

Youth and Transformation to Political violence in North Eastern Nigeria

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Abstract

Political violence being a global phenomenon had attracted several scholarly researches and non-governmental organizations reports particularly in relation to the sponsors, causes and consequences of such violence on the society. However, not much attention has been given to the actors if any, particularly in the case of Kalare youth group in Gombe state, Nigeria. Since the emergence of a group of youth known as Kalare as a tools for political violence in Gombe state, political congresses and elections are always accompanied with these violence groups, who are mobilised to scare the opponent or to counter attacks the perceived enemies. This paper investigated the factors responsible for the transformation of Kalare youth to political violent groups. This paper uses qualitative method of social research contrary to the study done in 2007 by Bashir using quantitative method which concluded that the youth were involved into political violence as a result of unemployment rate among the youth. Contrary to the earlier result this paper found out that the youth were influenced by other factors with material motivation offered by politicians as the major factor that pulled the youth into act of political violence. Others are poverty, moral decadence, drugs and peer groups influence.

Keywords: Youth, Transformation, Political violence, North Eastern Nigeria

1.0 Introduction

Political violence being a global phenomenon had attracted several scholarly researches and none governmental organizations reports particularly in relation to violence during elections, causes of political violence and consequences of such violence on the society (Amnesty International, 2007; Hollander, 2008b; Human Rights Watch, 2007b; Kolawale, 2006; Theophilus & Kingsley, C & Aondowase, 2013; Umar, 2003; Mbaya, 2013). However, not much attention has been given to the actors if any, particularly in the case of *Kalare* youth group in Gombe state, Nigeria. Since the emergence of a group of youth known as *Kalare* as agents for political violence in Gombe state, political congresses and elections are always accompanied with these violence groups, who are mobilised to scare the opponent or to counter attacks the perceived enemies. Furthermore *Kalare* are known for snatching of ballot box during elections and forcing of electorates to vote candidate out of their own choice. Indeed, apart from the Non-Governmental organizations and newspaper reports on the activities of *Kalare*, not many studies have been done on *Kalare* youth. Thus, this paper intends to study the *Kalare* youth group in Gombe state Nigeria, with particular focus on their transformation to a political violent groups.

1.1 Concepts of Youth

The word 'youth' has been defined in difference ways by various scholars and organizations. The United Nation Education Scientific Organization (UNESCO) in United Nations General Assembly, (2001), defines youth as those between the ages of 15 to 25 years old. In the case of Africa, youth is somebody who is above the age of 14, which is the highest age group in Africa. Obviously, youth is partly a social constructed or constituted group, like most social phenomena. Some people, who are well into their thirties but have not completed their education, have no job and are not in position to built their own family, can also be categorised as youth (D'Almeida 1992). Therefore, in Africa the age limit is between 14-35 age brackets; youth also comprises of both male and females. But in Nigeria, the Nigerian population commission defined young adult as person between the ages of 18-24 who also has the legal right to vote as adult. While, the 2009 second national policy document of the federal republic of Nigeria, defined youth as both male and female between the ages of 18-35 years old. Therefore, the definition of D' Almeida (1992), will be adopted for the purpose of this studies as it captured the age groups of the *Kalare* youth who are involved in political violence in Gombe state, Nigeria.

1.2 Concepts of Political Violence

Political violence refers to all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors - including competing political groups as well as incumbent- or its policies (Gurr 1970; Zimmermann 2011).

While, Ayang-Nyongo, (1993), Diouf, (1995) and Nzogola- Ntalaja and Lee, (1997), further elaborated that for violence to be political, there must be an intention to change the political process. Thus, the state feels threaten and resorts to aggression to protect itself; this amount to state violence which is a variant of political violence (Fashina 1989). Furthermore, Garver, (1977) and Fashina, (1989), agreed that political violence means

the use of force, usually but not necessarily, physical force, in order to harm or destroy human beings or non human objects, with the intention of preserving or altering political institution, system, government or policies. An act may account as an act of violence, both when used to maintain an existing arrangement and when used to change it.

While, Garver, (1977) argues that, the exercise of power is related to the experience of violence. He submits that violence is not so much a matter of physical force but more of violation of a person. Person can be violated either in their bodies or in their inability to make their own decision without external influence.

Therefore in this research political violence refers to all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors - including competing political groups as well as incumbent- or its policies as identified by (Gurr 1970; Zimmermann 2011). In addition to any attempt to through physical force or threat to denied individual to their decision particular with regards to whom to vote is political violence (Garver, 1977).

2.0 Historical Perspective of Political Violence

Although Political violence is a global phenomenon but it differs from one nation to another. A renowned theorist on the role of youth in political violence, Goldstein (2001), argues that youth have been key actors in political violence right from the English Revolution to the Revolutions of 1848, and that the existence of uneducated or unemployed youth may likely be easily co-opted into political violence such as “youth bulge” has historically been associated with a lot of political crisis (Goldstein 1991, 2001). According to Glenn, (2011), America like other nations has a long history of political violence – a dark river of brutality, even savagery that runs through the entire national experience. The American traditional political violence goes back as far as the colonial era, when Nathaniel Bacon and sizable number of Virginians rose up in armed rebellion against the royal governor of the colony in 1676. Other armed uprising taken place against colonial authority in New York and Maryland in the late 17th Century (Glenn 2011).

This means most societies had experienced political violence but each may also has its own peculiarities; as level of economic development has been found to be stronger predictors of political violence and that shows there is a strong correlation between democracy and economic developments (Lijphart, 2008; Lipset 1986; Muller, 1985; Sigelman & Simpson, 1977). Thus, due to the poor nature of African countries have witness an increase in political and ethnic conflict in the 1990’s (Berman 2009).

As a results violence and conflict have become endemic in Africa; this fact was seeing in the massacres in Rwanda, Burundi, the democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia and Algeria, among others. In Kenya, the governments, unwillingness to expand the democratic space for political participation is being challenged by several pro-democracy movements through political action and citizen’s campaign at various levels (Berman 2009). The wave of democratic and political change appears to have led to the identification of democracy in terms of multi party politics. Building a new democratic society was not the major agenda of African leaders, whose primary idea is to capture and hang on to state power at all costs (Hyden & Bratton, 1997; Ocheing, 1975; Uwaifo, 2012). As such they were not committed to serve the interest of people as expected in a real democratic society, these has let to poor dividend of democracy.

2.1 The History of Political Violence in Nigeria

The history of political violence in Nigeria was traced to the legacies of the trans-Saharan and trans-Atlantic slave trade and colonialism in Africa, in which societies were rampaged and ravaged through numerous invasions and invaders (Ngaji 2003).

Furthermore, Ngaji, (2003) stated that between 1951 and 1960, the Nigeria state was regionalized into three major groups: the North, the East and the West. These regions were created based on cultural and ethnic differences. As time goes on, it became apparent that some ethnic groups within the regions began to dominate the political economy of their respective regions because of their numerical strength. Sentiments deepened and the distinction within the provincial strata became very obvious, thus emphasizing the majority and minority phenomenon. However, over the years the pattern of political violence keen on changing. But in 2003, the nature of political violence took another dimension which become very rampant and even became a means of attaining political power. Thus, Yadudu, (2008) added that political violence is employed to further the cause of perpetuations in office or to unseat an incumbent. Even though, Yadudu’s discussion on political violence did not cover the actors in political violence, it has explained some of the reasons why politicians employ violence. As such this paper focused mainly on why the youth such as *Kalare* became predisposed to political violence by the politicians in Gombe state.

3.0 Methodology

3.1 Sampling

This paper utilizes purposive and snowball sampling techniques; by purposive technique means that *Kalare* respondents from Gombe local government, Yamaltu – Deba, and Akko, local government’s headquarters of

Gombe State were chosen for in depth interviews as the major concern areas for the purpose of this research in order to reflect the area where the activities of *Kalare* violence are more pronounce. While snowballing was use in getting access to the *Kalare* youth where a key informant was indentified who led the researcher to the next *Kalare* member until the required numbers for the purpose of this study were met. However, Funakaye and Billiiri local government headquarters were also chosen to represent the least or no *Kalare* violence local governments out of the remaining eight local governments of Gombe state.

3.2 Sampling Size

In selecting the sample size, the population were divided into two groups which consist of 43 respondents from the *Kalare* members and 6 key informants. These key informants include two State party's chairmen one representing each party. Other interviewed include two state political stakeholders and two sectional heads one representing the Military and the other representing the Police from the Anti *Kalare* squad. This is because the Military head is the head of the squad while the police are charge with the prosecutions of the *Kalare* youth. Thus they are capable of supplying all the required information about *Kalare* youth from the squad.

Table1. Distribution of *Kalare* youth respondents according to local governments

Local Governments	<i>Kalare</i> youth	Total
Gombe	26	26
Akko	07	07
Yalmat/Deba	04	04
Bajoga	03	03
Billiri	03	03
Grand Total	-	43

Table1. Indicate the numbers of *Kalare* youth respondents that were interviewed for this study in Gombe state in a glance. Gombe local government has the lagers population of respondents because is the capital of the state where the population of *Kalare* youth are more than anywhere in the state. While Akko and Yamaltu Deba local government the numbers were also based on the populations of *Kalare* in the local governments. Finally Bajoga and Billiri each 3 *Kalare* respondents were interviewed to represent the eight less *Kalare* violent local governments in Gombe state.

4.1 Reason for the Transformation of *Kalare* youth to Political Violence group in Gombe State

The reasons for the transformation of *Kalare* youth to political violence group is not tied to one factor as proclaimed by (Umar 2003; Bashir 2013) where their studies hold that unemployment is the major factor that influenced the youth to join political violence group.

Findings from the present study indicate that unemployment is one of the factors that contributed to political violence but it is not the major factor as there are other factors that influenced the youth involvement into political violence activities. This present research has identified other factors presented below according to sub headings.

4.2 Material Motivation from the Politicians

Under this heading described how the respondents felt that unemployment is not the only push in factor for their involvement into political violence. During the in depth interviews with the *Kalare* youth, most of the respondents gave other reasons for their involvement into political violence contrary to unemployment. More so, most of the respondents were attracted by the material benefits given by the politicians during campaign and elections as it were stated.

Where Lagagio 4 lamented that:

From 2003 to 2007 when you strike anyone with a weapon that led to his or her injury particularly an opponent of your sponsor, you will be given a new motorcycle as a gift here in Gombe so many of us were attracted by that material gift (IDI with Lagagio 4).

Therefore looking at the above statement by Lagagio 4, most of the youth were lured into political violence by politicians as a result of what the politicians offered as motivation. This motivational factor had played a role in attracting the youth into violent political activities in Gombe state. While, in a similar response on the reasons why he joined *Kalare* activities, Lagagio 9 stated that: *"We are being encourage by our Aspirants who asked us to do whatever they want and in return they reward us both in cash and in kind"*. However, MP3 Deba, responded differently though his reasons was also connected to the material motivation by the politicians as he said: *I joined Kalare activities because i want to earn something because during political campaign, politicians used to dole out money for youth to place posters in strategic places and to do other things (IDI with MP3).*

Despite the fact that a significant number of *Kalare* youth were pulled in to the *Kalare* violence as a result of material motivation, their explanations varies. According to Vmobile 1, “*I join Kalare group because i am ready to do any dirty job provided i will earn little money to solve my immediate problems since i was unable to further my education*”. From the above statement, it is evident that he joined *Kalare* group to enable him to get money so that he can sustain himself. He is also prepared to indulge himself in any nefarious activities to make a living since he could not further his education because of poverty. This respondent shows that he was influenced by social need factor as every human being has some basic needs which need to be satisfied either through legal or illegal means as shown in the case *Kalare* youth who chose to go through violence to get their demands satisfied

4.3 Unemployment

Although, unemployment was also given by some *Kalare* respondents as one of the factors that led to their transformation to political violence in Gombe state, it does not portray it as the only dominant factor. In fact the involvement of *kalare* youth in political violence has multi dimensional factors. Some of the respondents were of the same view with Lagagio 1 who gave reason as to why he joined a group of political violence in Gombe state. Stated that:

I joined Kalare group because i am redundant and the politicians need our services during campaign and elections. They pay us some money that enables us to solve some of our problems. But later we are exposed to drugs as a result of that (IDI with Lagagio 1).

From the statement above there are two factors tied together that why respondent joined political violence which is redundancy and the need to get some stipends from the politicians; the politician need their services for their political reasons which hitherto leads to drug abuse by the *Kalare* youth. While, Vmobile 9 has this to say with regard to what influenced him to join political violence group in Gombe State,

For us, we joined “Kalaré” necessarily to get the chance to become employed. This is how we happened to become members of “Kalaré” today and eventually got involved into politics (IDI with Vmobile 9).

To further buttress the earlier statement that the factors for the transformation of the *Kalare* youth into political violence can be clearly seen from the statement of Vmobile 9 where he lamented that the urge to get employment necessitated him to join the group to fulfil the basic necessities of life; thus he become actively involved in political violence. His word clearly proved that the pull-in factors into *Kalare* political violence are multi dimensional in nature.

However, Vmobile 9, maintains that:

If you join politics without joining “Kalaré” with a view to become prominent or inflict injury on someone or injury to be inflicted on you, cause commotion or perpetrate rigging during voting there is every tendency that the politicians will not notice or recognize you. Furthermore if you are recognized, they may likely create the opportunity for you to earn a living upon forming government (IDI with Vmobile 9).

Thus, the motivating factor from the point of view of the above respondent is the expectation that when the politicians that they worked for vigorously formed a government, the tendency they will earn a living as a result of their involvement in the *Kalare* political activities. Furthermore, Daza, a 28 years old respondent opined as to why he joined *Kalare* political violence which he attributed it to lack of job or employment and has this to say, “*Because i don’t have any job as such i decided to join the political thugs*”. Though, some of the *Kalare* youth claimed to have no job during IDI when most of them were asked as to what was their occupation before they join *Kalare*, their responses shows that they have job before their transformation into the political violence group. This can be seen in the table below.

Table2. Showing the *Kalare* respondent with their occupations before joining *Kalare* groups according to their local Governments in Gombe state

Occupations	Gombe LGA	Akko LGA	Y/Deba LGA	Billiri LGA	Funakaye LGA
Farming	2	-	1	-	-
Student	5	2	1	1	-
Business	14	2	-	-	2
Butcher		1			
Blending Machine operator	-	1	-	-	-
Apprentice		-	1	-	-
Bakery	1	-	-	-	-
Hunter	1	-	-	-	-
Unemployed	3	1	1	2	1
Total	26	7	4	3	3

Table2. Show that most of the *Kalare* youth have a job before joined political violence activities in Gombe state. In Gombe local government, out of the twenty six respondents interviewed for this research two are farmers, five are students, and fourteen of them were doing different businesses. Furthermore, one was working in bakery house and one is a hunter. There are only 3 respondents who have no employment or business when they joined the *Kalare* violence group. In Akko local government, two out of the seven respondents were students; two were doing business, one butcher and one operator of a blending machine before joining *Kalare* violent group. There is was only one respondent who is also not employed prior to his involvement into the *Kalare* violent group. While, in Yamaltu Deba local government, out of the four respondents, one was a farmer, one was a student one was an apprentice in a mechanical workshops and one was not employed before they joined *Kalare* valence group. Similarly, in Billiri local government, one out of three respondents as least or no *Kalare* violence area, one of the respondents was a student, and 2 were not employed as at the time they joined *Kalare* violent group.

Lastly, in Funakaye local government which is also one of the least or no *Kalare* violence, two of the respondents were doing business before their transformations into *Kalare* group, while one was not employed as at the time he joined *Kalare* activities.

4.4 Influence of Peer Group

There are few *Kalare* respondents who stated that they are being influenced by their friends to join *Kalare* activities. These respondents gave the same reasons for joining *Kalare* violence in Gombe state. According to Kattafaru, Lagagio 10 and Vmobile 12, they are influenced by their friends. While Vmobile 13 who also has the same view with above respondents but with different experience he said: “*I joined Kalare group because of envy as i used to see the members of kalare with new things especially motor cycles*”. The above view shows what their peer group possessed immensely influenced few *Kalare* youth to join political violence. Vmobile 13 reasons may not necessarily influence by peer group directly but other factors like envy.

4.5 Poverty

Poverty was also found to have played a role in pushing the youth into *Kalare* violent activities in Gombe state. This was revealed by some *Kalare* respondents during the in depth interviews. The respondents stated that they joined *Kalare* political violence as a result of their poor background in the society; in other words it is as a result of their disadvantaged background. According to Lagagio 12, “*those who don’t have money have to find something doing and earn a living and that is why you see most of the Kalare boys are from the poor families*”. Vmobile 9 opined that not only him but many *Kalare* youth joined *Kalare* activities out of necessity which is attributed to their poor family background. He stated that:

I want to state here that there is no pleasure in the act of Kalare violent activities because it is not a good job. But being there portrays necessity because it is difficult to earn a legitimate living. Since we live from hand to mouth in our communities as a result of hunger and poverty because we are from poor family. Some of us are educated but do not have a job to do. So, our life has been degraded and polluted with those habits (of being “Kalare”) because if you don’t join you can never become somebody or even get a job (IDI with Vmobile 9).

However, when the respondent was further asked whether he enjoyed being a *Kalare* member, this was his response, “*No, no! In fact, I earlier stated that it was a necessity that pushed me into it, it was a necessity*”. He emphasized that it was a necessity that made him to join *Kalare* but not because he liked it, “*Joining Kalare*

has become a necessity because you can only earn a living when you join politics and became a member provides you with sources of everything in Gombe state and Nigeria as a whole” (IDI with Vmobile 9).

Poverty has its own effect on the society, but it does not necessarily means that violence is a solution to poverty. One will wonder if violence is the solution to poverty why is it that those youth who joined the *Kalare* group are still battling with poverty and what happened to those that refused to join and still grappling with the same poverty. Whatever is the answer poverty still has a leading role in influencing the youth to join *Kalare* group as evident the previous responses who claimed they came from poor background. One of the elder statesman and political stakeholder further confirmed that most of the *Kalare* youth group are from poor background and has this to say:

Well, naturally they are poor. A lot of them don't have any job to do. I believe, majority of Nigerians are honest and well cultured but poverty can do a lot of things (IDI with Political stake holder 2).

This means poverty can influence somebody even out of his volition to join any unwanted group just to survive or seek some temporary relief.

4.6 Moral Decadence

Moral decadence was another factor given by the *Kalare* members though only few of them gave moral decadence as their reasons for joining *Kalare* political violence group. For example Lagagio 12, was of the view that the reason why the youth like him joined *Kalare* violence was as a result of moral decadence. When the researcher asked him as to why did he join group *Kalare*; his replied; “*Lack of good and adequate upbringing and home training*”. However, his statement was further emphasised by one of the key informant’s and a party leader in All People Congress (APC). He lamented that parents has a role to play in preventing their wards from joining any bad groupings such as the *Kalare* youth groups, parents duty is to keep an eye on their children. He further stated:

Well, 70 percent is the fault of the parents, as they are the ones that gave birth to the children and has principal responsibility for upbringing of their wards. Mostly parents failed in this endeavour as they don't use to monitor who their children associate with and neither do they take cognizance of where they sleep or who they mingled with. They hardly queried their wards if they happened to notice anything new with their children knowing very well they lack capacity to obtain that. This however has a greater implication on the life of the children as they will end up joining a very bad group which ought to have controlled had it been the parents did what is expected of them (IDI with APC Party leader).

The state party leader buttressed the views advanced by Lagagio 12 as he emphasised, lack of moral upbringing as one of the reason for influencing the youth to join *Kalare*. He believed that if parents failed to monitor the progress and upbringing of their child, the tendency is that the children may find themselves a god father outside who is capable of cajoling them becoming their errand boys who are bound to be submissive and will serve the political interest of their god fathers. This is more so in view of the fact that the god fathers will invariably control the youth and made them to join a group like *Kalare* in anticipation of both financial and material gains. He concluded as 70% the fault of parents that forced the youth to join *Kalare* group.

4.7 Drug Abuse among Kalare youth

Drugs abuse was also found to be one of the factors that result to violence as almost all *Kalare* uses or take drugs before they go for their political activities. The commonest intoxicants they takes are Indian hemp and drugs both tablets and syrups. However, some of the youth said that sometimes the drugs are given to them by the politicians (sponsors) before they carry out assignments. While in some other cases the money are given to them to buy the drugs themselves. But the question is that after the politicians give them dug what further instructions are given to the youth? This is what Eleven Boys said:

Mostly the instruction by the political sponsors has to do with settling of scores between political opponents. The sponsor understands that after we have taken the drugs, and knowing fully that the effect of the drugs made us to be merciless and fearless, he will take undue advantage of that and persuade us to attack and or kill his political opponent (IDI with Eleven Boys).

However, in corroborating what Eleven Boys said Lagagio 4, further explained: “*Yes the work cannot be done without drugs; i take Indian hemp and drugs like Tramol, Beneline syrups etc*”. This fact was further conceded by PDP straight 2, where he stated that: “*I normally take Indian hemp or Tramol when going for political activities because its make me become fearless and stronger*”. More than half of the *Kalare* respondents

confessed that they take both drugs and hemp or one of the two for them to be able to perform their activities very well as reiterated by Vmobile 9.

Well, yes, I still smoke cigarette up to now. I am also a smoker of Indian hemp. I never drink beer but I do smoke Indian hemp and Tramol drugs. If not, to talk at the podium will not be easy (IDI with Vmobile 9).

This means taking drugs has a vital role in making the *Kalare* youth more prone to violence as most of the times they are intoxicated because of drugs which make them go out of their senses, merciless and wiled. This was also confessed by the *Kalare* youth during interviews where most of them lamented that they were involved in violence that led to the deaths of either their *Kalare* opponents or members of the society on several occasions. Among the youth who confessed the participation in violence that led to death of some people was Cash money 5 who stated that:

Yes, i have participated in violence where 8 people were killed here in Gombe as a result of clash between Kalare groups because one group had destroyed our party properties, such as bill boards, party temples etc (IDI with Cash Money 5).

When Cash Money 5 was further asked whether they do this violence on their own or on directives from their sponsors this was his response: “*Yes, our group has burned so many political offices at Kumo and Kwadon on instructions from our sponsor*”. Similarly, while responding on the issue of violence, Cash Money 1, who is also a leader of one of the *Kalare* groups, concedes that he was also involved in burning of properties belonging to the opposition party.

Yes, we participated in burning properties of the opposition parties, that is even our main task and i dished out orders to those under me to burn the properties because i am a group leader (IDI with Cash Money 1).

Looking at the *Kalare* responses one will understand that the aim of employing or sponsoring the *Kalare* youth is to perpetrate violence and settle scores between the opposition parties and candidates contesting for the same offices. This is because some of the contestants are seen as a threat to the victory of others. That informed the need to either eliminate or force the other opponent to resign his mandate or face the wrath of *Kalare* violence and harassment if he has no means of repelling the attacks. The activities of the group multiplied in number because of the confidence that nothing will happen to them as a result of the violence as they are highly covered by those in authority. This has also led to the emergence of drug addicts and broadens the horizon of *Kalare* youth violent activities to continually harass, intimidate and inflict serious injury on their members as well as community at large mainly due to the influence of drugs.

5.0 Discussion

The result based on the responses from the *Kalare* youth on why do they transformed into political violence are extensively discussed. This research was interested in tracing other factors that led *Kalare* youth into political violence. This is because employment opportunities were provided but yet the phenomenon of *Kalare* violence still exists. Even though unemployment is a factor for political violence, material motivation plays a dominant role in this research finding. Conversely other factors featured in to influence the transformation as well as the escalation of political violence in Gombe state which includes drugs abuse among the youth, moral decadence and poverty among others.

First of all table1 shows that most of them have something to do or are gainfully employed before they joined *Kalare* violent political activities. Subsequently, some of them abandon their original businesses while others combined the two as a result of the material and financial motivation they derived from the politicians. It was reported by the *Kalare* youth themselves during in depth interviews that, whenever they happened to strike an opposition member with a weapon where an injury is inflicted on the victim, they are being rewarded with a brand new motor cycle by the politicians (Lagagio 9). This has been one of the major reasons that influenced the youth into the political violent groups, as they sees this as an opportunity to make quick and easy money.

However more than half of the *Kalare* youth are not educated and capable of engaging in any dirty trade because of their disadvantaged condition couple with the fact that most of them are unskilled youth. Furthermore, from the analysis of the result, it is confirmed that all members of the group emanates from poor family background. Their parents abandoned them and failed to cater for their upbringing which makes them vulnerable and susceptible to crimes. Accordingly, the possibility of getting government work is very narrow because of their educational background and even if they will be employed, it will be the unskilled or semi skilled with low income. The combination of illiteracy and poverty may result to a push factor capable of aiding political violence (Collier, 2000). Collier further stated that, if young people are left with no alternative to violence and are saddled with the web of illiteracy and poverty, there is tendency for them to join all sort of violence as an alternative ways of generating an income or survival (Collier, 2000).

Gombe being the state capital and as an urban area is capable of attracting varied number of youth in

search of greener pasture. However, as a result of different background and impact of urbanization youth may end in political violence. These youth are highly depending on politicians for daily subsistence as a result they become too dependent on a political sponsor consequently the sponsor is more to control and dish out orders to the teeming youth for their selfish interest or for the achievement of political goal. This finding was also supported by the work of Urdal, (2006), who hold that youth bulges and dependency on politicians for survival has relationship with political violence. The violence may decline as dependency ratio reduces, which means as much as the youth depends on the politicians for their survival, violence will continue. Despite that hundred percent of the *Kalare* youth are males; one may like to find out why males are prone to political violence. This fact was also observed by Neapolitan, (1997) and Neumayer, (2003), in their studies where they maintained that young males are the main actors in criminal violence. This result was further supported by the work of Sambanis; Elbadawi; & Nicholas, (2000) and Wiener & Mesquida, (1996), who also added that young males are not only protagonist of criminal violence but political violence as well. Another study also documented that the aggressive nature of young men who are prone to political violence may not be unconnected with their high male sex hormone percentages (Goldstein, 2001; Valerie, Ndreia, & Boer, 2004). The above study argued that males are more likely to be violent and join political violence groups than females. Though, there are other young males, who did not join *Kalare* violence, this may be attributed to the way individual child is brought up. This is more common with the culture of the Northern States, where the populations are predominantly Muslims mostly practices polygamous system of family. The polygamous system of family allowed one person to marry more than one wife and can have as many children as possible. However, in some situation where the parents are poor and the burden of taking care of the family becomes unbearable, they tend to lose control over their children. The upbringing of the children is virtually transferred to the mother, some community members, or friends who invariably will not provide the proper upbringing required of the child.

Hence, any child that suffers from moral decadence is capable of being influenced by peer group to join any violence group. Furthermore, moral decadence can be endangered by drugs abuse as a result of lack of good or adequate parental upbringing (Alagh 2007). Most of the *Kalare* youth are addicted to drugs as such the quest or demand for their drugs also pushed them into all sort of violence in order to fetch them money to maintain their drugs addiction. APC leader in an in-depth interview corroborated the views of Alagh, (2007) where he apportioned the blame of youth involvement into political violence on the parents' inability to take good care of their children. The result of the in-depth interview shows that most of the *Kalare* youth are into drugs and there is every tendency of the drug users to engage in violence towards each other, as discovered in the work of Mark, Ilgen and Felicia, (2011). Similarly, it was reported that most victims of homicides are victims of circumstances as their assailant are found to be associated with drugs and belongs to teenage group similar to that of *Kalare* youth as explained by Mario, Elizabeth, Lambert and Bernard, (1990). From the foregoing, it is evident that drug abuse contributed immensely to the transformation of *Kalare* into political violence.

This paper discovered that some of the *Kalare* youth joined the group as a result of the influences of peer group because of the way they spend money and/or use of exotic material that ordinarily may not be possible to obtain unless you join a violent group. The more one associate with one another the likely the possibility of behaving the same way. Tom, Matos, Simoes, Dizi and Camacho (2012), in their research using structural equations models found out that influence of peer group has direct link with negative risk behaviours. Their findings is the same as in the case of Vmobile 13 who stated that he joined *Kalare* simply because some of his friends are members; as such he follows them while going for their activities and that was how he became a member. While, Dishion, (2000), in his study of Early Adolescent Psychopathology also discovered that there is significant link between peer group and individual delinquency both in childhood and adolescent stage. Thus, the influence of peer played a role in the transformation of *Kalare* youth into political violence activities in Gombe state.

Conversely, the transformation of youth into *Kalare* groups has led to escalation of violence in Gombe state. The violence was escalated as a result of deprivations faced or experienced by the *Kalare* youth from their sponsors. The failure of the politicians to fulfil the promises made to the *Kalare* youth mostly sparked violence. However, the preponderance of violence is ignited after the politicians have fulfilled their goals and failed to redeem their earlier pledges made to the youth. Hence the *Kalare* youth react violently as contains in the deprivation theory of Heck, A. and Wech, (2003), where they stated that when desire becomes legitimate expectations and those desires are being denied or refrain from attaining them. Base on the fact that the youth felt they were engaged by the politician to work for them and any promise made in kind, cash or after winning election is considered legitimate by them and any effort to deprive them of their legitimate expectation will meet brick resistance from the youth which will lead to violence. As a result when they react other innocent people falls victims, which also corresponds with the view of relative deprivations by Morrison, (1971). Morrison stated that relative deprivation has consequences for behaviour and attitudes that lead to collective participation of actions as it was found in the case of *Kalare* youth. The findings in this research is contrary to the findings of political violence in the Middle East where political violence are caused by Zionism and foreign militarism as

stated by Rami, (2015). Similarly, the findings of this study also contradicts that of WHO, (2008), who hold the views that political violence are based on unequal distribution or access to resources. Nonetheless, other causes of political violence are political rivalry between the politicians that led to incitement of *Kalare* youth against one another as against the findings of Adele, (2012), who opined that ethnicity is the cause of political violence. Furthermore, drugs addiction among the *Kalare* youth are other stimulating factors for violence among the *Kalare* youth unlike in the work of Godowoli A., (2003), where he stressed that competition on the attainment of personal goals of individual politicians is the means of violence.

5.0 Conclusion

This paper concludes that, the major factor that involved *Kalare* youth into political violence group is material motivation. In other words the youth were mostly involved in an act of violence for the reward they get from the politicians which comes in both kind and cash.

The study found out that other factors responsible for the involvement are poverty among the *Kalare* youth where it was discovered that most of the *Kalare* youth are from the poor family background. In addition the poor background of the families has contributed to moral decadence, where parents lost control over their children simply because they cannot provides for their needs.

Furthermore, most of the *Kalare* youth were not gainfully employed because they lack the prerequisite skill and knowledge needed of them to perform on any skilful job. As such this contributed immensely to political violence for the benefit of the material gains offered by the politicians.

In addition drug addiction contributed in keeping the youth in violence as they are always in drugs. This has made them to always search look for money through all means to maintain their drugs addiction as such they easily contracted with little token just to enable them get money for their drugs.

Finally this paper contradicts the earlier study which holds that unemployment was the major factor responsible for the involvement of *Kalare* youth into political violence. This is because most of the *Kalare* youth abandoned their occupation and trades simply because they see violence as more profitable and a source of getting rich quickly syndrome.

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