Cote D’Ivoire’s Civil War and the Impact on West African Sub-Region Peace and Security

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Abstract
This paper examines the causes of civil war in Cote d’Ivoire, investigate the impacts of the civil war on Ivoiriens and foreigners living in the country and investigate the consequences of civil war on the West African Sub-region. The failure of the military coup, discrimination of “real” and “mix” Ivoirite and disenfranchised the Northern in Cote d’Ivoire resulted into a civil war which divided the country into north controlled by the rebels and south controlled by the government. A qualitative research design using Library Research and Semi Structured Interviews were employed. Two hundred and twenty five (225) copies of questionnaires were administered for Nigerians in selected agencies. The second research method used was interview. Through the field survey, the study discovered the diverse causes of the civil war, which included inequality, disenfranchising the North, socioeconomic disparity among the ethnic groups. This paper recommends clearly that there is need to enhance international cooperation on the detection and monitoring of peace and security threats related to nepotism and on prevention, preparedness, mitigation and response capacities.

Keywords: Civil war, disenfranchised, discrimination, immigrants, peace, security etc.

Introduction
The roots of conflict in Cote d’Ivoire lie in ethnic, religious, and regional divides that began to surface within the country in the late 1980’s (Bax, 2006:7). These divides, largely created by the country’s ruling elite in order to maintain political power, have resulted in a civil war between the largely Christian south and the mostly Muslim north (ibid: 8). More critically, the conflict has resulted in a xenophobic atmosphere, which has spawned ethnic based-hatred and violence targeted against a large portion of the society that has been labeled as being ‘non-Ivorian’ (http://news.bbc.co.uk, 2011a).

Cote d’Ivoire, the world’s largest cocoa producer, was once hailed as the model for economic or democratic prosperity in West Africa ((Bax, 2006: 9). Its population represents a diversity of cultures and religions. It has over sixty ethnic groups that share a variety of religious beliefs, with approximately twenty five per cent Christian, forty per cent Muslim, and thirty five per cent indigenous believers (http://news.bbc.co.uk, 2006b). The period of impressive economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s, due mainly to coffee and cocoa exports, brought many immigrants into Cote d’Ivoire, primarily from neighbouring Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea (Bax, 2006:7). During that period of economic boom, these immigrants were warmly welcomed into the country to provide labour force for the cocoa plantations and elsewhere. Today, they have come to represent more than one quarter of the country’s population (Douglas, 2006:6).

Demographically, Cote d’Ivoire can be roughly divided into the northern and southern halves. Southerners are mostly Christians or adherents to local religions while northerners are mainly Muslim. The country’s political elite have historically come mostly from the south. Most of the country’s wealth is concentrated in the south where the majority of commercial development is centred. The south also contains the country’s lucrative cocoa and coffee plantations as well as the sea port of Abidjan, the commercial and political capital of the nation. This port also serves as a critical hub for much of West Africa (http://www.oonew/news-Ivory.html, 2009a). A large number of northern Muslims have settled in the main cities of the south and have been working the cocoa and coffee plantations for decades. In contrast to many of the surrounding African nations, the different ethnic and religious groups co-existed peacefully for much of the nation’s history. This all began to change as the country’s booming economy started to spiral downward in the 1980’s and 1990’s (http://www.oonew/news-Ivory.html, 2009a). Competition for land and resources increased, heightening tensions between the southern elites, and the immigrants, who are mostly Muslim northerners.

When the southern elite realized that their hold on power, which they had enjoyed for over 30 years since the country gained independence, would not survive free elections, they began to disenfranchise the northerners, claiming that they were all immigrants and not true Ivoiriens (Daniel,2004) Xenophobic ideas blossomed, and from this, the notion of “Ivoirite” was born. ‘Ivoirite’ is a term that is used to separate “real” Ivoiriens from immigrants or those with a “mixed” background (http://www.oonew/news-Ivory.html, 2009a). The concept of “mixed” came to encompass Ivoiriens whose parents had come from other countries, which affected mostly people in the Muslim north. Resulting into political and social turmoil and eventually led to a civil war between the north and south in September, 2002. The situation also spawned ethnic-motivated hatred and violence aimed at immigrants and northern Muslims. A UN aid coordinator summed up the situation by stating that, “Cote d’Ivoire was where you made your dreams come true. Immigrants came here to do the jobs that
Ivorian nationals didn’t want to do, but now the sentiment is that non-Ivoriens should be chased out of the country” (Jaime, 2002: 10).

The objectives of the paper
This paper aims to examine the Cote d’Ivoire’s civil war and the impact on West African Sub-region peace and security. This broad aim is disaggregated into the following objectives:

i. To examine the factors that caused the civil war in Cote d’Ivoire;

ii. To investigate the impacts of civil war on Ivoirians and foreigners living in the country

iii. To investigate the consequences of civil war on West African Sub-region peace and security

Research Methodology
Both primary and secondary data were collected for the study. Questionnaire instruments were used to collect useful information and opinions from the public agencies (Federal Ministry of foreign Affairs, National Emergency Management Agency, and Economic Community of West Africa State). Two hundred and twenty five (225) copies of questionnaires were administered. The targeted agencies was selected which was made of two hundred and twenty five respondents who were Nigerians in selected agencies who were served with questionnaires.

The second research method used was interviews targeting the Ivoriens and policy makers in Nigeria. Fifteen Ivoriens were interviewed to elicit information on Cote d’Ivoire’s civil war in order to get public opinion on the subject. I made use of French interpreter for Ivoiren.

The instrument used in collecting the data was the questionnaire. Some of the questions were pre-coded to allow for easy analysis. However, others were open-ended to allow the respondents to give personal views to specific questions. The research instrument was pre-tested to check for ambiguity.

The secondary data for this research were sourced from relevant offices, textbooks, journals, newspapers, conference papers, handbooks, bulletins, the Internet and libraries.

The data from the respondents were analyzed using simple percentage, frequency tables and cross-tabulation. The interview data were analyzed through simple categorization of responses and very important responses were quoted. Secondary source of data were mostly valuable for the literature review of the paper.

The Conceptual Framework of the paper
With the nature of this work, the most appropriate theoretical framework would be that of frustration aggression theory. The theory was formulated by a group of psychologists at Yale University in the United States of America in 1939. They found that aggression is always an outgrowth of frustration (Dalland, 1939:20; Hayes, 1998:26). In view of their analysis, they defined frustration as encountering obstacles in achieving some desired goals (ibid).

The theory believes that, aggression is always a consequence of frustration. It argues that, the perpetration of violence is a means of relieving frustration. The basic postulation of their theory is that, interference with goal-directed behaviours creates frustration and discontentment which in turn lead to aggressive responses usually directed against the reputed frustrating agent (Gurr 1971:42). In addition, studies on aggressive behaviour submit that frustration may result to aggressive behaviour, which may also include another range of responses in form of frustration but not aggressive in content; this may take the form of regression, apathy, submission and avoidance (Himmelweft, 1930: 161). The frustration–aggression theory assumes that individuals and groups have goals of some sort and that much of their behaviours are purposive and goal-seeking and that, if this is not prevented in some way, the group is likely to behave quite peacefully (Dowse and Hughes, 1983:408-435). However, since this conduct is unlikely to be regular or at least always fulfilled in the human condition of struggling for scarce resources, the theory predicts that the result is likely to be aggressive behaviour, elicited by frustration. The frustrated group is likely to attack the believed source of the deprivation (Dougherty and Pätzgraff, 1981:267).

Frustration is the feeling that accompanies an experience of being thwarted in attaining one’s goals. Aggression, on the other hand, is defined as the practice of launching attacks.

The frustration–aggression theory holds that aggression is often a consequence of frustration, among which scores of events such as, deprivation of human rights, election malpractices, inequality e.t.c. Thus, the linkage between frustration – aggression and civil war is that, civil war is a violent conflict within a county fought by organized groups that aim to take power at the centre or in a region or to change government policies. However, when they cannot attain these objectives they get frustrated. In the midst of their frustration, they will resort to aggression which they believe will lead to attainment of their goals.

When an individual feels incapacitated to attain objectives, becomes frustrated and the most satisfying inherent response is to become aggressive (Bandura, 1973:5). In other words, if adversaries are too powerful, a group might likely resort to the use of violence to achieve its objectives. For instance, when the southern elite
realized that their hold on power, which they had enjoyed for over 30 years since the country gained independence, would not survive free elections, they began to disenfranchise the northerners, claiming that they were all immigrants and not true Ivorians (Daniel, 2004). Exclusionary politics and bad politics had led to pockets of clashes between the north and south in September, 2002. And also, in the year 2010, after much pressure exerted by Nigeria and other countries on President Gbagbo to set a new date for election, he conceded and same took place on 3rd November, 2010. None of the candidates was able to meet the constitutional requirements for a winner of the election. Consequently, a run-off was set for 28th November, 2010 between himself and Ouattara the main opposition candidate. The latter was declared winner but Mr. Gbagbo continued to hold onto power.

The frustration-aggression theory enables the study to know that the potentials for violent collective action by a group vary strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity (Gurr, 1971:24). Thus, if a group feels an intense sense of relative deprivation (oppression and injustice) within a society or state with respect to a class of value important to it, then it has considerable potential for collective violence.

The theory also enables the study to know that if a group thinks violence is illegitimate, or that it is unlikely to succeed, or it has other channels for venting its discontentment, then it is most likely to restrain itself, thus minimizing the potentials for violence (Dowse and Hughes, op. cit.).

One is not unmindful here of the merits and demerits of the frustration-aggression theory. One major merit of the frustration-aggression theory is that, an act of aggression is supposed to produce a release of aggressive energy and a reduction in the instigation to aggression (ibid:44). Another basic merit of the frustration-aggression theory is that, it has shown that groups are likely to respond in aggressive manner after being frustrated.

The first merit of the frustration-aggression theory flows directly from the above merit. (Beiner, 2005:6). Another defect is that it believes that an act of aggression will produce a reduction in the instigation to aggression. Instead, an act of aggression will lead to recycling of violence.

From the foregoing, the frustration-aggression theory is relevant to this study because, groups that resort to violence in states, sub-regions and regions and even in the international system have been frustrated due to non-attainment of their objectives.

**Literature review**

Civil war over the years has been generating a lot of controversial issues ranging from its origins and nature. Why do civil wars resort to the use of violence to achieve their objective? Whose action is to be regarded as a civil war? What must be done to curb it? What should constitute a definition of refugee? The last controversial issue raised is an attestation to the fact that there is no common and universally acceptable definition of refugee. This implies invariably that in the context of the study’s literature review, attempts to examine the contending definitions of refugee as well as others will form major focus.

The first major groups of African refugees stemmed from the colonial liberation struggles and subsequent dislocation. During the early 1960s, when most African colonies became independent, the number of refugees stood at 400,000 (Gregston, 2004:27). In 1970, it rose slightly to 750,000. However, by 1980, that number had exploded and reached the 5,000,000 mark, and at the end of 1993, Africa's refugee population climbed to nearly 6,000,000 (Ibid: 28). Africa, the poorest continent, is indeed a region rife and replete with refugees (Ibid: 30).

To a large extent, refugees and displaced people in Africa are proof of political instability which may result from a breakdown in governance when "a people have become either a victim of their own government’s abuse or that of an external aggressor, or coherent government has ceased to exist (Human Rights Watch Report, 2005). In 1969, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), taking into consideration the special refugee problems in Africa, expanded the UNHCR definition to include:

- Every person, who owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality (Ibid:2).

Africa is not only faced with natural catastrophes, such as droughts and famine which produce economic refugees, but it is also afflicted with wars. Civil wars, ethnic strife, human rights abuses, coups and oppressive governments are the most important factors responsible for the large numbers of refugees on the continent. At present, African countries have become host to about 6 million refugees who have fled their countries mainly as a result of civil wars. (Bureau, 2006:3). In recent years, massive population displacements
have resulted from such civil conflicts. At times, the governments on which the inhabitants depend for law and order and support are themselves party to the internal conflict. As such, displaced people living within territories controlled by their own government have not been able to receive international relief that was not invited or allowed by their governments (US House, 2006:1). Furthermore, the experience of the refugee uprooted from his home or country is horrendous, as explained by one scholar:

No sound is more distressing than the plea of the homeless. Their cry expresses the pain of hunger, thirst, and disease, and denotes the fear of death, insecurity, and repression. The cry is not pretence, but a reflection of grim reality. It is an expression of tragedy occurring daily . . . especially in Africa where one of every two refugees resides (White House, 2006:1).

Origin and Nature of the Ivorien conflict
The Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire, otherwise known as FANCI, were created in May 1960 by the government of the late President Houphouët-Boigny with a focus on creating a small army for various political and developmental activities. These included administration of the civil service and serving in other capacities as Ministers, Ambassadors and Directors in hospitals. FANCI was to also engage in road construction and infrastructural development, agriculture/fisheries and other marine activities, and the running of the national airlines (Air Ivoire). In terms of actual combat role before the current crisis, FANCI has not been involved in any military aggression or serious peacekeeping missions. During the Congo crisis in the early 1960s, FANCI was attached to the medical services unit of the UN force in the country.

FANCI’s capacity as a fighting force was, therefore, severely limited. Before the ongoing crisis, 80% of the FANCI budget was devoted to paying salaries of soldiers. This obviously had broad implications with respect to the capacity of the state to equip and defend itself, as has been glaringly manifested during the current crisis (United Nations News Centre, 2004).

The role of FANCI changed, however, under the leadership of ex-President Bedie. Bedie’s efforts to use FANCI in a political role - to suppress popular protests - resulted in serious tensions within the army’s officer corps and rank and file, and led to the sacking of the them armed forces commander General Guei. This prompted an attempted coup d’état in 1996, and a successful one in 1999. The current crisis has its genesis in these events (United Nations News Centre, 2004).

Past insurgencies in West Africa have typically started as incursions from neighbouring countries by armed groups, beginning with attacks from the border areas and gradually progressing towards the capital city, which has often been far removed from the initial scenes of fighting. This was the trajectory of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts. In the Ivorian case, however, the violence flared up, suddenly and unexpectedly, in the large commercial capital, Abidjan, and very quickly, with little apparent movement of forces, spread to the northern cities of Korhogo and Bouaké, the country’s second largest city and a major industrial base. The attacks, involving about 800 soldiers who were about to be retrenched from FANCI, appeared to have been well-coordinated. They were also bloody. In the first few days of fighting, 400 people were killed, many of them in Abidjan, including the country’s Interior Minister, Emile Doudou, and a former President, General Robert Guei (the country’s first successful coup-maker) and his entire family (BBC News, 2004).

An ill-equipped and ill-prepared Ivorian army was able to mobilize quickly, however, and in a few days of fighting repelled the rebels from Abidjan. The rebels, though, had already taken over the northern cities of Bouaké and Korhogo. A less than spirited attempt by FANCI to retake the cities was repulsed. A crack force of French troops staged a dramatic rescue of foreign nationals, including hundreds of American students, from Bouaké in the first weeks of fighting, and a reinforced French contingent established camps just outside Bouaké and along a zone roughly dividing the country into two parts - a formal acknowledgement, if this were needed, that the rebels now controlled the northern half of the country (United Nations News Centre, 2004).

The government of President Laurent Gbagbo, elected but controversial vote, reinforced its control of the southern half. An uneasy stalemate ensued in the country, in November 2003, by the emergence of two new ‘rebel’ groups in western Côte d’Ivoire. The two groups, the Mouvement Populaire du Grand Quest (MPIGO) and the Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix (MJP), said they were fighting to avenge the death of General Guei, and determined to do so by removing Gbagbo, whom they accused of the killing, from power. It emerged, however, that the rebels were really former Revolutionary United Front (RUF) soldiers and units from Liberia’s army loyal to then President Charles Taylor (Wikipedia, 2009), and that pillage, far more than politics, was driving their ‘insurgency’. Unlike the group holding the north of the country (the Mouvement Patriotique de la Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI), which established itself as a rather well-behaved force in key cities, the new groups in the west of the country soon became notorious for vandalism and terror, and they soon after clashed with French troops, leading to serious casualties. Tens of thousands of Ivorians fled the country (CNN News, 2004).

If it was easy to establish the character and provenance of the western rebel groups, understanding the motivation and nature of the much more important northern group proved far more difficult. Were they simply mutinous soldiers hungry for power? Or were they champions of a marginalized sector of the country, the mainly
Muslim - and Dyula-speaking - half of the country (the north), as they claimed? Or were they, as Gbagbo’s government claimed, an assorted bunch of disgruntled rogue soldiers and foreign mercenaries carrying out a plot by Côte d’Ivoire’s neighbours, particularly Burkina Faso, to destabilize the country? These questions persisted months after the failed coup and the beginning of the insurgency. Western reporters who ventured into the rebels’ stronghold generally found them genial and charming, behaving well to the civilian population but otherwise not engaged in any form of governance. A reporter from a major American newspaper found the rebels “lazying about,” and possessing “more satellite phones than battle scars.” She noted that five months after the rebels’ occupation of Bouaké, the banks there were not functioning, businesses were boarded up, schools closed and half the town’s population had fled (Thibodeaux, 2006). As the months progressed, the World Food Programme announced that 50 per cent of residents in Bouaké had no savings, and that the rest had lost 80 per cent of their purchasing power. Starvation loomed, precipitating a further mass exodus from the city. (Thibodeaux, 2006: 17).

All that was clear about the rebel leadership was that it comprised of mainly ex-soldiers and that a prominent figure in the group was a former radical student leader named Guillaume Soro. Soro soon emerged as a key player in the politics of the country, as he became the main opposition figure, angrily described the electoral code as “liberticide, racist, xenophobic and dangerous” (Ibid: 20). He then described his group as a mix of exiled soldiers and former students who were furious at the Ivorian government’s mistreatment of northern Ivorians. “If you are from the north,” he said, “you are subhuman, according to the government. We want a united Ivory Coast. We want a country that lives in harmony and includes everyone. We want a Pan African nation where the Ivory Coast is a melting pot (CNN News, 2004).

Though evidently self-serving, this rhetoric undoubtedly taps into long-simmering grievances among the relatively impoverished, and largely politically marginalized, inhabitants of Côte d’Ivoire’s northern regions. Since independence in 1960, Côte d’Ivoire has been ruled by people from the southern part of the country, who as a result constitute an elite class dominating the country’s government, civil service, academia and the business sector. This charmed circle, from mainly the Baoule and Bete ethnic groups (the first two Presidents of the country, Houphouët-Boigny and Konan Bedie, were Baoule, and Gbagbo is Bete) has in the past even contorted the country’s constitution to maintain the lopsided status quo. The most striking case was the adoption of a new electoral code by the National Assembly, at the instance of Bedie, which stipulated that Presidential candidates must be born in Côte d’Ivoire to parents who were themselves born in the country. Gbagbo, then an outspoken opposition figure, angrily described the electoral code as “liberticide, racist, xenophobic and dangerous” (Thibodeaux, 2006).

The intention, however, was purely churlish: to exclude from participation in the polls Bedie’s chief rival, Alasane Quattara, of Dyula ethnicity from the north, and Lansana Gberie & Prosper Addo a former Prime Minister of the country. Quattara’s mother is said to have come from Burkina Faso, and he was subsequently barred from contesting the 1995 Presidential polls, which Bedie won. But the code, which sedulously created a distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘mixed’ Ivorians, had far-reaching implications (Ibid).

When Côte d’Ivoire gained independence in 1960, it had a population of 3 million; in 2002 the population stood at 17 million (Thibodeaux, 2006:8). The remarkable increase resulted as much from natural growth as from labour immigration (Ibid:10). Under the patrician President Félix Houphouët-Boigny, who led the country to independence and ruled it until his death in 1993, the Ivorian government made it a policy to encourage huge immigration into the country of other Africans from the more depressed - and sometimes chaotic - states adjacent to Côte d’Ivoire (Ibid:15). The new immigrants were smoothly integrated into Ivorian society, with some of them holding important governmental positions, and the majority were employed in the country’s booming agricultural sector (Wikipedia, 2009).

By the 1980s, world market prices for cocoa and coffee (the country’s key export commodities) slumped drastically, and the huge presence of nationals from other African states began to be seen as a burden (Itano, 2003:42). In 1990, Houphouët-Boigny named Quattara, a senior official of the International Monetary Fund, Prime Minister partly to handle the economic crisis. Quattara introduced residency permits for foreign nationals in the country (Ibid:48). It cost $50 per annum for nationals from ECOWAS states and $500 for non-ECOWAS nationals. Houphouët-Boigny died in 1993, and Bedie, then head of the National Assembly won a power struggle with Quattara to become President. It was then that the toxicity of ethnic politics was smuggled into the debate about non-native Ivorians. In 2002, there were an estimated three million Burkinabes, two million Malians, 500,000 to one million Ghanaians and over 250,000 Guineans, plus tens of thousands of Liberian refugees in Côte d’Ivoire (Itano, 2003).

In his power-struggle with Quattara, Bedie persistently hammered on the concept of ‘Ivorite’ or ‘pure Ivorian-ness’. It was his way of ensuring that he remained at the helm, one of the most invidious uses of ethnicity. It irked the millions of non-native residents of Côte d’Ivoire, and, more significantly, Ivorians in the north who generally supported Quattara. Differences within the political class and the rolling back of the armed forces of Côte d’Ivoire from its previous engagement in the administration and developmental activities of the
country eventually led to the 1999 coup d'état and subsequent crisis after the elections in 2000. The reason for the actual crisis, however, came from the elimination of ex-President Bedie and Alassane Quattara from the elections based on constitutional issues and issues of identity, citizenship and nationality (Itano, 2003).

Analysis and interpretation of surveyed data
The study surveyed the views of the public on Cote d’Ivoire’s civil war and the impact on West African sub-regional peace and security and its implications for peace and humanitarian governance in Africa. A total of 225 questionnaires were applied.

The field survey made use of simple random sampling, which grouped the targeted respondents into four: stakeholders, policy makers and Ivoirens in Nigeria. Simple random sampling technique was adopted in order to ensure collection of data across all the institutions managing peace and security in West African Sub-region. This was in order to collect a balanced response and ensure representativeness of the survey sampled. Simple random sampling method was utilized to pick four institutions. In this way, Economic Community of West Africa State, Lagos, Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja and the National Emergency Management Agency, Abuja were chosen.

A total number of Two hundred and twenty five (225) questionnaires were administered. A total number of 225 completed questionnaires were returned. The analysis is based on the information derived from the 225 (100%) [Which implied Economic Community of West Africa State, (ECOWAS) Lagos 125(55%), National Emergency Management Agency(NEMA) Abuja 40(18%) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Abuja 60(27%) were returned with the sex ratio of 125 males and 100 females. Age distribution of the respondents shows that all were adults. Specifically, 171(76%) of the respondents were between 20-30 years old. While 54(24%) were above 31 years old. The break down showed that 12(5.33%) of the respondents were between 31 and 34. Furthermore, 30(13.33%) were between 35 and 39 while 12(5.33%) falls within the ages of 45 and above. Though the last three categories contain a substantial amount of public servants within the population of study, they did not receive the request to fill the questionnaires for this research work with much enthusiasm. The reasons adduced for their inability to fill the questionnaires ranged from their busy schedule to not understanding Cote d’Ivoire’s civil war and the challenges of refugee crisis. The nationality distribution of the respondents was Nigerian. The religious distribution of respondents revealed the ratio of the Christian and Muslim population. Of the 225 administered questionnaires 122(54.22%) were Muslims while 103(45.75%) were Christians. The implication of this for the study is that, views polled were not one sided but representative. The marital status distribution of the respondents shows that 60 people (26.67%) were single while 165 people (73.34%) were married.

On the socio-economic profile of the surveyed respondents, first, in terms of occupations, it shows that the surveyed respondents cut across varied employment. Of the total number of 225 valid respondents, public servants were 200(88.89%), while 25(11.11%) were Industrial Training students (masters) in Abuja.

The merit of the application of the surveyed instrument is that, the administering of the questionnaires across the identified professions enabled the study to determine the level of consciousness and awareness of the surveyed respondents on international issues. On educational qualification, of the 225 valid respondents, 144 (64%), 69(30.67%) and 12(5.33%) respectively were undergraduate/B.sc holders, Master Degree and post-graduate diploma and Ph. D holders. The essence of securing information on the respondents’ qualifications was to be sure that they relatively understood what the survey was about and thereby, to some extent, be able to make informed and rational suggestions for curbing civil wars in the sub-region.

The instrument contained twenty five (25) questions (Q) out of which the first seven (7) were on the demographic and socio-economic profiles of respondents. Of the remaining eighteen (18) questions, six asked specific questions. Twelve (12) sought for reasons for certain responses by the respondents while six (6) are open-ended questions (see Appendix A).
Table 1: Field survey: Respondents to specific issues (N=225).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUESTIONS(Q)</th>
<th>RESPONSE (NUMBER &amp; %)</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>NO RESPONSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q8: Are you aware of the increase in the occurrence of civil war in Africa today?</td>
<td>215(95.56%) 00(0%) 10(4.44%)</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q9: Do you think civil war should be used to settle crisis by political groups in a country?</td>
<td>85(37.78%) 140(62.22%)</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q11: Do you believe civil war is a threat to African peace?</td>
<td>180(80%) 25(11.11%) 20(8.89%)</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q13: Do you believe civil war is inspired by a group’s desire for attention?</td>
<td>177(78.67%) 48(21.33%)</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q14: Is civil war desirable as an instrument of politics?</td>
<td>185(82.23%) 40(17.77%)</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q17: Do you think Nigeria should settle any crisis from West Africa or any other country?</td>
<td>180(80%) 45(20%)</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Q8: On the question whether respondents were aware of the increase in the occurrence civil war in Africa today (Q8), table 1 shows that 215 (95.56%) of valid respondents were aware, while 10 (4.44%) did not respond to the question. The result shows that respondents were aware of the phenomenon of civil war in Africa.

Q9 asked respondents if they believed in civil war as a means of settling crisis by political groups. The survey results as shown in the table, show that 140 (37.78%) believe in civil war as a means of settling crisis by political groups.

Q10 asked for the respondents’ reasons for supporting the view that civil war is a means of settling crisis by political groups. Those against civil war were of the view that it is simply destructive, that it caused fear and unrest in Africa, that it retards economic growth and that resources devoted to rebuilding the destroyed places could have been used for other developmental programmes. While those who believed in civil war were of the view that, it serves as a means of protesting against injustice and inequality in Africa.

On whether civil war is a threat to peace in Africa (Q11), 180 (80%) responded positively to the question, while 25 (11.11%) responded negatively to the question. 20 (8.89%) did not respond to the question.

Q12 requested respondents to provide reasons for their respective responses. The majority of the respondents, who submitted that civil war is a threat and it leads to the destruction of lives and property, also believed that it threatens the peaceful co-existence of people and destroys national economy and stability among others. For those respondents that opined that civil war is not a threat to African peace, they argued that it serves as a conduit of protesting injustice and inequality in the African continent. They are equally of the view that civil war will put an end to inequality, injustice and thereby bring about stability rather than threaten African peace. Twenty (8.89%) did not respond to the question. In spite of the few that posited that civil war is a threat to African peace, it is the assertions of this study that civil war indeed is a threat to African peace.

On the issue of whether civil war was inspired by a group’s desire for attention (Q13), 130 (57.78%) respondents were of the view that civil war was inspired by a group’s desire for attention with about 95 (45.22%) holding a contrary view.

Q14 asked respondents who answered Q13 to give reasons for their view. A good number of respondents who opined that civil war is inspired by a group’s desire for attention shared the opinion that the groups want the whole world not only to be aware of their ideology and activities but also intend to advertise the plights of the people, which the groups belong to.

For those respondents that responded that civil war was not inspired by a group’s desire for attention, they were of the view that the act of conflict/crisis is usually inspired by ethnic discrimination and election malpractice. They were also of the fact that civil war is meant to achieve political freedom and full participation of other tribes in government.

On the issue of whether civil war is desirable as an instrument of politics (Q15), 185 (82.23%) respondents were of the view that civil war was desirable as an instrument of politics while 40 (17.77%) responded to the question negatively.

Q16 asked respondents who answered Q15 to give reasons for their view. The respondents gave similar answers, that civil war is an instrument of politics. To these respondents, civil war is caused by inequality, injustice, election malpractice in Africa, poverty, religious belief and foreign policies of developed countries.

On whether Nigeria should settle any crisis from West Africa or any other country, (Q17), 180 (80%) responded positively to the question, while 45 (20%) responded to the question negatively.

Q18 requested respondents to provide reasons for their respective responses. The majority of respondents submitted that Nigeria was one of the signatories to the peace accord in Africa Convention.
Therefore, Nigeria should continue to mid-wife the activities of West Africa or any other country in the Africa. Q19 asked respondents to suggest the political problems that mid-wife the activities of West Africa country could pose to Nigeria country. Majority of the respondents submitted that the country hosting victim of civil war for protracted periods can experience long-term economic, social, environment, political and security impact.

In response to Q20, majority of the respondents listed the socio-economic problems that victim country could pose to the host country. That is, the impact that the victim country have on the host country is often overlooked.

Q21 asked the respondents about how the civil war in West Africa sub-region is being managed. The majority of respondents have submitted that the civil war in West Africa sub-region is being managed through the following institutional bodies such as the Economic Community of West Africa State (ECOWAS), Africa Union (AU), and National Commission for Human Right, United Nations for Human Right, the host country as well as individual’s responsibility.

Q22 asked the respondents about what they think should be the role of the UN in the management of civil war. The majority of respondents have submitted that the United Nations for Human Right has also developed instrument to enable development actors to better address the causes of civil war in West Africa Sub-region.

Q23 asked respondents to give the role of Economic Community of West Africa State (ECOWAS) and Africa Union (AU) on causes of civil war in West Africa Sub-region. (70%) of respondents submitted that ECOWAS and AU should make sure that Africa’s framework for protection of life and properties and sub-regional legal framework for the protection of human right.

In addition, Q24 asked respondents about what they think are the adverse effects of civil war. In their response, majority of respondents averred that civil war has adverse effects in diverse areas of life. Specifically, the respondents submitted that civil war is disastrous, that is, it leads to the destruction of human being and material resources and that it creates insecurity and fear. The respondents equally opined that it does not allow for free movement of goods and services across borders and security officials of each country conduct excessive and undue checks. More so, the respondents were of the opinion that civil war hinders the mobility of people from certain areas because of being branded as terrorists. However, almost all the respondents including those that give negative answers to Q11 submitted that civil war does have adverse effects.

Q25 asked the respondents to suggest ways by which they think civil war can be reduced or averted as a weapon of politics in West Africa Sub-region. While majority of the respondents suggested ways to reduce civil war as a weapon in West African politics, few submitted that civil war could not be reduced nor be averted in West Africa while some were undecided. The majority group, which proffers solutions to curbing or averting civil war in West Africa, believes that civil war could indeed be reduced or averted in the West Africa if there is respect for people’s belief, equal right, free and fair election, no frustration and no nepotism in governance. They also believed that openness on the part of African leaders to International level would reduce civil war considerably. They equally opined that dialogue between the two regions (south and north) in Cote d’Ivoire would reduce civil war as a weapon in country’s politics. They also averred that there should be sharing of intelligence reports on civil war among African nations. However, a small number of 25(11.1%) of the respondents believed that civil war cannot be reduced or averted because it is an instrument of politics.

Discussion of Findings
The paper found that the civil war in Cote d’Ivoire was inspired by the contending groups desire for attention and power. The northerners in Cote d’ Ivoire wanted the international system to be aware, not only of its existence and activities, but equally of its plight and perceived exclusion in politics. Also, through the field survey, the paper discovered the diverse causes of the civil war, which included inequality, socioeconomic disparity among the ethnic groups or regions (North and South), election malpractice, nepotism, disenfranchising the North and most importantly, frustration. It is revealed that frustration is one of the major causes of aggressive behavior by most northerners in Cote d’ Ivoire. When they were hindered from actualizing their objectives they became frustrated and attacked the beloved source of the frustration, which is the southerners.

In other words, groups have aims and much of their behavior is to seek particular goals and when the realization of this objective is not prevented in some ways, the individual or group is likely to behave quite peacefully. However, if this goal is prevented from being achieved, the frustrated group is likely to attack the beloved source. For instance; there was socioeconomic disparity among the two groups involved in the war. One, the South enjoyed greater economic advantage than the North. Two, southerners hold power for over 30 years since Cote d’Ivoire gained independence and when they perceived that they could not survive free elections; they began to disenfranchise the Northerners, claiming that they were all immigrants and not true Ivoirians. The resulting political and social turmoil eventually led to the civil war between the south and north.

The findings of the paper equally revealed that civil wars have great implications for peace and
security in West Africa Sub-region. It was discovered that it brings in its wake destruction of lives and property. This is because, For instance; it was reported, that overall, 3,248 people were killed during the crisis, without identifying how many were combatants and civilians (BBC New, 2011). Most rebel attacks usually bring about loss of human lives and destruction of properties. It equally reveals that civil war, not only creates fear and unrest, but also destroys national economy.

Furthermore, the research work analyses the effects and implications of the civil war on Cote d’Ivoire’s peace and security. It was significant to observe that there is correlation between civil war and a nation’s peace and security. Field survey revealed strongly the implication of the civil war on Ivorians’ peace and security as well as for West Africa Sub-region as a whole. The study revealed that to reduce civil war, there should not only be respect for people’s beliefs and culture but there should be democratic consolidation and sustenance by African leaders while greater participation in governance by nation or groups should be encouraged.

**Conclusion**

The paper has shown that multifarious factors are responsible for civil war in Cote d’Ivoire. It is particularly noted that frustration is one of the reasons for most aggressive behaviors by most rebel groups. The major contributions to knowledge by the findings of this study are: one, is that groups have objectives that much of their behavior is to seek particular goals and when this aim is not prevented in some ways, the individual or group is likely to behave quite peacefully. However, if this aim is hindered from being realized the frustrated group is likely to attack the believed source, which in actual fact, might not be the real cause of the frustration. The study equally revealed that civil war has great implications for Cote d’Ivorie and Africa’s peace and security. It was also discovered that the war, not only led to the destruction of lives and property but that it also created fears and unrest within and among citizens of Cote d’Ivoire.

It is however, important to note that in spite of the counter-measures by the international community to curb civil wars, the phenomenon continues unabated in some part of the world. The implication of this is that, the international community will continue to live in fear of civil wars.

Two, is that, enduring peace cannot be achieved under such atmosphere. It is therefore, the submission of this work that as long as the powerful nations continue to adopt policies that are against individuals, groups and other states, peace would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.

Exclusionary politics and bad politics had led to pockets of clashes between the north and south in which many lives and valuable property were lost. Also, arms proliferation has been on the upsurge because of the high mobility of arms and ammunition since the activities of the rebel started. These have found their ways to armed robbers and assassins, thus increasing the security implication of Cote d’Ivoire’s existence. Not least is the region disharmony between the north and south. There is no gainsaying that the two regions of Cote d’Ivoire did, in the past, engage each other in violent clashes, which led to the death of many and the destruction of valuable property. The fact that rebel’s activities have led to increase in the wave of ethnic conflicts and the death of innocent people, for no reason other than because they hail from some particular ethnic groups, is indeed worrisome. All these have proved beyond reasonable doubt that the north poses a potent threat to the security of the government and people of Cote d’Ivoire.

**Recommendations**

The reoccurrence of rebel activities in the country underscores the failing of the Ivoirien state and its institutions saddled with the responsibility of ensuring security. Consequently, the need to re-strengthen the existing institutions to cope with the dilemma of regional nationalism which, must be erected on the following recommendation:

In order to prevent future conflict/crisis, the immediate and underlying causes behind conflict/crisis must be addressed and openly discussed, including discrimination related to the division between “indigenes” or “settlers”, ethnic conflict, religious, economic injustices and dispute over political boundaries.

Conflict resolution should be pursued through increased inter-ethnic dialogue. Ideally, such dialogue should translate into concrete activities and projects designed and implemented by representatives of different ethnic and religious communities.

There is need to enhance international cooperation on the detection and monitoring of the security threats related to nepotism, and on prevention, preparedness, mitigation and response capacities.

Finally, a part of the arguments of the frustration-aggression theorists is that political alienation, marginalisation and disenfranchising is capable of leading to frustration and aggression. The problem of insecurity in Cote d’Ivoire would therefore be adequately addressed by first ensuring a just and equitable distribution of resources, equality of opportunities and the meeting of certain germane demands of the civil society groups such as true federalism, free and fair election, improvement in the living standard of Ivoirians and the convocation of a national conference. It is interesting to note that these are some of the issues that
necessitated the advent of Cote d’Ivoire’s civil war and their resolution will go a long way in averting rebels activities.

This paper shows clearly that there is a paramount need to restore orderliness and security for the country to acquire any modicum of development. This would in turn imply that the official security forces must be capable of enforcing control over actual violators and potential violators. Such control has, however, not always been easy in the history of societies and human development, as it touches on trust, ego and the inner lives where hopes and will reside. However, inspite of the difficulty in establishing a perfect free society, it is suggested that the international community, corporate organisations and the people must always commit themselves to the collective goal of maintaining security by coming up with innovative ideas with which to confront insecurity of lives and property by rebels any where in the world.

References


APPENDIX (A)

INTERVIEWS

Interaction With:


Others interactions:
E-mail exchanges with following Ivoirians
   1. Armelle Lidwine Yeboua  (Daloa in Cote d’ivoire)
   2. Boriiss Nickyy Daadjets (Korhogo in Cote d’ivoire)
   3. Emmanuel Kokou (Yamoussoukro in Cote d’ivoire)
   4. Mikie Jerkie West (Yamoussoukro in Cote d’ivoire)
   5. Prodim (Yamoussoukro in Cote d’ivoire)
   6. Jerome Moura (Abidjan in Cote d’ivoire)
   7. Raissa Atse (Abidjan in Cote d’ivoire)
   8. Sow Dimba (Bouake in Cote d’ivoire)
   9. Young Ivoirians united for the peace in Cote d’ivoir