Crime and Policing in a Settler-Colonial Context: The Case of Palestinians in Israel

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Abstract: This article explores how the Israeli politicians and police shape anxieties about crime in a settler-colonial context. I consider three components of this context (control, inequality, and separation) and look specifically at the role of Israeli laws and police, as settler colonial agents, in shaping crime and its control within Palestinian areas. This article assumes that Israeli perception of threat do not depend on public order and security factors. Consequently, the Israeli state aims in controlling Palestinians is to mitigate a perceived national threat by imposing several methods of policing. The article argues that politicians, as settler-colonial ideologists, construct the law as an instrument that is used to criminalize Palestinians by linking them with violence and crime, and emphasizes that police statistics are a social event, which is constructed as a direct result of settler colonialism.

Key words: Palestinians, settler colonialism, crime, policing, modes of control

1. Introduction

Reports about crimes within Palestinian cities and villages in Israel have become common in recent years. The current article mainly describes and interprets the arguments of the Israeli politicians and police officers about crime and policing within Palestinians’ areas in Israel. This analysis is a necessary precondition for dismantling the technology of Israeli control over the Palestinian people, and to understand the dynamics of the policing that are exercised as illustrated in the power of the settler colonial state and as implemented through its criminal justice system. Specifically, the article addresses the following questions:

(1) How do Israeli authorities use the law and carry out its enforcement as a means of strengthening control practices? How do the Israeli politicians and police react, publicity, toward the issue of crime and its control in relation to the Palestinian community? (2) Do the police identify the special needs of this community? (3) How does the Palestinian community respond to the overall policy decisions premised upon ‘crime statistics’ and their explanation? (4) (5) How do the Israeli authorities permit different law enforcement policies and allow the discriminatory enforcement of rules and laws? (6) How is the unequal social and political position of the Palestinians connected to the criminalisation of social activities and resistance?

2. Security, threat and Control

The concept of control is relevant to the political sense in which the organized apparatus of the state operates to ensure control, prevent disorder, and maintain its power and explanation of reality (Cohen, 1989; Liska, 1989).

Scholars and activists have collectively constituted settler colonial studies (Kauanui, 2016; Snelgrove, Dhamoon & Cornassael, 2014). Their analysis offers a powerful political tool to ‘focus on the settlers, on what they do, and how they think about what they do’ (Veracini, 2010, 15). Moreover, the article analyses the stories of Israeli politicians and police officers and perceives them as tools of colonialism by considering how laws and police, in particular, treat colonized people. One essential element of the relationships between police and natives is the criminal statistics. Importantly, laws and police are critical parts of criminal justice systems in a contemporary settler colonial policing (Nielsen & Robyn, 2003; Tauri & Porou, 2014).

The reactions of the criminal justice systems are framed through a security paradigm (Krasmann, 2007; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015), which include the two terms of ‘enemy’ and ‘threat’, that are used to represent, according to Lajous (2016), the borderline relationship between exclusion and rule, inside and outside. More importantly, as highlighted, for example, by Bowling & Phillips (2003) in their analysis that the criminal justice
system imposes a ‘military model’ of policing that emphasizes the pursuit of enemies within and enforces criminalization mechanisms as a response to the majority’s perception of threat. Notably, for the arguments made in this article, these practices include also enacting new laws and rules (Earl, 2004). Ibe, Ochie & biyan, for example, refer to this nature of policing by considering terms like ‘police state’ and ‘racial profiling’.

In sum, control policy is part of a vicious circle that contributes to the criminalization of and to repression of the minority’s communities. Therefore, the important consideration here is to understand the actual intentions of the settler colonial policing agents.

3. Locations of Settler Colonial Expansion

As many have noted, settler colonialism is one of the most suitable approach to understand the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Pappé, 2012; Salamanca et al., 2012). Approaching such conflict and its dynamics without an understanding of its colonial character can be frustrating. Most of all, the emerging awareness of the settler-colonial situation and its relationship to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are mainly connected to three factors (Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury, 2014; Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury, 2017; Veracini, 2006): (i) the failure of the ‘equality paradigm, i.e. a phase in which hegemonic political forces within the Palestinian community sought to achieve equality in the state, (ii) the increasing public conviction that the peace agreements failed to end the conflict, and (iii) the behaviour of Israel which treats Palestinians as subjects to a settler-colonial project.

In this essay, it is important to study, in brief, the origins of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in order to realise how the colonizers deal with colonised subjects. The year 1948 was a critical one for the relationship between Palestinians and Israelis. By the end of 1948, the Palestinians were a minority within the provisional borders of the Israeli self-declared state (Bäuml, 2011). At the same time, the Israeli government considered the Palestinians, remaining in the state, an existential security threat, an actual ‘fifth column’ and part of an undistinguished ‘enemy’ to the Jewish state (Rudnitzky, 2014). However, the Military Government, with its restrictions and regulations, remained the most visible manifestation of control until 1966 (i.e., Korn, 2000).

One of the conclusions that can be drawn by addressing the Zionist ideology are the settler-colonial trends within the Zionist project, which was significant (Degani, 2015; Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury, 2014). This period has shaped the foundations of the relationship between the state and the Palestinians in a settler society.

By defining settler-colonialism as an ongoing context of Israel’s oppression of the Palestinians (Kauanui, 2016), the literature accepts three features that characterize the Palestinians in Israel (Hassanein, 2016; Milligan, 2011; Molavi, 2009):

1. **Separation**: The Palestinians society is separated and distinguished (both geographically and culturally) from the Jewish counterpart. The Palestinians in Israel live distinctly in towns and villages, attend isolated schools, speak a different language and belong to religious and culturally separate communities. They do not serve in the army; are not allowed to reside in Jewish areas; they are deprived from jobs in many ‘sensitive related’ occupations. The Israeli institutions dominate the space through ethnic segregation. This separation allows the discriminatory enforcement of rules and laws (Fenster, 2003; Yiftachel, 2009). Fenster (2003) for example stated that during the existence of Israel, the government dominate space through ethnic segregation.

2. **Inequality**: Palestinians within Israel are clearly isolated and unequal. They are denied influential positions and social amenities, they are disadvantaged in all aspects of socio-economic status, and they are discriminated against social government services (Darweish, 2010; Mossawa, 2016). By discriminating against Palestinians and in favour of Jews, these measures limit the Arabs’ contribution in the economic and social life of Israel, and thus constitute acts of apartheid. The result is major gaps in the provision of standard services – whether sewage systems, roads, support systems. Adding this to the historical record of land confiscation and disparity in economic development, education, housing and employment, the fact of inequality is beyond dispute (Adalah, 2011; Gerlitz & Asaqla, October 02, 2013). In the context of Palestine, clarifications must go back to the long history of Palestinians dependency and the way in which the state adopts a Jewish nation-state beliefs and ideologies (Darweish, 2010; Zureik, Lyon, & Abu-Laban, 2011).

3. **Control**: Palestinians in Israel are exposed to a broader and more rigorous degree of control and domination than Jews. Since the foundation of the state, and in order to enable the implementation of its policies, Israel has applied pervasive methods such as legal restrictions on political organisation and self-expression, and obvious
forms of surveillance and pre-emptive control aimed at preventing ‘subversive’ thought and behaviour, there are the less visible forms of political control employed by arms of the government. Following this analysis, complex systems of co-option, reward, patronage and manipulation have been developed to exploit dependency, to suppress political consciousness, to strength social separation and internal divisions in the Palestinian’s community (Cohen, 2010; Panchenko, 2009; Shihade, 2010; Stevens, 2011; Zureik, 2001; Zureik, Lyon, & Abu-Laban, 2011). Thus, for motives of extremely imbedded in the history of the state and the identification of Palestinians as part of an antagonistic national group, there can be no doubt about the point of difference control (Halabi, 2011; Kretzmer, 1990).

In the current article, I look beyond these features and attempt to look more specifically at the role of Israeli politicians, laws and the police. Separation, inequality and control are relevant to the patterns of ‘crime’ constructed by these parties.

4. The Politics of the Israeli Law

The main question associated with laws is how laws enable processes such as separation, inequality, and selective political control. The analysis of the legal position of the Palestinians differentiates between the following aspects (Barzilai, 2015; McBurney, 2014; Shehadeh & Iraqi, 2013; White, Feb. 25, 2016):

1. The few overtly discriminatory laws (such as the Law of Return).
2. Legislation that enables covert forms of discrimination (such as military service benefits or privileges).
3. Legislation that permits certain forms of institutional discrimination (through the legal standing of Jewish institutions).

During a visit to "the scene of Friday’s Tel Aviv shooting attack", in which two Israelis were killed and seven injured, Israeli Prime Minister made a statement announcing that ‘the Israeli government will no longer tolerate an "Arab-Israeli population" which does not answer to the country’s laws’ (Forman, January 3, 2016). This example shows the main concern of the current article, which is to understand the political context in which the criminal laws are used for control. At this point, there are two positions of particular theoretical significance to the question of crime. The first is the way in which guarantee of full civil rights to Palestinians, as individuals and citizens was not extended to the protection of group rights. This allowed for the use of the law to ban organizations that tried to create various forms of nationalist self-expression. The second related tension is between granting formal civil rights, but not expecting that Palestinians could be trusted to be fully loyal citizens of the state. This allowed for the use of surveillance, special controls- all on the omnipotent grounds of ‘security’. The fact is that from the creation of Israel, there are many examples that reflect the instrumental control through the law such as the Military Government from 1948 until 1966; the Emergency Regulations enacted in 1945, and land expropriation (Bassam, September 10, 2015; Bathia, September 2012; Jabareen, 2011).

This article considers the contemporary uses of ‘crime’. Current examples of the way in which the spirit of the Emergency Regulations influences the control of Palestinians in Israel are the ‘Emergency Powers’ (Detention, 1979), ‘The Criminal Procedure (Powers of Enforcement, Detentions, 1996)” and the 1989 ‘Anti-Terrorism Law’ that have been used to target Palestinian protests and make mass arrests to suppress political opposition, (Fargeon & Rotem, 2016). Nevertheless, many more examples could be cited. In 2014, following the protests in East Jerusalem and inside Israel the Israeli authorities imposed the law ‘Fines on parents of stone-throwers (Amendment No. 20 to the Youth Care and Supervision Law), which allows for direct fines to be imposed on the parents of minors convicted of committing an offense listed in the Israeli Penal Code. It offers the offense of stone throwing as an example, and this fact, gives rise to doubts that the amendment is arranged in a discriminatory way against the parents of Palestinian children (Adalah, 2015). Another example of law that follows several previous unsuccessful bills that sought to clamp down on human rights organizations is the ‘NGO Funding Transparency Law. This law targets human rights organizations. It requires NGOs that receive 50% or more of their funding from foreign governments to state that fact in various situations. Significantly, the law does not require transparency of donations received from private individuals, leaving right-wing, settler organizations, unaffected (Adalah, July 12, 2016). The “Stop-and-Frisk” Law (Amendment No. 5 to the Power for Maintaining Public Security Law) expands the powers of the police to stop and frisk individuals. The law also allows police to frisk any person present in an area declared temporarily as a “stop-and-frisk zone” by police, for reasons including ‘potential security threats’. This law produces greater scope for the discriminatory
use of these sweeping powers by the police to conduct arbitrary and aggressive searches of Palestinians (Adalah, 2016).

The most recent example is the 2016 ‘The Counter-Terrorism bill’, which contains broad and vague definitions of ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist organizations’. The law establishes new criminal offenses such as public expressions of support or empathy for ‘terror organizations’, and significantly increases the potential sentences for such offenses (Adalah, June 19, 2016). This law, which applies only inside Israel, is an omnibus that combines most provisions of existing ‘counterterrorism’ law, thereby finally replacing numerous defence regulations enacted by the British Mandate.

These examples clarify the role of the laws as means of ‘elimination’. Like other colonial regimes, Israel produced legislation framed in universal terms but intended exclusively to control Palestinians. Several studies concludes that institutionalized racial discrimination and criminalization are the basis for practices imposed by these laws (Korn, 2000; Mazen, 2017; Zulaikha, 2009).

5. Police, Palestinians and ‘crime statistics’

Notably, for the arguments made in this article, police interactions with indigenous people are a critical component. The police system is the first stage in the move from informal to formal control. Cohen (1989) in his important research summarises the main developments, which lead the police to become a political system: (a) Since 1948-1966, the Palestinians within Israel were subject to a formal Military Government, whose regulations were enforced by the police, the army and the Border Guard. (b) In 1974, the police was given the responsibility for internal security. (c) With the increase of social protests of Palestinians in 1976 (the Land Day - In response to the Israeli government's declaration of a plan to expropriate thousands of dunams of land for security and settlement purposes) the police moved at this time from a low profile to a ‘high policing’ approach, both for ordinary law enforcement and internal security. (d) Since the first ‘Intifada’ in 1988, the fear that protests in the Occupied Palestinians Territories will ‘spread’ into the Palestinian population has lent an even greater urgency to such considerations.

From these developments, we learn that police work is visible in political terms rather than as a neutral matter of law enforcement (i.e., Cook, May 5, 2014; White, May 11, 2010). This means that every major policing decision that affects Palestinians within Israel - such as opening police stations, deployment and recruitment – have been made with political consideration in mind. According to the journalists Kubovich (June 16, 2015) and White (May 11, 2010), the tendency to see the police solely as an agency of suppression is tempered by the much higher profile of the army and security services in the internal security realm. This policy actually presents the Palestinians in Israel and the OPT as parts of the same wider conflict. Therefore, the same practices are implemented that have long been routine in the military occupation of the West Bank, are being used in Israel to suppress opposition and limit civil rights. Moreover, the police do not differentiate in crime statistics between the two populations of Palestinians and define them as ‘non-Jews’. I argue that these practices reflect the Israeli colonial project which fabrics new technologies of control that permit the state to control populations that are considered a security threat.

Therefore, the ‘criminality’ of Palestinians is one of the core issues of police policy over time. Police committees, in 1980 and 1985, were established and demanded for new strategies that included the establishment of new stations and a greater investment in resources (The Israel Police, December 1988). The basis for the two Police committees did not stem from an increase in crime, but from a general perception that the Palestinian community was ‘getting out of control’ (Cohen, 1989, 133-135). In addition, the 1980s and 1990s were characterized by the separate organization of nationalists, while the Israeli intelligence reports showed increased in Palestinians nationalist activities’ (Rouhana, 2001). This process reflects the Israeli project that operates through a sense of elimination that seeks to erase Palestinians’ existence on specific issues such as territory, space, culture and nationality.

The tensions between Jewish and Palestinians in Israel have escalated significantly after the events of ‘October 2000’. As Veracini (2006, 22) mentioned, although that ‘the position of Palestinian Israelis is also changing dramatically, and the events of October 2000, for example, when the distinction between Palestinian Israelis and Palestinians of the Occupied Territories was disregarded by the repressive instruments of the Israeli state, are indicative of an apparent deterioration of relations’. In 2003 the 'Orr Commission’ was established to identify the causes behind these events (the violent clashes of the police toward the Palestinians in Israel, which ended in the deaths of 13 Palestinians demonstrators). The commission further emphasized that "The police must learn to
realize that the Arab sector in Israel is not the enemy and must not be treated as such’ (Haaretz, August 31, 2003). Consequently, the Israeli government decided to intensify policing in 'Arab areas', by building new units and ‘providing opportunities’ for Arab involvement in police manpower (Government of Israel, 2016). During 2005-2007, the ‘Shin Bet’ (Israel’s Internal Security Service) approved activities and units (such as the unit known as “mistaʻaravim” - Secret agents disguised as Arabs), and which were constructed after an assessment that there was ‘no intelligence infrastructure to deal with the Arabs who worked against the interests of the Jewish state’ (Cook, May 4, 2010).

The Ministry of Public Security hosted official and public discussion about crimes from 2012. This was mainly a consequence of the police perception that the ‘Israeli-Arab sector leads statistics in violent crimes’ (liveleak.com, January 15, 2012). Accordingly, the Israeli Public Security Ministry revealed plans and emphasized that the apparent aim is ‘to reduce crime rates and to increase law enforcement’ (Sanders, October 29, 2012). In order to enable the implementation of its policies, the ministry has justified new practices (such as targeting Palestinian Protesters on Facebook, and surveilling Islamic leaders) as a means of dealing with what is perceived as threat to Israel security (Cook, October 21, 2009; Cook, May 4, 2010; Kane, July 7, 2016).

Therefore, security is a central concern, which is taken into consideration during applying these practices, whereas the security-based policing relates to the specific territory of Palestinians. As mentioned above, since 1948, Palestinians have been viewed as a security threat, which is a result of the Jewish ethos of conflict in Israel (Levanon, 2015). The special status of the societal beliefs regarding security play an essential role in the functional features of the ethos by justifying several decisions, laws and actions. According to Bar-Tal, Jacobson & Klieman (1998) these beliefs are created from a lack of security, which has become part of the Jewish identity in Israel and a distinguishing matter of Israeli Jewish culture. They are demonstrated by 'securitism', a term used by Bar-Tal, Magal & Halperin (2009) to express the high priority to security and the perception widespread among Israeli Jewish society of the supreme significance of militarism. Consequently, specific laws give extensive power to the authorities and shape the legal basis for societies, and this structure is common in settlers’ societies (Smandykh, 2013).

The following example shows how the security considerations are the basis for any action at the levels of law and law enforcement, with the intent to dominate and eliminate. The Israeli Prime Minister announced following a political murder of two Jews by a Palestinian from Israel: ‘We will dramatically increase law enforcement in the Arab sector… We will open new police stations, recruit more police officers, go into all the towns and demand loyalty to the state's laws from everyone. There is wild incitement against Israel in the Arab sector…. I will not accept a state of laws for most citizens and a state within a state for some citizens with illegal weapons’ (Lukash, January 02, 2016).

As well, Booth & Eglash (November 15, 2014) also consider that the protests, which began in East Jerusalem in mid-2014 and spread to Palestinian areas within Israel, were additional events that have escalated the tensions between the police and Palestinians. Accordingly, the journalist Cook wrote an article stating that ‘The Border Police, which operate chiefly in the occupied Palestinian territories, are to be placed at roadblocks in Israel. Concerns about aggressive policing had been emphasized by a government decision to relax live-fire regulations in Israel and Jerusalem against demonstrators… including children, who throw stones’ (Cook, October 12, 2015).

In addition to the above events, the results of the Israeli elections of 2013 and 2015 created a political trend of increased popularity of extreme right-wing groups of members of the governing coalition and the ruling parties, who are steering a political campaign against the human rights of Palestinians within Israel (Eldar, March 15, 2015).

The criminal statistics are the result of the mentioned Israeli policies toward Palestinians. The data in Table 1 below shows that Israel Police arrested 427,157 persons from 2011-2015, over 60% percent of whom were classified as ‘non-Jews’. The type of crimes they were arrested for, however, demonstrates an even greater difference between ‘non-Jews’ and Jews. 91.5% of the persons arrested for crimes classified as “security offenses” were ‘non-Jews’. In addition, 60.0% of ‘non-Jews’ arrested for crimes ‘against public order’. 77.0% of people arrested for personal harm were ‘non-Jews’.
Table 1 Numbers of arrested persons for serious crimes


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offences</th>
<th>Total Arrests *</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Arabs**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of arrests</td>
<td>No. of arrests</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>427,157</td>
<td>173,111</td>
<td>252,157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>59.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against State Security</td>
<td>36,902</td>
<td>3,055</td>
<td>33,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>91.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against Public Order</td>
<td>168,746</td>
<td>67,857</td>
<td>100,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>59.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against a person Life</td>
<td>5,072</td>
<td>1,134</td>
<td>3,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>77.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bodily harm</td>
<td>76,295</td>
<td>36,002</td>
<td>39,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Offences</td>
<td>8,328</td>
<td>4,946</td>
<td>3,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Offences</td>
<td>26,844</td>
<td>15,968</td>
<td>10,804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property Offences</td>
<td>94,832</td>
<td>40,959</td>
<td>53,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>56.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud Offences</td>
<td>10,138</td>
<td>3,190</td>
<td>6,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>68.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Israel police, the national public complaints, 2016.

* Others: The total figures include 1,889 (0.4%) arrests and 1,383 (0.6%) arrests without indictment for others (foreign residents and unknown persons).

** Arabs include Palestinians inside Israel and Arab residents from the Palestinian Authority.

Table 2 shows that there are types of crimes such as “stone throwing” for which ‘non-Jews’ are far more likely to be arrested. Of the 10,223 people arrested for “stone throwing” between 2011 and 2015, 9,830 (96.0%) were ‘non-Jews’. The data also show that of 5,241 persons arrested for offences Against Emergency Regulation, 95.0% were ‘non-Jews’. These findings prove that for the most part only Palestinians are arrested for ‘Violating the Declaration enclosed space’; ‘Unlawful association membership’; ‘Serving in an illegal organization, and ‘Violation of law of entry to Israel’.
Table 2. Numbers of arrested persons for political acts, Jews and Arabs, 2011-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offences</th>
<th>Jews/ No.</th>
<th>Arabs/ No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Against State Security; Thereof:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stone throwing</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>9,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petrol bomb throwing</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against Emergency Regulation</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>4,986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The acquisition/ possession of illegal weapons</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spying &amp; treason</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flying Palestine flags</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incitement</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incitement to rebellion</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infiltration</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2,229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Throwing an object at a person</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>6,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violating the Declaration enclosed space</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>3,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlawful association membership</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1,476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servicing an illegal association</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Against Public Order; Thereof:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trespass</td>
<td>3,970</td>
<td>3,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in demonstration</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>3,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of law of entry to Israel</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>35,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault on or foiling of police officer</td>
<td>15,029</td>
<td>22,450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Israel police, the national public complaints, 2016.

The police, in particular, were regularly attributing more than 60% of all crimes in Israel to 'non-Jews' (which include tourists, foreign workers, Palestinians from the West Bank, and others) without any efforts to separate cases according to place of residence. These statistics reflect concerns and variations in the control practices, and aims to justify the domination over Palestinians.

These published statistics have been a matter of concern, particularly for police commissioners, which used descriptions such as 'The situation is unacceptable'; 'Arab society is overrepresented in all types of violent crimes compared to its relative percentage in society' (Hartman, February 9, 2016). From the viewpoint of Israeli political leaders and police agents, these utterances reflect perception of a loss of control. Subsequently, the police demanded a policy of ‘equality in law enforcement’ (Bassam, October 5, 2015; Cook, November 17, 2015). Following these arguments, the ‘Israeli security cabinet’ designed a new plan: ‘We’re leading an historic plan to deepen law and order within the Arab sector … But we won’t be able to close the gaps in law enforcement without having people from the Arab community join police ranks and take part in enforcing the law in Arab villages and municipalities, for their sake and for the sake of personal freedom in this country’ (Jad, August 25, 2016; Yanovsky, October 30, 2016). This example reflects the politicized rhetoric and the ironies of colonisers, who show good intention by using universal language, and mirrors what has been clearly said by Veracini (2013, 30): ‘Indeed, settler colonialism is at its strongest when it can speak in universalising terms, when it can claim to be “closing the gaps.” This has been the case within Israel proper, where the Arabs constitute a minority’.
Crime statistics and police actions are direct results of the Israeli authorities’ ethos that Palestinians are hazard peoples. This is exactly the approach that Israeli politicians and law enforcement agencies introduced. I argue, here, that settler colonialism as a mode of domination shapes and organizes the perception of Palestinian ‘crime’. This perception defines Palestinians as criminals (against public order and against state security) and reflects the main concerns and fears of the Jewish society, while these concerns are not linked to ordinary crimes (such as robbery, thefts and drugs abuse).

6. The public sphere

The dominant perception of ‘Palestinians’ crime’ comes from political and "security" interests rather than strict "crime control". In the highly politicized rhetoric of Israel all issues virtually connected with Palestinians are perceived in terms of the overall Israel-Palestine conflict.

The article highlights the role of the state in constituting the public sphere. Accordingly, the press directed the public discussion by focusing on the crime rate, its factors and ways of intervention. A few scattered journalistic reports have exposed serious crime problems in certain areas. These emerged as particularly dramatic cases with widespread reports of possession of weapons, murder, and violent crimes (i.e. Eldar, November 18, 2013; Groisman, June 14, 2016; Lieber, November 18, 2016). Some Jewish Journalists (such as Sulitzeanu, February 18, 2016) approved that the police, as a security force, still handle Palestinians inside Israel according to a security-oriented approach through viewing every Palestinian as a potential national security threat.

As I mentioned, the Israeli politicians and police describe the ‘crimes of Palestinians’ by using notions such as the ‘growing crime’, ‘wild west’; ‘an intolerable reality; ‘terror of crime’. The police view the crime situation and its control through the cooperation between police and Palestinians: ‘We send large forces into Arab villages, where there is fierce opposition that has nationalistic overtones’ (Benovadia, January 26, 2017). The police’s sense is to explain that the high percentage of arrested Palestinians is a consequence of two situations: the community itself (the non-cooperation) and the insufficient policing (Rotem, June 1, 2016).

Thus, the ‘Settler colonial logics’, as a term used by Lloyd & Wolfe (2016), is to define the main patterns of colonisers’ thinking about relationships between settlers and natives. From the police logics, the solutions depend on getting the full cooperation of the Palestinians. Accordingly, this cooperation will bring effective policing, though more stations and more Arabic-speaking officers (Abdalla, May 30, 2012; Halavi, February 9, 2016). The following example shows the police logics in shaping its intentions: ‘today there's a growing understanding that the police need to close the gaps between the level and quality of service provided to the Jewish majority and the Arab minority’ (Keinon & Ben Solomon, January 10, 2016). Another example that shows the logics of settler-colonialism. The irony is that the colonizers speak about the ‘suffering’ of the colonized peoples: ‘We have decided to make this change and promote the enforcement of the law in all areas: In construction laws that are not being enforced at all, in the laws regarding the noise that we hear from mosques …the citizens themselves are suffering there; they are suffering from increasing crime’ (Hassanain, April 01 2016). These arguments are understood, too, under the classic settler colonial model as apparatuses for fulfilling ideologies. At this point, Veracini (2013, 30) argues: ‘The prospect of integration/ assimilation, and the rhetorical claim that indigenous individuals can participate in the political life of the settler polity, are among the most powerful tools available for consolidating settler colonial projects’.

The Israeli policing in general, and the Police in particular, have been the subject of continued criticism and claims due to the mayhem caused by crimes and violence in Palestinians towns and villages. The consensus among Palestinians, about the relation with the policing systems, is clear. Palestinians have not a certain readiness to call the police, in order to deal with crime that the police do not respond to suitably. Leaders (Knesset members and chiefs of local municipalities) perceive the crime situation as a political matter (Eldar, November 18, 2013; Sanders, October 29, 2012). The foremost-demonstrated vision is that the Palestinians deserve equal rights to policing services, while the police intention is to ‘control Arab society, since he sees it ‘as a threat, not a population that deserves rights’ (Grosman, June 14, 2016)). The following arguments of the Arab Knesset members reflect the general perception of the Palestinian’s community toward the police: ‘When these weapons are turned internally toward our communities, no one hears a word, but when they are used on Jews, the entire country wakes up’ (Hartman, January 7, 2016).
7. Conclusion

The article considers the ongoing relationships between the law, its enforcement agents and the Palestinians in Israel. I argue that it is critical to engage with settler colonialism as particular mode of domination, whereas its agents shape and organize their logics toward the relationship between Palestinians and crime.

The main argument of the Palestinians is clearly that the Israeli police in particular handle them according to a security-oriented approach and through seeing every Palestinian as a latent danger. Palestinians in Israel are presented as part of the same broader national conflict. Thus, Israel views the existence of the Palestinians as a national security threat and an antagonistic group, which is perceived and treated as enemies.

The article finds that by approaching the Palestinians as origins of threat, the police practices a control policy, through designing new plans, forming committees, applying over policing and constructing over-representation of Palestinians in criminal statistics. Accordingly, the tendency to see laws and police as agents of the Israeli settler-colonialism is strengthened by the extremely complex form of the army and security services in the inner security dominion.

Consequently, the separation between political and none-political actions of Palestinians is constructed through the criminal statistics. These statistics tell us more about the political construction of crimes than about what is actually happening. At the higher level of the police, we see the considered placement of militaristic-style policing. This policing provides different methods when administering to Palestinians. The ongoing control policy, which directed towards Palestinians, is a consequent of the presence of a strong ethos of threat among Israeli politicians and police officers and their belief that control can prevent the Palestinians from realizing the threat. As I mentioned above, this intended approach is motivated by the Israeli control policy that employs militarized repression mechanisms.

In part, the article applies the social control approach, by assuring positive relations between political threat and control policy (Cohen, 1985; Nielsen & Robyn, 2003; Tauri & Porou, 2014). Based on threat and control perceptions, the article considers that the Israeli actors respond to the threat by relying more seriously on social control mechanisms to sustain the dominant position of the majority (Smooha, 1982).

The article emphasizes the importance of settler-colonial studies in analysing the differences that exist between the Israeli law enforcement agents and Palestinians concerning crime and policing. I argue that the actions of these agents are a result of impulses and perceptions of threat and fear that are characteristic of the Israeli ongoing security industry (Eitle, D’alessio & Stoltenberg, 2002; King & Wheelock, 2007; Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury, 2014; Smith & Holmes, 2014).

Other critical thinking with regard to settler-colonial framework is that of the two constant claims of settler colonial agents: the Palestinians are arrested in higher numbers that they should be in relation to their proportion of the total population, and that they have to cooperate with the police in order to deal with crime and violence. These claims are the most common tools for fulfilling the Israeli settler colonial policy.

The political edge of the crime issue is more transparent when dealing with the hard end of the Israeli systems. In this case, no comprehensive approaches are needed to see the senselessness of the excessive policing as long as the elementary source of the political conflict is not addressed.

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