

Nigeria's Role in Regional Collective Security in Africa: An Appraisal of Nigeria and Niger Republic Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)

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Abstract

Collective security is an indispensable tool used by nation-states in ensuring stability, peace and development of the international system. It assures of the protection of economic, cultural, political, and other ties which states involved treasures and wants to continue preserving. This study examined Nigeria's roles in regional collective security in Africa, An appraisal of Nigeria and Niger Republic Multinationals Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The study is essentially qualitative in its approach, primary and documentary sources are the major instruments used for data collection. Respondents of Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) were purposively selected. To correlate collective's security discourse, the study drew collective security theory, which no doubt threw more light on harmony of collective effort to curtail the threats of terrorism in the region. The study found that the multinational joint task forces have really addressed the challenges of insecurity as a result of Boko Haram threats in the region. The study argues the joint team faces with problem of inadequate funds and man power to fight the menace though they have really achieve a lot in their fight to curtail terrorism in the region. The study concludes that corruption as a bane to African development really impeded the success of the MNJTF in the region. The study recommended among others there is there is a need for West African leaders to display greater political will, and make stronger financial commitments in order to actualize the full potentials of the sub-region's collective security mechanism.

Keywords: Collective Security, Insurgency, Nigerian State, Boko Haram and Multinational Joint Task force

Introduction

Recent developments of regional crisis and tensions of war and war-like activities that threatens the peaceful co-existence and security of lives and property with Nigeria and it neighbours. Since the return of civil rule in 1999, Nigeria has been experiencing rising spectre of violence and insecurity bordering on natural resources mismanagement and control, citizenship question, electoral violence, religious and ethnic polarisation, and the current ferocious insurgency against the state. To be sure, Nigeria is a country of cyclical crisis – the history, dynamics and challenges of its development are deeply rooted in tension, conflicts, instability and insecurity (Imohe, 2010; Abdullahi, 2013).

Internal conflict and instability in Nigeria (as the case of militancy in Niger Delta and Boko Haram in the north region) not only poses a serious threat to internal security in Nigeria but threaten regional stability of west African as a whole, thereby calling for collective security in order to ensure peace and stability in the continent (Onuoha, 2014). Terrorism poses enormous threats to the security, political stability, economic development and human security of the West African governments and people. It submits that the region is not presently a hub of terrorism but is a fertile ground for breeding terrorist networks through trans-national criminal networks, small arms proliferation, illegal natural resource transfer, human and drugs trafficking.

The Nigerian state has become a centre of war with violence erupts in almost all regions despite its big brother role in Africa and the various conflict prevention, management and resolution mechanisms in existence. Indeed, Africa has been experiencing a variety of complex political, economic, environmental and social upheavals in degrees and intensity that is unprecedented in the continent. These factors conspired to launch the continent into a series of devastating intra-state conflicts ever experienced in a single continent anywhere in the world in the last decade and a half. Intra-state conflicts have ravaged Africa. Bakwesagha (2013) observed that intra-state conflicts in Africa today have given the continent the 'unenviable record of hosting the highest number of uprooted communities in the world; 7 million refugees and close to 20 million internally displaced people'.

A common denominator of these conflicts is that many of them suffered initial neglect, even by

African countries. The responses of the United Nations (UN) to many of these conflicts are usually slow and in some cases erratic. Many of the responses came only after a major humanitarian disaster had occurred.

Given the increase in intra-state conflicts in Africa, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at its 28th Ordinary Session in Dakar, Senegal, between June 29 and July 1, 1992 decided on a mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. The Assembly expressed concern with the proliferation of conflicts in Africa and the immense suffering that they have brought to the people of Africa. Worried by the adverse implications of conflicts for the security of Africa and the socio-economic development of the continent, it decided to 'adopt, in principle the establishment, within the framework of OAU, and in keeping with the objectives and principles of the charter, a Mechanism for Preventing, Managing and Resolving Conflicts in Africa' (Salim 1992).

Largely overwhelmed by the number of conflicts in Africa, the OAU played minimal roles. It could not even kick-start its own mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. It played mediator roles between sub-regional organizations and United Nations. The Sub-regional organizations became the primary units of conflict management in Africa consequently. These sub-regional organizations are the Inter-Governmental Development Authority (IGAD) in the East; The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the West; the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU/UMA) in the North; The Southern African Development Community (SADC); and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in the Central Africa Sub-region. ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD, organizations originally formed for economic and development reasons, have been developing a peace and security role because of the inevitable realization that these two issues are closely linked. Of all these, only ECOWAS and SADC have established some form of sub-regional security response mechanism for the purposes of conflict management which are not enough considering the magnitude of regional threat to member states now. For example it should be noted that, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established as a regional economic grouping with the specific aim of establishing customs union and establishing a common market.

Years after, its scope expanded beyond just achieving economic integration to security management in the West African sub-region. African leaders have collaborated in areas such as conflict prevention, management, resolution and peace-building; control of the proliferation of Small and Lights Weapons (SALWs); containment of refugee crisis; war against money laundering and terrorism (Alli, 2010). Hence, this regional body, which is supposed to be the collective security arrangement, is ineffective in terms of quick response. It is expedient to mention that the AU has however, been inefficient in solving Africa's security issues. Sesay and Akonai (2010), liken the AU to a house without a roof of which people are asking for shelter and protection from it, and conclude that the organization is more or less an occasion for hope and not yet an achievement (Floralinet *al*, 2014).

However, due to the slow response of this organizations intervening in regional conflicts, various states as the case of Nigeria and Niger Republic entered into collective security arrangement through Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to curtail the problem of insecurity and ensure survival of Nigerian state. For example, Nigeria and Niger Republic signed an agreement for the immediate commencement of joint border patrols along the borders between the two neighbouring countries to curb the activities of the Islamic Religious sect, *Boko Haram*. The agreement was signed in Niamey the capital of Niger Republic in 2013. Therefore, this study appraises the role of Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) between Nigeria and Niger Republic as collective security effort in tackling insecurity in the region.

Conceptual clarifications and theoretical reviews

The Concept of Collective Security

The term collective security can be understood as a security arrangement in which states cooperate collectively to provide security for all, by the actions of all against any state within the group which might challenge the existing order by using force (Abdullahi, 2014).

According to Danchin (2009:40) the concept of collective security is "notoriously difficult to define, as the term is associated with a loose set of assumptions and ideas and its continued existence remains a contested concept. Claude Jr. (1992), agrees and further suggests that when the term collective security is used loosely, appears to be a synonym of peace or world order while it has also been used to refer to any and all multilateral efforts to deal with the problem of international peace and security, rather than a specifically to the system that gained prominence after the First World War.

Roberts and Kingsbury (1993), define collective security as "an arrangement where each state in the system accepts that security of one of them is a concern of all, and agrees to join in a collective response to aggression". It is the foundational principle of the League of Nations: namely that member states would take a threat or attack on one member as an assault on all of them. The concept of collective security is a sort of social contract among states in which the collective-security goal is stability and peace (Blin and Marin, 2009).

Kupchan (1995), defines collective security as, “an agreement between states to abide by certain norms and rules to maintain stability and when necessary, band together to stop aggression”

Collective security is a ‘system of world order in which aggression by any state or group would be met by a collective response’ (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1997). It is a system of collective self-regulation’ occurring when ‘a group of states attempt to reduce security threats by agreeing to collectively punish member states that violate systems’ norms’ (Downs 1994).

Essentially, collective security has three meanings. The first is the Kantian or Wilsonian collective security model that is seen as an arrangement among states for effective action against any aggressor from within that community of states. When an aggression occurs, all member states would have the moral, political, and legal obligation to act against the aggressor and restore peace. This is based on the shared conviction that ‘peace is indivisible’ and that every state’s security interests are affected by any aggression anywhere.

The second meaning of collective security refers to an intervention, usually undertaken by a coalition of states, against international aggression or internal conflict or disorder with the explicit or implicit approval of the United Nations.

This intervention can take many forms, including mediation and conciliation, economic sanctions, preventive force deployments, coercive military operations, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and crisis management.

The third meaning of collective security concerns an intervention by a single state or a coalition of states against international aggression or internal conflict or disorder without the approval of the United Nations Security Council.

This definition captures three distinct ideas: the purpose or end of stopping aggression; the reliance on legal norms to determine both the meaning of that term and the appropriate response; and the rejection of self-help in favour of collective action. Thus, collective security rests on the idea of institutionalizing the legal use of force, “to reduce reliance of self-help as a rather crude instrument of law enforcement”(Kupchan 1995).

When these ideas are brought together, the concept of collective security in this study may be further defined as an institutionalized universal or regional system in which States have agreed by treaty jointly to meet any act of aggression or other illegal use of force resorted some groups against States.

The first assumption of collective security is simply that wars are likely to occur and that they ought to be prevented. Conflicts are an outcome of unreflective passion or deliberate plan. Wars normally represent efforts to settle disputes, or they could be effects of indefinably broad situations of hostility or calculated methods to realize ambitious designs of conquests (Danchin, 2009).

Collective security is a specialized instrument of international policy in the sense that, it is not only intended to prevent the arbitrary and aggressive use of force or provide enforcement mechanisms for the whole body of international law but also assumes the centre piece of world order is the restraint of military action rather than the guarantee of respect for all legal obligations. It also assumes that this ideal (that is, restraint of military action) may be achieved or at least approximated by a reformation of international policy without changing the structure of international system. Thus collective security holds the belief that governments are open to (or agreeable with) moral appeals against the misuse of force, and therefore have a rationalistic approach to peace. The rational appeal suggested by collective security to potential belligerents is the use of diplomatic, economic, and military sanctions as tools for inducing rational decision to avoid ‘threatened damage’ to national self-interest.

Collective security also assumes the moral clarity of the situation, the assignability of guilt for a threat to or a breach of the peace. It focuses on the concept of aggression, with its implication that the parties to a military encounter can be characterized as an aggressor and victim. After the identification of the guilty party, collective security rejects primary concern of international morality in favour of the principle of power. Collective security fails if either of the two assumptions prove invalid: that blame can be confidently assessed for international crises, and that states are rationally calculating enough to behave prudently.

Collective Security is a conception whereby the nation-states of the world, under the auspices of an international organization like the United Nations, agree to deter or prevent war and maintain international peace and security by opposing aggression (Ubelejit, 2014).

Again, Collective Security concept therefore, is a strategy adopted by members of the international system to collectively restrain the use of force among its members. The principle stipulates that members would take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace and for the suppression of aggressive acts and breaches of the peace (Adedoyin, 2004).

In its theoretical underpinning, Bennett (1988) stressed that, the theory of collective security rest on assumption that all nations share a primary interest in maintaining peace.

Bennett (1988:23) argued that:

In order for collective security to operate, peace must be viewed as indivisible, and threats to peace anywhere must be treated as the concern of all members of the international system. Furthermore, all members must agree in advance to react promptly and effectively against threats to peace and must be organized in such a way as to provide the procedures for collective response to such threats, even if the collection is directed against members with which they are friendly. The aggressor nation will be faced with such overwhelming opposition from all other members of the system that peace will be promptly restored. In fact, the promise of preponderant opposition will usually dissuade incipient aggressors from their inclinations towards breaches of international peace.

A collective security system entails the centralization of a society's coercive mechanisms. As a corollary the members of that society, in this case States, give up a great deal of their individual freedom to indulge in self-help, and are generally restricted to a limited right of self-defence, usually until the central authority takes over their protection.

Again, Organski (1958) for instance, lists five basic assumptions underlying the theory of collective security. That in an armed conflict, member nation-states will be able to agree on which nation is the aggressor. All member nation-states are equally committed to contain and constrain the aggression, irrespective of its source or origin. All member nation-states have identical freedom of action and ability to join in proceedings against the aggressor. The cumulative power of the cooperating members of the alliance for collective security will be adequate and sufficient to overpower the might of the aggressor. In the light of the threat posed by the collective might of the nations of a collective security coalition, the aggressor nation will modify its policies, or if unwilling to do so, will be defeated.

On the other hand, Claude Jr. points out that the theory of collective security is less heavily dependent on a set of assumptions about the nature and causes of war and thus claims to be applicable to wider variety of belligerent (confrontational) situations, assuming that not all wars occur from similar type of causes.

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To this end, the objective of collective security is to inhibit war through the threat of collective action. The theory of collective security is based on certain basic conditions, which are required for its effective applications. Henry Kissinger (1992) observed that collective security requires each state to share responsibility for every other state's security. He argued that it 'assumes that every nation perceives every challenge to the international order in the same way, and is prepared to run the same risks to preserve it' (Kissinger 1992).

It is such that insecurity of one state makes all states less secure. A local dispute in one part of the world can threaten another part (as the case of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria which affects its immediate neighbours); economic and ethnic rivalries can spill over into other countries. Collective security therefore requires all states to take joint action against any aggressor, and all are to act in concert.

However, joint force is deeply rooted in the theory of collective security. A theory derived from the idealist view of international system as one based on community of states with the potential of cooperating to overcome mutual problems. The dream of the idealists is to create an international system based on collective security that would replace the anarchic system that lacks central enforcement mechanisms (Kant 1957;

Olson 1971; Watts 1979; Lighten and Flak 1982; Baldwin 1993; Kelley 1995; Vasquez 1983; Naradin and David 1992; Long and Peter 1995; Scott and Waltz 1995; Andreas and Rittberger 1997).

The United Nations, since inception in 1945, has been an institutional framework for collective security and has utilized contingents of multinational forces to keep the peace and maintain security. Regional organizations like NATO and sub-regional organizations like ECOWAS-ECOMOG have used peacekeeping and peace enforcement mechanisms to manage conflicts.

The point here is that intervention for humanitarian goals is the vision of an international order in which state sovereignty is not absolute, but a set of attributes that can be curtailed when essential human rights are being violated and that international security is not just about territories of states but also the population in those territories. International intervention is employed to redress outrageous behaviour during the course of an internal conflict (such as significant violations of human rights). It has also been used to resolve disputes of a considerable size, intensity, and length. It could be utilized to forestall the likelihood of intervention by outside states interested in assisting the government in power; the insurgents, or other intervening states; and to address actual or potential spillover of a conflict across international borders. Thus, this theory is used to explain the role of multinational joint task force of both states.

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However, the theory of collective security has certain limitations. According to Morgenthau (2006), the logic of collective security is flawless provided that it can be made to work under the conditions prevailing in the international scene. For collective security to operate as a device for prevention of war, three assumptions must be fulfilled.

Firstly, the collective system must be able to muster at all times such overwhelming strength against any potential aggressor or coalition of aggressors that the latter would never dare to challenge the order defended by the collective system.

Secondly, at least those nations whose combined strength would meet the requirement under (1) must have the same conception of security that they are supposed to defend.

Thirdly, those nations must be willing to sub-ordinate their conflicting political interests to the common good defined in terms of the collective defense of all member states.

In practice, these three conditions have never been fulfilled thus rendering collective security as being idealistic.

Another scholar, Mearscheimer (1990), criticizes collective security for the following reasons. He argues that, the theory of collective security is an incomplete theory because it does not provide a satisfactory explanation for how states overcome their fears and learn to trust one another. In other words, it is too ideal. He also argues that it assumes too easily the satisfaction of an extraordinarily complex network of requirements. Mearscheimer argues on the contrary that states have abundant reasons to doubt that collective security will work when aggression seems likely. States that ignore balance of power will perform worse than others. He also argues that collective security has little support from historical record. That peacekeeping has no role to play in disputes between great powers, and since it cannot use coercion, is powerless. To him, concerts often emerge in the aftermath of great wars and are merely a matter of classical balance of power which is why they only last as long as the balance of power does not change.

Claude Jr.(1961), also points out that, collective security is crafted in such a way that it provides certainty of collective action to frustrate aggression. Thus, a potential victim is reassured and the potential law breaker will get deterrence because the resources of international community will be mobilized against any abuse of national power. This ideal encourages states to hope for collective support in case they are victims of attacks and the aggressive state will receive deterrent action for abusing its national power. This is an ideal in the sense that, it does not provide, “*ifs and buts*” It also fails to “stimulate the revisions of state behavior at which it aims and upon which its ultimate success depends”. Thus, “if the hope which it encourages should prove illusory, it stands convicted of contributing to the downfall of states whose security it purported to safeguard.” Also, “if it merely warns potential aggressors that they may encounter concerted resistance, it fails to achieve full effectiveness in its basic function, that of discouraging resort to violence, and if its warning should be revealed as a bluff, it stimulates the contempt for international order which it is to eradicate”(Mearscheimer, 1990).

Therefore, the theory of collective security is filled with absolutes, of which none is more basic than the requirement of certainty.

Another limitation outlined by Claude Jr., is what he refers to as “dilemma of circularity”, where collective security cannot work unless policies of states are inspired by confidence in the system, but requires exceptional act of political faith to *repose* confidence in the system without previous demonstration that

collective security works. Collective security theory urges states to assume the application of the notion of self-fulfilling prophecy where if they act as if the collective security system works then it will do so, or else it will fail. The reality is stakes are very high in the world of power politics that states do not lightly undertake such experiment in the field of national security. Another criticism to collective security is the charge that it risks turning every local encounter into a global conflict by drawing outsiders into the fray. Ideally, a collective security system would prevent war altogether or convert the defeat of every aggressor into an easy police operation by overwhelming forces.

However, despite these points of criticisms and recognized weaknesses of the Collective Security theory, it cannot be denied that the system has not been totally meaningless and without positive features. It has brought into vision the idea and possibility of collective steps for the preservation of world peace through crisis management in the event of a war. The chances for a more purposeful and successful use of Collective Security in this post-cold war world have brightened. Currently it is being operationalized in several different parts of the world. Indeed, Collective Security constitutes a modern device of crisis management. All the members of community of nations are expected to act and save the humankind from the scourge of war and aggression and to use the collective security theory for this purpose.

Apart from its being instrumental to the establishment of regional security arrangement, the collective security concept has also been adopted in many instances around the world to maintain international peace and security, a responsibility which is generally referred to as peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace support and in some instances peace enforcement operations.

However, While Collective Security aims at promoting friendly relations and equality of states within the arrangement, it does not forget the sovereignty of a state that makes it independent and free from political or economic exploitation and dominance by any other state or entity.

It is in line with this activity that collective security has an important role to play in the provision of security and promoting peace within member states, the continent and world at large. Apart from the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), South East African Treaty Organization (SEATO), Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), the ANZUS PACT of 1951 and WARSAW PACT of 1955 that were mainly created to provide collective security to member countries, there are other regional organizations like African Union (AU), European Union (EU), South African Development Community (SADC) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) that provide collective security to members even though not primarily formed for that purpose.

The world generally is concerned about security, be it on individual basis (states acting alone) or collectively (states coming together to protect each other). The United Nations in maintaining international peace and security, take collective measures to acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and this can be done either by the Security Council of the United Nations or the regional and sub-regional collective security bodies. Chapter VII of the UN Charter in article 39-50 provides for Collective Security and article 51 provide for Collective defence (United Nations World Governance Reports, 2012).

Furthermore, chapter VIII of the same Charter in articles 52-54 makes provision for the creation of Regional and Sub-regional Collective Security Arrangements. This we can say is the basis upon which any discussion on Collective Security can be based as far as this work is concerned (The United Nations Charter of 1945).

The emergence of the concept of collective security means there have been in existence individual security bodies for the different states that come together to form an alliance in the form of collective security to protect all Member States from the aggression of any other State within or outside the organization. The idea of collective security was a dream entertained by the enlightenment of philosophers, who wished to end once and for all, the conflicts and schemes of unscrupulous leaders whose ambition has nothing to do with their subject's wellbeing. The idea of progress, freedom and happiness too, is rooted in the theoretical conception of collective security. It was at the instance of a philosopher, Head of state, Woodrow Wilson (a professor of political philosophy at Princeton), that the concept became a reality with the League of Nations, then later with the support of another American, Franklin D. Roosevelt that the United Nations was found.

Impact of Insurgency on Nigeria and its Neighbours

Accounts of newspapers, Radio, Television and even the internet depict the degraded state of security in Nigeria and its immediate neighbours. Nigeria's security dilemma is so critical that the ordinary man is not sure of existence anymore and just resorts to self-help or resigns to faith in the Supreme Being or fate. They have recorded numerous and successful attacks of the Boko Haram sect on various sectors of the society. These have included international organizations, security agencies, educational institutions, places of worship, and so forth, including the United Nations building and Force Headquarters in Abuja, raids on army barracks and military formations, bombing of churches and mosques, among others. On October 1, 2010, when Nigeria was

celebrating its Golden Jubilee, terrorists attacked Abuja, the federal capital. These events and activities have instilled fears and anxiety in Nigerians and visitors.

According to the Human Rights Watch (2015), Boko Haram has struck over 115 times between 2011 and first quarter of 2014, in the course of their operations the sect has indeed changed the face of terrorism in Nigeria.

The deadliest dimension of the Boko Haram terror, has been its incessant moves into Niger, establishment of major camps in neighbouring countries, kidnap and dehumanization of over 234 Nigerian teenage girls, occupation of important towns and cities and declaration of sovereign 'Caliphate Republic' in the northeastern part of the country (Human Rights Watch, 2015; Interviews, 2016). These ominous trends constitute serious threat to Nigeria's corporate existence and could end the nationhood. This is where strategic partnership with immediate neighbours comes in, to encircle Boko Haram and other terrorist elements and share military and intelligence resources with Cameroon, Chad and Niger to tackle and put an end to terrorism.

As argued by a respondent (Interview, 2016) that, the attacks and other abuses committed by Boko Haram have resulted in massive internal displacement. It has also led to significant flows of populations from the Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States of Nigeria into Niger, Chad and Cameroon. This situation has significantly strained resources in the host countries, raising concerns that this may give rise to tension between refugees and host communities.

Today, most Nigerians and Nigeriens are facing the risk of being exterminated as a result of Boko Haram insurgency (Terrorism). The impacts of Boko Haram insurgency in contemporary Nigeria and Niger foreign relations have left behind inestimable damages to every facet of life of the citizens in the northern region affected (Titus, 2016). There is no gainsaying that, the upsurges of terrorism have slowed down national economic growth and development of both nations, since no investors would invest in a crisis ridden nation like Nigeria (Baiyewu, 2012; Titus, 2016).

It further compounded the problems associated with the relocation of Multinational Companies to safer territories in Africa like Ghana due to infrastructural decay. The ongoing insurgency has had a significant negative impact on the regional economy. Lebanese and Indian expatriates who have established businesses in Maiduguri decades ago have relocated to Abuja and the south (Interviews, 2016). A good number have left the country altogether. Hotels, banks and other business sectors have witnessed significant reductions in their activities. The border towns that have thrived on trade with neighbouring countries have also seen their businesses curtailed because of increasing restrictions on cross-border traffic. In Maiduguri and Adamawa alone, an estimated 126 industries have recently closed down (Leadership News, 2012; Interviews, 2016).

One of the noticeable effects has been the tendency to worsen unemployment and lead to youth restiveness, thereby making crime a profitable venture and attractive. It has also led to near collapse of tourism industry as the nation loses huge foreign currency that could have accrued from this sector. Boko Haram insurgents threaten the viability of Nigerian state, bringing about economic crises, political instability and destruction (Oviasogie, 2013). Boko Haram insurgency poses serious dangers to Nigeria's nascent democracy and economic development. Terrorism paves ways for vicious political violence in Nigeria and lack of legitimacy of government (Titus, 2016). Terrorism affects voting behaviours and access to life satisfaction. Northeast of Nigeria (mostly Adamawa, Yobe and Borno) the centre of the activities of the sect have crippled economically. Thousands of people have died in the sect bloody campaign. Boko Haram insurgency led to closure of business activities within Northeast. The insurgents caused migration of people from North to Southern part of the country (Dauda, 2014). The mass emigration of Nigerians citizens, who are non-indigene to northern region of the major conflict affected cities posed a serious threat to political economy of Nigeria. The rush to escape from the north affects the profitability of business establishment in the region. The contradictions caused by Boko Haram insurgency in the area of social relations of production and productive forces in Nigeria's political economy are very obvious (Titus, 2016).

Recent report from International Crisis Group (ICG) (2014), showed that, banks have begun closing down their business outlets due to a decrease of economic activities in the volatile areas. The employees of these institutions are increasingly demanding that they be posed to less volatile branches. Indeed, a mass departure from the northern region will not only constitute a depletion of economy but also caused those departing from the region into financial and psychological pressure.

According to the Government of Nigeria's National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), about 868,235 people were affected by the ongoing terrorist attacks in the North East (Interviews, 2016). NEMA is currently managing 20 camps for internally displaced people (IDPs). The precarious security situation prevents the delivery of aid to many people in need. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that the number of refugees and displaced people has exceeded one million (Interviews, 2016).

Boko Haram insurgency has led to the displacement of huge human population in the affected States. Available information suggests that the number of internally displaced persons and refugees associated with the insurgency has been enormous. Based on a recent United Nations Humanitarian Commission on Refugee (UNHCR) report, no fewer than 5,000 people have been displaced in the Northeast region of Nigeria as a result of the raging insurgency (International crisis group report, 2013). The UNHCR further reveals that, some 10,000 Nigerians have also crossed into neighbouring Cameroon, Chad and Niger in recent months.

Around 8, 100 people have sought refuge in Cameroon according to local authorities who say that Nigerians are continuing to arrive. The number of Nigerian refugees in Niger is 2,700 and in Chad 150 (International crisis group report, 2013.). This is more so considering the fact that they have been dislocated from their family and social capital bases.

Recent figures from the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) indicate that 16,470 Nigerian are displaced with “conflicts and ethno-religious crises and emerging terrorism” constituting the main sources (Alkassim, 2013). In effect, the rising wave of Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern Nigeria has been largely responsible for the spate of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the country in the recent times.

Roles and Appraisal of Multinational Joint Task force (MNJTF)

Africa’s shared destiny has once again been underscored by the proposed 8, 700 member strong Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to be originally drawn from Nigeria and her four contiguous neighbouring countries of Cameroon, Chad and Niger (which together constitute members of the Lake Chad Basin Commission) and Benin Republic.

The MJTF’s singular mandate is the decapitation of Boko Haram and the nuisance it represents. The AU’s initiative has the support of France, United States of America and United Nations. The MNJTF is to be mandated to deal with cross-border security issues in the Lake Chad region and conduct ‘operations aimed at preventing the expansion of Boko Haram, as well as other terrorist groups and eliminating their presence’ (The Guardian Newspaper, 2015). It also aims at facilitating ‘the conduct of joint/simultaneous/coordinated patrols and other types of operations at the borders of the affected countries’, tackle the insurgency on its national territory while regional and international partners, within or outside a MNJTF framework, secure border areas to prevent Boko Haram from further spilling over into neighbouring countries (The Guardian Newspaper, 2015; Interviews, 2016).

To a respondent’s view, this development is the most audacious African response to the six year old insurgency in Nigeria that has claimed thousands of lives, destroyed socio-economic activities in the north east part of the country and traumatised the whole of the North, in particular and the entire nation in general. The collective securities through MNJTF in the region have really curtailed the upsurge of insurgency and promote friendly relationship between the affected nations.

Corroborating this point, a respondent (Interview, 2016) argued, that is exactly the counter-insurgency template required to root out Boko Haram from Nigeria, and its neighbours which have come under assaults by insurgents and is underlined by the deep forays of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which has recently had made ways into the notorious Sambisa Forest, which has for long served as a sanctuary for the terrorists and from which they launched numerous bloody campaigns against Nigeria and her neighbours, and the spectacular recapturing of Munguno, Marte and some other communities in Borno State held by them.

The MNJTF, really assisted in counter-insurgency in the region, for example, the military rescued one of the missing 219 girls of Government Girls Secondary School, Chibok Borno State. This marked breakthrough in the search for the missing 219 students abducted by Boko Haram on April 14, 2014. In continuation of Operation Crackdown, troops of MNJTF in conjunction with Civilian JTF deployed in one of the blocking positions at Baale, near Damboa rescued one Miss Amina Ali and a suspected Boko Haram terrorist, Mohammed Hayatu, who claimed to be her husband (Interviews, 2016).

Troops of MNJTF recently struck inside Sambisa forest, killing 15 Boko Haram insurgents and rescued 41 captives. This position was re-echoed as respondent report that in the last three months, MNJTF have destroyed many Boko Haram’s camps, arrested and killed many of the insurgents. Hundreds of them have even surrendered to the troops denouncing the sect and seeking forgiveness and reintegration into the society (Interview, 2016).

Troops of 152 and 155 Task Force Battalions at Operation Lafiya Dole in conjunction with troops of Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) from Niger, have conducted a massive joint clearance operation of suspected Boko Haram terrorists along Nigeria-Niger borders. The unprecedented clearance operation conducted swept through over 10 suspected Boko Haram terrorists’ hideouts along the border. In the operation, 22 terrorists were killed while three Ameers (commanders) of the Boko Haram were arrested.

Abducted persons were also rescued (Daily Trust, 2016; Jauro, Interview, 2016).

Respondents argue that, during the operation, the troops cleared Nbaga, Bula, Dabube, Ybiri, Greya and Suduwa towns and other adjoining settlements. That is those towns and settlements that were occupied by suspected fleeing Boko Haram terrorists, who escaped from villages previously cleared by troops of the MNJTF. In the operation, which a respondent described as a huge success, the troops also rescued 1,275 persons held hostage by the terrorists (Vanguard News, 2016; Interviews, 2016).

In appraising the government response to insecurity respondents pointed out that, the Paris Summit agreed on a number of steps aimed at enhancing regional cooperation and international action against the Boko Haram terrorist group, notably through coordinated border patrols; the establishment of an intelligence and fusion unit; the adoption of sanctions against Boko Haram, Ansaru, and their main leaders; as well as through support for marginalized areas and for their vulnerable populations (Interview, 2016).

The London meeting reaffirmed the commitments made at the Paris Summit and welcomed the progress accomplished since then, particularly the signing in Yaoundé, on 9 June 2014, of the Memorandum of Understanding, on the Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit (RIFU). The countries of the region pledged to contribute a battalion each to the MNJTF, while the partners committed to facilitate the early operationalization of the RIFU and offered training to the Nigerian and regional forces engaged in the fight against Boko Haram and other terrorist groups. The meeting recognized that, in addition to law enforcement, military and intelligence cooperation, security and stability can be achieved only through an approach that includes respect for human rights, alleviating poverty and creating jobs, strengthening the rule of law, improving education and protecting the rights of women and girls (European Parliament, 2015; Interviews, 2016).

The European Parliament further buttressed that, on 3 September 2014, the countries of the region convened their 3rd ministerial meeting in Abuja. That meeting welcomed the progress made in the operationalization of the RIFU, the efforts of the Nigerian Government in setting up a fund in order to alleviate the plight of the victims of the Boko Haram insurgency and the measures taken to strengthen the MNJTF (Interviews, 2016). The meeting also underscored the need to effectively address the sources of funding for, and the supply of weapons to Boko Haram.

At their Extraordinary Summit, held in Niamey, on 7 October 2014, the Heads of States and Government of the LCBC Member States and Benin assessed the security situation and discussed a common strategy in the fight against the Boko Haram terrorist group.

In appraising the role of the MNJTF, President Buhari put it that “Displaced persons (IDPs) are now being resettled in their respective homes,” (Channel TV, 2016), the President declared:

This feat totally accords with our promise to Nigerians to rid the country of terrorism and extremism within few months of our assumption of office. “Our efforts are already yielding dividends and we will not relent until the terrorist groups are totally decimated and wiped out of our country and sub-region,” Buhari also reaffirmed Nigeria’s readiness to support measures to end the conflicts in Burundi and South Sudan, including the proposed deployment of troops by the AU to Burundi (Channel TV, 2016).

Challenges of Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)

In spite of the successful records of the troops, there are various challenges that hindered the operation in the area as lamented by the respondents during the interviews. The Boko Haram-induced insurgency that began in 2009 has demystified the Nigerian military’s invincibility, as the insurgents have made nonsense of their containment plans. Sadly, the near futility of our military’s efforts was compounded last April 25, 2014, when Boko Haram kidnapped 276 girls from the Chibok Girls Secondary School, Chibok, Borno State (more than 200 of them are yet to be found), and later went ahead to declare a Caliphate Republic in their territories controlled by them in the north east region of the country.

The approach adopted by the AU has raised some doubts among commentators. As far as the timeframe is concerned, logistical difficulties, together with the attitudes of the countries involved which have always tended to focus more on their own interests than on a regional approach could delay the operationalization of this force. However, recent efforts suggest that the force could take shape soon. The number of troops is seen as insufficient to combat Boko Haram effectively, given its military capacity. The problem of funding has not yet been solved, and it will require the UN to set up a fund for the operations (Interview, 2016).

Another challenge the troop faces is the lack of operational logistics and the understanding of the terrain of the environment they operate. To be sure, a respondent (Interview, 2016) argued that our soldiers are facing logistics problem except the recent development by the present administration in terms of importing new and sophisticated war equipment, some of us do not understanding the area very well, the insurgents has upper hands because most of us do not know much about the northeast area. The MNJTF

indeed have recorded a lot of success in counterinsurgency in the border between the two countries, many captors and hostages has been freed with the helped of our troops in the borders we are winning the war very soon and all the Internally Displaced Person (IDPS) would go back to their original homes (Interviews, 2016).

Corruption as bane to development in Nigeria has also impeded the success of the troop MNJTF in the region. Poor management of the allocated funds and diversion of the money meant for allowances of the troops affect the success of the team in fighting the war in the region. A respondent (Interview, 2016) lamented that “ imagine the government have allocate money for our men but hunger can kill us, no prompt payment of allowances how can an hungry man go and fight well feed terrorist? (...) is not possible sir”. To be sure, from statistics of the office of the National Bureau, (2015), about N200 million was allocated for equipping the security agencies fighting insurgency in the northeast from 2015-2016 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2016). But when listening to the media, one would notice that the soldiers are still complaining about under-funding and other challenges facing the troops in that area. To this effect, respondents appraised the success of MNJTF though challenges are there, but the joint teams have really tried to combat the insurgents from perpetrating their evils in both countries.

To this end, the MNJTF really assisted in curtailing the resurgence of terrorism in both countries, based on the available information from the respondents and the extant literature. In spite of the challenges facing the team, they have reduced the upsurge of the menace in the nations to some extent.

Findings and Discussion

This section presents and discusses field data on appraisal of Multinational Joint Task Force between Nigeria and Niger. By tapping into respondent's perceptions towards the impacts of establishing the joint team in order to curtailed the threats of terrorism and other menace between the both nations.

The reactive measures carried out by the Joint Task Force further lured it in to the evil plot of the insurgents as it is a known character of terrorists to purposely engage in selective scorched earth tactics by setting houses and other valuables on fire to smudge security agencies, instill fear and pains to the people. It is obvious from intelligence, that the style of the ambush, barrage of fire and explosion that rocked areas where the confrontation took place was planned to wreak destruction of cataclysmic proportion. The strategic use of worship centers and houses to stockpile arms, ammunition, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and served as launching pads for attacks on the MNJTF troops further assisted in the element of surprise achieved by the terrorists and the level of destruction that followed. The insurgents planted IEDs on MNJTF routes and shot through loopholes. They appeared to display mastery of IED bombings, used Rocket Propelled Grenades, General Purpose Machine Guns and threw Hand Held Grenades against the troops. They clearly knew troops' movement and so they buried and remotely detonated IEDs on their routes of advance which caused the death of one personnel, many sustained various degrees of injuries and damage to two operational vehicles for the past years (Daily Trust, 2013).

In line with professional formation, troops must necessarily return fire even for self-survival. Here lies the endemic problem of urban warfare or fighting in built-up areas. Fighting in built up areas is tasking, hazardous, cumbersome and arduous. There is limited view of space and fire, visibility and maneuverability is limited. Ambush attrition losses are high and collateral damages cannot practically, completely be avoided. Noncombatants may not fully appreciate the complex nature of fighting insurgency and the unmitigated misery and sorrow inflicted to local communities and security agents by the terrorists.

Similarly, the regular hazards, tribulations, deprivations and death suffered by security agents is mostly under reported and seemingly show little concern by the press, some elites and leaders in Nigeria. For instance, within one week - from Thursday 25 April to Thursday 2 May, 2013, a total of about 40 Nigerian security agents lost their lives through various terrorists' attacks in Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno and Kano States. From 2011 to date, in Borno State alone, about 100 of JTF personnel have paid the supreme sacrifice during fighting with Boko Haram's insurgents.

However, to tackle the problem of insecurity and economic hardship, Nigeria government in collaboration with its neighbouring countries embarked on collective security measures. Indeed, since the start of the conflict, the budgets for defence and security have increased massively but there is little sign of the money reaching the frontline. The escalation of the insurgency in early 2010, caught the government flat-footed. It initially believed the violence would peter out. Sustained attacks, however, ushered in more sober responses.

To be sure, since 2012, Nigerian government has tried to address the challenge on multiple tracks most especially by increasing the defence budget from 100 billion naira (\$625 million) in 2010 to 927 billion naira (\$6 billion) in 2011 and 1 trillion (\$6.25 billion) naira in 2012, 2013 and 2014. Much of these increases were to combat Boko Haram (Daily Trust, 2013; Interviews, 2016). In addition, an estimated sum of almost N350billion (US\$2billion), was allocated in 2014 to the armed forces.

In addition, several other offices had budget lines related to the conflict. The allocation to the armed

forces was the largest item in Nigeria's federal budget and formed some 7.5% of the total. It is very hard to determine how much of that money went to the north-east. In October 2014, the National Assembly approved a request to borrow US\$1 billion as an additional amount, half of the total 2014 defence budget, for purchase of military equipment (www.budgetoffice.gov.ng). Other measures include strengthening anti-terrorism legislation, boosting the capacities of the military and other security agencies, exploring dialogue with the insurgents, declaring a state of emergency in the North East and launching military offensives against the insurgents (Daily Trust, 2013; Interview, 2016).

More evidently, Nigerian President, Muhammadu Buhari, has given the assurance that Nigeria will redeem its pledge of \$100 million for the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to enhance the operations of the Task Force against Boko Haram (Vanguard News, 2016; interviews, 2016). The President made this disclosure during a high-level meeting of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. President Buhari revealed that having already released \$21 million to the task force in June 2015, Nigeria will remit the balance of \$79 million very soon. President Buhari also assured the Council that Boko Haram's capacity to conduct conventional attacks has been "heavily degraded". He said; "As at now, there is no single Nigerian territory under the control of the insurgents other than their hideouts in Sambisa Forest" (Interview, 2016).

Although, respondents lament that, war in the north-east remain under-resourced due to a high level of corruption. The diversion of funds leads to shortages and poor maintenance of equipment and facilities, and to soldiers being underpaid.

Conclusion

The post-Cold War international landscape has witnessed not only dramatic changes in the types of conflict and humanitarian crisis, but also a change in the nature of conflict management strategies. Several nations around the world continue to gravitate from centralized collective security, under the UN, towards decentralized peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian operations undertaken by regional organizations. These organizations have developed new and robust mechanisms for the management of threats to peace and security in their respective regions.

In this direction, ECOWAS's quest for peace and stability through formation of MNJTF in the West African sub-region established in 1990s, to deal with the insecurity in the region. The force is used to control several of the region's conflicts.

More importantly, from all indications, security is a big challenge to all countries of the world. Nigeria, formerly the 'Regional Police', stemming insecurity in West African states and restoring order and political stability, has turned out to become a peculiar security case in the West African sub-region.

Consequently, MNJTF peace initiatives encountered many problems, and hence failed to achieve the much needed peace and stability. Despite this laudable arrangement, it remains questionable whether MNJTF collective security objectives can be achieved. An examination of the Mechanism reveals serious challenges, which if not properly addressed, could deny MNJTF the achievement of regional collective security.

Lastly, it is noteworthy to point out that, it is evident that it has been difficult to realize a collective security system despite the commitment to the ideal. The commitment to this ideal is a manifestation of yearning for peace and order as an end, rather a belief that the theory of collective security provides a realistic and acceptable means to that end. The world is still very far from the satisfaction of the essential requirements for permitting the operation of a collective security system, and such a system, even if feasible, is in fact a less attractive ideal than it has been thought before. However, despite the difficulty of realizing this ideal, the theory of collective security has acquired ideological significance and its basic elements will continue to influence the approach to peace through international organizations.

Claude, Jr.(1992), could not have put it more partly when he notes, "the point remains that collective security has inspired the growing recognition that a war anywhere is a threat to order everywhere, has contributed to the maintenance of the realistic awareness that it is states which are effective components of international society and which are consequently the essential objects of a system aiming at control of international disorder, and has stimulated the rudimentary development of a sense of responsibility to a world community on the part of the reality of global governments and peoples ... collective security is a snare as well as a delusion; as a formulation of the reality of global governments and the ideal of global responsibilities, it may be a vital contribution to the evolutionary development of conditions of peace through international organization through collective efforts(Claude, Jr.,1992).

Recommendations

- i. Leaders of both countries should promote efforts geared towards sensitivity to early warning indicators and put in place proactive and problem solving mechanisms for addressing security issues in the sub-

- region.
- ii. There is need for the provision of equipment, sophisticated military hardware including good vehicles for border patrol.
- iii. There is a need for West African leaders to display greater political will, and make stronger financial commitments in order to actualize the full potentials of the sub-region's collective security mechanism.
- iv. In cases of peacekeeping missions embarked upon by any Collective Security arrangement, the welfare of the troops should be adequately enhanced in order to reduce cases of divided attention while on a mission. This is to give way to more productivity and efficiency.
- v. The issue of funding collective security arrangements is very important. Hence, the need for all member countries to fulfill their financial obligations. In the case of the ECOWAS, as it is now the financial capabilities fall for short of what it requires to discharge its duties accordingly. There is need for member countries to take the funding of its activities seriously, and this includes the control of corruption and mismanagement of resources.
- vi. As Nigeria and its neighbours prepare to undertake major military operations, it is worth mentioning that any long-term solution will require an approach that goes beyond security and military responses. Such an approach should also include development and policy responses that will makes it more difficult for groups such as Boko Haram to tap into legitimate grievances of people in marginalized regions.

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