

Political Violence in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (1971-1981)

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Abstract

This study deals with an essential topic of contemporary Arab history related to armed violence practiced against the Jordanian state during the period between 1971-1981; this is the period after the Jordanian state regained its sovereignty and ended the chaos and violence practiced by the Palestinian factions against the Jordanian governmental institutions, their service facilities, and political and diplomatic bodies to put pressure on the Jordanian state and push it to implement its requirements.

The study focused on researching the causes and motives of violence, and its general and specific objectives, through tracking armed violence operations, tools, and forms, and its victims and analyzing its contents to arrive at an accurate diagnosis of its goals and requirements and to put all of this in a sequential historical context to serve researchers and those interested.

Keywords: Political Violence, Palestinian factions, diplomatic bodies, motives of violence, victims, historical context, state

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Introduction

Definition of political violence:

Political violence is defined as every use of force that aims to inflict moral harm or harm to individuals and property, whether by using threats, oppression, destruction, or killing; this is in order to achieve unlawful gains legally and socially, and politically rejected¹.

Jwleian Frond says: "Violence within the framework of the public and the private does not deviate from being an explosion of force and attack on persons and groups directly in order to subjugate and control them."².

From a sociological point of view: political violence is all attacks of a collective nature that target political regimes and rival groups, as well as groups that support the regime, occupy its administrative positions, and implement its policies.³.

Although all the definitions that the researchers dealt with to determine the nature of violence and the forces associated with it, they unanimously agreed that violence represents every case of departure from political systems in general; it aims to change its behavior or eliminate it and replace it, or even place it in the position of bargaining.⁴.

There are many researchers who link political violence and power and its preservation and contestation by political organizations on the one hand and ruling regimes on the other hand; in order to be more accurate and aware, we saw the need to differentiate between two other concepts that are related to each other: political violence; and political conflict, although we have reviewed the concept of political violence, the concept of political conflict is limited to the conflict of two or more political organizations, who mainly operate within the system, but who are fighting for power, in other words, it is a confrontation between two or more parties operating within the framework of the political system to achieve their goals, and superiority over the other parties, controlling and directing them, and dictating their will to the other party to prevent it from departing from it⁵.

The difference between the two concepts is evident in the fact that the political conflict contains two basic forms, the first is that those responsible for it conceal their goals and are content with storing them in their minds to ensure that they do not show fear of exposure, as for the second, it is the one in which those responsible for it

¹ Issa Bayram: Human Rights and Public Freedoms, A Comparative Study between the Text and Reality, Dar Al-Manhal Publications, Beirut, 1st edition, 2011, p. 375 / See also: Elizabeth Pickard et al., The phenomenon of political violence from a comparative perspective, Publications of the Center for Research and Political Studies, Cairo University, 1995 g, p. 16

² Hanin Tawfiq Ibrahim - The phenomenon of political violence in Arab regimes, publications of the Center for Arab Unity Studies, Lebanon - Beirut 1999, p. 48

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⁵ Mohsen Ahmed Al-Khodary, Conflict Management, 1st Edition, Cairo, 2010, p. 46

announce their goals, and they invoke the responsibility of the other party for its causes⁶.

Moreover, because the violence that was practiced on the Jordanian state during the study period extending between 1971-1981 was aimed at controlling the system, subjugating it, dictating the will to it, and even trying to abolish it and replace it, the necessity here requires that the main forms of violence practiced against the state be addressed to reveal the confusion and misunderstanding that some scholars interested in Jordanian affairs may fall into.

Forms of political violence practiced against the Jordanian state:

First: political assassinations

Assassination is defined as every killing or attempted killing targeting an official figure who occupies an administrative position that influences political decisions or is related to decision-making centers, and at the top of the figures most vulnerable to the assassination is the head of the political system, heads of government, and members of the cabinet, party leaders and security leaders, state representatives in diplomatic missions (ambassadors) and newspaper editors-in-chief⁷.

Second: Coups and coup attempts

Political coups are defined as - the state of planning and implementation for the sudden overthrow of a regime and the ruling elite next to it. Coups are usually characterized by violence; the overthrow of the regimes is often carried out from within them, specifically by the ruling elite itself or by another elite to replace the elite that was overthrown, and in some cases, which is the predominant case - coups are carried out by military elites with the support of the security services, in specific cases - including the attempt to topple the regime in Jordan, armed organizations and militias operate in coups within the state within special controls and agreements, such as what the PLO factions did in 1970-1971⁸.

Third: The rebellion

Insurgency is a form of confrontation with political systems between the civil and military components of the state, or both, most of its goals are limited to pressuring the regime to push it to respond to achieve limited demands that serve the interests of the groups or powers that have resorted to it, although the rebellion is often governed by a period of time linked to the response or rejection of the regime to the rebel demands, there are profound risks involved in the operations of the rebellion, which are controlled by the speed of response or rejection of the demands of the rebels, because the length of the period would give the rebel forces sufficient time to reorganize themselves and gain new supporters on their side and the possibility of renewing and escalating their demands, and a number of factors controlling the results of the rebellion, it is represented by the nature of the rebellion, whether civilian or military, then the rebellion movement is affected by the size of its participation in it, especially if it is civilian, but if it is carried out by military elements, its results are governed by the availability of civil support, or the support of the security forces - or both - in this case, the risk becomes high because the elements participating in the rebellion possess weapons and expertise, and their rebellion loses the mainstay of its protection, which makes it easier to overthrow it⁹.

Fourth: Feedback

Cases of reactions are mostly related to judicial trials that have a long-term impact or to judgments in which the judicial penalties issued reach the death penalty for elements belonging to political forces and currents or opposition organizations, and the charges against the convicts are often related to attempting to cause chaos or inciting action to overthrow the existing political system, or on charges of working for foreign parties or participating in public demonstrations, and judgments are often issued under exceptional laws from special courts bearing different names, the violent reactions are focused on the formation of these courts and questioning the integrity of the judgments issued as a violation of human rights¹⁰.

Terrorism

Definition of terrorism: It is a use that means violence, destruction, killing, and oppression that groups and sometimes states resort to, but it is often manifested by groups that are financially well-off countries or

⁶ Khader Khadr. Political Concepts in Political Science, Publications of the Modern Book Foundation - Lebanon - Beirut - 2008 - pg. 191

⁷ Izzat Syed Ismail - Psychology of Extremism and Terrorism - Annals of the Faculty of Arts - Kuwait University - 1999, p. 17

⁸ Rummel- Oimehsion of Conflict Behavior within Nations, Jordan of conflict resolution. P. 64

⁹ Ali Layla - The Social Dimensions of Political Violence, in Dr. Nevin Massad (Editing and Presentation) The Phenomenon of Political Violence from a Comparative Perspective, Center for Research and Political Studies, Cairo, 1995, p. 66

¹⁰ Sheikh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, The Jurisprudence of Armed Violence in Islam, Publications of the International Foundation, Beirut, 2001, p. 113

individuals with the aim of achieving particular goals that may be for states strategic goals, but they are definitely for groups whose interests are primary engine, that is why terrorist operations can sometimes be carried out by individuals or groups outside the law in order to create a state of panic that facilitates their obtaining particular gains - however the goals of the terrorist groups may be to bring down the ruling regime and solutions are in order to implement an idea that may be a positivist idea as was the case in the system, and national regimes, or it is a religious idea that organizations affiliated with the Islamic trend seek, and although there is a close connection between the concepts of violence and terrorism, terrorism in its forms and tools far exceeds the contents of political violence¹¹.

Furthermore, because terrorism has particular concepts and terminology, it was necessary to prove the particular terms that took on names that were used on the Jordanian national scene in order to facilitate their understanding when dealing with them; among those prominent terms was what was known on the national scene as revolutionary violence, whose use was associated with armed clandestine organizations. Revolutionary violence means - liquidation operations that included individuals and groups that do not support the ideas and actions of armed organizations and militias, and among other terms that prevailed on the Jordanian national arena during a specific period of periods of loss of national sovereignty is the term cleansing, it is the end of the work of individuals who are not wanted because of their support for individuals or groups, or they supported the presence of individuals alone in the presidencies of some national institutions, including the term sabotage, which refers to the organized work carried out by non-national paramilitary organizations and militias according to strictly secret plans, it targeted the bombing of some public and private institutions that confronted or opposed the nature of the work of these groups or militias, among other terms that have had a great impact on the Jordanian national scene - kidnapping - which is an organized implementation that targeted some political and military leaders - the media network with the aim of influencing it or even revenge and undermining it in order to weaken it by practicing psychological and physical violence against it to push it, either to change its loyalty or to extract the secret information that they have or push them to withdraw from the scene, whether by offending her, or the practice of rape - and sometimes the kidnapping is for the person responsible directly, or kidnapping a loved one or one of his family members to put him under pressure that may lead to delaying a specific work that gives the kidnappers time - or taking advantage of the situation and exploiting it to propagandize the kidnappers' supporters and give them strength to ensure the continuation of their loyalty.¹².

Conflict and political violence on the Jordanian national scene 1971-1981

First: the political conflict

a. Historical roots of political conflict:

It should be noted that in the wake of the Arab defeat in 1948, the Imam of Israel migrated to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Many Palestinian Arabs had caused their migration to change the demographic structures, especially in the main city centers, as the displaced people were received in housing camps in Amman - Zarqa, Irbid, Jerash, and other Jordanian cities, but in smaller numbers.

And because of the poor conditions of the IDP' shelters - social problems began to arise, which prompted camp residents to express their rejection, and they demanded to return to their homeland, and in response to these demands, the United Nations General Assembly issued Resolution No. 194 in December 1948 to guarantee the security of the return of those wishing to their country, or pay compensation to those who decide to stay in their place of refuge in exchange for losing their property, the demonstrations and acts of violence calling for return subsided, and those in charge of them were absorbed¹³.

In May 1950 and based on the desire of the Palestinian people for the unity of the two banks of the Jordan, hoping to preserve what remained of Palestine, and based on the decision of the Kingdom of Jordan to accept unity with the Palestinians, the Kingdom of Jordan became officially responsible for finding appropriate solutions to the Palestinian demands, and this responsibility constituted political, economic and social burdens on the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, however, the Jordanian state, which was established on a national basis, accepted the challenge of the circumstances arising from their asylum, and began to facilitate the processes of their integration into the public order and created the conditions for their participation in the administration and in political life, and it pushed large numbers of them to hold ministerial and other high-ranking positions in the administration and the army, and absorbed other numbers of intellectuals in the media, and allowed them to join the Jordanian national

¹¹ Khamis Al-Omar - Violence, War and Jihad, Awqaf House Publications, Damascus, 1966, p. 257

¹² Ted Henderson. Political violence, its philosophy, its origins - its dimensions, translated by Issa Tannous and others, publications - Dar Al-Masirah, 1st Edition, Beirut, 1986, pp. 32-35. See also: Mr. Ahmed Mustafa Omar - Specialized Media - Study and Application, 1st ed. Sharjah, University Library - 2002 - pg 181

¹³ Khalil Hindi and Others - The Palestinian Resistance and the Jordanian Regime - An Analytical Study of the September Attacks - Research Center Publications - The Palestine Liberation Organization - Supervised Nabil Shaath, Beirut, September 1971, p. 53

movement.¹⁴

In 1954, the government issued special legislation organizing the Palestinian presence and considered everyone who resided before May 15, 1948, in Transjordan to hold Jordanian nationality. According to these legislations, the Palestinians must declare their national affiliation and loyalty to the Hashemite throne.¹⁵

In 1967, after the loss of the West Bank, voices appeared calling for enabling the Palestinian people to obtain arms and allowing the Palestinians to build their military formations under the pretext of contributing to the restoration of their stolen lands. However, they were not satisfied with these demands but were declaring their refusal to surrender to Arab solutions, based on the decision of the Arab League in 1964, which responded to their desire when it agreed to frame the Palestinian action by officially declaring the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization, but they forgot that the Arab League's decision had previously defined the nature of the relationship between Jordan and them when it placed it on a path that preserves the Jordanian state's sovereignty and that their demands to take full responsibility for organizing the Palestinian people are inconsistent with the Arab League's decision¹⁶.

At the same time, Jordan found that the demands of the Palestinians were inconsistent with the arrangements agreed upon with the Palestinian National Council, which met in Jerusalem in 1964. Nevertheless, the government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan tried to hide its differences with the Palestine Liberation Organization and to show courtesy to them. However, with time, and when the Palestine Liberation Organization began to pressure the Jordanian state to push it towards allowing them to form a military force, it took the liberation of the Palestinian lands upon itself. The Jordanian-Palestinian relationship entered an impermeable path; the approval of the Jordanian state meant slipping towards directions in which slogans are mixed, and that would create a reality based on the duplication of power, and therefore responding to their demands became impossible to implement, and when the PLO insisted on its demands and attempted to impose its will and dictates on the Jordanian political system, the warnings of confrontation awaited sufficient justification to resolve the duplication of power¹⁷.

In March 1968, following the widespread military operation carried out by the Israeli Zionist enemy in the Jordanian Karama area - and the participation of the Palestinians alongside the Arab Army (the Jordanian Armed Forces) in defeating the aggression, the relationship with the Palestinians began to take a sharp turn¹⁸.

In the aftermath of the Battle of Dignity, the Palestinian armed factions had abandoned their positions on the front line with the enemy and retreated into Jordanian cities, and their elements and leaders began to promote and claim that they were behind the victory that was achieved on the Day of Dignity¹⁹

When the media of the organization and the official spokesperson for the Palestinian armed struggle adopted these slogans, the Jordanian Armed Forces (the Arab Army) felt insulted because it considered that what the organization, its members, and flags promoted detracted from its role, which was waiting for it to be restored and to prove its ability in front of the Zionist army.

With the escalation of chaos and incitement to it by the leaders of the armed struggle and the loss of security in the Jordanian cities as a result of the actions of the armed Palestinian elements, the vows of the confrontation that exploded on September 17, 1970, were prepared.²⁰

Moreover, since this study chose the year 1971 as the beginning of it to avoid entering into the events of that conflict that saturated research, we saw a focus on the violence that the Jordanian state suffered as a result of that, and specifically on the forms of violence practiced against the state, its symbols and its citizens, and among these forms:

First: Armed political assassinations

In order for this study not to be criticized, we note some armed assassinations that took place in the Jordanian arena, including, for example, the assassination that claimed the life, of the Prime Minister of Lebanon, Riad El Solh, which was carried out by elements believed to belong to the Syrian National Party while on his way to Amman Airport to leave to his country on June 29, 1951²¹. The second incident is the case of the assassination

¹⁴ The previous source, page 54, and see also, Ahmad Al-Tal - Jordan and the Alternative Homeland Conspiracy, 1st Edition, Dar Al-Sayel Publications - Amman, 2003, p.11

¹⁵ Ibrahim Abu Amsha, Palestinian Effectiveness, and Development - Abu Salama House Publications, Tunis, 1984, pg. 82

¹⁶ Abdel-Moneim Hamza, Secrets of King Hussein's Stances Between Supporters and Opponents - Publications of Al-Safawi Press - 1st edition - Cairo 1999 - P.117

¹⁷ Khairiya Qasimia - Ahmad Al-Shugairi - Palestinian Arab leader - Kuwait - 1987 - p. 293

¹⁸ A group of researchers - Military History of the Jordanian Armed Forces (Arab Army) Publications of the Directorate of Moral Guidance - General Command - First Edition - Military Press - Amman 2009 - pg. 388

¹⁹ <https://www.ammonnews.net/article/262902>.

²⁰ Yazid Al-Sayegh - Armed Struggle and the Search for a National State (1941/1993) Institute for Palestine Studies - Beirut 2002 - pp. 229-242

²¹ Haitham Al-Kilani - A critical pause in front of the Palestinian resistance before, during, and after the September events, p.

of the head of the Jordanian state, King Abdullah I bin Al-Hussein. At the same time, he was about to enter the prayer at the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem on July 20, 1951. The third incident was the assassination of the Jordanian Prime Minister Hazza al-Majali in his office on August 29, 1960²².

In addition to the political assassinations that were practiced against the Jordanian state and its symbols, but which come outside the timeframe of the study, we also mention the assassination attempts that targeted the life of His Majesty King Hussein bin Talal, where his life was targeted by the armed military formations affiliated with the Palestine Liberation Organization on June 19, 1970, on his return to Amman from a short visit to Jerash, another attempt targeted his life in the center of the capital, Amman, when a Palestinian militant fired his sniper bullets from the top of his minaret, the Great Hussein Mosque, which was disappearing on August 11, 1970, an incident in which the king's special advisor (Zaid Samir al-Rifai) was wounded at the time, one of the bullets landed in his back while he was trying to protect His Majesty with his body.²³

As for the political violence that falls within the time frame of the study, it is the violence that targeted the Jordanian state and its symbols and political leaders, and diplomats; he goes back to the period that followed the departure of the Palestine Liberation Organization from the Kingdom to Lebanon in the wake of the success of the Jordanian state in resolving the conflict with it militarily. After leaving Amman, the Palestine Liberation Organization formed a secret military arm in Beirut affiliated with the Palestinian National Liberation Organization (Fatah), initially called the Military Monitoring Agency, under the leadership of Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), who was still in Jordan to manage it and made its mission to work to overthrow the monarchy in Jordan, but this secret organization, and after the departure of its leader, Salah Khalaf, after these organizations declared themselves by signing their new name on their operations data, the tone of return to the Kingdom of Jordan appeared to the extent that the tone in which they were speaking overshadowed the tone of return to Palestine. For them, the Issue of returning to Jordan meant retaliation and revenge, as they declared in their statements and conversations that they would hold Jordanian officials accountable for their positions on the commando action and their role in expelling it from operating on the land of the Kingdom.²⁴

Moreover, in the implementation of that intimidation and threat, the Black September Organization began planning, training, and providing the necessities for its operations that will target Jordanian officials - benefiting from their special relations with some Arab countries in particular and from the changing state of Arab relations, and the harbingers of Arab action, which was suffering division and division as a result of the competition of large and wealthy Arab countries that aspired to fill the political void left by the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser.²⁵

Assassination attempt on Zaid Al-Rifai (December 15, 1971)

Zaid Al-Rifai, who worked as a special advisor to His Majesty King Hussein, and whose life had previously been endangered while accompanying His Majesty the King on his tours in Jerash and central Amman in June and August 1970, was appointed ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the United Kingdom.

On December 15, 1971, the Black September Organization chose Zaid Al-Rifai to start its military operations against the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. It seems that his choice was a warning to the Kingdom against its competition with the PLO over the representation of the Palestinian people and putting pressure on King Hussein to prevent him from speaking on behalf of the Palestinians concerning the peaceful solutions that were proposed at that time by the United Kingdom and the United States of America.²⁶

The failed assassination was carried out while Ambassador Al-Rifai was on his way from his home to work at the Jordanian Embassy in the British capital, London; the operation was carried out by an Algerian man named Khalifa Sahel Omar (25 years old), after prior monitoring of the movement of Ambassador Al-Rifai, where the investigation information indicated, after his arrest, that he had rented a "red" car, which he used the day before the execution of the operation, to monitor the road used by Ambassador Al-Rifai to reach his work, reveal the security guard procedures, and the number of accompanying guards. Furthermore, after confirming the ambassador's movement path, he plotted to attack the ambassador when his car passed at a crossroads, taking advantage of a traffic light that regulated the traffic on the roads as soon as the ambassador's car arrived, as Khalifa Sahel says in the investigations conducted in Black September, a Palestinian organization was handling the organization's external operations with him by the joint investigation team between the British police and its French counterpart until he pulled his head out of the car window, he was fired from an automatic weapon he had in his pocket at the car of Ambassador Al-Rifai, who was wounded in the arm, after which he was taken to the hospital. As for Khalifa Sahel, who had planned the operation, he headed towards the sea in the car he was driving himself,

281

²² Al-Hussein bin Talal, my career as a king. Pp. 218-219

²³ Yazid Al-Sayegh, The Armed Struggle and the Search for a Palestinian National State (Previous reference), p. 229

²⁴ Ibrahim Al-Sayel - A Second Soldier and Proud, 1st Edition, Amna House for Publishing and Distribution, Amman, 2019

²⁵ Musa Al-Kilani - Why did they assassinate our ambassadors - Al-Ghad Newspaper - Issue (11), dated 5/22/2012

²⁶ Khalil Hindi et al. - the Palestinian Resistance and the Jordanian Regime (previous reference), pp. 54-56

after which he moved to France and entered it. In Paris, following the news that arrived from London that the Jordanian ambassador had been injured as a result of an assassination attempt that targeted his life, the French police suspected Khalifa Sahel, and following the security cooperation between the French and British governments, the British security services were informed of the suspicion of a person believed to have carried out the operation in London, a joint investigation was conducted between the security services, which resulted in Khalifa Sahel's confession that he had carried out the assassination attempt on behalf of the Palestinian "Black September" organization in return for money.²⁷

The political implications of the assassination attempt on Al-Rifai

The attempt to assassinate Ambassador Al-Rifai led to a political crisis between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the United Kingdom. The Jordanian reactions to it intensified with the intense anger that appeared against King Hussein bin Talal, accusing him explicitly of the United Kingdom government and its security services of complacency and negligence in protecting the Jordanian diplomatic mission, and the failure to take measures to protect the life of the Jordanian ambassador, and in addition to that, His Majesty King Hussein instructed Jordanian officials to start procedures for moving his family's headquarters, and transferring his children's studies to the Netherlands instead of London.²⁸

When the British government learned of the king's intention to transfer his family and divert his children's education from London, it saw that the act that His Majesty the King was considering would cause embarrassment to the government and detract from the value of its security services, Therefore, the British Foreign Office hastened to request its resident ambassador in Amman, Sir Duqlas, to visit His Majesty King Hussein and convey a message to him stating that the information he received from the Jordanian ambassador through the postal letter bearing the number (721), which states that the British government has informed the Jordanian ambassador and warned them of the entry of (30) Palestinian suspects to Heathrow Airport, who would threaten Jordanian interests in London - is incorrect, and that what the ambassador was informed of was that the British government informed the ambassador that it had increased the number of members of the protection around the plane that transports the family of "His Majesty the King" to Amman to reach thirty guards, and that the error in transmitting information was borne by the Jordanian ambassador, the British Foreign Ministry asked its ambassador to inform King Hussein that it is aware of his intention to transfer his family to settle outside the United Kingdom, as well as to transfer the place of study for his children, and that it asks him to reconsider that, and that the British government pledges to do more to protect the diplomatic mission and the headquarters of the Jordanian embassy in London, and that measures have been taken to increase the number of surveillance cameras around the embassy.²⁹

The attempted bombing of the Jordanian embassy in Geneva / Switzerland

The hijacking of a Jordanian plane, September 16, 1971

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization had agreed in August 1971 to accept the mediation initiated by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which aimed at the need to bring the two parties together for the first time after the events of September 1970 and the departure of the Palestine Liberation Organization to Lebanon at a round table to search for a mechanism of action agreed upon by the two parties, Saudi Arabia's goal in the meeting, even if they did not agree on anything, was to ease the tension between them. Perhaps this would contribute later to setting an agenda for dialogue to reach solutions that they would agree upon. It was decided that the Saudi government would host the two sides in the city of Jeddah at the end of September 1971. Instead of the Palestine Liberation Organization preparing for a meeting, some elements of its organizations began to prepare for an operation targeting the Jordanian state and exerting pressure on it by placing an explosive device that was installed in a parcel placed in front of the headquarters of the Jordanian mission in Geneva / Switzerland on September 16, 1971. Instead of the PLO and its factions practicing a measure of political propriety, especially since it accepted the principle of dialogue with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan through Saudi mediation, elements began to declare their responsibility for the explosion that targeted the headquarters of the Jordanian mission; it was clear from the adoption of the process that the Palestine Liberation Organization does not want any rapprochement with the Kingdom of Jordan and does not want any détente in relations between them.³⁰

It turned out that the bombing, which targeted the Jordanian embassy and the main headquarters of the mission, was planned by the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Khalil Al-Wazir Abu Jihad, and that he was the one who chose a special group from the Fatah movement to carry out this operation, among the elements that participated in the implementation of the operation was Ahmed Afana (Abu Al-Mu'tasim), who was one of

²⁷ Ahmad Al-Tal, Jordan and the Alternative Homeland Conspiracy, previous reference, p. 105

²⁸ Hassan Al-Saati - Reading in British Documents, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat Newspaper, Issue (8489), dated 24/2/2002

²⁹ Hassan Al-Saati - Reading in British Documents, Issue (8489), previous reference.

³⁰ Al-Rai Newspaper - Issue (93), Friday, September 17, 1971, p. 1

the elements supposed to attend with the Palestinian delegation for the meeting that was expected to be held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, with the Jordanian delegation, among them were also Helmy Abu Gharbia (Abu Tamer), Azmi Al-Zaghair, Saeed Ahmed Mustafa, and Omar Al-Talib, who worked to attract a Lebanese youth named (Issam Abdel-Qader Ali) after they took advantage of the living situation of his family, they used him to carry out their operations after field training and psychological rehabilitation, making him able to carry out hijackings of Jordanian planes after the embassy bombing.³¹

The hijacking of the Alia Airlines plane, September 16, 1971

The kidnapping plan prepared by members of the Fatah Organization was based on the hijacker threatening the pilot of the plane to detonate it with a bomb he was carrying or to take the plane and its passengers to the Iraqi Republic; the other plan that was approved by Khalil Al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) and the elements supervising the operation was that if the hijacker succeeded in diverting the plane to the Iraqi Republic and entering its airspace, to be received by planes from the Iraqi Air Force - and then the kidnapper announces a set of demands to the Palestine Liberation Organization, including the approval of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to postpone the meeting, which was agreed upon with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Those who supervised his training threatened him with assaulting his family and that if he accepted, he would receive the value of (50) fifty dinars. However, the Jordanian security group among the plane passengers controlled the hijacker and landed the plane at Beirut International Airport.³²

The assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal on August 28, 1971

In the days following the Battle of Al-Karama (March 21, 1968) and the retreat of the elements of the PLO factions from staying on plans for confrontation with Israel and preferring to work in Jordanian cities, the characteristic of the commando elements became a lack of commitment to law and order. Their arrogance was exacerbated by the competition of some capitalists and clan-protected leaders to associate with them in the hope that the Palestinian factions would secure their interests. It tried to impose its will on the official Jordanian institutions. It helped them to declare their challenge to the state by supporting the official Arab regimes that supported them with more money and weapons.³³

Wasfi al-Tal was observing the situation and studying its developments. When he noticed that the government of Abdel Moneim al-Rifai was unable to put an end to their actions that would weaken the prestige of the state, he began seeking to be a substitute for Abdel Moneim al-Rifai, Wasfi's quest was motivated by the search for national solutions that remove the official mistakes that opened the way for the Arab powers to interfere in internal affairs and thus defeat the sovereignty of the state.³⁴

And when Wasfi al-Tal saw that the transgressions of the Palestinian organizations had exceeded the acceptable limits of committing mistakes, he began to talk about security and public order, and he began to announce in a tone of confidence that any formula for understanding with the Palestinian factions and their relations with the state authority must take into account that the only authority is the authority of the state, but the other side responded to my description with another saying that there is no authority above the authority of the resistance and that all authority belongs to the resistance,³⁵ Here, Wasfi saw that Jordan became interested above all in living the stage of returning to itself, that all the national slogans being put forward began to collapse, and that the only way out of the impasse was to resume national action.³⁶

In the face of the challenge, through my description, he said: (Jordanians have the right to suffer from Arab and Palestinian transgressions, and they have the right to form their ideological organization, as Jordanians do not have a sacred cause, but rather their cause lies in the Issue of assimilating them into national action, without being in an accusation cage.³⁷

Wasfi al-Tal's philosophy stemmed from his analysis of the superficiality of the political culture of the resistance leaders, which allowed the organization's media to be a tool for transcendence and chaos. Therefore, Wasfi began to propose to all political actors and military leaders from all sides that the Jordanian state's two demands must be achieved at any cost: security and order, and that acceptance of half-solutions has become an echo of the past.³⁸

³¹ Muhammad Al-Manaseer - A page from the history of Jordan - episode (83), previous source

³² Dr. Muhammad Manaseer - the same previous source.

³³ Dr. Jamal Al-Shaer - A Politician Remembering Forty Years of National Action, 1st Edition, Dar Al-Rayes Publications UK - 1988, pg. 211

³⁴ Ibid., pg. 212

³⁵ Abdel Moneim Al-Rifai - The Waves (Pages from the Journey of Life), Publications of the Ministry of Culture, 1st edition, Amman - 2001 AD - pg. 65. See also - d. Jamal Al-Shaer - a politician who remembers - previous reference - pp. 212-213

³⁶ Khalil Hindi - The Palestinian Resistance - previous reference - p. 54

³⁷ Dr. Jamal Al-Shaer - a politician who remembers - previous reference - pp. 216-217

³⁸ Nazir Rasheed - My Memoirs of Hisab Al-Saraya and Hisab Al-Qaraya - Publications of Al-Dar Al-Ahliya for Publishing and

It seems that the reason for the recentness of the leadership of the organization and its lack of real knowledge of the national alliances and its lack of understanding of the structure of the Jordanian regime and its cohesion with the people did not help it to understand the message of Wasfi, and this led to its absence from the Jordanian scene and its final exclusion and distrust in it.

The assassination of Wasfi Al-Tal

Wasfi Al-Tal was thinking, before traveling to Cairo, of reshuffling his government, and he intended to transfer the tasks of the Ministry of Defense to one of the new ministers. However, because of his preoccupation with preparing for the regular session of the Arab defense ministers, he was late in making the amendment, so it became necessary for him to attend, as defense minister, the meeting that the League of Arab States used to hold - at the league's headquarters in Cairo - and during a descriptive preparation for the meeting, the Jordanian ambassador to Cairo, Ali al-Hiyari, returned for an ordinary vacation. But at the same time, he was carrying a verbal message from the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, Abd al-Khaliq Hassouna, and another from the Egyptian Ministry of Defense, stating that the Egyptian government did not want Wasfi al-Tal to attend and head the Jordanian delegation, he carried this message to Wasfi Al-Tal, Director of Jordanian Intelligence, Nazir Rashid, who advised Wasfi to name someone other than himself to attend the meeting of Arab defense ministers. However, Wasfi al-Tal insisted on attending, and when the intelligence director insisted that his presence posed a threat to his life, Wasfi replied: (Life is one, and God is one). However, he replied that the state's sovereignty is more important than his life. Wasfi's family intervened to discourage him from traveling, as did one of Wasfi's friends. When His Majesty the King tried to dissuade him from traveling when he followed him to the airport and asked him to return to amend his government, according to which he assigned another person to hold the portfolio of the Ministry of Defense, he apologized, saying: (Jordan's sovereignty and decision must stem from the Jordanian state, and that the Jordanian state does not submit to anyone, even if there is a sacrifice.)³⁹

Carrying out the assassination

The available information indicates that the decision to execute Wasfi Al-Tal while he was attending a meeting of defense ministers in Cairo was taken by the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization and that the special team for the assassination operation arrived in Cairo early before Wasfi Al-Tal attended, and that there was planning and agreement that took place between the officials of the Liberation Organization and the Egyptian political and military leaders. The first evidence is that the Egyptian police responsible for the security of Cairo Airport had seized a Brawling pistol with a member of the execution team for the operation. However, Cairo airport security allowed the exit of the gun and its owner as soon as the leader of the Palestinian operation, Fakhri Al-Omari, told them that he was a member of the Palestine Liberation Organization and was a member of the organization's office in Cairo.⁴⁰

The arrival of the special team to carry out the operation to Cairo was in batches; at the time, some of them arrived with the commander of the operation, Fakhri Al-Omari, on 11/17/1971. Other elements entered at a later time.

The delay in the arrival of some elements before arriving in Cairo reveals that a double operation was awaiting the Kingdom of Jordan and that the target in the second operation was the life of His Highness Prince Hassan bin Talal. Jawad Al-Baghdadi says: (Abu Aziza): "One of the perpetrators" was officially informed in Beirut by "Abu Ali" Hassan Salameh that he was preparing to carry out an external operation and to prepare to travel to Pakistan, then he provided me with a travel ticket that starts from Beirut to Cairo and ends in the Pakistani city of Karachi. Upon my arrival in Cairo, I received a call from "Abu Ali" Hassan Salama, informing him that I should stay in Cairo and that I should go to the "Sheraton" hotel; upon my arrival at the hotel, I was surprised by the presence of Izzat Rabah, "Abu Al-Ezz," who was supposed to participate with me in the assassination of Prince Hassan, and in the presence of Ziad Al-Helou "Abu Al-Khair", Mufid Al-Wong, and Munther Khalifa.⁴¹

On 11/28/1971, the assassination squad gathered in the Sheraton Hotel cafeteria, and they all drank beer, waiting for the arrival of another figure who turned out to be Fakhri Al-Omari (the leader of the operation), it seems that the perpetrators did not know the nature of the operation nor who would be targeted, but after Al-Omari arrived, he explained to them - that he was assigned to lead the assassination of the Jordanian Prime Minister, Wasfi Al-Tal - and that they are the ones who will carry out the operation, and that the task of shooting Wasfi al-Tal in the head will be carried out by Jawad al-Baghdadi, and Izzat Rabah, and for the success of the operation, Al-Omari asked Jawad Al-Baghdadi to concentrate in Yoon to carry out the operation on the right side of the

Distribution, 1st Edition, Amman, 2015 AD, p. 212

³⁹ Nazir Rashid - My Memoirs - previous reference - pp. 212-213

⁴⁰ Memoirs of a Jordanian - Who Killed Wasfi Al-Tal - Al-Hilal Electronic Newspaper, 11/18/2013 AD, link: www.alhilalnews.net

⁴¹ Al-Hilal News, previous reference, on 11/18/2013

garden that precedes the main gate of the hotel, and for Izzat Rabah to meet him on the left side, and for Ziad Al-Helou and Mufid Al-Wong to perform the operation, and Munther Khalifa to cover the attack and secure the withdrawal after the completion of the operation to the hotel and not outside.⁴²

After the assault on Wasfi al-Tal, he was taken for treatment as he was about to enter the hotel's main gate. However, he arrived at the hospital dead, as it was found that he had been shot in the right upper arm in the middle of the collarbone; this means, as the then director of Jordanian intelligence, "Nazir Rashid," and the attackers themselves confirmed it after the assassination, conveyed my description of treatment. However, he arrived dead, wounded in the right hand. However, in the hospital, it turned out that there was another injury, as a bullet lodged in the middle of the collarbone; this injury caused suspicion that there was another murderer who was stationed at the top of the hotel, and therefore the director of Jordanian intelligence, Nazir Rashid, insisted on attending the writing of the medical report and taking a copy of it to benefit from it in the investigation.⁴³

Arrest the killers and prosecute them

The plan of the Black September Organization for the assassination operation, as previously mentioned, required the executing elements to withdraw into the hotel and not outside it. This means that the killers surrendered to the Egyptian services. No search or pursuit operation took place; at the same time, the Black September Organization hastened to issue a statement signed in the name of Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), issued in Beirut, adopting the operation and declaring the Black September Organization its responsibility for the execution of Wasfi al-Tal.

At the same time, a high-level security team headed by the director of the Jordanian General Intelligence, Nazir Rashid, arrived in Cairo to participate in the security investigations. When the delegation arrived, Nazir Rashid went to the hospital to attend to the autopsy and to see the forensic doctor's report; during the autopsy process and writing the forensic doctor's report - Nazir Rashid, with his security acumen, noticed that there was a contradiction between the results of the initial investigation that was conducted with the perpetrators and the results of the forensic report and that the account of Jawad al-Baghdadi and Izzat Rabah, which confirmed that their bullets were directed at Wasfi al-Tal's head and chest, does not match the location of the fatal bullet, which settled in the middle of the right collar bone from the top,⁴⁴ Nazir Rashid's doubts were confirmed by Jawad al-Baghdadi's confessions and Izzat Rabah many years later, in which Jawad al-Baghdadi stated that he did not kill Wasfi al-Tal even though he was assigned to empty fourteen bullets into Wasfi al-Tal's head, and that his gun had been "returned" after the first shot that hit the right arm in the forearm area of Wasfi al-Tal's body, and that because of that he withdrew when Wasfi tried to pull his pistol with his left hand, fearing that it would kill him.⁴⁵

The testimony of Jawad al-Baghdadi confirms that despite the adoption of the Black September Organization for planning and carrying out the assassination, there is a desire on the part of the host country, driven by its reasons, to get rid of Wasfi al-Tal, the accusations of the hosts being complacent with the killers are multiplied, whether by freedom of movement despite the seizure of weapons with some of them at Cairo airport when they entered it, and then by the theatrical atmosphere that accompanied their trial and their release on the day after the trial (29/8/1971) and allowing them to roam freely in Cairo for a whole month.⁴⁶

Among the things that lead us to believe in the conspiracy theory against the life of Wasfi Al-Tal is the pleading that was allowed to the head of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Ahmed Al-Shugairi, and the court's acceptance of the medical report in which he claimed the presence of another killer, and that the Palestinian defendants do not bear the killing process, as if the Palestinian elements did not shoot or did not try to open fire in front of the whole world.

Attempted hijacking of the Jordanian Airlines plane (Alia) by the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine February 19, 1972

On February 19, 1972, the Palestinian factions increased their pressure on the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan when one of the members of the Popular Front, the Iraqi "Saleh Mahdi Al-Mustawfi," hijacked the Jordanian Airlines plane (Alia) during its flight between Amman and Cairo, after the plane took off from Amman Civil Airport (Marca), the hijacker went to the command headquarters and asked the pilot of the plane to go to land at Beirut International Airport - but the hijacker and whoever planned it forgot that Royal Jordanian had prepared for such situations and secured its planes with a protection team for the plane to remain as it is and the passengers. They succeeded for the second time in thwarting the hijacking of the Jordanian planes; the Jordanian security men on the plane seized the hijacker.

⁴² Saeed Al-Shamat - One day - Black September assassinated Wasfi Al-Tal, Al-Youm Al-Sabea Newspaper, Monday - 11-28-2016 AD

⁴³ Nazir Rashid - My Memoirs - previous reference, pg. 212

⁴⁴ The previous source - p. 213

⁴⁵ The previous source - p. 213

⁴⁶ Nazir Rashid - My Memoirs - previous reference - p. 213/214

During the extensive investigation conducted with the hijacker after he was handed over to the Jordanian security services upon the return of the plane to Amman, he admitted that he had attempted to hijack on behalf of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and that the front asked him to force the pilot of the plane to land at Beirut airport, and that if he succeeds, another group of elements affiliated with the front will deal with the incident, and that because he agreed to carry out the hijacking of the plane, he previously obtained sums of money.⁴⁷

The failed kidnapping sought to prevent the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan from speaking in the name of the Palestinians. The currency's main goal was media targeting to inform the world about the PLO's rejection of the United Kingdom project forward by King Hussein in 1972. However, this operation, justified by the objectives above, was not the only one that targeted Jordanian Airlines planes (Alia). The specialized force formed by the Jordanian military security services thwarted four attempts that followed this operation in 1972.⁴⁸

The detention of the Jordanian embassy staff (Khartoum, March 4, 1973)

The staff of the Jordanian Embassy in Khartoum had accepted the invitation of the Saudi Ambassador in Khartoum to attend the farewell ceremony of the US Ambassador to the Republic of Sudan - Cleo. A. Noel (Kl. U.Noil) ended his services as ambassador to the United States of America. The reception of the new American ambassador, but the heavy diplomatic presence at the Saudi ambassador's house was surprised by an armed attack, which resulted in the detention of the two American ambassadors, the Jordanian ambassador Adly Al-Nasser and some ambassadors of European countries.⁴⁹

The attackers' demands were specific and clear and concerned the request of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to release the Palestinian detainees held in Jordanian prisons, and when the Kingdom of Jordan rejected the kidnappers' demands, the kidnappers killed the newly appointed and outgoing American ambassadors, along with the Belgian ambassador, the operation, which was carried out by Palestinian elements belonging to the Palestinian National Liberation Organization (Fatah), embarrassed,⁵⁰ It embarrassed the Sudanese host country and increased the embarrassment of the Sudanese state. The attackers targeted a large number of diplomats who represent the link between the Republic of Sudan and the countries of the world. Therefore, the Sudanese security carried out a quick storming of the house of the Saudi ambassador arrested the attackers, and freed the kidnapped, including the staff of the Jordanian embassy; the investigations conducted by the Sudanese security services revealed that the operation was planned by senior leaders of the Palestinian National Liberation Organization "Fatah", including Khalil Al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) and Mahmoud Abbas, the current Palestinian President, investigations also revealed that the operation was aimed at striking Jordanian-Saudi relations to push Saudi Arabia to put pressure on the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to release Palestinian detainees in Jordanian prisons whom the Kingdom refuses to release because of their responsibility for the shedding of Jordanian blood.⁵¹

Attempt to detain the Jordanian government presidency building and detain the Jordanian Council of Ministers, February 10, 1973

On February 10, 1973 AD, in a preemptive operation, the Jordanian security services and the General Intelligence revealed a dangerous commando operation that was targeting the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the danger of that operation stemmed from the fact that it aimed to reheat the Jordanian national arena and to escalate relations between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization, after a relatively long period of calm, during which the Jordanian government responded to the release of large numbers of Palestinian detainees who were held as a precautionary measure after the Black September 1971 organization assassinated Prime Minister Wasfi Al-Tal.⁵²

The attempt to seize the Jordanian Council of Ministers was a complex operation - its objectives varied between what is strategic and long-term, and what is traditional and recurring and linked to immediate demands, or what is gradual and easy and appears according to the requirements of the success and failure of the operation:

The strategic objectives included three No's:

First: No to the United Kingdom - a unitary project proposed by King Hussein bin Talal in 1972 AD. It is based on reconsidering the complete integrative unity that has been applied since 1950 AD and replacing it with a confederal unity project that enables the Palestinian national identity and personality to be highlighted.

Second: No to liquidation - what is meant here is the refusal to liquidate the Palestine Liberation

⁴⁷ Dr. Muhammad al-Manaseer - A newspaper from the history of Jordan (field 82), previous reference, dated 10/23/2009

⁴⁸ The same previous reference, dated 10/23/2009, and see also. Dr. Khalil Ibrahim Al-Hajjaj, History of the Jordanian Political Parties, Arab Center Publications, Amman, 2000, p. 170

⁴⁹ Muhammad Manasir, *ibid*.

⁵⁰ American Ambassador captured by Guerhills published on the Harold on March 12-1972

⁵¹ Faisal Jalloul - Abu Dawud's Confession - The Story of Black September and the Munich Operation - Al-Hayat Newspaper - Issue (381), dated May 17, 1991 - pg. 4-5

⁵² *Ibid*. (same Issue), pp. 75-77

Organization, cancel its role, and speak on behalf of the Palestinian people.

Third: No to peaceful solutions, which the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and Israel proposed.⁵³

These supposed demands were that if the attackers succeeded in controlling the Jordanian Cabinet and carrying out the process of detaining the members of the Council of Ministers, the presence of one of the ambassadors of the Republic of Tunisia in Amman or Beirut in order to hand him the requests of the attackers to sue them with the Jordanian state, in addition to these far-reaching and impactful strategic goals, there were other traditional demands that were put forward or moved to others according to the course of the process and the developments of its success and failure, among these objectives, for example, is that in the event of success of the process, the strategic objectives are presented first, after that, negotiation and bargaining takes place on the release of the members of the Council of Ministers in return for the release of forty (40) Palestinian detainees whom the Jordanian government refused to release because they were linked to striking military targets or killing Jordanian citizens, as for the failure of the process of storming and controlling the government building and the failure of detaining members of the Council of Ministers, the process would move to the second alternative - which is to withdraw to the Third Circle area in Jabal Amman towards the US embassy in order to attack its employees to use them as hostages and bargain for the release of Palestinian detainees in Jordanian prisons, and in the event that the appropriate conditions are not available to attack the American embassy, then it will withdraw to Amman Civil Airport in the northern Marka region, with the aim of taking hostages to bargain with them in the release of Palestinian detainees and securing a return plane for the kidnappers and the liberated detainees to Tunisia.⁵⁴

Operation planning and implementation stages

The roots of planning the operation go back to early July 1972, when Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) and Muhammad Daoud Odeh (Abu Daoud) met, in this meeting, Abu Dawud suggested to Salah Khalaf to heat up the Jordanian arena. Restore the dominion of guerrilla action over it, with the aim of preventing the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan from monopolizing the Palestinian cause and speaking on behalf of the Palestinians, and when this idea found approval from Abu Iyad, Abu Dawud offered to carry out a major operation aimed at occupying the Jordanian Government House building and detaining members of the Jordanian Cabinet to achieve strategic Palestinian national gains and other demands.⁵⁵

In November 1971, Salah Khalaf and Muhammad Daoud met. Salah Khalaf presented the need to inform Khalil Al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) about the idea, as he was responsible for Jordan before the Palestine Liberation Organization. When Abu Jihad came and presented the idea to him, he approved it, however, he suggested some amendments, requesting and choosing a goal that would be more realistic and achieve quick gains in a short time, the new amendments proposed by Khalil Al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) consisted of carrying out a raid on Al-Jafr desert prison - north of the southern city of Ma'an - where Palestinian detainees are held and transported by large freight vehicles (trucks, or jeeps) that are provided for the operation, or even asking the liberated detainees to walk towards a pocket that will be provided for the operation, or even asking the liberated detainees to walk towards the Saudi border and cross it, but his proposal was not approved by Abu Iyad and Abu Dawood due to the difficulty of implementing it - for fear that the liberated people would be exposed to thirst and die in the desert, or that the Arab army, the Jordanian Armed Forces, would be able to catch up with them using military vehicles, or attacking them from the air by the Jordanian Air Force base located in the Al-Jafr area adjacent to the prison. These discussions persuaded Khalil Al-Wazir to return to the first option, which is to attack the Government House building and agree to carry out the operation and support it financially and with the necessary and qualified elements for implementation by the Fatah organization.⁵⁶

Preparing for the operation and providing its requirements

After the approval of the three leaders of the operation, Muhammad Daoud Odeh "Abu Daoud" was assigned to lead the operation, and by order of Khalil al-Wazir "Abu Jihad" Salah Khalaf "Abu Iyad" signed: On a financial document with a letter addressed to Salim Zanoun, the financial representative of the Fatah movement in Kuwait, to issue the financial document and supervise the purchase of cars needed for the operation from the Kuwaiti market with Kuwaiti plates and hand them over to a person who will come from Beirut and receive them, at the same time, it was agreed that the date of the operation would be during the Hajj season of that year (1973), using Saudi and Bahraini passports.⁵⁷

On the days of 7 and 8/12/1972, Abu Dawood left Beirut for Baghdad, and from there to Kuwait with a

⁵³ Ahmed Nazif - This is how Abu Iyad was assassinated - The Palestinian Notebook - Link: Palestine-assfir.com/article.aspx?id3473 January 2016.

⁵⁴ Al-Hayat Newspaper - Issue (14399) Date 8/22/2002 AD - P.1-2

⁵⁵ The Jordanian Al-Rai Newspaper - Issue (596) Confessions of Abu Dawud - Sunday, March 25, 1973, pp. 6-7

⁵⁶ Salah Khalaf - Palestinian without identity - previous reference - p. 95

⁵⁷ Al-Rai Newspaper - Confessions of Abu Dawood - previous reference - p. 7

forged Iraqi passport in the name of (Saad al-Din al-Wali); in Kuwait, Abu Dawoud met Salim Al-Zagnoun and a person who was sent from Beirut to receive the cars. He is called "Ahmed Muhammad Hammad", nicknamed "Mahmoud", and he works as a mechanic for the Fatah movement in Beirut, and he was born in the city of Jenin.⁵⁸

Two American-made cars, the first of the type "Buick" and the other of the type "Chevorleecit," were purchased, with a value of "1,200" Kuwaiti dinars, and they were sent to Beirut, and there they were equipped and provided with stores of weapons and ammunition necessary for the operation. After providing the necessary financial and logistical requirements for the operation, the executors were chosen from among the elements of the "Fatah" movement. They were provided with forged Saudi and Bahraini passports. They were asked to enter the Kingdom in two batches and through two different routes -The first route is to set off from Kuwait towards Saudi Arabia using the Dhahran-Riyadh-Tabouk road to Amman. The second group enters from Kuwait to Baghdad and from there to Al-Qaim-Damascus-Amman.⁵⁹

However, before its members went to Oman, this plan faced sudden problems with which it was impossible to use Saudi and Bahraini passports. This problem was the exposure of the use of Saudi and Bahraini passports, in a commando operation carried out in the Thai capital, Bangkok, on 27 and 28/12/1972 AD, in this case it was necessary to search for alternative passports, and during the search process it was suggested to use Omani passports, however, the proposal was not approved by Abu Dawud, the political leader of the operation, on the pretext that the use of Omani passports arouses suspicion among Jordanians who were not accustomed to entering this number of Omanis as tourists due to the poverty that the Sultanate was suffering from at the time, as a result, a meeting was held between Khalil Al-Wazir with members of the leadership of the Popular Front, and he informed them of the need for Fatah for a set of forged passports, which were later secured by the coordinator between Fatah movement and the Popular Front, Tawfiq Al-Tirawi, after the Popular Front secured it through a person who was working for the Eritrea Liberation Front, called "Muhammad Ali" and he was residing in Beirut.⁶⁰

Entry of Implementation Elements into Amman

The available information indicates that the leadership of the Palestinian National Liberation Movement "Fatah" has asked the political leader of the operation, Muhammad Daoud Odeh "Abu Daoud" to meet Khalil Al-Wazir "Abu Jihad" in charge of Jordan in the Palestine Liberation Organization, accordingly, Abu Dawood went to Beirut, and there, during the meeting with Khalil al-Wazir "Abu Jihad," Abu Daoud was handed two forged Jordanian passports, the first in the name of "Hussein Abdullah al-Salibi" from the city of Salt, and the other in the name of a woman under the name "Huda al-Salibi," and she plays the role of his wife with the aim of removing doubts about him - and Huda was the supposed wife of Abu Dawad, a Palestinian girl named Salwa Abu Khader from the city of Haifa, no more than 15 years old, she is the daughter of a Fatah member whose father died in Israeli prisons while executing a sentence issued against him by the Israeli military courts for his participation in a commando operation. At the same time, her mother was serving a prison sentence by the Israeli occupation, while her older brother, Samer, was killed in a commando operation - known as Operation Boat, which was carried out by elements of the "Fatah" movement on the shores of Haifa in 1969. As a result, Huda became the only breadwinner for five brothers who were younger than her. After receiving the passports, he was asked to go to Baghdad on his own - Abu Dawood left Beirut,⁶¹ on 1/12/1972 to Baghdad, while Huda joined him on 9/12/1972. Later it turned out that Salah Khalaf "Abu Iyad" had previously arrived in Baghdad and made the necessary hotel reservations, as the information indicates that their stay was in the tent hotel - where Salah Khalaf stayed in Room No. (309) and Abu Iyad and Huda stayed in Room No. (401), on 12/10/1971 AD, Salah Khalaf "Abu Iyad" moved to another place known in Baghdad as the House of Movement and located in the Al-Bataween neighborhood - near the headquarters of the Fatah movement.⁶²

The house of the movement in Baghdad consisted of two floors and was surrounded by high walls that reached two meters (2 m) high. In this house, Salah Khalaf "Abu Iyad" met with several officials responsible for Jordanian affairs - in the offices of Baghdad and Damascus - among the attendees was a Palestinian poet called Abu Al-Sadiq - who was called the poet of the Palestinian revolution. After Salah Khalaf "Abu Iyad:" agreed with those responsible for Jordanian affairs in the Damascus and Baghdad offices on how to coordinate the entry of the executing elements, he met with the elements supposed to carry out the operation, the number of members that Salah Khalaf met in the House of Movement ranged between twenty-eight and twenty-nine (28-29) members, he informed them during the meeting that they would carry out a heroic act that would serve the Palestinian cause, and that the enormity of the operation they would undertake would have a significant impact on the Palestine Liberation Organization and on Fatah in particular, but he did not disclose to them what the operation was and

⁵⁸ Muhammad Daoud Odeh (Abu Daoud) Palestine from Jerusalem to Munich, French publishing house publications, May 1999, p. 32

⁵⁹ Ahmad Abd al-Karim al-Hayh - Bin Bila al-Filistini - Disaster Revolution, Al-Jazeera Channel, 8/27/2010

⁶⁰ Al-Rai newspaper - the full text of Abu Dawood's confession - previous reference, p.8

⁶¹ Al-Rai newspaper - the full text of Abu Dawood's confessions - previous reference - p. 7

⁶² The previous reference, pg. 7-8

where it would be carried out, and before leaving the room for the poet Abu al-Sadiq to recite a poem that inflames their feelings, he handed them the passports necessary for their travel, and made them understand that there are coordinators at this stage who will secure their entry to Jordan, and that the offices of Fatah in Baghdad and Damascus will take care of that - it was Salah Khalaf - who is the coordinator of Jordan affairs in Baghdad, and Fathi Abu Al-Raed, the coordinator of Jordan affairs in the Damascus office, then he went back to the tent hotel where Abu Dawood and Huda were staying - and upon his arrival he asked Abu Daoud to go immediately to Jordan to prepare for the operation - and prepare the supposed theater - and draw the place and put the necessary plan for the attack - choosing a place for the perpetrators to stay when they enter Jordan, monitoring the traffic around the scene of the operation, choosing a suitable place on the road leading to the scene of the operation to store the necessary ammunition and weapons, and preparing the cars that will be used in the operation upon their arrival.⁶³

On January 10, 1973, Muhammad Daoud, after crossing the Jordanian border coming from Damascus with his companion (his supposed wife Huda), believed that he had succeeded in reaching and that nothing caught his eye, but at the same time, he noticed on his way to Amman that a Volkswagen car was following his car and that special attention from the driver of the car caught his eye when Abu Dawud arrived, he was surprised that the driver of the car that took him from Ramtha to Amman had chosen the same hotel in which he was staying. Abu Dawud was apprehensive about the matter, so he went to that person and asked him who she was. He replied that he had come from Beirut - to follow him and that he was aware of everything - and that he was the person who would deliver to him the password for the operation that he would lead at the appropriate time.⁶⁴

On January 11, 1973 AD, Abu Dawood was preoccupied with preparing for the operation, as he demonstrated the location of the operation and its details - before looking for a place to store weapons and ammunition, and revealing alternative ways to reach the scene of the operation - and after he settled his opinion - on the appropriate place for the residence of the executing elements - choosing the Al-Kasarat area near the Sports City as a place to store weapons and ammunition, and preparing the vehicles that would be used to carry out the operation, he returned to the hotel, on the next day, 12/1/1973 AD, Abu Dawud and his supposed wife Huda, along with the car driver Qazi al-Lebanese and his wife, decided to go out on a tour in the areas of Amman - However, while they were passing on the road leading to the Dakhiliyah roundabout, they were stopped by a military patrol, when they asked for their passports and the patrol officer looked at them, the officer was surprised at the relationship between a Jordanian and a Lebanese family, upon further scrutiny of the information documented in the passports and the persons in front of him, the officer noticed that the age of the fifteen-year-old girl (Huda) does not correspond to the number of suspected family members in the passport, who are six (6) members, then the patrol officer decided to transfer them to the Al-Hussein police station - but when "Huda" tried to get out of the car in front of the Al-Hussein police station, a pistol (*) fell from her. According to Abu Dawood's confessions, he had asked her to attach it to her body and hide it under her clothes; with Huda's confusion decided to detain the group and transfer it to the General Intelligence Department for interrogation.⁶⁵

On January 15, 1973, the General Intelligence Department completed the investigation with Muhammad Daoud Odeh (Abu Dawood) and Huda and announced his confessions in the local newspapers on January 16, 1973.

Arresting a cell carrying out an attempt to seize the place of the Jordanian ministers

Abu Dawood says: "During his arrest and being in the interrogation room, I learned that the operation had failed and was under the control of the Jordanian General Intelligence Department before it began. During the arrest, the Jordanian intelligence offered him one of the elements to carry out the operation, so I learned that all the elements who had arrived in Amman, sixteen (16) out of twenty (20), were arrested."⁶⁶

As for Salah Khalaf Abu "Iyad," he says: The operation that was to be carried out by twenty (20) members, targeting the Jordanian Government House building, was divided into four groups distributed to the wings of the building and its internal and external gates, we assigned each group a leader, and each leader had specific tasks. As for the field leadership of the operation, it was entrusted to Ben Bella (*), who is concerned with the process of leadership and negotiation upon the operation's success. We handed him a list of names of forty (40) Palestinian detainees. He was provided with a password that would be a key for him - with the person who was assigned to be a mediator between him and the European countries, and among the demands, in the event of the success of the operation, was to secure a plane to transport the executed, members of the cabinet, and the released Palestinians so that we would be transported to Libya. There the members of the Jordanian government would be

⁶³ Al-Rai Newspaper - Confessions of Abu Dawood - previous reference, p.8

⁶⁴ Muhammad Daoud Odeh (Abu Daoud), a Palestinian from Jerusalem to Munich - previous reference, p. 34

⁶⁵ Al-Rai Newspaper (Confessions) Muhammad Daoud Odeh, p. 8, and also looked at Wilhelm Dietl, Our Lady of Mossad, University Studies House, Beirut, 1993, p. 129.

⁶⁶ Al-Rai Newspaper - Confessions of Abu Dawood, previous reference, p. 8

released.⁶⁷

In the same context, Ahmad Abdul Karim al-Hayh, who is known as Bin Bila al-Filastini, the commander of the operation, and is now a retired major general from the Palestine Liberation Organization, explains: "One day I went to Salah Khalaf and I asked him about the reasons for the failure of the operation to detain the Jordanian cabinet, so he pointed to me with his hand," meaning "The Jordanian intelligence service infiltrated us."⁶⁸

Moreover, we show from Ben Bella's testimony to Al-Jazeera that the Volkswagen driver, who claimed to Abu Dawood that he was fully aware of the operation and that he came to hand him the password, stayed with him in the hotel and accompanied him on tour on the day of his arrest. He was nothing but an agent who was working for the Jordanian Intelligence Department. The failed attempt to attack the Jordanian Government House building was revealed; he falsified all the allegations that the PLO leaders used to invoke their lack of knowledge of the Black September Organization and that those whose names are mentioned are isolated elements and do not have any reference, whether politically or financially, with the PLO and do not represent it.

On the contrary, the investigations conducted proved that, at the same time, Jordan was forced to reveal some Syrian interference in Jordanian internal affairs and the Syrian intelligence's attempt to embarrass Jordan and undermine it and its international reputation, the escalation of the situation between the two countries was further exacerbated by the Syrian intelligence's assassination in December 1980 of the Syrian political refugee in Jordan, Abdul Wahhab al-Bakri, in downtown Amman. Furthermore, when the Jordanian security services arrested the perpetrators, including an employee of the Syrian embassy in Amman, it turned out that he worked as a major in Syrian intelligence. He confessed to carrying out the assassination, and Jordan announced that on state television. Hafez al-Assad was disturbed by the Jordanian reaction, it was then that he asked his brother Rifaat - Commander of the Defense Brigades - to send a trained group to assassinate the Jordanian Prime Minister (Mudar Badran), whom the Syrians considered to be close to Iraq and he had a word of respect for Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi President.⁶⁹

In addition to the aforementioned reasons, there is another reason represented by Mudar Badran's challenge to Hafez al-Assad regarding his explicit declaration of support for Iraq in its war against the Islamic Republic of Iran Hafez al-Assad supports.⁷⁰

The disagreement with Syria and Al-Assad's rush to get rid of Badran were exacerbated by the tightening of the screws on Al-Assad's agents and intelligence in the Jordanian arena, which had gained its glory during Zaid Al-Rifai's presidency of the government – where it was secretly, albeit exposed to the Jordanian state during Al-Rifai's era –it pursues and monitors the movements of the Syrian opponents of various political orientations, in order to paralyze their movement and prevent any attempt targeting the Syrian interior.⁷¹

Prepare for the operation and schedule its implementation.

After the order that Rifaat Al-Assad received from his brother, Hafez, the Syrian President, the elements necessary to carry out the operation were selected - and the assassination plan was drawn up under the full supervision of Rifaat Al-Assad, Commander of the Defense Brigades, in cooperation with Major - Suleiman Hadid - Brigade Commander in the Defense Brigades.

The implementation cell was chosen from a group of elements, all from the Defense Companies, and it consisted of:

- Colonel: Kamel Barakat (Defense Brigades) Born and inhabited: Quwaiqa village between Jableh and Latakia (Alawite).
- Sergeant: Issa Ibrahim Hamed Fayyad (Defense Brigades) (forged passport).
- Driver: George Abdo Bitar (public car driver) (forged passport) Amman - Levant.
- Taha Muhammad al-Haddad al-Khalidi (a trader from the Homs desert) used to work for Defense Companies.

These elements were provided - with a set of weapons - which were entered by a Mercedes car that George Abdo Bitar drove, as he was known for his frequent passage -He was also assigned to rent a house close to the Prime Ministry building - to be a residence for the elements carrying out the operation - the plan was for the rented house to be in Jabal Amman - but due to exceptional circumstances of the operation, an apartment was rented in the city of Sweileh, northwest of the city of Amman.⁷²

After renting the building - the group started - observing the movement of the Prime Minister's convoy,

⁶⁷ Salah Khalaf "Abu Dawud," a Palestinian without identity (Saqib reference), pp. 95-96.

⁶⁸ Ahmad Abdul-Karim Al-(Ibn Bila al-Filastini), A Story of a Revolution, Al-Jazeera Channel, dated 8/27/2011

⁶⁹ Dr. Muhammad al-Dakhil, Terrorism of the Assad Gang Outside Syria, The Syrian Foundation for Publishing and Distribution, 3rd edition, 2012, pp. 3-42.

⁷⁰ Mudar Badran, A Politician Remembered (Previous Reference), Episode 19.

⁷¹ Same previous source.

⁷² See Mudar Badran, Al-Ghad Newspaper, A Politician Remembers - Interview with Muhammad Khair Al-Rawashdeh - Episode (19), dated 2/15/2015.

the hours of his morning presence - and his departure from the presidential building - and determining the number of security personnel - and the cars accompanying him, and accordingly, the plan was drawn up to assassinate the following way:

On December 23, 1981, elements of the operation entered in batches. It became clear that the operation was under the supervision and control of the Jordanian Intelligence Department. It was run by Tariq Alaeddin (Abu Hassan), Director of General Intelligence, and his assistant, Rajaa Sidqi Dajani.

According to the available information, the execution members were lured and followed up after they were placed under close supervision until the execution day, which is December 31, 1981, the General Intelligence Department's plan was waiting for the operation's commander to enter the Kingdom, accompanied by the driver, George Abdo Al-Bitar, who found in his car 4 bombs that were intended to be used to throw them at the Prime Minister (Badran)'s car by two elements of the implementation, while the other two elements are firing heavy fire from special machine guns brought for this purpose, with the arrest of the operation's leader, another team from the General Intelligence Department attacked the apartment in which the rest of the operatives were staying in the city of Sweileh, after which it announced the failure of the operation and presented the results of the investigation directly through the operatives on the Jordanian official television.⁷³

Attempt to assassinate the Jordanian ambassador in Beirut:

Less than a week had passed since the attempt to assassinate Prime Minister Mudar Badran until the Kingdom faced a new act targeting the life of Ambassador Hisham Al-Muhaisen, which turned out to be the operation behind the Syrian intelligence, as a response to the arrest of the perpetrators of the failed assassination that targeted Mudar Badran.⁷⁴

The kidnapping was carried out by members of the Syrian Thunderbolt, which suddenly raided the Jordanian guards and killed them, the first soldier - Abdul Salam Al-Qarala, and wounded the first sergeant, Muhammad Salem Karim - with wounds - and a Lebanese security man working in the embassy guard was killed by the Lebanese state security.⁷⁵

In response to this process - the Jordanian government asked the Secretary-General of the United Nations to intervene to release the Jordanian ambassador - and the international community - to stop the unjustified Syrian attacks on the Kingdom of Jordan and to stop interfering in internal affairs, and threatening the security of its employees working outside the country as diplomats to provide services to Jordanian citizens.⁷⁶

As an attempt by the Syrian security services, headed by the Syrian Intelligence Services and the Defense Brigades, to divert the world's attention from the Syrian regime, in which two unknown organizations, the "National Confrontation Side" and Vanguard of Revolutionary Violence - the Palestinian Eagles of the Revolution, claimed responsibility for the kidnapping - and that they had handed over the Jordanian ambassador to the Syrian deterrence forces operating in Lebanon.⁷⁷

Ambassador Al-Muhaisen was detained for (70 days) in the hope that the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan would release the perpetrators of the attempt to assassinate Mudar Badran, and since Jordan considered this act a form of bullying and extortion that does not comply with international norms and contradicts the sovereignty of the state, it refused to release the detainees, Ambassador Al-Muhaisen was transferred to one of the headquarters of the Air Force Intelligence, which was affiliated directly to the Syrian President (Hafez Al-Assad), after which a painstaking negotiation process began, which ended with Jordan's approval, under pressure from the people of the city (Tafileh), to which Ambassador Al-Muhaisen belongs, on the exchange of Syrian detainees for Ambassador Al-Muhaisen, where the terrorist group left for Damascus - to be received by Hafez al-Assad in the presence of his brother Rifaat, and on 14/4/1981 AD a popular delegation of Muhaisin's relatives left for Damascus, and they returned him to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. When Al-Muhaisen returned to Jordan, he announced in an interview on Jordanian television that the Syrian authorities were the ones who released him and that he was a front,⁷⁸ the Lebanese National Confrontation follows the Defense Brigades.⁷⁹

Conclusion

If this study traced the roots of violence and armed conflict on the Jordanian national scene, defined its forms, methods, and tools, or analyzed its contents, traced its operations, and explained its effects on the state and society, because its causes are limited to the responsibility of the state officials who took the lead in public action

⁷³ Mudar Badran, A Politician Who Remembers, Al-Ghad Newspaper, previous reference, episode (19).

⁷⁴ Dr. Muhammad al-Dakhil, Terrorism of Islamic Gangs Outside Syria, previous reference, p. 17.

⁷⁵ The kidnapping was carried out by members of the Syrian Thunderbolt, which suddenly raided the Jordanian guards and killed them, the first soldier - Abdul Salam Al-Qarala, and wounded the first sergeant, Muhammad Salem Karim - with wounds - and a Lebanese security man working in the embassy guard was killed by the Lebanese state security.

⁷⁶ Dr. Muhammad al-Dakhil, Terrorism of the Assadist Gangs, pp. 23, 24.

⁷⁷ Dr. Abdullah Al-Dahamsheh, Syria Mazraat Al-Assad, previous reference, p. 252, p. 253.

⁷⁸ Mudar Badran, a politician who remembers (Episode 21).

⁷⁹ Dr. Muhammad al-Dakhil, Terrorism of Islamic Gangs (previous reference), p. 27.

before finishing off the source and resolving the dual power and ending the chaos, and restoring national sovereignty to the hands of the state, the study revealed the failure of state institutions to perform their duties represented in putting an end to the causes of violence.

The parliamentary institution comes at the top of the national institutions that bear responsibility for the interference that befell other state institutions because it did not fulfill its oversight duty, it did not use its powers to hold the arms of the state accountable, which became afraid of confronting the elements responsible for violence and turned the state apparatus into tools to serve its interests. It contributed to spreading chaos, corruption, and bribery. As for what is related to the political apparatus of the state, it inclines to try to reform by using appeasement and courtship; turning a blind eye to some severe incidents has given the elements responsible for the violence the opportunity to expand in all aspects of the state and transform them to serve their interests by bullying them, another reason that contributed to deepening the chaos and spreading fear among the population was that the state allowed the Palestinian armed elements to turn away from working on the lines of engagement with the Zionist enemy, to work from inside Jordanian cities and Palestinian refugee camps, which contributed to increasing the chances of friction between the Palestinian armed factions, the security forces and the army inside the Kingdom, and thus the division of union and loyalty on this basis.

However, although we have limited the reasons that contributed to the roots of the causes of violence in the Jordanian state, the goals behind the violence, it sought to show that it was the responsibility of other parties, including the Arab countries, which saw financial support for some Palestinian organizations as exempting them from their national responsibilities for liberation, as well as the United States, its Western allies, and their bias towards Israel, as for the particular goals - they are represented by the exploitation of the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah) to work in the Jordanian national arena and its media apparatus to propagate it as the largest and most influential organization on the Jordanian state, to win its supporters to form a striking numerical force that enables it to outperform all Palestinian factions as a prelude to controlling the political and military decision of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the dismissal of its political leadership, which was assigned by the Council of the League of Arab States, represented by the leadership of Ahmed Al-Shugairi, who was replaced by Yasser Arafat (Abu Ammar), the leader of the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah).

It can be said that all the international and Arab goals and the unique goals of the Palestinian factions were behind the armed political violence that struck the national arena "during the specified study period between 1971-1981, and it led to more causes of violence, the effects of which are still present today, appearing at times and disappearing at others, but it did not heal and needs to reformulate the relationship between the components that make up the state in order to end it once and for all.

Finally, the results of the actions that targeted Jordan show that the Jordanian security services had a great deal of national responsibility and diligent professional work in protecting national security at home and abroad, it was able to avoid the country from many evils that were targeting it, and thanks to this concern, it secured the stability of the state and preserved its sovereignty.

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