

Chinese Communist Party Diplomacy and Orientations to Political Parties in African Countries

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Abstract

The new policy of the Chinese Communist Party's diplomacy has made the highest representatives of 48 African nations (The new policy of the Chinese Communist Party's diplomacy has made its highest representation in 48 African nations). This confirms its friendship with African countries. Currently, the priorities of Beijing are to seek above all to acquire investment in Africa despite the impression of novelty that characterizes the sending of Chinese diplomacy in Africa. It is a dynamic framework of continuity of an African policy of China. Indonesia's Bandung conference was offered to China from April 18th to 24th, 1955 as a platform to weave and reestablish relations with Africa. It was from Bandung that China's dream to support African countries in the struggle against imperialist colonial rule allowed reinforcement of its nascent diplomacy. State visits signal the renewal of the Communist Party's diplomacy. On the other hand, the support of the Chinese Communist Party to the liberation movement in Africa marks a momentum in its diplomacy. This major role played by Beijing helps to sit the idea from a resolutely anti-colonialist and militant third way ideological legacy. However, this new policy is not devoid of ambiguities or continuity with the traditional goals of Chinese people in the world, two of which must be recalled; the maintenance of the political regime and the attainment of a status of great power capable of raising China, at least diplomatically, to the same rank as the United States, and therefore above the other major nations.

Keywords: African countries, Chinese Communist Party, diplomacy, orientations, political parties

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I. INTRODUCTION

At a time when the Western powers seem to be moving away from the African continent or maintaining only a minimal threshold of presence, China has demonstrated its ability to assume its new role as an emerging power. Showing an impressive dynamism, she has implemented a global strategy to find new frontiers for her people and her economy. As full-fledged actor of globalization, Beijing understood the benefit it could draw from Africa by using one of the most formidable weapons of the post-Cold War era: economic power.

This power at work across the continent has not yet unveiled all its intentions. In any case, beyond the issues it continues to raise, it challenges Africa on its ability to take charge of its destiny and to consider external aid, from wherever it comes, as a supplement and not the main focus of its development. Chinese Communist Party's foreign diplomacy policy continues to be undergoing development reforms initiated by former party leaders after Mao Zedong's death (1976).

In 1979 Deng Xiaoping crafted the reform and the opening of the People's Republic of China (PRC) based on two main principles of the diplomacy of the Chinese Communist Party which stand out that is: peace and the development. In the process of growth of China as a world power, Africa is an important step for China to build its own image as a great and responsible country. The new Chinese diplomacy in Africa is based on five principles governing Chinese foreign policy first laid down in 1953 by Cabo En Li. They are: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; non-aggression; non-interference in the internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence.

In July 1992, the then president of China, Yang Shang Kun, visited Africa. During the visit the new bases of China-Africa orientation were discussed. This led to translation and recalling of the previous Chinese Foreign policy by Cabo En Li (1953). It was agreed that China supports African countries in maintaining their national sovereignty and independence, as well as in their fight against external intervention. China respects African countries in their choice of a political system and proposed path of development of their nations.

After several years, these principles remain the heart of the China - Africa relationship. This orientation of the new Chinese Communist Party diplomacy has the right to be clear. It barely denounces neocolonialism, as the Beijing Declaration from the meeting of foreign ministers of foreign trade and cooperation says. The International Day of China and African Countries of October 10th -12th, 2000 stipulated that all states have the right to equal participation in international affairs. No country or group of countries has the right to impose its will others and interfere in the internal affairs of others.

In the study of the theory of diplomacy of political parties, the Chinese academic community started late. The academic community generally believes that the factors that contribute to the formation and development of

political parties are diverse, including international political parties, national, and party political leaders. At different historical times, the reasons for the advancement of the development of political parties are also different. Sun Jian believes that in today's world, party politics exist in the vast majority of the nation-state. With the wave of democratization in the world, to promote the political party, modern politics dominated by political parties have become the political form generally accepted by the overwhelming majority of the world. It is impossible to speak of diplomacy, if there are not a certain number of political parties. Without the development of party politics at the moment, the main body of political party diplomacy will be out of the question. Zhou Yuyun analyzes the diplomacy of political parties from the point of view of the internationalization of political parties. He argues that international exchanges of political parties are growing on the one hand. The influence of party politics is within the reach of a country and becomes an integral part of international politics. On the other hand, some political parties with the same ideology and similar objectives form organizations of international, regional and transnational political parties in accordance with the purpose of consultation in order to coordinate relations. These factors form the basis of the diplomacy of political parties.

On the function and usefulness of political diplomacy, most researchers believe that the role of party diplomacy is mainly reflected in four aspects. First, the diplomacy of political parties can help lay the groundwork for state relations. Second, party diplomacy can compensate for the lack of government diplomacy. Third, the diplomacy of political parties can establish a good international image of the party and the country. Fourth, the diplomacy of political parties can promote party building.

On the status quo of the Chinese political party's diplomacy in recent years, the Chinese academic community is gradually becoming concerned about this hot topic. At present, the CCP has established various relationships with more than 600 political parties and political organizations in more than 160 countries and regions, and conducted new types of inter-party exchanges and cooperation through high-level exchanges and work level visits. Many scholars believe that, compared to other forms of diplomacy, the diplomacy of the Chinese political party has the following salient features: primary emphasis on the country's overall diplomacy; integration of the work of political parties into specific practices of state diplomacy. The second is putting the diplomacy of political parties in the party cause, and to constantly improve the external work of the party with quality and efficiency. Third, is to emphasize adherence to the principle of party-to-party exchange on the basis of four principles: transcend ideology, and promote dialogue and communication between different civilizations and ideologies. Fourth, we must pay attention to the unique role of political party diplomacy in promoting the CCP's good international image and national resilience and promoting the building of a harmonious world. Some researchers have summarized this as follows: relations with openness; the pragmatism of the connotation of relations; the equality of the principle of relations; the purpose of the unity of relations; the prospective of the effect of relationships.

The CCP's political diplomacy towards other countries and regions is currently a weak subject of academic research. However, it has had some achievements in recent years. For example, there is Wu Zhi Cheng and Wang Tian Yun "Historical Review and Reflection on the Communist Party of China of its exchange relations with Europe," Wang Cuiwen, "The Historical Exchange Process and the Chinese Communist Party's Teachings in Latin America," Zhang Rui Zhuang and Liu Feng, "Relationship Between the Chinese Communist Party and the United States." Over the Last 90 Years, "Gao Ya," Chinese Communist Party and diplomatic studies of political parties in the Arab States "and so on. However, there are few studies on the relations between the CCP and political parties in African countries. At the moment, there is only Li Liqing's book, "The history and current situation of China's exchanges with black political parties," "The current situation of political parties in black Africa and relations between Chinese political parties" and Zhong Weiyun's "Africans" and Master Fan Shiyu's thesis entitled "Diplomatic Studies of Contemporary China on African Political Parties.

In the year 2001, China adopted a more peaceful and consensual international diplomatic style to support this policy and reinforce what the Chinese authorities now define as the soft power (Ruanshili). From the late since the year 2000, China has continued to privilege its diplomacy of great (daguo) country and therefore its main political partners United States, Russia and member countries of the European Union. As a result of this relationship, China is contributing to the establishment and strengthening of its ties with its neighbor, Japan.

II. AFRICAN POLITICS OF CHINA

The new policy of the Chinese Communist Party diplomacy in Africa made the highest representatives of 48 African nations in November 2006, confirming its relations of friendship with African countries. In fact, to date, five African countries have diplomatic relationship with Taiwan. At the present moment, the priorities of Beijing are to seek above all to acquire investment in Africa. Despite the impression of novelty that has characterized the sending of Chinese diplomacy to Africa, it is important to recognize it is in a dynamic framework of continuity of an African policy of China.

Bandung in Indonesia from 18th to 24th April 1955 offered China a platform to weave and reestablish its relations with Africa. From Bandung a dream for China was born to support African countries in the struggle

against imperialist colonial rule. This allowed China to reinforce its nascent diplomacy. State visits signaled the renewal of Communist Party diplomacy.

On the other hand, the support of the Chinese Communist Party to the liberation movement in Africa marked a momentum of her diplomacy. This major role played by Beijing helped to sit the idea from a resolutely anti-colonialist and militant third way the ideological legacy. However, this new policy is not devoid of ambiguities or continuity with the traditional goals of Chinese people in the world, two of which must be recalled; the maintenance of the political regime.

III. CULTURAL DIPLOMACY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

While China awarded scholarships to students from African countries long before the soft power concept was formed in 1990, Sino-African exchanges and contacts have been considerably strengthened since the 2000s in the various fields of festivals, films, music, education, sport and tourism. The promotion of academic exchange, the Confucius Institute, the media and the dissemination of cultural products are the main tools.

The theme of the Chinese cultural emergence (WENHUA JUEQI) is supposed to contribute to the reduction of the negative image of China. Thus; programs for the promotion of Chinese culture were set up from 2006. The Chinese Minister of Culture SUN JIAZHENG, said at that time that culture constituted the third pillar of the Chinese Communist Party's diplomacy after the political Chinese economy. In the same year, the secretary of the department of the Communist Party, LI CHANGCHUN, reiterated that China must market cultural products internationally including the export of films or the development of Chinese media to foreigners.

China has signed more cultural agreements with African countries and adopted 150 plans of implementation in the field of educational cooperation. Nineteen Chinese universities have established co-operation programs with 29 African universities in 23 countries. These co-operations are in line with the Chinese discourse on mutual exchanges. During the fifth focus in July 2012, the Chinese government announced the award of 18,000 scholarships to African students.

IV. A MORE MODERATE AND CONSENSUAL DIPLOMACY

Since 2001, Beijing has adopted a more moderate and even consensual international discourse. It has developed more constructive actions and has relegated to the background its often militant denunciation of American "hegemonism". Thus, in November 2002, at the XVI Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Jiang Zemin avoids this is a first to attack "hegemonism", that is to say in the United States. Rather than continue appearing as an opposition force, cultivating the durability of its enemies. The Chinese government today seeks to be perceived as a force of proposal, helping to smooth or reduce the serious tensions across the world; favoring solutions, in his eyes, "win-win" (shuangying) and almost giving the impression that she has just no enemies. The consolidation of Hu Jintao-Jiang Zemin's power from 2004 into the presidency of the Communist Party's military commission - further heightened this seemingly de-ideologized discourse centered around Confucian-inspired concepts such as search for harmony (hexie) and union without uniformity (he erbu tong), as well as the promotion of the culture of harmony and cooperation (hehewenhua). Clearly, the quest for international harmony is now perceived by the Chinese authorities as a direct extension of the quest for social and ecological harmony within the country.

In order to mark his rise to power, Hu Jintao tried in the winter of 2003-2004 to officially adopt the idea that China was in a period of "peaceful ascent" (hepingjueqi). However, by April 2004, this formula was abandoned, replaced by the more traditional one, dating back to Deng Xiaoping's era, of "peaceful development" (heping-fazhan). The project was commendable because, as stated repeatedly abroad by Zheng Bijan, Hu Jintao's special adviser and the only official to remain authorized to use this formula. The emergence of China is of a nature to raise concerns and questions: only the guarantee that this rise will remain peaceful is likely to reassure the international community and especially the main neighbors of China. But from the outset, this concept was criticized by both moderates who felt that term "ascension" was too aggressive, and by the nationalists who, on the contrary, thought that the qualifier "peaceful" exaggeratedly bound the hands of China and forbade her, for example, to solve the Taiwan question by military means if necessary. In fact, the "peaceful development" formula has the advantage of refocusing attention on the country's internal development, and mainly its economy. Since then, the promotion of harmony has prevailed, at least in speech, on any idea of brutal ascension.

To support this policy and reinforce what the Chinese authorities now define as China's soft power (ruanshili) - an economic and cultural influence quite far removed from the concept coined by the American political scientist Joseph Nye - Beijing undertook from 2004 to set up a network of Confucius institutes around the world, cultural and linguistic centers established on the model of French alliances or Goethe Institute.

Since the beginning of the 2000s, China has continued to favor its great country diplomacy (daguo) and consequently its main political partners (United States, Russia, and European Union). However, this policy also led her to seek to improve her relations with essential neighbors, such as Japan, between 2001 and 2004, or too long ignored, as India, to count have shown a diplomatic activism all which, supported by rapid economic

expansion, has led them to become politically and commercially more present, and therefore more influential, in many parts of the world. This was tested on the occasion of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 (and illustrated by the \$ 1 billion donation to Thailand).

This new attitude has been confirmed in recent years. For example, through more frequent participation by China in peacekeeping operations, or substantial but modest (\$ 60 million) support from the United Nations. Australia, Japan or the United States, brought to the victims of the tsunami that hit Asia in December 2004. More recently, in the occasion of the third China -Africa summit held in Beijing in November 2006, the Chinese government was able to demonstrate its growing capacity to help the least developed countries, especially the black continent (including \$ 3 billion in loans and \$ 2 billion in preferential purchase credits in 2007-2009). In a whole register, the weak opposition of the Chinese authorities to the invasion and the occupation of Iraq by the American forces in the spring of 2003 were triumphed with the vigor of the Franco-German protests. On the issue of Taiwan, even if it has not demonstrated the intention to unblock the situation, Beijing no longer seems to seek to accelerate the process of reunification, striving above all to prevent a formal independence, the only guarantor (de facto) of the island's security. It is in this sense that China wants the outside world to read the "law against the secession of the nation" (in fact of Taiwan) promulgated in March 2005: if the use of "non-peaceful means" (feihepingfangshi) are inscribed on it, this will only be used if "secessionist forces" on the island realize Taiwan's secession that is if the Taipei government challenges the status quo. Undeniably, these evolutions nevertheless raise a large number of questions.

V. "MULTILATERALISM"

China's gradual integration into the global economy, which is symbolized by its ascension to the WTO in December 2001, has led Chinese authorities (in the new diplomacy) to join fully multilateral organizations and mechanisms. Since 2001, China has sought more clearly to acquire within these organizations an influential position likely to contain American power from within (APEC, ASEM Regional Forum, ambitions of Russia in its "near outside" (Organization cooperation agreement). In this regard, the launch in 2003 of a regional negotiation on the nuclear issue in North Korea revealed the true intentions of China: to set up a forum of consultation which allows him to acquire a position unavoidable in security in the Korean peninsula and eventually on the whole of its periphery. The provisional agreement of September 2005, then the more substantial one, concluded in February 2007 on the military denuclearization of the Pyongyang regime after it had, in 2006, tested a long-range missile and carried out an underground nuclear test, operations that have both failed-owe a lot to Beijing, and to his role as intermediary between Kim Jong-un and George W. Bush.

Multilateralism and border diplomacy (zhoubianwaijiao) are therefore closely linked, whether in Northeast Asia or Southeast Asia. Thus China strengthened its political, commercial, cultural and tourism relations with ASEAN, an association of countries with which it signed a partnership agreement in 2003. China's acceptance in 2002 to discuss sovereignty disputes multilaterally on the islands of the South China Sea (parcels and spratly), without modifying its own claims, undeniably favored this rapprochement. Since the end of 2004, stimulated by a bilateral trade approaching 150 billion dollars, China-ASEAN relations are moving towards the establishment of a free trade zone. In Central Asia, Beijing is also playing the role of multilateralism, agreeing to open the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to a greater number of observers (Mongolia, Pakistan, Iran and India). In order to fight more effectively against 'extremism, separatism and terrorism', China is encouraging information sharing and the organization of joint military maneuvers (initially bilateral with the Kyrgyz, then the Russians, and multilateral in 2007 with the Russians and Kazakhs).

VI. SECURING EXTERNAL ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE

At the same time, rather than seeking to regain an illusory energy and food self-sufficiency, Beijing has on the contrary endeavored to secure its growing external economic dependence through the establishment, investment and trade, of an ever-growing network. This is characterized by dense ties of cooperation with countries in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, of which the United States and the developed world as a whole are also, to varying degrees, dependent. In these regions, prolonging its pragmatic and multi-polarity great country diplomacy (daguo), China has anchored its action in a number of privileged partners - poles - chosen because of their regional weight, energy resources and mineral or both. For example, in the Middle East, China has close relations with both Saudi Arabia and Iran, which supply a large part of its oil; with Egypt, which gives it access to all of the Arab world; and with Israel, with which it has developed a military cooperation. Currently, this military co-operation worries the United States, which tries to contain it. Similarly, in black Africa, its main partners are South Africa, Nigeria, Sudan and Angola. Nigeria, Sudan and Angola supply China with hydrocarbons. In Latin America, Chinese diplomacy has primarily targeted four countries: first, Brazil, with who trade is multiform (soybean, wood, aeronautics, oil, nuclear), Argentina for its cereals, Chile for its copper, essential for the Chinese electronics industry, and Venezuela for its oil.

VII. THE NEW CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

However, this new foreign policy is not devoid of ambiguities, nor of continuity with the traditional objectives of the People's China in the world, among which two must be recalled; the maintenance of the current single party political regime and the attainment of a status of great power capable of raising China, at least diplomatically, to the same rank as the United States, and therefore above the other major nations. If the case of the African policy of Beijing is revealing of these ambiguities, the question of Taiwan, the military modernization, the China-Japan and China-America relations illustrate the difficulties of the Chinese Communist Party to integrate completely in the "concert nations."

The case of China's African policy is indicative of the ambiguities of its new foreign policy. Having received with great fanfare in Beijing the highest representatives of 48 African countries in November 2006, the Chinese government seems to have only friends on this continent. In fact, only five African states still maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan (including Burkina Faso) and today the stakes for Beijing go far beyond the issue of official recognition. Above all, seeking to acquire in Africa, through investments that are often unprofitable, direct access to the raw materials it needs (oil, gas, copper, and wood) and to develop an industrial and commercial presence, China has openly chosen to separate the economic from the political. In 2006, it had become Africa's third largest trading partner (\$ 53 billion) behind the United States and France. Putting forward the principle of "peaceful coexistence" (among the five) to which it is most attached - non-interference in internal affairs - it officially refuses to take into account the political situation of the countries with which it is building links and even more to pressure their government. Thus, it does not subject its aid to any economic or political condition. Seemingly smooth, this strategy has brought to light many contradictions in a Chinese attitude that; while promoting its own development model and its methods (which, however, have not proven themselves in China) of good governance and the fight against corruption, refuses to take into account the sometimes disastrous consequences of its African policy. China has been accused of ignoring the ills of a continent struggling to get on top of the global development agenda and helping to destroy what other partners in Africa have striven for after a long history of failures and success. Building, this policy has affected China's relations not only with the United States, but also France and the United Kingdom, whose relations with the African continent, for obvious historical reasons, have remained particularly close.

VIII. NATIONALISM AND DIPLOMACY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

This gap between the diplomacy of smiles and harmony on the one hand, and the strategy of force and intimidation on the other hand, is obviously bound to last, and no doubt to become stronger as the People's Liberation Army is modernizing and feeding the nationalist pride of the Chinese. If the partners furthest away from China are less sensitive (European Union, Africa, Latin America), Asia and the powers exercising strategic responsibilities in this part of the world (United States and to a lesser extent Australia) are particularly aware of this contradiction and the new situation that results from it. Thus, behind the diplomatic prudence that characterizes them, the ASEAN countries are for the most part supporters of the maintenance of a force American military presence in the region, and in particular in the Strait of Malacca, of a nature to balance the intrusion of the Chinese Navy. Similarly, India remains cautious about the advances of Beijing and its new balance between Islamabad and New Delhi: competing with its large northern neighbor both economically and politically, it has chosen to strengthen its strategic ties with the United States to better guard against China's regional domination. In addition, despite real progress, the border conflict in Arunachal Pradesh is still far from settled, revealing the power of nationalism beyond and beyond the Himalayas.

Despite developments since 2001, nationalism continues to weigh on Beijing's foreign policy and, in turn, on that of other Asian capitals. In this respect, the sudden tightening of Seoul to the historical kingdom of Koguryo (37 BC to 668 AD), whose capital was in present-day Manchuria, in the Han Empire, shows how much, beneath the surface of profitable co-operation, the identity passions remain strong. But it is with Japan that these passions remain the most difficult to overcome. Certainly, the willful and persistent ambiguities of a part of the Japanese political class on the responsibilities of their country in the Second World War (visits of the Prime Minister to the temple of Yasukuni where the tablets of 14 war criminals are kept, women of comfort of the Japanese Army) contribute to perpetuating anti-Japanese sentiments not only in China but also in South Korea and in part of ASEAN. Nevertheless, far more than other Asian governments, the Chinese authorities remain tempted to exploit these sentiments and put them directly at the service of specific foreign policy objectives. Thus, while the anti-Japanese mobilization that appeared in major Chinese cities in the spring of 2005 seemed in many respects spontaneous, it was directly fanned and controlled by Chinese power. Heard loudly denouncing the February 2005, US-Japan declaration that Washington and Tokyo marked their "strategic interest in a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question," Beijing allowed the street to speak up until the popular protests broke out. Anti-Japanese racism could affect the country's international reputation and thus jeopardize its own economic interests. In June 2006, taking advantage of the departure of Prime Minister Koizumi and his replacement by Abe Shinzo, yet another conservative, Hu Jintao hastened to organize, without this time the

"public opinion" Chinese expression of the least objection.

In a way, the authoritarian nature of the regime is likely to reassure the neighbors of China: the Chinese Communist Party is probably better armed to channel Chinese nationalism than a democratic power. Nevertheless, despite unprecedented economic interdependence (China is Japan's largest trading partner and Tokyo, with more than \$ 240 billion in trade in 2006, is Japan's second largest trading partner Beijing, behind Washington), China-Japan relations are likely to remain difficult and politically unstable. Indeed, beyond the question of Taiwan, and even through this question, it is the whole problem of China-Japan strategic rivalry that is posed. To what extent can these two countries mutually recognize each other's role as major powers and therefore their responsibilities in the security of the Asia-Pacific region? If Japan cannot ignore or question China's membership in the big five, China is still far from accepting the same status for its hereditary enemy, especially at the UN, despite the major financial contribution made by Tokyo not only to international organizations but also to the economic and human development of Asia.

IX. THE DIPLOMATIC PRINCIPLES OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

The cornerstone of the new Chinese diplomacy in Africa appears as a replica of the five principles governing Chinese foreign policy first articulated in 1953 by Chou En-Lai They are:

1. Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity;
2. Mutual non-aggression;
3. Non-interference in internal affairs;
4. Equality and mutual benefits;
5. Peaceful coexistence.

In July 1992, the African visit of Chinese President Yang Shang Kun, during which the new China-Africa orientations were exposed, concluded in terms reminiscent of the 1953. En-Lai cabbage trip: "China supports African countries in the maintenance of their national sovereignty and independence, as well as in their fight against foreign intervention ... China respects the African countries in their choice of a political system and a path of development peculiar to their national conditions."

After several decades, these principles remain the basis of Sino-African relations and assert themselves in the eyes of the Beijing authorities as continuity. In 2006, the present Hu Jintao reaffirmed China's position by insisting that "the treatment of equals is the sure guarantee for strengthening mutual confidence between China and Africa. We attach great importance to everyone's concerns." In the Chinese diplomatic vision, coercion and the application of sanctions are less effective than permanent bilateral contact. In addition, coercion is often a source of conflict, hence the imperative need to promote absolute neutrality in the domestic affairs of partner countries.

X. DEFINING A NEW PARTNERSHIP FRAMEWORK

This orientation of the new Chinese diplomacy has at least merit to be clear. On the one hand, it barely denounces neocolonialism. As mentioned in the Beijing Declaration of the meeting of Foreign Ministers, Foreign Trade and International Cooperation of China and African Countries held from 10 to 12 October 2000, "All States have the right to participate, on the basis of equal footing in international affairs. No country or group of countries has the right to impose its will on others, to interfere in the internal affairs of others under any pretext, or to unilaterally impose coercive economic measures on them." On the other hand, it announces the advent of a new era of proclamation and recognition of an Africa of great interest and trust whose relations with the rest of the world must be stripped of all forms of conditionality.

Thus, the African return to Beijing is greatly facilitated by the ability of its diplomacy to re-evaluate its historical roots in the continent and especially to recycle its founding principles to adapt to its new missions. To the old colonial powers, which are struggling to emerge from neo-colonialism, Beijing opposes historical legitimacy based on militancy and solidarity. China seems to pave the way for its offensive by a constant appreciation of the past and an exaltation of the Sino-African future. A cornerstone of Chinese activism and influence in the 1970s, China's new diplomacy is now promoting this "win-win" space for development between Africa and China.

XI. THE DEMONSTRATION OF THE AFRICAN POLICY OF CHINA

China's new African policy is part of a coherent approach that ties the country's internal development needs to its capacity to secure in a sustainable way the means necessary for its growth. Among these, oil occupies a preponderant place. China's affirmation strategy as a "strong state" presupposes that the country is freed from all forms of constraints imposed by other competing powers that are likely to hinder its independence, and consequently, development.

Aware of its high energy vulnerability since becoming a major importer of oil, China has turned to the African continent for three major reasons: guarantee in a sustainable way the supply of raw materials, mainly

energy, essential to the strong growth of the country; have an undemanding market for its emerging multinationals; and expand its influence in the world, especially in international fora, thanks to the diplomatic support of African countries. To achieve these goals, the architects of China's African policy have prepared to meet the political, economic, socio-cultural and even military challenges that lie ahead in the Sino-African strategic partnership.

XII. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POLITICAL STRUCTURES

Beijing's return to Africa is characterized by the desire to compensate for the weakness of its political influence on the continent by a series of measures likely to raise its flag. Aware of the need for forums shaped by Franco-African summits or periodic meetings of the Commonwealth, Beijing launched a diplomatic cycle articulated around a greater visibility of its leaders on the continent, the creation of spaces for political dialogue convened by the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FCSA) and the institutionalization of annual meetings at the highest summit.

XIII. THE PARTY VISITS

Since identifying Africa as a strategic partner, China seeks to ensure political visibility to match its ambitions. If in the 1980s, the Chinese leaders' stays were mainly motivated by diplomatic lobbying around the Taiwan issue, the current visits are directed towards countries with high political and especially economic potential.

It was from 1995 that the ballet of Chinese visits took their real flights. Prime Minister Li Pong, qiao Shi, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, the 3 Vice Prime Ministers, Zhu Rongji, Qian Qichen and Li Lanqin, stayed in Africa. In May 1996 Jiang Zemin, President of the PRC and Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) made an official visit to six African countries. This strong gesture towards the continent marked the starting point of a new definition of Chinese policy in Africa. It is from the rostrum of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa that President Zemin addressed the baptismal fronts of the South African strategic partnership in his address entitled "For a new monumental work in the Annals of Sino-African Friendship."

Since taking office in 2003, President Hu Jintao had been showing signs of interest in the continent. After his African visit in January 2004 to Egypt, Gabon and Algeria, the Chinese president visited Morocco, Nigeria and Kenya in April 2006. This visit followed the visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing to Africa to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Africa. In short, 2006 marked Africa's year in China, to the point that President Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao and Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing alone preached the good word in fifteen years. African countries thus reinforce the interest and seriousness that Beijing intends to inject into these new Sino-African relations. To beat the heat while it's still hot, President Jintao started a new tour of ten countries in January-February 2007. The order of Chinese diplomacy is on the scale of Beijing's ambition to formalize its exchanges with the continent through viable structures.

XIV. THE FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA CO-OPERATION

To provide a framework for sustainable expression of the new partnership, Beijing quickly realized that the cooperation and political spin-offs of the various tours of its leaders needed a formal forum to emerge. Thus, from 10th to 12th October 2000, the first conference of the FCSA brought together 45 African countries, numerous international and regional organizations, as well as representatives of the private sector. This first initiative brought together, in addition to the Secretary General of the OAU, four African Heads of State (from Egypt, Zambia, Togo and Tanzania). The meeting was sanctioned by two important texts: the Beijing Declaration and the Program for China-Africa Cooperation. It was also marked by a strong gesture that did not fail to arouse the interest of heads of state that had not made the trip. In fact, Beijing cancelled part of the debt of African countries to the tune of 10 billion dollars. Three years later, it was the turn of Addis Ababa to host the second FSCF from 25th to 26th November 2003. In addition to a greater participation of African Heads of State, Beijing succeeded in getting the need to institutionalize this type of meeting acknowledged. A 2004-2006 action plan was adopted pending the 2006 Mass, which saw China reap the benefits of the painstaking work of its diplomacy.

Forty-eight African countries including forty-one heads of state and government attended the third session of the ASCF from 4 to 5 November 2006. Coinciding with the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations with Africa (Nasser's Egypt had established diplomatic relations in 1956 with the PRC), this summit marks the apotheosis and attests to the success of the offensive launched by China towards Africa. It is the biggest Sino-African event since the proclamation of the PRC. Historically high quality by most participants, the summit is perceived as the antithesis of the Franco-African meetings or the summits of the Commonwealth.

The goal seems to have been achieved for Beijing, according to the statement made by Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika at the end of the summit: "China and Africa can, in fact, count on a new type of partnership, mutually and the consequences of colonial history and the damaging effects of paternalistic development

assistance.” The summit adopted a Beijing Declaration and a 2007-2009 Action Plan. Better China has filled its visitors with a generosity hitherto never reached.

Thus, by betting on diplomacy to make the opening of China to the world and to consolidate its chances of development, Deng Xiaoping, the craftsman of modern China, laid down the demands of China's foreign policy of Africa. His successors Zeming and Jintao realized that militant cooperation tinged with Third World ideology would give way to a pragmatic approach focused primarily on the interests of China. Realism and pragmatism seem to be the levers on which Beijing relies to implement its economic and commercial diplomacy in Africa, the lung of its power strategy.

XV. THE ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

While China's political influence in Africa is unquestionable in the light of visits by its dignitaries to the continent, the economic dimension of Chinese penetration is indicative of Beijing's ambitions. The clear indicator of this breakthrough lies in the staggering figures illustrating the growth of China-Africa trade from \$ 20 billion in the summer of 2004; China-Africa trade grew to \$ 37 billion in 2005. These figures, which are unambiguous about Beijing's economic aims, reflect a multi-faceted reality that comes in a series of targeted strategies. In the first place, "energy diplomacy", at the heart of Chinese priorities, is the subject of special treatment in the China-Africa partnership. In addition, Peking, in its long-term commercial logic, is promoting a Chinese model that challenges traditional development aid practices put in place (World Bank, IMF) and the former colonial powers. Finally, this overall strategy is accompanied by the gradual establishment on the continent of an optimal business environment for the benefit of emerging Chinese multinationals.

XVI. CONCLUSION

This brief reflection on recent developments in China's foreign policy and the Communist Party's diplomacy has highlighted the increasingly contradictory interests that this country is now trying to reconcile: its development in a peaceful environment or the return of Taiwan to the homeland; multipolar coexistence including ties with its closest neighbors (Japan, India, Russia) or the rivalry between powers for supremacy in Asia-Pacific and more particularly in East Asia; better security and more great regional influence through multilateralism or a bipolar game that raises China above the other great powers to make it almost equal to the United States and, tomorrow, the real world superpower. China might have to debate these options for a long time while trying to reconcile them. Internal constraints and globalized economic interdependence will continue to weigh more on the diplomatic choices China will make in the future as compared to international rivalries.

The internal constraints are enormous and Beijing acknowledges them and is trying more and more to exploit them to get on the road of the tactical advantages of its diplomatic partners. But at the same time, in order to stay in power, the current Chinese regime needs, to flatter the nationalism of the society it controls, and consequently to inflate its real power and influence. The risks associated with this diplomatic game steeped in principles and symbols remain important, especially around Taiwan and Japan. Paradoxically, they are less with the United States, because of the virtual impossibility for two nuclear powers to wage war against each other.

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