. They proposed the government enact a specific law to deal with cattle rustling to enable law enforcers deal with the crime.

The respondents (37%) also said that free and compulsory primary education was a strategy being used by the local community and the government to eradicate cattle rustling in Tot since the year 2010. They said that teachers, the provincial administration, the police and the local community leaders were co-operating to ensure that people are educated against cattle rustling. They added that keeping boys in school denied cattle rustling mandarins the man power to steal cattle. The key informants suggested that the government would succeed in eradicating cattle rustling if it kept the boys in schools till form four or even class eight as they would get proud of their achievements and despise joining raiding squads which are dangerous to their lives.

#### **4.3 Summary**

From the above results, it can be seen that the police had several available strategies to control cattle rustling in Tot Division. All respondents were in agreement that peace building and restoration, deployment of more police officers, and disarmament were strategies that the Kenya police used to combat cattle rustling. The respondents were also of the opinion that the Police used intelligence gathering and stopping illegal trade in livestock and arms to combat cattle rustling, among many other strategies. However intelligence gathering was poor due to cultural impediments like curses and oaths; also failure by the government to deploy CID and intelligence officers in the area hampered intelligence collection.

The people and the police were however frustrated because of the connection those traders in illegal livestock and arms trade have among politicians who make it difficult for the police to apprehend and charge them in a

court of law. The respondents added that the Kenyan government ought to police her borders with neighbouring countries of Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda and Ethiopia to curb the infiltration of light arms from those countries. The police were equally frustrated by the level of secrecy among the Pokots and the Marakwets as it made it impossible for them to pursue suspects, because local cultures supported cattle rustling.

Cattle rustling disrupted education due to closure of schools and displacement. The low levels of education in the area also helped perpetuate cattle rustling. Poorly educated young men become cattle raiders due to their inability to get formal employment and better opportunities. The study established that close to 70% local community respondents were not in any gainful employment with only over 16% being teachers while over 12% were farmers and a mere 2% were accountants. The large pool of the unemployed can easily be recruited to participate in cattle rustling.

### **5.1 Conclusion**

The study was set to assess the effects of policing strategies on cattle rustling in Tot division. It established that the policing strategies employed were not quite effective and did not adequately address the conditions that encourage cattle rustling among pastoralists. The policing strategies used did not factor in the socio-economic, political, cultural and environmental conditions in the pastoralist areas and this hampered the employed strategies.

All pastoralists consider the possession of firearms as crucial to their survival because guns are used to defend and acquire property. All pastoralists argue that lack of government guarantee on their safety makes them acquire firearms for self defence which leads to proliferation of small arms and light weapons among pastoralists in the country. This study contends that the government disarmament strategy will only succeed when the pastoralists will feel secure.

Cattle rustling is also intertwined with local and national politics and it appears that the illegal activity will continue so long as there are businessmen to bankroll it. Many pastoralists have had their cattle stolen but they have not seen a businessman charged in court for being in possession of their animals.

The researcher indicates that education would go a long way in eradicating cattle rustling among the Pokot and Marakwet. The strategy of keeping boys in school in the area was only adopted in the year 2009 and its effects could not be ascertained as at the time of the study.

### **5.2 Recommendations**

The study recommended that:

- The government disarms the pastoralist communities continuously and deploys more security officers to the porous international borders to prevent cross border rustling and entry of illicit arms into the country.
- The government sets very high penalties on possession and illegal trade of firearms.
- The government should adequately facilitate police officers with sufficient equipment, serviceable vehicles, training and better remuneration to boost their capacity to fight cattle rustling.
- Empower the local communities in improving education standards and provide a means of alternative livelihood.

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