

Armed Political Conflict Between Supporters of a Civil Rule System and Supporters of a Religious Imamate System in the Sultanate of Oman - Secret British Documents - Oman Encyclopedia Source (1954 - 1971)

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Abstract

This research deals with an important topic of contemporary Arab history and focuses precisely on the armed conflict that the Sultanate of Oman witnessed in the period between May 1954; it is the period that followed the death of Imam Muhammad bin Abdullah al-Khalili to 1971, the period in which the conflict ended after Sultan Qaboos bin Said bin Taimur assumed power.

As for the historical sources of research are completely confined to secret British political documents published by the Center for Arab Unity Studies; it was translated by Dr. Muhammad bin Abdullah bin Muhammad al-Harithi in 2007, in six volumes containing more than ten thousand documents.

With regard to the methodology, the researcher followed the historical methodology that is based on investigating the educational material and proving it chronologically to clarify the reality of the events satisfactorily and appropriately; the research between the historical and political methodology focuses on highlighting the basic factors of the conflict and the limitation of scientific material and its trial, on identifying the causes of conflict and show its effects on the spatial framework of the research, which is the Sultanate of Oman.

Keywords: Oman, History, Politics, Imamate, International Relations.

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Introduction

The city of Rustaq *, located in the Dakhiliyah region, remained the historical capital of Muscat and Oman from 1783 AD until 1793 AD. At that time, the country's political leadership was led by an imam elected according to the rules of Ibadi jurisprudence, which requires that the Ibadi scholars elect the Imam, as the people of the contract and solution (¹). And based on what the matter was concerning the political leadership, the Omani tribes that were more religious and close to the Imam also continued to control the matters of governance exercised by the Imam, who based his rulings on the actions of the Imamate judges in the Omani states, whether in Muscat or

* Al-Rustaq: A small town located in the Western Hajar region, about 160 km away from the city of Muscat, see: Saud Al-Otaibi, Omani Order and Customs, Ministry of National Heritage, 1991, pp. 60-64.

¹ Madiha Ahmed Darwish, Sultanate of Oman in the Eighth and Nineteenth Centuries, 1st Edition, Dar Al-Shorouk, Jeddah 1982, p. 29.

the interior region (Oman)⁽²⁾. However, this situation began to change as a result of the transfer of the capital to the coastal city of Muscat by Sultan bin Ahmed Al Busaidi, who usurped the rule (1793 AD)⁽³⁾. And the transfer of the capital to Muscat led to the end of the mechanism for electing the Imam and its final demise in Muscat by mixing with the foreigners who were residing there, uprisings and rebellions against the new civilian rule, and these movements sometimes succeeded in restoring power temporarily.

As happened in the years (1868-1871 AD) at the hands of Izzat bin Qais *, A member of the Al Said family with the help of the Inland Tribes⁴. After the expulsion of Imam Azzan bin Qais and the restoration of power from him at the hands of Faisal bin Turki Al Busaidi in 1871 AD, many attempts were made by the interior tribesmen to restore the imamate regime, but they failed to do so due to the strong support that was provided to the Sultan by the British government ⁽⁵⁾. In 1913, the year before the outbreak of the First World War (August 4, 1914), tension escalated, and the feelings of enthusiasm for action against the Sultan flared up, driven by two factors: Stopping the arms trade and stopping the slave trade, which, according to the Ibadi school of thought, are two legitimate Islamic businesses, The outrage increased in them that the responsibility for officially stopping them came at the hands of parties embracing the Christian religion (British diplomats), in May 1913, A massive fundamentalist religious revolution was ignited, sparked by the power of the inner tribesmen far from Muscat, and it was that they occupied the historic city of Nizwa and declared it their capital, while the city of Tanuf near Nizwa was declared the capital of the revolution and the cradle for its launch. ⁽⁶⁾. And in return for that revolution, the Sultan's forces, with the participation of the British forces present in Muscat, responded to the protection of the Sultan, in implementation of Britain's commitment during its second declaration with the French government to protect Muscat and Muttrah and protect the Sultan after announcing the independence of Muscat from Zanzibar in 1862 AD, and the agreement also signed with the Sultan to protect him and his rule center in 1895

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The participation of the British forces in striking the rebels formed a strong message to the tribes that Britain would not allow attacking the coastal cities of the Sultan, No matter how strong the hostility was to him, but this warning did not lead to a deterrent to the Ibadhi tribes and Sheikhs, who in January 1915, attacked Muscat, the capital of the Sultan, with about four hundred men (400). However, they once again faced failure to achieve what

² Muhammad Shaiba Al-Salmi, Nahza Al-Ayan, Bahriyat Oman (d. D), Dar Al-Kitaab Al-Arabi, Cairo (d. D), p. 23. See also: Robert Giran Landt, Oman since 1856 AD, Biography and Destiny, 5th Edition, Publications of the Ministry of National Heritage and Culture in Oman, Masqad 1994, 268-280.

³ Abdullah bin Muhammad Al-Tai, Oman's Political History, 1st Edition, Al-Rabian Library Publications for Publishing and Distribution. Al-Safat, Kuwait, 2008, p. 114, p. 153, and see also: Ibrahim Atneesh (Abu Ishaq) Introduction to the book "The Essence of the Order in the Sciences of Religions and Rulings by Imam Al-Salmi, Modern Colors Library, Muscat, 1989, p. 15, p. 26.

* Azzan bin Qais bin Azzat bin Qais bin Sultan bin Ahmed, a cousin of Sultan Salim bin Thuwaini bin Said (1865 - 1868 CE), seized power in Muscat and declared the establishment of the religious imamate there in 1868 CE and continued until 1871 CE

⁴ The previous source (ibid.), P. 153.

⁵ Muhammad Al-Taie, Oman's Political History (previous reference), p. 162. See also: Salem bin Aqeel, Oman between division and unity 1913 - 1976 CE, Edition 1, Arab Center for Bioenergy Publications, Oman, 2007, p. 23, p. 31.

⁶ Oman Encyclopedia of Secret Documents 6 mg, prepared and translated by Muhammad bin Abdullah Al-Harithi. Edition 1. Publications of the Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, October 2007, Document No. (107), Report of Imam Tanuf Revolution and the Causes of the Revolution, Volume 2, pp. 80-83, and will be referred to later, thus. "Encyclopedia - Document Number - Volume - Page Number .

⁷ Same previous source, vol.2, p.85.

they were aiming for, as their forces were attacked by the abundance of bullets that rained down on them like rain from the British forces that were using the House of Falaj near Muscat as a focal point for their defense of the cities of Muttrah and Muscat ⁽⁸⁾

Despite the failure of the Imam's forces, the conflict was not resolved where as they succeeded during 1916 in controlling large and large parts of the interior of Oman and some coastal areas that were under the control of the Sultan and securing sea lanes through which to transport goods to and from the interior region. Furthermore, the Imam formed a government in the interior region and provided it with power when they created arms and administrative organizations that significantly led to its stability for a long time, as no one disputed it. And their stability increased by their avoidance of contact with the British forces present in the areas surrounding their areas for fear of using force against them and destroying their fortresses ⁽⁹⁾, at a time when the Imam and his supporters were interested in developing their regions, the Sultan's government in Muscat was overwhelmed with debt and suffering from imbalance and many contradictions. Therefore, the British Government of India realized the necessity to save the Sultan, as it took immediate measures to prevent the collapse of the Sultan's government and the loss of control over the coastal Batinah lands. And it worked on arranging for the Sultan to be granted a financial loan that is provided from the public income of the Government of India in order to use it in reorganizing Muscat and restructuring its government, and an increase in support of the Sultan, as the British Political Agent gathered the Omanis in a reconciliation conference between them, in the valley of Samail Castle and recognition of him as the ruler of all Oman, and because the Imam rejected the Sultan's conditions before announcing his acceptance of making extensive structural reforms in his system of government and re-allow them to trade in arms and slave trade ⁽¹⁰⁾. After the failure of the 1915 conference, the Imam's forces began to consolidate their ranks and supply weapons with all causes of strength and support. Therefore, the British Government of India once again asked the British Political Agent in Muscat to gather the Omanis and pressure them to sign an agreement in which the Imam would coexist with the Sultan, which would limit the ongoing violence between them. Accordingly, his new moves resulted in persuading the Imam to continue negotiations with the Sultan, and during the negotiations, the political agent threatened the participants on the Imam's side in case they hesitated to move their ships to support the Sultan and impose taxes on their trade, and when the Sultan imposed taxes on their goods, the tribes were angry at his acceptance of negotiations with the Sultan, and one of their members killed the Imam on July 21, 1920 ⁽¹¹⁾ in September 1920, and under British pressure on the British political agent residing in Muscat to take advantage of the conditions experienced by the tribes as a result of the killing of Imam Rashid bin Salem Al Kharousi and the election of a new imam known for his penchant for coexistence in peace, and his keenness to inject the blood of Omanis, the British political agent succeeded in gathering the Omanis and signing them on An agreement known as (The Seeb Agreement / September 28/1920)

⁸Same as previous source, Vol. 2, p. 86.

⁹Dr. Khalil Al-Hajjaj, History of the Omani Revolution 1913 - 1920. British documents are a source. Al-Mishkat Magazine / The International Islamic Sciences University, Volume VI, Issue 2/2017, p. 377, p. 417.

¹⁰The Omani Encyclopedia, Document No. (115) Summary of the events in Muscat. Date October 16, 1914, Vol. 2, p. 103. See also: Document No. (116) of December 7, 1915, Letter of the Political Agent Resident in Muscat to the British Foreign Ministry, Volume 2, p. 104. See also: Document No. (127) Report of the Chief Political Officer in Basra on the Revolution Against the Sultan of Muscat, dated July 1, 1916, Volume 2, pp. 147-154.

¹¹The Encyclopedia (previous reference) Document No. (141) (Telegram on the Assassination of Imam Salem, July 21, 1921, Volume 2, pp. 161-164.

¹²). At the time that, in the agreement, it implicitly recognized the Sultan's recognition of the Imam and the exploitation of the interior region, on the one hand, it also led to the establishment of two semi-independent entities in Oman, which are contradictory in principle. And the first entity included the coastal region, its capital is Muscat, and its flag is red, and the Sultan rules it according to civil laws, and the second entity included the interior desert region and is known as (Interior) he has a white flag. (¹³).

The renewal of the revolution and the explosion of the armed conflict 1954 and its causes:

The Omanis lived in the shadow of the division imposed by the Seeb Agreement for a relatively long period that spanned nearly thirty years (30 years) and was dominated by complete stability. During which the issue of the division of Omanis was devoted, but this calm suddenly disappeared due to the absence of Imam Muhammad bin Abdullah al-Khalili due to death, and who remained keen to abide by the Seeb Agreement that he signed with the Sultan; Because he believed in injecting the blood of Omanis, and his focus on implanting religious concepts of the Ibadi school of thought in the souls of Omanis (¹⁴).

After the death of * the Imam, according to what is sought from the Ibadi school of thought, the ovulation scholars gathered to consider electing a new imam, Among a group of candidates, but the conditions of the meeting passed quickly because the ruling Imam, may God have mercy on him, had left a will that included naming an imam after him. In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. This is what I say while I, the Imam of the Muslims, Muhammad bin Abdullah al-Khalili: I have regained the succession of the boy: Abdullah bin Imam Salem because I have seen in his weakness and incitement, and this is contrary to what is meant by order of the Khilafah because its matter is solid as the Almighty said" And said one of them: "O my father! Hire him! Verily, the best of men for you to hire is the strong, the trustworthy." Surah Al Qasas A 26. And I have looked at the matter of the Muslims in diligence for God and the Muslims, and I have seen Ghaleb bin Ali: He is the strongest in his religion, and justice is in his faithfulness, so I made him the Caliph on the command of Muslims after me, following the example of Al-Istikhlaf by Abu Bakr Al-Siddiq and Omar bin Al-Khattab, may God be pleased with them both. This is my good belief in him. Otherwise, those who have wronged will know which way to turn. And since the Imam al-Khalili had testified to this succession forty days before his death, each of the Ibadi Masihs: Abdullah bin al-Imam Salem, Mansour bin Nasser al-Farsi, Saeed bin Nasser al-Saifi, Malik bin Muhammad al-Abri, Muhammad bin Salem al-Ruqishi, Saud bin Sulayman al-Kindi, Ibrahim bin Muhammad al-Ruqishi, Zahir bin Abdullah al-Othmani, Salim bin Muhammad al-Harithi, Ali bin Nasser al-Ghusaini, Muhammad bin Rashid al-Habsi, Khalid bin Muhdid al-Battashi, Ahmed bin Nasser al-Busaidi, and Saleh bin Isa al-Harthy, and these were the judges of the Imam except (Saleh bin Isa al-Harthy), he is a tribal leader over his people, a pillar of the state, and upon him and his fathers the Muslim state was established. He announced the acceptance of Ghalib bin Ali and Al-Hanai, Imam of Oman (¹⁵).

Five days after the Imam assumed most of his responsibilities, to announce himself in the surroundings in which he lived, he sent several messages, one of which was addressed to Sultan Saeed bin Taymur bin Faisal, who had

¹² The Omani Encyclopedia, Document No. 154 (the Seeb Agreement 28 / September / 1920AD), Volume 2, p. 224.

¹³ Saeed bin Muhammad Al-Harthy, The Wet Pearl in Highlighting the Warehouses of the Heart (a copy by the researcher Fuchtathia) 1985, (d, n), p. 306

¹⁴ The same previous source, p. 292, p. 293.

* Imam Muhammad bin Abdullah al-Khalili died on May 1, 1954 CE, as a result of a febrile seizure that afflicted him. See Al-Lu'lu' al-Rutayb, (previous reference), p. 292.

¹⁵ Saeed bin Muhammad Al-Harthy, see. Wet pearl (previous reference), p. 295.

assumed the throne of the Sultanate after the death of his father, and another speech by the Muscat Government Council, and another addressed to the British political consul residing in Muscat, but this was different from others because it included an announcement that he rejected the presence of British foreign forces and British companies in the Duqm area, in which oil is hoped to be discovered. It is an issue that was emphasized by the late Imam Khalili of the former British political consul. However, instead of ignoring the message as he did with Imam al-Khalili, the British Consul underestimated the new Imam and responded to him that the British presence was based on an agreement with Sultan Said bin Taimur. Here the Imam saw that there is something that the British are planning to do based on marginalizing the interior region and its Imam. Therefore, the Imam made a quick move represented in sending his brother Talib to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to request cooperation between them, and in return for this movement from the front, the British political consul reduced the move, believing that Saudi Arabia would not respond to the request of the Imam Ghaleb, and it will not give him the importance of not wanting to get involved in the Omani issue in the interest of the Imam Based on the sectarian difference (¹⁶).

In September 1954, the confrontation in an open war between the Imam and the Sultan, and the return of armed conflict again became a matter of time and waiting for a justification for its launch. The time did not last, as the justification came at the hands of the Sultan's Interior Minister. "Muhammad bin Ahmed" who had officially visited the tribes of Ja'lan, the Dera', and the Wahiba tribes, and he started offering them gifts and financial gifts, hoping to win them alongside the Sultan's forces in case they needed to engage the Imam's forces to deter them from threatening their English allies and their companies in the Duqm region, and when these tribes, especially the shields, announced their readiness to protect the Sultan's allies, and the entry of new foreign experts into the region in mid-October 1954 AD, under the pretext that they are geological experts who came to fulfill their companies' commitment to their agreement with the Sultan, where the level of challenge for the Imam has reached a point where he can not wait with him, therefore, without warning, he rose and started with a confident tone of himself warning the tribes that declared their standing with non-Muslims and listening to the will of the British Consul who represented colonialism, and he announced that he would attack families and tribes, enter the city of Ibri, the business center of the Dera'a tribes, and destroy them, and destroy their villages, and that Naam would enter the headquarters of their leader, Ali bin Hilal (¹⁷). At a time when the Sultan and his Minister of Interior relied on the power of the tribes to respond to the power of the tribes to repel any possible attack by the Imam, the Imam and his supporters they consider their war a jihad for the sake of Allah, and therefore, as soon as the Interior Minister of the Sultan ended his secret visit to the tribes on October 15 / 1954, until the Imam personally led an attack on a city, and he and those with him were able to occupy it within a short period (¹⁸). But the quick victory that was achieved forward quickly faded before the English force of Oman Square, which interfered in the Sultan's favor, barely fifteen days had passed since the front entered the city until he was able to

¹⁶ The same previous source, pp. 296-298. See also: The Omani Encyclopedia Document No. (715), the letter of Imam Ghaleb to Sultan Saeed bin Taymur in which he informs him of his election as Imam of Oman, Vol. 3, p.526. See also: Document No. (717), the letter of Sheikh Saleh bin Isa bin Isa al-Harithi to the British Consul (on Imam Muhammad bin Abdullah al-Khalili), volume 3, p. 530. See also: Document No. (521) Letter of Imam Ghalib to the Ibadi Sheikhs, Volume 3, p. 542.

¹⁷ The Encyclopedia (previous reference), Document No. (653) (The Situation in Muscat, Musnad, and Oman, Volume 3, p. 353. Also see: Document No. (654), dated October 24, 1954, Vol. 3, p. 355. See also: Document No. (655), Vol. 3, pp. 358--360.

¹⁸ Saeed bin Muhammad Al-Harthy, Wet pearl (previous reference), pp. 301-303.

retreat from it and withdraw from it⁽¹⁹⁾.

Although the attack gave a lesson to the British Consul, the strongest lesson was directed at Sultan Saeed, as the participation of the British forces in clashing with the Omanis and interfering in their internal affairs led to the increasing voices of Omanis and their opposition to the Sultan for allowing their unilateral armed intervention against Omani citizens, on the other hand, this intervention provoked regional parties known to be hostile to the Sultan and to have ambitions in the Omani lands, this party was represented in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which promised the Messenger of the Imam his brother Sheikh Talib bin Ali during his visit to them in cooperation with the Imam, and its announcement, immediately after the British force participated in removing the Imam from Ibri, its willingness to finance the establishment of a regular army for the Imam that would protect the interior region, and it ensured that it would provide it with all the necessary weapons and money needed, here, Sultan Said bin Taymur felt that he had been involved with the internal tribes, although he had always been unwilling to enter into a new open war with them, losing his dream of unifying Oman and consecrate the division of Oman⁽²⁰⁾. But the quick victory that the Imam achieved was quick and faded before the British force of Oman Square located on the coast of Oman, which intervened in the interest of the Sultan and protected the Dura tribe and their allies, And forcing the forces of the Imam to retreat and withdraw from the city of Ibri⁽²¹⁾. The Imam could have invested in changing the Omani reality, had the Imam not been hesitant and weak in taking the appropriate decision at the appointed time, his delay would have resulted in the attack on the Sultan's forces and his allies, To grant the Sultan the opportunity to initiate a sudden attack on the city of Nizwa, the capital of the imam, to storm it and occupy the city of Tanuf, from which the front revolution was launched on May 15, 1913⁽²²⁾.

The defeat of the Imam in Nizwa was a personal shock to the Imam, who was frustrated and disappointed because he felt responsible for the defeat. Therefore, he raised the issue of his dismissal from the position of the Imamate, but his supporters, who felt that they could return again to defend their principles, rejected the request of the Imam Al-Hanaiyin⁽²³⁾. The text of the resignation of the Imam Ghaleb after a delegate recounted: " Know that I am weak in knowledge, little money, little experience, weak politics, and you are the pillars of the state and its leaders." and you have come now and I am clear to you of this deed of yours, and what they have told me, so choose whatever you want for your nation. I am as one of you, and I have to serve Muslims as one of them, and I pledge to you not to go to my country and pledge allegiance to whomever you choose; this is what I have brought you together, and peace be upon you."⁽²⁴⁾ but the pillars of his state, the scholars, and the judges all present chose his deputy, Sheikh Muhammad al-Raqqashi, to which he responded by saying that this matter is not for you, but rather to the Muslims, and Muslims excuse you, so if you are betraying one of us or an order without it, so save the matter of Sharia, and it is not permissible for you to violate the affairs of the Muslims according to Sharia, Imam Ghaleb said: "If you do not excuse me, then the pledge of allegiance must be

¹⁹ The Omani Encyclopedia: Document No. (654) (Former reference), Volume 3, pp. 514-555.

²⁰ The Omani Encyclopedia: Document No. (710), Telegram of the British Commonwealth Relations Office to the High Commissioner on (Occupying the City of Nizwa) October 24, 1954, Vol. 3, p. 404.

²¹ The Omani Encyclopedia: Secret British Documents, Document No. (654) Vol. 3, pp. 514-515.

²² The Omani Encyclopedia: Document No. (710), Telegram of the British Commonwealth Relations Office to the British High Commissioner on (Occupying the city of Nizwa, the capital of the Imam), dated January 13, 1954 CE, vol. 3, p. 404, p. 490.

²³ See: Document No. (654), Telegram of the British Political Consul in Muscat to the Political Agent in the Gulf, October 24, 1954, Vol. 3, p. 355.

²⁴ Saeed bin Muhammad Al-Harthy, Wet pearl (previous reference), p. 38.

renewed. When the dialogue between them prolonged, Sheikh Saleh bin Ahmed Al-Harithi stood and pledged allegiance and gave the covenant of God and His covenant as requested by the Imam, then the leaders and scholars follow up, respectively ⁽²⁵⁾. As a result, the imam was carried to his country (Dar Seit) near Nizwa to live in semi-isolation in the house of one of his relatives from the elders of the Al Hinai tribe ⁽²⁶⁾. When many of the imam supporters and their elders went out to Saudi Arabia, other supporters flocked to come to it, and its rulers honor them and secure them with supplies until the Omani community increased there. Their voices rose, and some of them set off to the Arab countries carrying the Omani issue and asking its rulers to return their state, and in return Sultan Saeed was sending an invitation from Dhofar to the political consul, senior members of the State Council in Muscat, employees and heads of tribes supporting him to come to Nizwa to celebrate the victory over the Imam on the 11th January 1955, and on that day Sultan Said addressed the audience, saying: " I love justice, closeness to Oman, and I love scholars, and I want them to be the rulers of the command and the prohibition, and my path in that is the path of Imam al-Khalili, and that I did not mean anything but good. Praise be to God, he helped me to do that. Then the imam asked to meet him, but he refused, then Sultan Saeed returned to Muscat, and the decorations are evident in the country, so he entered, relaxing his turban between his shoulders, lowering his head in humility, while the interior remained under the guard of that and the British leaders "⁽²⁷⁾.

Oman Liberation Army 1956:

After the occupation of Nizwa December 24, 1955 AD, many thought that the issue of Imam Ghaleb bin Ali and his call had died, but a number of factors contributed to keeping his roots in the da'wa and resistance alive and burning, and among these factors: Saudi ambitions that are no longer hidden in some lands of Oman, and the strong Arab tide that began during that period extends its activity to the Arab Gulf states, because of these two contradictory factors, the Saudis received Imam Ghaleb, along with Sheikh Saleh bin Issa and a group of Omani leaders accompanying the imam, and they suggested to them to organize an army of Omanis with which they could take back their country, and that King Faisal would be responsible for spending on it and providing it with the weapons it needed ⁽²⁸⁾. And when the Imam was able to gather more than seven hundred fighters from his supporters, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia granted them a place in the Al-Jawf region of the city of Dammam to be training camps for them on the use of modern weapons ⁽²⁹⁾. As for Egypt, which was ruled by the Arab nationalist regime led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, President Abdel Nasser received Sheikh Talib bin Ali, brother of the Imam, and Sheikh Suleiman bin Hamir bin Nasser al-Nabhani, And he ordered the opening of an office for the imamate in Cairo, and after that the two Arab states, the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, supported putting the Omani issue on the agenda of the Arab League, and although many members of the League Council were never encouraged to pay attention to the Omani issue, however, it later became one of

²⁵ Previous source, Vol. 2, p. 309, p. 310.

²⁶ The same previous source, p.309.

²⁷ The Omani Encyclopedia, Document No. (714), dated January 19, 1956, volume 3, p. 496.

²⁸ Saeed bin Muhammad Al-Harthy, Wet pearl (previous reference), p. 322. See: The Omani Encyclopedia, Document No. (714) (Former reference), Volume 2, p. 496, p. 497.

²⁹ Saeed bin Muhammad Al-Harthy, Wet pearl (Former reference), p. 323. See: The Omani Encyclopedia (previous reference), Document No. (714), dated January 19, 1956 AD, Volume 3, p.523. See also: Ibrahim Shaddad (The Internal Conflict in Oman During the Twentieth Century 1913 AD - 1975 AD), Al-Awzai House Publications, Muscat, 1989 AD, p.33.

the most important permanent issues on the university's agenda ⁽³⁰⁾. In June 1956 AD, the Arab Republic of Egypt provided the Omani revolutionaries with hours to broadcast their activities on Radio Voice of Cairo, where news of their revolution was highlighted in the introductions of news bulletins, and at the end of the year 1956 AD, Radio Sawt al-Qahira announced the formation of the Oman Liberation Army in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. And opening a political and administrative office of the imam in the city of Dammam ⁽³¹⁾. After this announcement, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia began preparing conditions for the revolutionaries of the Oman Liberation Army, and increasing their readiness to enter the Omani lands in preparation for the launch of their revolution against the Sultan. For this, Saudi intelligence officers and senior political officials contacted the Omani tribes that live in the city of Al-Buraimi, including tribes Qatab, Baluch, and Bani Kalban, and Dar'a, and the tribes of Wadi al-Jizzi - They are tribes that were not a main party in the 1921 Al-Seeb agreement. Their areas are within the areas that the Saudis used to list within the borders of the areas they were looking to control them; Saudi Arabia had previously contacted the Al-Muqabil tribe, which lives in Wadi Al-Jizzi, which controls the road between Buraimi and the capital of Sultan Said, Muscat. And they agreed with its sheikhs to raise problems when needed with the Diru tribes, whose tribe controls the road between Buraimi and the inner region, likewise, they did with the Baloch, to whom Saudi Arabia allocated monthly sums of money (100 rupees) for each sheikh, and for the sheikh of the tribe (1,000 rupees) in exchange for providing services to the revolutionaries supporting the Imam Ghaleb, and it seems that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has succeeded in this field with great success, as the available information revealed that it provided other sums of money to the Wahiba tribe, amounting to (30,000 thousand) thirty thousand rupees, then it returned and raised the value of the amounts paid to the armor in Wadi Al-Jizzi (1500 rupees) for each sheikh in exchange The formation of a local force from members of their tribes to provide them with weapons, ammunition and salaries for all of its members, Provided that it is under the Saudi order, specifically by the order of the Prince of Al-Ahsa ⁽³²⁾.

In June of the same year 1955 AD, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by personal order from King Faisal, had sent 1,000 rifles and 100,000 rounds of ammunition, and an amount of 20,000 rupees to the Omani rebels and delivered them to the Al-Batinah coast, and from there it was sent to the interior region for storage until the hour of their use. The Saudis sent ammunition packed in bags full of dates, and others filled with rice, and before the revolutionaries headed to the movement, and to form the hearts of the leaders of the revolution, it paid in July of the same year (1955 AD) a value of 70,000 thousand rupees to Imam Ghaleb and 30,000 rupees to Sheikh Suleiman bin Hamir Bin Nasser al-Nabhani, and 30,000 rupees for Sheikh Saleh bin Isa al-Harithi, and these last two leaders are to prevent the transfer of their allegiance from the Imam towards the Sultan ⁽³³⁾.

Ibrahim bin Saleh Al-Harithi Movement 9 / May / 1957-14 / May / 1957:

Among the leaders returning to participate in overseeing the military operations and planning to clash with the forces of Sultan Saeed, Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salmi, a judge and supporter of the imam, who had left Oman in 1955 AD, to join the Imam, and his departure was starting in Kuwait under the pretext of joining his family. But after crossing the border, he turned to Dammam, where Imam Ghaleb was, his return was also governed, in

³⁰ The Omani Encyclopedia, Document No. (919) Report of the British Foreign Office on the Omani Problems, Date of August 1957 CE, Volume 4, page 340, p. 343.

³¹ The previous source (ibid.), P. 343.

³² Previous source, Vol. 2, p. 344.

³³ Previous source, vol. 2, p. 345, p. 346.

addition to the tasks mentioned in supervising and planning the fighting, to be an assistant to Ibrahim bin Saleh, commander-in-chief of the Oman Liberation Army in the Eastern Province ⁽³⁴⁾. On July 9, 1957 AD, Sultan Saeed learned that there was a work being planned for him with the participation of the Saudis and Imam Ghaleb, and information grew for the Sultan that Ibrahim bin Saleh led and was present in the eastern region, specifically in Tire, and that he had a trained force with weapons. Therefore, Sultan Said sent an expeditionary plane to survey the lands of Al-Sharqiyah with the aim of the force that had come with Ibrahim from the air, and in addition to that the Sultan had ordered the regular force stationed in Nizwa to move to the eastern region to help strike and eliminate the force that came from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia under the leadership of Ibrahim, in this atmosphere, Ibrahim wished to inform people that new events would take place in the Sharqiyah region, and at the same time, he wanted to send a message to the Wali of Al-Sharqiya, who had taken over the area that Ibrahim himself wanted the governor to be. By virtue of his family's leadership over the eastern region, therefore, he sent someone shooting at the governor's vehicle while he was passing through the city, and this incident was the beginning of the hostile action for which he attended ⁽³⁵⁾.

Ibrahim's initiative and his hostile movement against the governor led to the belief that he was luring the Sultan's forces to confront the front outside the city of Muscat and away from his center of rule. Therefore, the Sultan initially hesitated to allow large forces to be sent from Muscat to the Eastern Region, and to resort to negotiation with Ibrahim and deal with him with patience and to know if he was behind him big plans that were woven, in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, reaching his goals, he granted Ibrahim security over himself and requested to meet him at Al Alam Palace in Muscat ⁽³⁶⁾, and when it became clear to the Sultan that the work was directed at the governor and not against him, he exempted him and those with him. However, after leaving the Sultan's palace and instead of spending the force, Ibrahim asked her to go on May 13 to the Ibra region. Thus he swore by swearing it on the Qur'an in front of Sultan Said. From Ibra, he sent a stipulation to the Sultan for his return to Sultan Said's recognition of him as a Sheikh of the Al-Harath tribe. When the Sultan knew that Ibrahim required the Sheikh to plow, he asked his brother Tariq bin Taymour to contact Ibra residents and ask them not to receive Ibrahim bin Isa bin Saleh al-Harithi or support him to arrest him and hand him over. When Ibrahim learned of the Sultan's determination to confront him, he returned to Seeb and surrendered to the Royal Guard on June 13, 1957. He was brought on June 14 to the palace of al-Alam with five men accompanying him, and there, after he was allowed to enter and prevented his companions who were taken to prison, Tariq bin Taimur received him, and instead of meeting Sultan Said he entered through a small door that led to a dock where ships stopped to be carried to a prison Jalali near the palace ⁽³⁷⁾.

It seems that Ibrahim really wanted to draw attention to him without having in him any concept of revolution, its Sheikhs, his father, Sheikh Issa, and his grandfather, Saleh, were respected by their opponents from the sultans, but he did not prove that he had an idea to defend it, and therefore he paid the price for his recklessness for a long period of imprisonment that lasted from June 1957 until Sultan Qaboos bin Said received power, who was released in November 1970 ⁽³⁸⁾.

³⁴ The Omani Encyclopedia, Document No. (919), dated August 1987 AD, Volume 4, p. 344.

³⁵ The previous source (Nafsakh), p. 345.

³⁶ The same previous source, p. 346

³⁷ Saeed bin Muhammad Al-Harthy, Wet pearl (previous reference), p. 328.

³⁸ The Omani Encyclopedia, Document No. (991) (previous reference), p. 347, and Document No. (1005), dated 9/11/1957, Volume 4, p. 399. See also: Saeed bin Muhammad Al-Harthy, Wet pearl (previous reference), p. 322.

The movement of Talib bin Ali bin Hilal Al-Hadhi (14 June 1957 AD - August 1957):

Talib bin Ali bin Hilal Al-Hinai, brother of Imam Ghaleb, had left the country after the defeat of the Imam in Nizwa to Bahrain. From there to Saudi Arabia before leaving it to the Arab Republic of Egypt, after his meeting in Cairo with Sheikh Suleiman bin Nasser al-Nabhani, the two worked after they met with the President of the Republic, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and explained the Omani issue to him, to open an office for the imam in Cairo, which supported the Egyptian intelligence community. But he suddenly returned to Oman and appeared in the coastal region of Al-Batinah on June 14, 1957 AD, which is the same day in which the fate of the movement of Ibrahim bin Issa Al-Harithi was determined on July 12. Sheikh Suleiman bin Hamir bin Nasser al-Nabhani arrived after he was smuggled out of his house arrest from Muscat, he arrived at the headquarters of his Nabhani tribe in "Birkat Al Mozz" in Tanuf region, and upon his arrival, his in-laws set up checkpoints and Maris on the road between the city of Izki and the city of Nizwa leading to each of Fahud, Muscat and Samail, to prevent any reinforcements from the Sultan's forces. This led to the retreat of the Omani regular force and forced it to retreat from Dar Seit and Al-Ghamr and return to its headquarters in the military zone in Teams organization, On his return, he was surprised by the many casualties among his fighters and supporters who had participated as volunteers alongside them. And when the commander of this force tried to escape from the confrontations to reduce the number of casualties by changing the road and the direction to the Fahud road, he became in a more violent confrontation with the men of Suleiman bin Hamir bin Nasser, who had previously cut this road and set up barricades on it, and therefore its losses in equipment and injuries among its soldiers increased ⁽³⁹⁾.

A large number of injuries and losses in the ranks of the Sultan's force caused embarrassment to the Sultan, because the collapse of his regular forces exposed his reality to the Omanis, especially since Talib's success in this tour will give him strong support and increase the numbers that will be organized alongside him in the face of the Sultan, and in addition to all of that, the road will open again. To seek the help of the British forces, whose participation caused Oman's cards to be confused again. Therefore, the Sultan thought to seek the help of the Capital Protection Division, but he was afraid of taking the battle to the heart of the capital, and for this reason, he returned to thinking about moving the military garrisons to (Fahud) and again he found that if he took this step, so Taleb will take advantage of the vacuum that will be produced in the North and extend his activity towards the tribes of al-Dahirah and the Trucial Coast (United Arab Emirates) ⁽⁴⁰⁾.

The movement of Sheikh Talib bin Ali Sultan Saeed confused and showed his inability to resist, and made his power exposed to the front revolutionaries. They took advantage of the Sultan's hesitation, and the revolutionaries inflicted further losses in the ranks of his regular forces that were sent to besiege Bilad Sit and Ghamr. When the Sultan learned of this, he had nothing left but to ask for help from the British who were waiting for the request, so they immediately sent two divisions, the first consisting of the force of scouts that were present on the northern coasts, and the second was the strength of its soldiers from the Cameroonians. The first goal of the fighting was to dismantle the siege imposed by Talib and Suleiman bin Himyar bin Nasser on the regular military divisions of the Sultan, and despite all these forces and planning, they tried to resolve the battle in favor of the Sultan. However, they failed to reach results that would reduce the intensity of the battle or reduce its losses. Because the battle led by Talib bin Ali was tantamount to revenge for the defeat of the Imam and his removal from the imamate's capital, Nizwa, 1954 AD, and the good planning that was placed for the battle in

³⁹ Previous source (ibid.), Vol. 4, p. 347.

⁴⁰ Previous source (ibid.), Vol. 4, p. 348.

fortified castles and the abundance of weapons provided to them by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, faced with this failure, the leaders of the English teams decided to engage the air force and a missile squad to strike the rebel sites, as the planes bombed the rebel castles in Izki, Nizwa, Tnuf and Bahla, and fired missiles at the rebel bases, and airstrikes were directed at all moving cars in the areas in the hope of ending the battle and removing the rebels. Imams from Nizwa and its environs ⁽⁴¹⁾.

Sheikh Talib, his brother, the Imam, and the forces that came with him had found in Sit and Ghamr a strategic place for confrontation, especially since these areas contain four strong rock forts. Where Talib attached a large group of machine guns to prevent the advance of the Sultan's forces, and these preparations contributed to the Hebrews declaring the Imam's peace and refraining from participating in the fighting on the side of the regular royal force, and when the commander of the regular force of the Sultan tried to clash with Talib's forces and advance to storm the fortresses, despite the firepower that was used in the clash, he failed to reach his plans due to the failure of his forces to penetrate the areas that Talib and his brother, the Imam, had determined their readiness, therefore, the Sultan asked to provide him with two military divisions to help him disperse Talib's forces and create a loophole through which they could storm the fortresses. However, they failed due to a Talib expanding the field of operations and sending specialized experts from the members of the Oman Liberation Army who trained with explosives in the Imam camps in Saudi Arabia, to detonate the army trucks that might reach the Sultan's forces' rescue, and plant explosives on the main road leading to Faraq, from which military aid trucks may pass ⁽⁴²⁾.

Changing the combat strategy and the siege of the Green Mountain (August 1957 - November 1958).

In August 1957, the bombing of the Imam partisans by the British planes intensified. The fortresses in which they were fortifying were struck with missiles, but the revolutionaries' sense of the Sultan's weakness pushed them to prolong the confrontation and influence his psyche, but they needed to save their lives and reduce the losses they incur as a result of the aerial bombing of their bases, therefore, they decided to move to the mountains and start a guerrilla war that would inflict heavy losses on the ranks of the Sultan's forces, therefore; They moved to the Green Mountain, where the many trees, forests, caves and canyons could be used as fixed bases for their fighters, and upon their arrival at the Green Mountain, they built their plan to control the roads and paths leading to the mountain to facilitate their movement in and out of the mountain and to ensure supplies reach them, they also cooperated with the inhabitants in the mountain and its surroundings, namely the Rayam tribes headed by Suleiman bin Hamir bin Nasser al-Nabhani, one of the pillars of the Imam movement and its resistance. When the British who command the military forces noticed that the forces of the Imam had chosen Green Mountain as a scene for their armed operations, and that they controlled the roads leading to the mountain, they closed the main entrances to the mountain, and established military checkpoints and successive barricades to prevent movement to monitor the movements of the imams, who established themselves on the top of the mountain and around the roads leading to it, to push them to search for routes more exposed to their planes. They become easy targets to be struck by aircraft ⁽⁴³⁾. And when these English plans did not succeed in reaching their goals with the guerrilla warfare imposed by the imams as a way to carry out their counter operations, Britain was

⁴¹ Previous source (ibid.), Vol. 4, p. 348.

⁴² previous source (ibid.), P. 347.

⁴³ Saeed bin Muhammad Al-Tai, Wet pearl, p. 325.

forced to seek the help of some of its military leaders in Aden, it expanded air operations against the rebels. On January 1, planes flew extensively over the Green Mountain to monitor the rebels, with the aim of preparing a short and concise plan to eliminate the rebels and push them to surrender. And after preparing the plan required of the commander of the forces of the Arabian Peninsula, in March 1959 the aircraft launched offensive operations. But they did not succeed in reaching their goals that were set, at that time the British field commanders believed that the revolutionaries had entrenched themselves in the mountain areas, but they were surprised that the leaders of the revolutionaries were talking about a confrontation between them and the British in the name of the Sultan from Saudi Arabia, and they succeeded once again in seeking safe places in their camps in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ⁽⁴⁴⁾. The important issue that haunted the Sultan, his brother Tariq bin Taimur, and the British leaders was the issue of weapons reaching the rebels despite the siege imposed on the Green Mountain. The result of the research and the answer to the question was given by Mr. Tariq, who used to say: "The issue of arms reaching the imam is going on a road furnished with dirhams ⁽⁴⁵⁾. This means that many betrayals were taking place among the sultan's forces, whose members were falling before the power of money, which is an important matter that contributed to prolonging the confrontation, and Britain and the Royal Guard forces failed to root out a revolution. An imam led by his brother Talib with great ability, however, in practice, there is no longer a field leadership on the ground capable of causing trouble to the Sultan, and it has become incapable of bringing about any significant change in Sultan Said's policy.

Omani Revolutionary Council November 7, 1961

The impact of the operations carried out by the supporters of the Imam at home became individual operations and their effect was minimal. At the beginning of the year 1960 AD, the number of dead from the Sultan's forces and their British allies did not exceed five soldiers (5 soldiers). But the impact of the bombings they were doing in the cities left a great media resonance in the hearts of people, As the revolutionaries rushed to make adjustments to their tactics, change the rules of engagement, change the quality of targets to be more effective and leave a media impact that enables them to attract new elements that support them ⁽⁴⁶⁾.

On the basis of this new strategy, on November 9, 1960, the revolutionaries blew up the oil pipeline of the National Petroleum Corporation, and on November 10, that is, the next day, the British Middle East Bank created its Doha branch, with explosive charges made of (R) RDX, This means that the confrontation with Britain has turned into an economic war of attrition targeting its interests in the whole of the Arabian Gulf ⁽⁴⁷⁾. On February 25, 1961 AD, Britain was forced to conduct negotiations with the Imam to discuss solutions to the Omani issue and limit their activities against it, but these negotiations reached a failure, and based on this failure the Imam rebels intensified their activities inside Oman. On March 8, 1961 AD, they carried out a large explosion on board the Dutch ship Whaninga while leaving the port of Muscat towards the city of Salalah, where the Sultan resides, using explosive devices placed in the center of the goods shipped to the city (Salalah). And this bombing caused severe damage to cars and supplies that were on their way to the Sultan himself ⁽⁴⁸⁾. On

⁴⁴ The Omani Encyclopedia, Document No. (992) dated 8/4/1957 AD, Volume 4, p. 350, p. 351. See also: Document No. (993) (DT), Volume 4, p. 352, p. 353.

⁴⁵ Saeed bin Muhammad Al-Harthy, Wet pearl, p. 342.

⁴⁶ The Omani Encyclopedia, Document No. (1106), dated September 22, 1960, Volume 4, p. 846.

⁴⁷ The previous source (ibid.), P.847.

⁴⁸ The previous source (the same), Document No. (1153) (rebels and mine planting), dated June 21, 1961, vol. 5, p. 126.

April 1, 1961 AD, the revolutionaries managed to orchestrate another bombing of a British ship while it was sailing in the Arabian Sea, south of Oman, on its way to the port of Dhofar and the island of Dhofar while carrying weapons and ammunition to the British military centers located in these areas. This explosion caused huge material losses to the ship and its cargo ⁽⁴⁹⁾, on April 8, 1961 AD, the revolutionaries succeeded in setting fire to the ship (DARA) belonging to the British India Land Transport Company while it was heading to Kuwait - Doha - Dubai - Muscat - Karachi ⁽⁵⁰⁾. On April 13 and 14, 1961, the revolutionaries were able to carry out explosions simultaneously with the date of discussion of the Omani issue in the United Nations General Assembly ⁽⁵¹⁾. On May 29, 1961 AD, the revolutionaries succeeded in carrying out a series of explosions with booby traps in mail parcels sent to Muscat in bags via Muharraq Airport in Bahrain ⁽⁵²⁾.

On November 1, the Imamists found that, faced with the escalation of operations carried out by their supporters, the revolutionary movement had to be reorganized and a body should be found to assume the political and military leadership; So they agreed to establish a revolutionary council for them.

The Omani Revolutionary Council October 7, 1961:

The Omani Revolutionary Council consisted of nine (9) members from among the most famous leaders of the frontier Omani revolution, and they were chosen from among those who took up arms and the opponent of British imperialism, and all of them were those who were sentenced to death by the Sultan in absentia. As for the principles that they agreed upon at this stage, they are summarized in the continuation of armed military resistance until the evacuation of the last British soldier from Omani soil, and it was decided that the headquarters of the council would be in Cairo ⁽⁵³⁾.

Members of the Omani Revolutionary Council October 7, 1961:

- Imam Ghaleb bin Ali bin Hilal Al Hinai: Chairman of the Council.
- Prince Suleiman bin Hamir bin Nasser al-Nabhani - Governor of the Green Mountain Region: Vice President.
- Talib bin Ali bin Hilal Al-Hinai: Commander of the Resistance Forces.
- Himyar Bin Suleiman Bin Himyar: Representative of the Imam in Cairo.
- Ahmed bin Obaid Al Kaabi (Ibn Sheikh Bani Kaab): Member.
- Suleiman bin Muhammad Al-Salmi: Member.
- Faisal bin Ali Al Said (cousin of the Sultan): Member.

As for the other two, the imam preferred to remain inside Oman without mentioning their names until the official announcement of the council ⁽⁵⁴⁾.

⁴⁹ Previous source (ibid.), Vol. 5, p. 120.

⁵⁰ The previous source (ibid.), Vol. 5, p. 121, p. 122.

⁵¹ The Omani Encyclopedia, Document No. (1152) dated June 4, 1961 A.D., Volume 5, p. 125, p. 125. See also: Document No. (1159) (Confidential) (The Minutes of Oman and the United Nations), Volume 5, pg. 151.

⁵² The previous source, Document No. 1153 of June 21, Vol. 5, p. 127, p. 132

⁵³ The previous source, Document No. (1169) dated November 7, 1961 AD, (Confidential / Ministry of Foreign Affairs), volume 5, pp. 185-191.

⁵⁴ Document No. (1169) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the British Consulate in Muscat, dated November 7, 1961, volume 5, pp. 185-187.

Objectives of the Omani Revolutionary Council:

1. Withdrawal or evacuation of British forces from Oman (the interior).
2. Recognition of the right to full self-determination of the population of Oman and their right to freedom and independence.
3. The release of political detainees.
4. Establishing compensation for the people of Oman for the losses that occurred as a result of the war events.

And it was the first declaration issued by the Council after its formation - directed to the residents of Oman - explaining the lofty goals of the outbreak of the Omani revolution, and laying down the necessary plans for struggle and armed resistance inside Oman, And securing the necessary equipment for the revolution, and among the decisions taken by the council in its meeting in Cairo was the announcement of establishing representative offices for the imam in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Indonesia and New York ⁽⁵⁵⁾.

Negotiations between the Imam and the Sultan:

December 1959 - 1971:

It seems that the Imam's supporters, before their withdrawal from the Green Mountain, had asked to negotiate with the Sultan to end the reasons for the disagreement with him. However, the British government indicated to the Sultan before the start of the negotiations to resort to exploratory dialogues to know the imam's intentions and determine his demands, and that English officers take over the dialogue in place of the Sultan ⁽⁵⁶⁾.

On December 17 1959, the Sultan sent a member of the royal family, Ali bin Muhammad bin Turki, to visit the imam in Dammam. Ali bin Muhammad stayed in Dammam for five days, during which he met Imam Ghaleb and the sister of Taleb Suleiman bin Issa Al nehaey. While absent from the meeting Sheikh Saleh bin Isa, and Hamir bin Suleiman Al nehaey, due to their presence in Cairo ⁽⁵⁷⁾. During this visit the imam and his supporters presented a framework agreement consisting of five points that were sent to the Sultan. Which:

First: For the Sultan to abdicate the throne to his son Qaboos.

Second: Establishing a Higher Council of State headed by a Faisal bin Turki Al Said family member.

Third: Establishing a foreign affairs committee affiliated with the Supreme Council, consisting of six members representing Muscat and six others representing Oman (the interior). A defense committee shall also be formed with the same representation.

Fourth: For the method of government to be similar to what is in place in Libya - meaning that the (interior and coastal) regions enjoy self-rule - and unite under a central "federal" presidency.

Fifth: Fulfilling the British government to protect its interests and granting its companies priority to work in Oman in exchange for accepting its withdrawal from Oman ⁽⁵⁸⁾.

In July 1960, negotiations were renewed and continued until the end of February 1961, in the Bhamdoun area in Beirut, but they stumbled again due to the Imamate lifting the ceilings of their conditions, however, what

⁵⁵ Document No. (1169), previous source, volume 5, pp. 188-189.

⁵⁶ Document No. (1281), dated May 26, 1961, Volume 5, p. 581. See also: Document No. (1295) a summary of the exploratory discussions with the Omani revolutionaries, dated July 2, 1964, volume 5, p. 635.

⁵⁷ Document No. 1199, Negotiations between the Imam and the Sultan, dated February 4, 1960 CE, Vol. 4, p. 806.

⁵⁸ Previous source, Vol. 5, p. 807. See also Document No. (1144) (Summary of the Articles of the Omani Revolutionaries' Demands), dated January 1960 CE, Volume 5, p. 101

distinguishes these negotiations is that when it announced the failure of a session, so that the Imamate would initiate another session and announce their readiness to reduce the level of their requests, in February 1961 AD, the Imamate requested to ensure the success of the negotiations the Sultan's recognition of the Treaty of Seeb, 1920. And that it becomes the new basis for the relationship between them and the Sultan, and stipulated that, if the Sultan approves, their leaders are allowed to return to their countries and pledge to them to preserve their full religious and worldly powers as the situation was in 1955⁽⁵⁹⁾. In October 1961 AD, it was agreed to resume negotiations in Beirut, and just before Suleiman bin Hamir and the Imam delegation went, a meeting of the Imamate was held in Kuwait. A framework for the negotiations was set up, represented in one item: the announcement of the withdrawal of the British army from Oman and setting a date for this withdrawal. In the Kuwait meeting, it was agreed that if Britain was serious about withdrawing, then the move would be made to a second session in which Imam Ghalib bin Ali would discuss the return of Imam Ghalib bin Ali to Oman and fixing the date for a ceasefire, Going to establish a normal friendship with Britain without any specific privileges. On January 17, 1961, during the second session, the British government expressed its regret for not meeting these demands. This is because accepting it in this quick way from a technical point of view means the British government waives its rights in the Omani-British Agreement of 1800 AD, and that is still in effect⁽⁶⁰⁾. The Omani delegation's response to the representative of the government that it is not possible to enter into negotiations that go far from the general framework presented in their memorandum presented in the first session, And that they originally did not recognize the Omani-British agreement signed with Oman in the year (1800AD) because none of the imams, including Imam Ghaleb, did sign it, and therefore they would never recognize it, and for these reasons, it was announced that the discussions would be suspended. On the second day of suspending the discussions, Imam Ghalib sent a message to a Saudi figure telling him that the revolutionaries wanted negotiations to continue and reaching a possible settlement, and he suggested that these new negotiations be in Rome instead of Beirut⁽⁶¹⁾. And he has no objection to the start of new negotiations on February 10, 1961⁽⁶²⁾. In the same month of February 1961 AD, Imam Ghaleb bin Ali from Baghdad announced that he had rejected an offer from Britain to negotiate with the Sultan face to face with the presence of British officials as observers of these negotiations; he explained the reason for his rejection that the Sultan could not negotiate without the English, from whom he derives power⁽⁶³⁾.

In August 1961, a person named Abdullah bin Ahmed Al-Ghazali called the Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign Affairs and claimed that he represented Imam Ghalib, who had assigned him that the revolutionaries wanted to negotiate⁽⁶⁴⁾. Sultan Saeed bin Taymur responded to Imam Ghalib's demands that he was ready to agree to the return of Imam Ghaleb and his brother Talib, and revealed the possibility of securing a safe way to communicate with them and receive a messenger from them, provided that the Imam announces in writing or hands over a letter to the Minister of Internal Affairs, Ahmed bin Ibrahim, it includes his relinquishing his position (the Imam father,

⁵⁹ Document No. (1295), dated July 2, 1964, volume 5, pp. 635-363.

⁶⁰ Document No. (1028) Negotiations between Al-Ghumam and the Sultan, Volume 5, pp. 581-840. See also: Document No. (1136) Report of the British Embassy on the Beirut Negotiator, dated 1/9/1961 AD, Volume 5, pp. 80-81.

⁶¹ Document No. (1139) Suspension of Negotiations for the Report of the Bahrain Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated February 4, 1961, vol. 5, p. 87.

⁶² *Ibid.*, P. 88.

⁶³ Document No. (1140), Telegram of the British Embassy in Baghdad and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated February 2, 1961, volume 5, p. 89.

⁶⁴ Document No. (1281) Revolutionaries Negotiations, Vol. 5, p. 581.

Ali bin Hilal, and undertaking to stay in his region (Nizwa) only, And that he pledges not to leave anywhere without permission from the Sultan's government, and that he does not interfere in public affairs in any way, and that he does not conduct any contact with external parties, and if he deviates from these pledges, he will be subject to punitive action by the Sultan and the British government (⁶⁵). The Sultan's response also included that he agreed to the return of Suleiman bin Himyar, since he recognized his legitimacy when he applied for the issuance of Omani passports, and the desire of the people of the Suleiman tribe for his return, and that the Sultan would arrange for him to stay in a house in Muttrah, with regard to Sheikh Saleh bin Isa, his return is completely unacceptable, because upon his return Saleh will demand that he be the Sheikh of the Al-Harath clan, and this contradicts the Sultan's placing his trust in Sheikh Ahmed bin Muhammad al-Harithi as an elder over them, with regard to the return to the Al-Seeb agreement, the matter is not possible at all because it was imposed on his father and he did not sign or approve of it, and its effect was due to the fact that all the castles and forts at their time were in the hands of the Imamate and the sheikhs of the interior region, And that he does not see a need to open the debate, especially since the leaders and supporters of the Imamate were the ones who violated its provisions and therefore it is now finished (⁶⁶).

In November 1963, a person called "Fayez Ajaz" and believed to be a journalist working for the Al-Mashriq newspaper, claimed that he represented the Imami revolutionaries, except for Sheikh Talib, and that he had instructions from Imam Ghaleb to strive to achieve a complete settlement. And that the Imam is ready to make concessions in some points that were the subject of disagreement in the previous negotiations, and after a process of consultation between the parties interested in the matter, Fayez attended and approved in May 1964 to the British Embassy in Beirut, and he presented the issue of mediation, affirming that realistic negotiations would be supported by all revolutionaries except for Talib the brother of the Imam, but he announced that if negotiations were not accepted, they would resort completely to negotiation with Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and bias to support the Arab nationalist revolutionary tide, the British did not give importance to this offer, especially the implicit threat to join Abdel Nasser, and the nationalist idea of the English flag in advance that Abdel Nasser was supporting them and nothing new in the matter, and during the same year, Mr. Fayez returned, authorized and contacted the British embassy, but in his new call for negotiation he carried a message from the Imami revolutionaries, in which they pledged that if they were not heard, they would travel to Moscow⁶⁷. However, in the presentations Fayez presented, he permitted the conditions of the Imamate to be reduced to two conditions:

1. Conditions return to what they were in 1955.
2. Request the intervention of the British government to protect the returning rebels, if their return is approved⁶⁸.

On 23 June 1964, Fayez visited the British embassy in Beirut for a third time, carrying a message in which the Imamate proposed to conclude a separate agreement with the tribal leaders to stop the fighting before starting any negotiations, and the preparation for the return of the leaders, but the Sultan insisted that the leaders not return to Oman except according to what he had previously provided, which is a condition that they submit

⁶⁵ Document No. (1144), previous reference, volume 5, pp. 102-103.

⁶⁶ Document No. (1144), Vol. 5, p. 103.

⁶⁷ Document No. (1028), previous reference, volume 5, p. 581.

⁶⁸ Document No. (1028), previous source, volume 5, p. 584.

prior books to the Minister of Interior and request that they be allowed to return within specific controls.⁶⁹.

Because of that, on January 7, 1965, a new attempt appeared, but this time not to seek negotiation, but rather to allow the Imam to return to Oman; the Emir of Kuwait led this attempt, Sheikh Salem Al-Sabah, who consulted the British ambassador to Kuwait in providing advice to him about his desire to approach Sultan Said bin Taymour to allow Imam Ghalib, who is in Kuwait, to return to Oman, but the ambassador indicated to the Emir of the State of Kuwait not to try and go ahead with this attempt, due to the impossibility of the Sultan's approval for the return of all revolutionaries to Oman, so the attempt stopped at this point⁷⁰. On December 12, 1966, the Special Committee on the Omani Question emanating from the United Nations General Authority issued a decision: to stop all hostilities against the Omani people and to withdraw British forces from Oman, and the release of detainees, and allowing the return of political exiles abroad to their country, Oman, but Oman and its ally Britain did not comply with the implementation of the decision.⁷¹.

In light of the development of the Omani issue in the United Nations, Britain rejected the decision of the General Assembly and justified its rejection of the decision under the pretext that it is not permissible to discuss the internal affairs of countries as stipulated in Paragraph 2 of Article 7 which refers to non-interference in the internal affairs of the independent state, Britain criticized the General Assembly for basing its decisions on the claim of revolutionaries who do not recognize the Sultan in the first place, and in their opposition do not constitute the majority of the Omani people.⁷².

And after the end of the Arab-Israeli war (June 1967) and amid the Arab boycott and the suspension of oil supplies to Europe, with Oman entering the schedule of oil exports - from the Shell field in Oman - and the announcement of the start of official production in October 1967. The Sultan declared his non-compliance with the Arab boycott decision, Britain continued to justify Sultan Saeed's statement that it was in line with the interest of the Omani people and his country's need for the funds necessary for the development and bringing about the Omani revival.

In September 1968, Shell held a meeting with the British Foreign Office in London to assess the impact of the political situation in Oman on oil production and export; it ended with the result that the revolutionaries do not have sufficient potential to have any effect preventing the flow of Omani oil and that the revolutionaries are divided among themselves. The company and the British forces pledged to protect the Omani unit and set an assessment for Oman to increase the number of exploration and drilling workers for Omani oil, which has proven to be of high quality.

Following this assessment, the British Foreign Office discussed the issue of changing the regime and replacing Sultan Said bin Taimur with his son, Sultan Qaboos, who carried out the coupon the night of July 23, 1970, against his father⁷³.

After Sultan Qaboos assumed power in the Sultanate of Oman, His Majesty, despite his recent reign in the Sultanate, showed great flexibility in managing the Omani state and was able to remove many obstacles around unresolved issues, especially with regard to developing the relationship with King Faisal bin Saud, where

⁶⁹ Document No. 1291 dated June 22, 1964, Volume 5, pp. 226-628.

⁷⁰ See also: Document No. 1294 dated July 7, 1964, Volume 5, p. 632. See also: Document No. (1357) dated December 12, 1965, volume 5, p. 805.

⁷¹ Document No. (1400), dated January 17, 1966, Volume 5, p. 906.

⁷² Document No. (1400), previous source, volume 6, p. 169.

⁷³ Document No. (1421) dated July 27, 1967, Volume 5, p. 259.

the Sultan took the initiative to visit the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and to respond to King Faisal's request to accept a meeting with Imam Ghaleb and to express to him his welcome back to Oman⁷⁴.

On April 12, 1971, and at the request of King Faisal, the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States opened a channel of communication with Imam Ghalib and his brother Talib, to know their position on the new change in the Sultanate, and discussing the issue of their return to Oman, and at the same time King Faisal bin Saud asked the Secretary-General to explore Sultan Qaboos's opinion of the return of Ghaleb and Talib to their countries, and when Al-Khouli, the Secretary-General of the League, spoke with Sultan Qaboos, the Sultan replied that he welcomed their return and that he had no objection to the Imam's return, and that he would appoint him a jurist for Oman, in addition to assigning him some religious aspects to administer it, and that he had no objection to the Imam's brother's student returning to work in trade, when asked about the rest of the imamate rebel leaders, he excluded the return of Sheikh Saleh bin Isa for reasons related to his tribe, and the same is the case for Sulayman bin Hamir bin Nasser al-Nabhani⁷⁵.

Al-Khouli praised the Sultan's proposals that helped alleviate the complaints expressed by the Saudis and Kuwaitis about the Imam's staying of his supporters outside their country⁷⁶.

In June 1971, Oman sent a delegation from the Prime Minister's office in the Sultanate of Oman to Beirut to meet Imam Ghalib and his brother Talib, and the invitation was sent by Hassan Sabri al-Khuli, Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, who sent Salem al-Yafi as a representative of the League of Arab States, but Taleb's stiffness in the debate and his suggestion that Imam Ghaleb participated in the ruling contributed to the failure of the meeting. Nevertheless, the university gave another opportunity to meet on August 28, 1971, the talks took place in Beirut, but once again reached a complete dead end due to the negotiators' presentation of the issue of Imam Ghalib's participation in the government, Al-Yafi submitted his report to the Arab League, causing negotiations with Imam Ghaleb bin Ali to fail, and he asked the Arab League to put a vote on the League Council to consider accepting Oman as a member of the Arab League⁷⁷.

After Imam Ghaleb moved to Doha, Qatar, lengthy discussions were held with them moderated by the Deputy Emir of Qatar Sheikh Khalifa, who was negotiating with them on behalf of Sultan Qaboos; in these discussions, Sheikh Khalifa offered Ghaleb to accept the Sultan's offer of appointing the Mufti of Omani homes, along with other religious responsibilities. Although the Imam insisted on the title of Imam, he returned and abdicated and agreed to accept the Sultan's proposal, provided that Sheikh Saleh bin Isa and Sheikh Talib are granted positions, even if they are symbolic as governors, or the formation of a municipal committee entrusted with managing them even if it has limited powers. However, this request was shocked by Saleh's rejection and the student's refusal, and negotiations ended.⁷⁸

On December 15, 1971, Sultan Qaboos took the initiative to visit the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, so King Faisal suggested holding a meeting between the Sultan and Imam Ghalib, he asked Sultan Qaboos to send Ghalib a message of good intentions - but the Sultan refused to do so - and as a result of the Saudis' understanding of Sultan Qaboos' point of view, he sent the Media Director, Nasser Al-Bu Ali, to Imam Ghalib to invite him to

⁷⁴ Document No. (1487) dated October 16, 1868 CE, Vol. 6, p. 422. See also: Document No. (1531) (Confidential) (Coup in the Sultanate of Oman), dated July 23, 1970, Vol. 6, p. 651.

⁷⁵ Document No. (1575), dated April 3, 1971, Volume 6, p. 795.

⁷⁶ Document No. (1576), dated May 27, 1971, Volume 6, p. 797.

⁷⁷ Document No. (1578), dated 29 / August / 1971AD, p. 801.

⁷⁸ Document No. 1580, dated September 27, 1971, Volume 6, p. 508. See Document No. (1582) dated October 1, 1971, Volume 6, p. 810.

visit the Sultan, the Imam responded by saying: "Qaboos and I are guests of the Saudis", despite King Faisal's anger, he sent him an invitation and assigned Major General Mustafa Mahmoud to hold the meeting between Sultan Qaboos and the Imam, and in the meeting, Sultan Qaboos showed great wisdom when he said addressing the Imam: "His policy is to invite all Omanis to return to their country, and that he is often welcome, and he will be dealt with with grace and respect for his knowledge and position and granting him a religious title," however, the Imam's lack of tact in dealing with the Imam prompted the Sultan to end the meeting, and the reason for that was Sheikh Suleiman bin Himyar and his son Himyar, their loyalty to the Sultan, and as a result King Faisal expressed to the Sultan that the issue of the Imamate for them had ended.⁷⁹.

Conclusion

Through the information that the study was able to obtain from British and private documents about the Omani struggle for power during the study period extending between 1954 - 1971, we find that several reasons have contributed to extending the period of conflict between them for a long period, including:

1. The will of the British government to prevent the arrival of a religious fundamentalist current to power is difficult to deal with rejects its existence, and difficult to deal with.

2. The financial, logistical, and arms support provided by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the Imam's forces during the conflict period, and the provision of training bases and safe shelters for the front rebels, in addition to granting them freedom of movement inside and outside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which led to the continuation of the conflict.

3. Because of the financial, armed, and media support provided by the Arab Republic of Egypt to the revolutionaries, and the reception of the Imam's representatives by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and granting him political, administrative, and representative offices of the Imam in Cairo, the imams still believe that their issue will not die and give them confidence in their victory.

4. The Arab League's adoption of the Omani issue and its inclusion on the agenda of the League of Arab States's council. The Omani issue was discussed in the United Nations papers and pushed them to prolong the conflict.

5. The Imam and his religious and military leaders made several mistakes, including:

a. The greed that appeared among the chiefs of the tribes and some political leaders supporting the Imam, as they were racing to transfer their loyalty and shift from support for Sultan Saeed to obtain gifts and large financial aid Imam did not provide them with.

⁷⁹ Document No. 1584 dated December 17, 1971, Volume 6, pp. 815-816.

- See also: Document No. (715), the message of Imam Muhammad bin Abdullah al-Khalili to Sultan Said bin Taimur, 25 Shaban 13733 AH.
- Document No. (717), Sheikh Saleh bin Isa's letter to the British Consul in Muscat, dated 6/9/1373 AH.
- Document No. (991) dated August 1, 1957 AD, Volume 4.
- Document No. (1099) dated February 4, 1960, Volume 4.
- Document No. (1106) dated September 12, 1960, Volume 4.
- Document No. (1136) dated January 19, 1961, Volume 5.
- Document No. (1139) dated February 2, 1961, Volume 5.
- Document No. (1140) dated February 4, 1961, Volume 5.

- b. The Imam's resorting to settling outside Oman and leaving the domestic field without leadership led people to become accustomed to life without the presence of the Imam and his legal judges in the states.
- c. The two imams were freed from armed confrontations inside Oman and shifted to political action from outside Oman.
- d. The spread of bribery and rumors within Omani society led to people dispersing around the Imam and tightening his movement.
- e. The desire of Omanis to benefit from the fluctuations of countries and their sense of the joy of the upheaval of their lives based on strict religious principles.

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