

Influence of Transactional Factors on Political Interests on the Performance of the Public Bureaucracy

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Abstract

The change from a centralized government system to a decentralized system has not shown better changes in the bureaucracy performance, especially public services. Failure to realize the performance of the public bureaucracy cannot be separated from the performance of government officials as implementers of government functions who must have integrity and uphold morality in carrying out their work. The poor performance of the bureaucracy is caused by the low commitment of bureaucratic officials in upholding ethics in the implementation of public services, resulting in many cases of corruption, collusion and nepotism in the government work environment. One of the factors causing this is the continued occurrence of transactional political interests in employee position/career promotions. The desire of bureaucratic officials to obtain positions in the government structure easily encourages government officials to become part of regional leadership politics, through efforts to mobilize support from lower levels of officials and the community in implementing work programs. This situation gives rise to unhealthy employee career competition, and tends to create compartmentalization among bureaucratic apparatus, which has the potential for conflict and creates less conducive conditions, and results in poor performance of the public bureaucracy.

Keywords: Transactional, public interest, performance, bureaucracy.

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INTRUDUCTION

Bureaucratic reform so far has not resulted in significant improvements in the quality of government administration and public services. The tendency is that the behavior of bureaucratic officials in providing public services is still felt to be oriented towards the interests of the authorities compared to the interests of the community. Bureaucratic officials who happen to occupy a position always play with their power to satisfy the interests of their leaders, and even always place themselves as powerful officials, and the public is obliged to serve them so that all their interests can be easily resolved. This kind of attitude and behavior is the cause of the bureaucracy's increasing orientation towards providing better services. In the context of public services which are full of cultural nuances of power, this can encourage various deviations such as corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN). Public services are often a strategic moment for bureaucratic officials to intervene with the public. People who wish to quickly resolve their affairs inevitably have to obey and comply with what bureaucratic officials want. Delays in public services are often triggered by people not following the wishes of the bureaucratic apparatus and as a result this will increase the length of time in completing their affairs (Dwiyanto, 2002).

With regional autonomy, it is hoped that it will be a solution for fundamental changes in improving government performance. The community is no longer an object of service that must follow the wishes of government officials, but also determines the form of service that should be and must be treated humanely. Regional autonomy conceptually aims to make regional government administration more efficient, transparent and accountable. The behavior of bureaucratic officials must be able to demonstrate the degree of accountability, responsiveness and efficiency in providing public services. The bureaucracy must be seen to be clearly developing a commitment to developing dialogue and building trust in the public. The implementation of accountable public service can be disrupted due a lack of public trust in the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy must be able to place the interests and satisfaction of the community in various government activities. This can be realized when the bureaucracy places the community as subjects who must be given the best possible service.

Substantial Regional Autonomy requires space and opportunity for the community to participate in government administration. It is hoped that a government system that is designed to be closer to the community (at the bottom) can encourage increased community participation, so that the aspirations and interests of the community can become a reference in formulating and establishing various regional policy programs. Programs structured in this way are usually more appropriate in fulfilling the wishes of lower society, while at the same time instilling a sense of belonging to the community. For this reason, the ability of local government officials to respond to changes and the demands of society that continues to develop is needed, as emphasized by Ryaas Rasyid (1997), that: "Increasing the quality of professionalism of bureaucrats is a must. However, the government's ability to respond to various changes and new demands that continue to grow in society can only

be maintained if its officials have a high quality of professionalism." The public's demands for public services are increasing in line with the development of the environment which demands services that are easy, not complicated and can be completed quickly. This makes it imperative for the government to always accommodate the public's demands. Ryaas Rasyid (1997) further stated that: "A professional and responsive civil service person cannot be assessed from just one aspect, but must be assessed from all aspects, in addition to his expertise and skills, his mentality also needs to be taken into account." Government professionalism is not only seen from the aspect of ability but also the mentality of serving the community. Suradinata (1996) in Waluyo (2007), added four keys to developing the professionalism of government officials, namely: (a) Improving service quality according to the ever-growing demands of society through integrated quality control programs and methods. (b) The realization of planning mechanisms and budget programs that listen more to and absorb the aspirations of the community, both as objects and as subjects in the use of development. (c) Creating a bureaucracy (if necessary by downsizing and/or restructuring) so that it is more capable of serving the community.

PNS (Civil Servants) as implementers of the bureaucracy must be able to develop a bureaucratic work culture that is transparent, clean, accountable, and can be an example for the community in providing good services. In Law Number 43 of 1999 about Personnel Principles, it provides the basis that personnel management is oriented towards efforts to create efficient civil servant figures, effectiveness and professionalism as well as the proper implementation of civil service duties, functions and obligations. However, efforts to make it happen employee professionalism has not been implemented optimally, it can be seen that many people still complain about public services, complicated work procedures, long turnaround times, expensive service costs, and discriminatory attitudes and behavior. The low performance of the bureaucracy (PNS) is due to the incompetence of some structural officials within the government. The appointment and dismissal of officials within the government are not fully guided by PP No. 13 of 2003 concerning the Appointment, Transfer and Dismissal of Civil Servants (PNS), regarding the general conditions for appointing civil servants.

Meanwhile, the selection process for bureaucratic structural positions is not based on individual qualities but rather considers transactional political interests. This condition encourages the desire of bureaucratic officials to obtain positions in the government structure easily, thus encouraging government officials to become part of the success team of the governor/regent/mayor, with the hope that when the supported candidate for governor/regent/mayor can win the regional elections, they will obtain ease in occupy positions in government structures. One form of bureaucratic involvement, through various work programs and its activities are always driven by political interests that have the potential to accumulate public support for regional head candidates, or become part of efforts to mobilize support from subordinate officials. As a result, it can give rise to unhealthy employee career competition, and tends to create compartmentalization among bureaucratic officials, which can potentially lead to conflict and foster conditions that are less conducive.

Bureaucracy is indeed very vulnerable to non-neutrality in the political process, because bureaucracy has the advantage of mobilizing the masses to win one of the candidates in the regional leadership election. For this reason, bureaucracy has become an arena for political power struggle by various political parties in winning the Pilkada. From the results of LIPI research (2005), it shows: "a number of factors encourage bureaucracy to engage in politics in regional elections. Among these are the interests of civil servants (PNS) to mobilize their careers quickly, strong patron-client relations, and the role of shadow bureaucracy." Based on Law Number 43 of 1999 concerning Amendments to Law Number 8 of 1974 concerning the Basic Principles of Civil Service, it states that: in carrying out their duties as elements of the state apparatus, civil servants should be neutral from the intervention of all groups and political parties and not be discriminatory in providing public services. Therefore, bureaucratic involvement in regional elections is very contrary to civil service law. Therefore, these violations need to be dealt with firmly with administrative and/or criminal sanctions.

Apart from that, the assignment of government officials in structural positions still ignores assessments based on the required job description and job specification. Regional leaders and regional policy makers often choose people based on the politics of retribution, or because of close family or kinship. With such a decision, it is possible to launch practices of corruption, collusion and nepotism, as well as the possibility of launching conspiracies to share projects and corrupt behavior. Such a decision attitude, of course, is very detrimental to the apparatus or other structural officials, because their rights are to be promoted and develop their careers and occupy positions in accordance with their competencies, easily hampered by a decision that has the feel of transactional politics and the personal interests of the person making the policy or decision. The broad implications for the distribution of human resources tend not to be based on a professionalism approach, but are more dominant on political income alone. This brings material and immaterial losses in government bureaucratic organizations and individual human resource elements. Another implication is that the performance of regional government organizations is increasingly ineffective due to inefficiency or mismanagement in structuring human resources for existing position formations. This ineffectiveness will create difficulties for the implementation of the vision and mission of regional government agency, while inefficiency will cause losses in the expansion of the budget to finance unprofessional human resources, loss of state money due to the incompetence of officials

in managing regional finances and will even have the potential to give rise to corrupt behavior([file:///C:/Users/ADMIN/Documents/PENGEMBANGAN KARIER PNS](file:///C:/Users/ADMIN/Documents/PENGEMBANGAN%20KARIER%20PNS)). Overall behavior, attitudes and decision actions in the placement of apparatus in positions that are less or not guided by the policies of Law no. 43 of 1999, PP No.13 of 2003 and other policies as well as job description and job principles Such specification analysis certainly makes it difficult to hope that a professional bureaucracy will be built. PP No. 101 of 2001 concerning Civil Servant Training, emphasizes that, every official who wants to occupy a position, must take part in PIM IV, III, II, I and ADUM Training first. This policy is often used by regional leaders to prepare certain officials who will be appointed to positions in their organizational work units. However, in determining the apparatus to take part in PIM training, prioritizing like and dislike, loyalty and disloyalty factors and more nuanced personal and group political interests, it will be difficult to realize right men in the right place, right men in the right time for the purpose of developing a professional bureaucracy.

Open promotion (Open Promotion) can be an alternative way or strategy to minimize transactional political interests of regional leadership, through a transparent position selection system and accountability for competence and integrity. Through a fit and proper test,

It is hoped that it can produce structural officials who have sufficient capacity, competence and integrity to fill certain positions/positions so that they can implement their duties and responsibility more effectively and efficient. Apart from that, open promotion is one way to reduce the potential for corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN) because recruitment for positions is carried out transparently, using certain indicators and carried out by parties who are neutral and competent in selecting. Openness in position promotions encourages competition for government officials to demonstrate their abilities and competencies in their positions, so that many choices are available in determining the suitability of officials, in addition to having strong intentions and motivation (motivation-driven) to occupy these positions, can also avoid co-optation. politics because every government official has the same opportunity to take part in the selection process for positions.

Literature review

Transactional political interests are increasingly entrenched in promotions in the current bureaucratic environment, especially in the selection process for structural government positions. Filling structural positions becomes a transactional arena for political interests, on the one hand for regional leaders or individual policy holders it can become a political tool or medium that can be played to perpetuate their power, and on the other hand for government employees it becomes a means to develop career positions more easily in government.

In the world of politics, transactional interests cannot be separated, namely; between economic interests and political interests. Many people are interested in getting involved in politics, not based on fighting for the interests of society (the public), but rather to gain power with the aim of achieving economic values that can make politicians prosperous. This transactional logic of interest influences the mindset of the bureaucracy to also play in the world of politics with the motive of making it easier to pursue a career in government. According to Atkinson (1958), a motive is a latent disposition that strives strongly towards a certain goal, this goal can be in the form of achievement, affinity or power. Motive is a process to achieve a certain goal, such as achievement or power. Meanwhile, Walgito in Bimo (2005) defines motive as a force within oneself that encourages action or is a driving force. Thus, motive is the power within a person that moves him to carry out an action that is directed at achieving a goal. Motive is a psychological process that occurs within a person, so motives are invisible and hidden. In the world of politics, the ideal goal is to gain power to fight for the interests of society. According to Beck and Sorauf (1994), it consists of three motives: material incentive motives, solidarity incentives, and idealism incentives (etd.ugm.ac.id/index.php?mod=download&sub..). Further explanation, as follows: First, the material incentive motive consists of three parts, namely: (a). A person participates in politics (in this case a bureaucrat) namely to seek protection (patronage). The protection referred to here is more about pursuing individual interests to obtain monetary rewards or take refuge in the government. This includes, among other things, safety and protection against physical and emotional harm. Involvement to obtain a certain position of loyalty is very necessary so that they continue to receive protection. (b). To become an elected official (elected office). The best shortcut is to get closer to the government or party authorities if you want to perpetuate power. Power and position are something that everyone desires, because with position and power, people will gain pride and profit. Because the position here must have a structure, a position is a power with the attachment of pleasure, so officials don't want to lose all of that. Position must be maintained, at any cost because position is a career achievement, it must be achieved because it determines our lives, now and in the future it is said that there are times when an agent can expect some form of material reward, especially money, as a reward for acting in a certain way. (c). To obtain a higher position (Preference). Being a public official has a very high social status. They are respected and appreciated in such a way that they are able to increase a person's status. The enjoyment of the role of having a high social status is what makes the status of a public official a dream.

Second, Solidarity Incentives (Social Incentives), namely the motive to seek a new social life from what they have had so far. Gaining high social status is what makes status as a public official a dream, apart from

gaining new networks. Identifying incentives for solidarity creates difficulties because they are non-material and can only be felt. Involvement in the organization is more important than material incentives. The assumption that emerges is that they always rely on existing friendly relations to gain a position in order to perpetuate power. Solidarity or social incentives are more about the need for appreciation, in this case everyone in society there is a need or desire for self-assessment that is stable, has a strong basis, and is usually of high quality, for self-respect or self-esteem. Includes the needs for self-esteem, self-confidence, competence, mastery, sufficiency, achievement, independence, and freedom (independence). Concerning appreciation from other people, prestige, recognition, acceptance, fame, dignity, attention, position, appreciation or good name. People who have enough self-esteem will be more confident, thus they will have more potential and be productive. On the other hand, low self-esteem will lead to feelings of low self-esteem, a sense of helplessness, even a sense of hopelessness and neurotic behavior. Freedom or independence at this level of need is the need for a sense of non-binding by things that hinder self-realization. This need cannot be Because this need will provide satisfaction, it cannot be exchanged with a pack of fried rice or some money.

Third, idealism incentives (Purposive/Issued Based Incentives), namely the desire to fight for something that is ideal. Fighting for the interests of the people is more important than personal interests. As party activists, they must have strategic management skills, including the ability to translate ideology into a vision, mission, political party platform into work programs which can then attract the interest of their potential voters because they are considered to represent and be identical to their interests. If an activist has idealistic motives then the direction of parliament moves progressively. Parliament feels increasingly meaningful to the people, who in fact as representatives of the people should fight for the interests of the people. An activist's commitment to fighting for the interests of the people is a responsibility and obligation as a citizen. But it is very regrettable that the commitment of activists to appear as community servants is very difficult to obtain. Fourth, mixed incentives (Mix Incentives), namely the mixing of several previously mentioned incentives into one another. The motive for getting involved in political activities is not single. Sometimes material incentives, solidarity incentives and purposive incentives are mixed up. In society, the political culture is still traditional, activist involvement is more due to seeking material things or awards. Meanwhile, societies with advanced political cultures are more oriented towards purposive incentives (*etd.ugm.ac.id/index.php?mod=download&sub..*).

The involvement of government officials in the Pilkada is driven by personal motives, namely to perpetuate power or maintain a position/position in government. On the one hand, the bureaucratic apparatus is a strategic element in winning the Pilkada, so that the bureaucracy becomes a struggle for political parties to become the political machine in the democratic party. Strong pressure or encouragement from political parties becomes a transactional arena for political interests, and on the other hand, a bureaucrat will receive rewards in the form of a position or position in government. Such conditions will affect the performance of the bureaucracy in providing public services. Bureaucracy as a public institution functions to run government by upholding morality and integrity in carrying out its work. Meanwhile, poor government performance is caused by the low level of employee commitment to upholding ethics in the implementation of public services, resulting in many cases of corruption, collusion and nepotism in the government work environment.

According to Rue & Byars in Edy Suandi Hamid & Sobirin Malian (2004) stated that: "performance can be defined as the achievement of results or "the degree of accomplishment" the level of organizational achievement". The level of achievement of a public organization's targets or objectives can be seen from: input indicators, outputs, outcomes, benefits and impacts. Supriatna (2000) further explained that each indicator in question is: (a) Input indicators are everything that is needed so that the implementation of activities can run to produce output. These indicators can be in the form of funds, human resources, information, policies, laws and regulations and so on; (b) Output indicators are something that is expected to be directly achieved from an activity which can be physical or non-physical; (c) Outcomes indicators are anything that reflects the functioning of the output in the medium term (direct effects); (d) A benefit indicator is something related to the final objective of implementing the activity; (e) An impact indicator is an influence that is generated, based or predetermined opinion at each indicator both positive and negative.

Another opinion, according to Dwiyanto, et al (2002), there are several indicators that are commonly used to measure the performance of public bureaucracy, namely: (1) Productivity, where the concept of productivity measures the level of efficiency and also the effectiveness of services. Productivity is not only understood as the ratio between input and output, but more broadly, namely how much public services have the expected results; (2) Service quality, namely how far the public is satisfied with services from government officials. In general, the value of community satisfaction is seen from the quality of service, which is easy and cheap; (3) Responsiveness, which shows the alignment between programs and service activities with the needs and aspirations of the community; (4) Responsibility, namely explaining whether the implementation of government activities is carried out in accordance with correct administrative principles or in accordance with organizational policies, and (5) Accountability, namely showing the government's responsibility to the community in every time it carries out various government activities. From this view, there are 2 (two) things that can be considered, namely:

first, looking at the performance of public services from the perspective of service providers, namely the bureaucratic apparatus, and second, looking at the performance of public services from the perspective of service users, namely the public. However, in understanding the performance of public bureaucracy, the two approaches should be understood synergistically.


From the above thinking, a concept was produced that transactional political interests influence the performance of public bureaucracy. For this reason, the following hypothesis is constructed regarding the relationship between variables, namely:

Ho = There is no influence between transactional political interests on the performance of public bureaucracy,

Ha = There is an influence between transactional political interests on the performance of public bureaucracy.

Figure 1

The transactional relationship between political interests and the performance of public bureaucracy



RESEARCH METHODS

This research uses a quantitative approach method to specify respondents' assessments of transactional political interests and the performance of public bureaucracy. Data was collected by distributing questionnaires to 120 randomly selected people in 6 sub-districts, Ponorogo Regency. Each sub-district was assigned 20 respondents by random sampling, consisting of: 8 employees and 12 community service users. Respondents' assessments were measured using a Likert scale with gradations from very positive to very negative, in the form of words including: a) Strongly agree with a score of 5, b) Agree with a score of 4, c) Undecided with a score of 3, d) No agree with score 2, and e) Strongly disagree with score 1. Meanwhile, the data analysis method uses a regression analysis model with processing via SPSS.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION.

Correlation Test

To test the hypothesis, a correlation test was carried out between the transactional variable political interest (VX) as the independent variable and the performance of the public bureaucracy (VY) as the dependent variable. The correlation test results are as follows:

Table. 1
 The transactional relationship of political interests on the performance of public bureaucracy

Correlations

		Transaksional Kepentingan Politik	Kinerja Birokrasi Publik
Transaksional Kepentingan Politik	Pearson Correlation	1	.834**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	120	120
Kinerja Birokrasi Publik	Pearson Correlation	.834**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	120	120

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

From the table above, the calculated correlation value between the transactional political interest variable and the public bureaucracy performance variable is 0.834 with a p value = 0.000. If compared with the value $\alpha = 0.05$, it is known that $pvalue = (0.000) < \alpha (0.05)$. Thus, the Ha hypothesis is accepted, namely that there is a correlation between transactional political interests and the performance of public bureaucracy.

Regression Test

The results of the regression calculation between the transactional variable political interest (VX) on the performance of the public bureaucracy (VY) are:

Table. 2
 The transactional influence of political interests on the performance of public bureaucracy
Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Coefficients Beta		
1	(Constant)	3,880	3,322		1,168	,245
	Transaksional Kepentingan Politik	,929	,056	,834	16,447	,000

a. Dependent Variable: Kinerja Birokrasi Publik

From the regression equation ($Y = a + bX$), it can be identified: (1) Constant value 3.880; shows that the performance of the public bureaucracy will be constant if the transactional variable of political interest is equal to zero (none), assuming that other factors remain or do not change in value. (2) The public bureaucracy performance variable which has a value of 0.929 (positive) indicates the transactional influence of political interests on the performance of the public bureaucracy. If transactional political interests increase by 1 unit, the performance of the public bureaucracy also decreases by 0.963. Thus, transactional political interests have a positive influence on the performance of public bureaucracy.

Determination Test.

The coefficient of determination (R^2) is used to measure the extent of the model's ability to explain variations in the dependent variable (Ghozali, 2006). The coefficient of determination test results are:

Table 3

Determination Test Results between transactional variables of political interest and the performance of public bureaucracy

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.834 ^a	.696	.694	4.68531

a. Predictors: (Constant), Transaksional Kepentingan Politik

The Multiple Coefficient of Determination (R^2) is 0.696 or 69.6%, which means that the performance of the public bureaucracy can be explained by transactional variables of political interest, while the remaining 30.4% is explained by other variables not explained in this research. Transactional political interests still play a role in the bureaucratic environment, this is indicated when the regional elections are approaching the Pilkada process. While we understand that the bureaucracy has strategic power in mobilizing the masses, the bureaucracy has advantages compared to other community groups, for this reason many mayoral/regent candidates involve the bureaucracy in the winning process in the regional elections. There are several bureaucratic situations that are exploited by other parties, namely: first, bureaucracy is often easily used as the personification of the State, so that it becomes easier for bureaucracy to use the name of state institutions to seduce or even intimidate the public. Second, the bureaucracy is assessed because it holds access to information in the regions, so that the bureaucracy has a large source of power among regional election candidates. Third, the bureaucracy has a variety of technical expertise which is very necessary for various kinds of daily needs, especially in the formulation and implementation of policies. Manipulating voter data to the point of inviting ghost voters is a job that is very likely to be carried out by the bureaucracy. Fourth, the existence of vested interests in the form of the interest of maintaining and improving career/position positions is the reason why some bureaucrats engage in politics in regional elections. Although the impact could 'displace' the position of independent (non-partisan) professional bureaucrats. Fifth, the strong patron-client culture still causes loyal civil servants to vigorously defend their superiors who are candidates in the regional elections.

CONCLUSION.

The main factor that triggers low bureaucratic performance is transactional factors of political interest. The tendency for bureaucratic behavior is to be more oriented towards power (leadership) compared to orientation towards the interests of society. This shows that there is a distance in the formal relationship between employees and their leaders, giving rise to a less critical attitude towards the leadership's policies because there is a fear that most employees will receive sanctions from their leaders. Such bureaucratic attitudes and behavior will affect professionalism in carrying out their duties and functions, namely low levels of innovation and creativity in efforts to take new steps to achieve work effectiveness.

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