

# The Relationship between agency theory and the theory of signaling on Voluntary Disclosure: Case study in Iran

Mohammad Ali Naseri Forough Heirany Mahmoud Moein Addin  
Department of accounting, Yazd Branch, Islamic Azad University, Yazd, Iran

## Abstract

This study investigates The Relationship between agency theory and the theory of signaling on Voluntary Disclosure . empirically the research data is collected from 70 firms in the Tehran Security Exchange (TSE) during 2009-2014. multiple regressions technique is used for examining the stated hypotheses. It is used for, two models. The first model is based on agency theory and the second model is based on signaling theory. The relationship between ratio of fixed assets, Leverage, ROE, Liquidity on the level of voluntary disclosure.. In order to examine the hypotheses, data is collected from the annual reports of the companies using official bulletins of the Tehran stock exchange, mainly, through Novin software, Tadbir Pardaz software, and stock sites such as [www.rdis.ir](http://www.rdis.ir) & [www.irbourse.com](http://www.irbourse.com). The results indicate that based on the models, ratio of fixed assets, and, Liquidity are associated significantly and positively with the level of voluntary disclosure.

**Keywords:** agency theory, signaling theory, voluntary disclosure

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Transparency and disclosure represent one of the pillars of corporate governance. Several scandals have occurred worldwide due to lack or improper corporate disclosures. Different stakeholders use corporate disclosure in their decision-making process. Disclosure is defined in the accounting literature as “informing the public by financial statements of the firm”. Disclosure is also defined as “the communication of economic information, whether financial or nonfinancial, quantitative or otherwise concerning a company’s financial position and performance” (Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Corporate disclosure falls into two broad categories: mandatory and voluntary. On one hand, mandatory disclosure consists of information disclosed in order to comply with the requirements of laws and regulations. Voluntary disclosure is the disclosure that exceeds what is recommended by law and represents a free choice from managers to disclose additional information (Meek et al, 1995). In this sense, voluntary disclosure is a choice, just like other accounting choices regarding recognition and measurement of economic transactions (for instance FIFO or LIFO for inventory). But why would managers and/or companies choose to disclose more information than required by law? Recent studies have showed that companies enjoy several benefits with increased disclosure, like for instance: lower cost of equity capital, lower cost of debt, greater market liquidity and more analyst following (Botosan, 1997). However, if companies do not disclose all the information they have, i.e. they are not fully transparent, one should presume that there are costs involved with voluntary disclosure, like for example, costs related to personnel and certification (Leuz and Wysocki, 2008) and property costs, regarding the disclosure of an information that is strategic to the company (Verrecchia, 2001). There are various objectives due to which mostly firms are interested in the voluntary disclosure of the information. It is essential for the accountants and users of the financial statements to understand that why firms voluntarily disclose information about their operations (Verrecchia, 2001). Financial managers in business firms want to have a sound disclosure policy to access the paybacks for running of business operations e-g adequate disclosure results in better relationship between business firm and audited firms. Stanga (1976) claimed that analysts have incredible effect in investment market, which build the investors’ confidence to make the investment decisions. The firm-specific characteristics are most important which are taken into account in this research. Several researchers provided the evidence that in various national studies that variety of firm-specific characteristics have a significant relationship with the level of voluntary disclosure in advance and emerging markets (Buzby, 1975). The purpose of the present study is effects of agency theory and signaling theory on the level of voluntary disclosure.

## 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Before presenting the theoretical framework of this research, we consider that it’s relevant to give the definition of voluntary disclosure because it will limit the scope of our investigation. At this level, previous studies are divided into two parts (Pourtier, 2004): Those who do not define the voluntary disclosure (for example Xiao et al. (2004) and those that present it in opposition to mandatory one (Chavent et al. 2005, Raffournier, 1995, Cooke, 1992). But these definitions are incomplete because they don’t care about the dimensions of voluntary disclosure given by Pourtier (2004) which are: The content, the chronological sequence of publications and the vector chosen for publications. Thus, in this study, voluntary disclosure consists in voluntary publications regarding their content, disclosed in a mandatory vector (the annual report) and which are made in the chronological sequence provided by law. So we are dealing with only one of the dimensions of voluntary

disclosure which is the content. Precisely we deal with two categories of the dimension "content" which are information not provided in accounting laws and information which gives more details to mandatory publications.

## 2-1.AGENCY THEORY

Basic agency paradigm was developed in the economics literature during 1960s and 1970s in order to determine the optimal amount of the risk- sharing among different individuals (Spence and Zeckhauser, 1971; Ross, 1973; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Harris and Raviv 1976, 1978; Holmstrom, 1979).

However, gradually the domain of the agency theory was extended to the management area for determining the cooperation between various people with different goals in the organization, and attainment of the goal congruency (Eisenhardt, 1989). In 1980s, agency theory was also appeared extensively in the managerial accounting realms to determine the optimal-incentive contracting among different individuals and establishing suitable accounting control mechanisms to monitor their behaviors and actions (Demski, 1980; Biaman, 1982; Namazi, 1985). It is this last function of the agency theory that will be emphasized in this study. In its primitive form, agency theory relates to situations in which one individual (called the agent) is engaged by another individual (called the principal) to act on his/her behalf based upon a designated fee schedule. Since both individuals are assumed to be utility maximizer, and motivated by pecuniary and non-pecuniary items, incentive problems may arise, particularly under the condition of uncertainty and informational asymmetry. That is, the objective function of the principal and the agent may be incompatible, and therefore, the agent may take actions which will jeopardize the principal's benefits. In addition, an agency operates under the condition of risk and uncertainty. In effect, the basic agency theory usually assumes that both individuals are risk averse. Under this circumstances, the amount and content of the produced accounting information and other information sources would become a significant issue in risk sharing and controlling the agent's actions (Namazi, 1985; Baiman, 1982, 1990). The preceding basic agency model, however, has also been extended to cases in which there are multiple agents (Holmstrom, 1979; Antle, 1982; Radner, 1981), private information (Penno, 1984), multiple period performance (Radner, 1981), and multi-objective models (Namazi, 1983). In addition, the effect of various cultures on the assumptions of the agency theory has also been investigated (Osterman, 2006; Kren and Tyson, 2009). Given the agency theory paradigm, and following Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Jensen and Meckling (1972), and Kaplan (1984), among others, a firm can be characterized as a nexuses of contractual agreements among different individuals, Mohammad Namazi(2013).

## 2-2.signaling theory

Signaling theory posits that firms with good performance tend to make voluntary disclosures more readily, as doing so is regarded as an easy means of distinguishing themselves from others in the marketplace. Hence, we conjecture that voluntary disclosure is positively related to firm performance and quality. Both Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) and Lang and Lundholm (1993) provide empirical support for this supposition.

- **Liquidity**

Liquidity represents a firm's ability to meet its short-term liabilities. Firms with greater liquidity are considered to be operating better businesses. In accordance with signaling theory, these firms are prone to disclose more information voluntarily (Cooke, 1989).<sup>2</sup> Agency theory, in contrast, suggests the opposite conclusion: to alleviate information asymmetry, firms with less liquidity are likely to release more information to investors, creditors in particular. Indeed, several studies (e.g., Wallace et al., 1994) claim that weak liquidity may prompt firms to amplify their disclosure to justify their liquidity status.

The empirical findings on the liquidity-disclosure relationship are also inconclusive. Wallace et al. (1994) document a negative relationship between liquidity and disclosure in both listed and unlisted Spanish companies, whereas Alsaeed (2006) and Barako et al. (2006) find no significant relationship in Saudi Arabia or Kenya. No previous study in China has taken liquidity into consideration. Using the current ratio as a proxy for liquidity, we conjecture that there is generally a positive relationship between the two in Chinese public companies, as stated in the following hypothesis.

- Rate of return on equity of firm (ROE )

Under the signaling theory framework, firms with strong performance and good quality have more incentives to voluntarily disclose information to distinguish themselves from under performing firms. Singhvi and Desai (1971) claim that greater profitability may induce management to supply more information, to illustrate its ability, to maximize shareholder value, and to elevate managerial compensation.

Auditor type (or rank) is popularly employed as a signal to the market. Financial reports audited by higher ranking auditors are regarded as better in quality and more credible. However, the literature provides mixed evidence in this respect. Using a relatively small dataset, Xiao et al. (2004) find a positive relationship between the Big 5 (or Big 4) auditors and internet-based voluntary disclosure in China.<sup>3</sup> However, several studies (Hossain et al., 1995; Depoers, 2000; Alsaeed, 2006) have shown that neither Big 5 (nor Big 6) auditors

nor ROE have a significant influence on management's disclosure decision. Yang Lan, Lili Wang, Xueyong Zhang (2013)

### **2-3.voluntary disclosure**

We will classify determinants of voluntary disclosure in three groups (Lang and Lundholm, 1993, Wallace et al., 1994, Camfferman and Cooke, 2002, Alsaeed, 2006). The first one is composed of the determinants related to the structure of the firm (Size of the firm, leverage, ownership concentration, board independence and firm age). The second group contain determinants related to firm's performance (we will deal here only with one determinant with is profitability). The latest group includes market related determinants (industry type and audit firm size).

- **Firm size**

The relationship between voluntary disclosure and firm size is explained essentially by the agency theory. According to Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) accounting practices and voluntary disclosures are supposed to control conflicts of interest between shareholders, creditors and managers. This conflict of interest depends on some characteristics of the firm. They explained, based on the amount of external capital and referring to the work of Jensen and Meckling (1986) and those of Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman (1981), that agency costs increase with the amount of external capital which increase with the size of the firm. This leads to an increase in the benefits of the contract connecting shareholders, creditors and managers simultaneously with the size of the firm. These benefits include financial disclosures. Disclosure's costs are also used to explain the positive association between the level of voluntary disclosure and the size of the firm (Raffournier 1995). In addition to agency theory, political costs's theory is also used. Indeed, large firms face high visibility and are subject to governmental interventions. In order to reduce these political costs, larger firms are moving towards a greater voluntary disclosure to reassure social and governmental groups (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). It is also important to say that large firms have their place within their industry or at least have managed to create and maintain their market share. So, the disclosure of favorable information about their activities is not likely to threaten their competitive advantage, which is unfortunately the case for small firms (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Ahmed and Curtis (1999) argue that large companies disclose more information due to their business portfolio which is developed enough and the presence of several owners that have different information needs. The majority of studies collected were able to prove the existence of a positive and significant relationship (to different degrees of significance) between firm size and the level of voluntary disclosure. (Raffournier, 1995 for Switzerland, Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987, for Mexico, Cooke, 1992, for Japan, and Zeghal et al. 2007 for Canada).

- **Leverage**

According to the agency theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976), a situation of information asymmetry exists between creditors and the company. Lenders have no idea about the activity of the firm, but they are convinced that greater the amount of debt is, greater will be the managerial discretion to divert resources (Ahmed and Curtis, 1999). To cope with this situation, creditors will introduce controls which costs will be borne by the firm. To reassure them and reduce these costs, managers will have to disclose more information about the firm. But for firms who propose to borrow capital, another explanation may be advanced. Indeed, firms tend to disclose more information in the annual report when they are seeking to raise capital. These disclosures are intended to lower the cost of debt. The estimated debt risk by lenders will be minimized in presence of information on the activity of the firm and especially on its continuity (Ahmed 1994). Results related to this determinant are non-conclusive (Ahmed and Curtis, 1999). Some researchers have been able to reach a positive and significant relationship (Naser et al., 2006, Barako 2007) while others have not been able to prove the existence of relationship between the level of voluntary disclosure and the level of debt (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987, Raffournier, 1995).

- **Ownership concentration**

According to Fama and Jensen (1983) when the capital of the firm is more dispersed there is more possibility to conflicts of interest between principal and agent to occur. To reduce these conflicts, some shareholders will tend to require managers to disclose more information in order to evaluate the performance of the firm (Lakhall, 2004). So it's intended that voluntary disclosure will be more important in capital diffused firms (Chau and Gary, 2002). Ho and Wong (2001) explain that for companies with highly concentrated ownership, conflict of interest is not between shareholders and managers but between majority and minority shareholders. In this situation, managers are encouraged to act against the interests of small shareholders by withholding information. Chau and Gray (2002) showed statistically, for companies of Hong Kong and Singapore, that more the capital of the firm is diffused, more it will make disclosures voluntarily.

Lakhall (2004) empirically validated the hypothesis of a positive relationship between the diffusion of ownership and disclosure of earnings forecasts. But, Raffournier (1995) and Naser et al. (2006) could not prove the existence of a positive relationship between the dispersion of capital and the level of voluntary disclosure.

- **Board independence**

The agency theory states that the presence of increasingly high external directors on the board helps to control and limit the opportunism of managers thanks to their competence, independence and objectivity necessary for the function of control (Ho and Wong, 2001). Indeed, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the presence of more outside directors (non-executive) makes the board more effective so the company will have to disclose more. In the same vein, Forcker (1992) showed that a high percentage of non-executive directors on the board increase the control of the quality of financial disclosures and reduced profits from withholding information. Ho and Wong (2001), Zeghal et al. (2007) and Lakhali (2004) were unable to validate their hypotheses of a positive relationship between the degree of independence of the board and the level of voluntary disclosure. Arcay and Vasquez (2005), on a sample of Spanish companies, have been able to prove empirically that the independence of the Board and subsequently the adoption of good governance rules promote voluntary disclosure. Contrary to this, the results of Eng and Mak (2003) who worked on a sample of companies listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange, showed the presence of a negative relationship between the degree of independence of the Board and the level of voluntary disclosure. They explain their results by the fact that the presence of a fairly high percentage of outside directors will act as a substitute for other governance mechanism namely the voluntary disclosure.

- **Age of the firm**

Studies of the relationship between voluntary disclosure and firm age are not multiple and rely very largely on logical reason. Courtis (2004), in his study of the determinants of intentional release of non-clear and not understandable information by firms, explains that a senior company have necessarily acquired habits of disclosure through the development of an information system and sophisticated communication strategies in addition to employing specialized staff for the preparation of annual reports which pushes them to publish clear, comprehensible and more detailed reports than younger firms. Akhtaruddin (2005) in his study of the determinants of voluntary disclosure in Bangladesh, argues that older firms are more experienced and are therefore more likely to include more information in their annual reports to improve their image and reputation on the market. In addition to this logical argument based on the experience of the firm, we believe that the theory of competitive advantage can be invoked to argue the relationship that may exist between this determinant (age of the firm) and voluntary disclosure. Indeed, an old company has certainly positioned itself in the market and within its industry by acquiring a competitive advantage. Therefore, aged firms are not afraid of the reactions of their competitors consequently to their publications because they were able over time to anticipate and knew how to face them. We can say that these firms have acquired a competitive advantage even at the informational level. Few studies have investigated this determinant. The age of the firm was quoted by Camferman and Cooke (2002) as a new variable to consider in order enriching the literature on the determinants of voluntary disclosure.

Akhtaruddin (2005) investigated the relation between the age of the firm and its level of voluntary disclosure. He has not been able to establish statistically a positive association between the level of voluntary disclosure and the age of the firm. Alsaeed (2006) studied the impact of the age of Saudi firms on their level of voluntary disclosure and has been able to prove a positive and significant association between these two variables. Ansha (1998) also obtained a positive and significant relationship at 5%.

- **Performance- related determinants**

Companies that are conducting or achieve a high degree of profitability will try to disclose more voluntarily to report it to the market and reduce the information asymmetry (Eccles et al., 2001). Singhvi and Desai (1971) argue that an important profitability motivates managers to disclose more information in order to increase the confidence of investors who will be able to increase managers' market compensation. The relationship between the degree of profitability and the level of voluntary disclosure has been widely studied. But the results are far from conclusive. Indeed, some authors have led to a positive relationship between the level of profitability of the firm and the level of voluntary disclosure. We can mention at this level Lakhali (2004) who was interested in the French context and who confirmed the hypothesis that firms that have a higher degree of profitability will tend to disclose more about their expected results. Similarly, Chavent et al. (2005) demonstrated empirically that the greater the degree of profitability is greater the voluntary disclosure on provision will be for French firms. On the other hand there are those who obtained statistically no relationship between the degree of profitability of the firm and the level of voluntary disclosure. We can mention at this level Raffournier (1995) for the case of Switzerland and Ahmed and Courtis (1999) for the meta-analysis.

There are studies, despite having made the assumption of a positive correlation between the degree of profitability of the firm and the level of voluntary disclosure, their statistical results showed a negative relationship. We can mention Camferman and Cooke (2002), Balkaoui and Kahl (1978) and Wallace and Naser (1995).

- **The size of the audit firm**

Raffournier (1995) argues that auditors in general play an important role in the definition of financial communication policy for their customers. Large audit firms encourage companies to disclose audited additional



information and be more transparent. Against by, the smaller firms do not influence their customers but try to align their needs for fear of losing them by forcing them to publish more information (Alsaeed, 2006). Big audit firms and internationally renowned ones are found to have a positive influence on levels of disclosure of their customers. But the empirical results are inconclusive at this level. Camfferman and Cooke (2002) and Nasser et al. (2002) found a positive and significant relationship between the size of the audit firm and the level of voluntary disclosure. Raffournier (1995) support this positive relationship only when he rejected the variable firm size suggesting that this latter variable captured the effect of the variable size of the audit firm. Ahmed and Courtis (1999), Ansah (1998) and Alsaeed (2006) led to the absence of relationship between firm size and the level of voluntary disclosure. Wallace and Naser (1995), meanwhile, showed the presence of a negative relationship between the size of the audit firm and the extent of disclosure level.

- **The type of industry**

Some characteristics specific to an industry such as the degree of competition within the industry, product differentiation, the industry's structure (monopoly or oligopoly) and growth can give rise to differences in the policies of communications. (Leventis and Weetman, 2004). Cooke (1992) argues that the manufacturing sector is exposed on the international level, thereby causing an effect on disclosure practices in this sector. Zeghal et al. (2007) suggest several reasons that lead some firms in a sector to disclose more than others belonging to another one. First, they argue that proprietary costs vary by industry due to the differences in the levels of competitiveness, the type of private information and hazard due to entry of new firms in the sector. Second, and based on the theory of signals, they explain that within the same sector, companies are required to align with each other about their disclosure practices because any deviation will be considered as bad news by the market. Several previous studies used the theory of political costs to highlight the influence of the industry type, to which the company belongs on its level of disclosure. Raffournier (1995) has not been able to confirm the relationship between the type of industry and the level of voluntary disclosure. But Ho and Wong (2001) and Cooke (1992) showed that manufacturing firms voluntarily disclose more than others belonging to other sectors. Zeghal et al (2007) argue that companies belonging to the sector of biotechnology industries disclose more about their research and development activities. Lakhali (2004) also argues that firms in the high technology sector disclose more about earnings forecasts. She adds that firms belonging to sectors subject to significant price volatility do too. Meriem Jouirou, Mohamed Bechir Chenguel, (2014).

### **3-RESEARCH HYPOTHESES**

This section develops hypotheses that are subjected to statistical testing. These hypotheses are developed with reference to two well-known theories, agency theory, and signaling theory, which are briefly reviewed here in the context of voluntary disclosure. This review and discussion provide the foundation and justification for the explanatory variables extracted and considered in our hypothesis development.

Hypotheses of this study are as follows:

#### **The first group of hypotheses:**

H<sub>1</sub>: There is a significant relationship between voluntary disclosure and leverage.

H<sub>2</sub>: There is a significant relationship between voluntary disclosure and fixed assets.

#### **The second group of hypotheses:**

H<sub>1</sub>: There is a significant relationship between voluntary disclosure and ROE.

H<sub>2</sub>: There is a significant relationship between voluntary disclosure and Liquidity.

### **4-VARIABLES DEFINITIONS**

#### **4-1. Independent variable:**

##### **Signaling theory variables**

- Liquidity: It is the ratio of current assets to liabilities
- ROE: It is the ratio of net income to equity

##### **Agency theory variables**

- Leverage: It is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets
- ratio of fixed assets: It is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets

#### **4-2. dependent variables**

Note that in this study we want to study signaling theory and agency theory on voluntary disclosure so the variable of voluntary disclosure is as the dependent variable. As was stated in the study to quantify disclosure variable is used from the list of points disclosure and transparency of companies Tehran Stock Exchange

These Variables are summarized in the table (1).

**Table( 1):Description of the variables**

Names of the Variables	Proxies	Calculations
$DSCORE_{it}$	Disclosure of firm i in period t	The list of points disclosure and transparency of companies Tehran Stock Exchange
$LMV_{it}$	Financial leverage of firm i in period t	The ratio of total liabilities to total assets
$FA/A_{it}$	Fixed assets of firm i in period t	The ratio of fixed assets to total assets
$Liquidity_{it}$	Liquidity of firm i in period t	The ratio of current assets to liabilities
$ROE_{it}$	Rate of return on equity of firm i in period t	The ratio of net income to quity

### 5-METHODS OF DATA ANALYSIS

In this study, the multiple regressions are used for data analysis. Initial data was inserted in Excel spreadsheet and SPSS software was applied to analyze the data statistically. Also Rahavard Novin software, Tadbir Pardaz software, stock organization library and stock sites such as www.rdis.ir & www.irbourse.com were used.

### 6-RESEARCH METHOD AND REGRESSION MODEL

Considering that the aim of this study was to examine the relationship between agency theory and signaling theory on the level of voluntary disclosure

First of all variables in the model study in a multiple regression model tested general form it is as follows:

$$DSCORE_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 LMV_{it} + \alpha_2 FA/A_{it} + \alpha_3 Liquidity_{it} + \alpha_4 ROE_{it} + \hat{\epsilon}$$

### 7-SAMPLE SELECTION

The sample was chosen from the firms listed on the Tehran stock exchange (TSE), from 2008 to 2013, using the following criteria:

- 1). Firms were listed in TSE during 2008 -2013
- 2). Data was available for all the years under the study.
- 3). The companies didn't have changed the fiscal year for the period studied.
- 4). Banks, Insurance and Investment firms were not considered in this study.

### 8-DATA ANALYSIS

- **Testing Results of the first group hypothesis:**

**In the Model 1:**

$$DSCORE_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 LMV_{it} + \alpha_2 FA/A_{it} + \hat{\epsilon}$$

**Table (2):Variables Entered**

Model	Variables Entered	Adjusted R Square	Durbin-Watson	Method
1	$FA/A_{it,t}$	<b>1160/</b>	<b>652/1</b>	Step wise

We entered variables into the model respectively. models were defined and finally the last model including 1 variables was defined as an optimum model for predicting the voluntary disclosure. As a result, the regression model came as the followings:

$$DSCORE_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 FA/A_{it} + \hat{\epsilon}$$

**Table (3):Excluded Variables**

model	Variable	Beta ln	t	Sig	Partial Correlation	Vif
1	$LMV_{it}$	-0.041	-1.949	0.52	-0.92	1.002

As it is seen, LMV significance level is equal to 0.52 > 0.05, therefore, this variable was not entering the model. Optimum model was model 2, which had a more determination coefficient than the previous ones

**Table (5):Coefficients of model 2**

Model4	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig	VIF
	B	Stl. Erro	Beta			
Constant	37/205	2/457		15/14	0.000	
<i>FA/Ait<sub>i,t</sub></i>	13/132	5/790	0/110	2/368	0/024	1/2

The optimal regression model was written as the following:

$$DSCORE_{it}=37/205+ 13/132FA/A_{it} + \hat{\epsilon}$$

• **The results of the first model tests**

According to the statistical results of the first group hypothesis to test the research, the first group, Of the two independent variables one variable ratio of fixed assets the company has positive and a significant impact on the voluntary disclosure. Also , as reflected in the relationship between the variables in the model can be seen, If disclosure of corporate information is evaluated based on agency theory ; Variable ratio of fixed assets the company has a direct connection with the disclosure of company ,. Thus expected to increase the proportion of fixed assets , The extent of voluntary disclosure by companies to increase. Meanwhile, based on table (6) the first group test suggests that ,one independent variable has a significant relationship with the company's disclosure (F= @. /000), which together offer a 11 % (AdjR<sup>2</sup> = 0/116) Explains the behavior of the dependent variable.

• **Testing Results of the second group hypothesis**

**In the Model 2:**

$$DSCORE_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 LIQUIDTY_{i,t} + \beta_3 ROE + \epsilon$$

**Table (4)**

Variables Entered

Model	Variables Entered	Adjusted R Square	Durbin-Watson	Method
1	<i>Liquidity<sub>it</sub></i>	<b>2610/</b>	<b>584/1</b>	Step wise

We entered variables into the model respectively. models were defined and finally the last model including 1 variables was defined as an optimum model for predicting the voluntary disclosure. As a result, the regression model came as the followings:

$$DSCORE_{it}=\beta_0+ \beta_1Liquidity_{it}+ \hat{\epsilon}$$

**Table (5):Excluded Variables**

model	Variable	Beta ln	t	Sig	Partial Correlation	VIf
1	<i>ROE<sub>it</sub></i>	-0.041	-1.949	0.52	-0.92	1.002

As it is seen ,*ROE* significance level is equal to 0.52> 0.05, therefore, this variable was not entering the model.

**Table (6):Coefficients of model 2**

Model4	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig	VIF
	B	Stl. Erro	Beta			
Constant	<b>37/783</b>	<b>2/395</b>		<b>14/525</b>	0.000	
<i>Liquidity<sub>it</sub></i>	<b>6/600</b>	<b>1/898</b>		<b>3/477</b>	<b>0/001</b>	<b>1/4</b>

The optimal regression model was written as the following:

$$DSCORE_{it}=37/783+ 6/600 Liquidity_{it} + \hat{\epsilon}$$

• **The results of the second model tests**

According to the statistical results of the second group hypothesis to test the research, Of the two independent variables one variable Liquidity has positive and a significant impact on the voluntary disclosure. Also , as reflected in the relationship between the variables in the model can be seen, If disclosure of corporate information is evaluated based on signaling theory ; Variable Liquidity company has a direct relationship with the company's disclosure , Thus expected to increase *Liquidity* , The extent of voluntary disclosure by companies to increase. Meanwhile, based on table (6) the second group test suggests that ,one independent variable has a significant relationship with the company's disclosure (F= @. /000), which together offer a 26% (AdjR<sup>2</sup> = .261) Explains the behavior of the dependent variable..

## 9-Conclusion

In this study, the effect of agency theory and signaling theory has been assessed on the level of voluntary disclosure of listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. In this regard, two models were reviewed, the relationship between ratio of fixed assets, Leverage, ROE, Liquidity on the level of voluntary disclosure.

According to the results of statistical models to test the research, the first model, the ratio of fixed assets was extremely positive and significant, while Leverage was negative and significant. Thus, it can be claimed that the increase in the ratio of fixed assets would increase the voluntary disclosure.

In the second model, Liquidity of company was positive and significant. So when disclosure of corporate information is evaluated based on signaling theory; it confirms this with the increase in Liquidity, the voluntary disclosure will increase.

We find evidence that differs from the findings of previous studies. For instance, Yang Lan, Lili Wang, Xueyong Zhang (2013) used a sample representing more than 80% of all public companies in China, they found that firm size, leverage, assets-in-place, ROE, and ownership diffusion

are significantly associated with voluntary disclosure and that auditor type and the intermediary and legal environments are highly significantly associated with voluntary disclosure.

## REFERENCES

- Baiman, S. (1982). Agency Research In Managerial Accounting: A Survey. *Journal of Accounting Literature*, 1, 154-213.
- Botosan, C. A. (1997). Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. *Accounting Review*, 72(3), 323-349.
- Chen, J.P., Chen, C.S., Su, X. (2001). Is Accounting Information Value Relevant in the Emerging Chinese Stock Market? Companies earnings announcements. *Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation*, 10, 1-22
- Coffee, J.C. (1999). The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications. (Working Paper 144, Columbia Law School Center for Law and Economic Studies), (February), available on the Internet at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=142833100> O.A.G. Hassan et al. / *The International Journal of Accounting* 44 (2009) 79-102
- Diamond, D. & Verrecchia, E, 1991. " Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital," *Journal of Finance*, American Finance Association, vol. 46(4), pages 1325-59, September
- Hassan, O. A. G., Romilly, P., Giorgioni, G. & Power, D. (2009). The value relevance of disclosure: Evidence from the emerging capital market of Egypt. *International Journal of Accounting*, 44, 79- 102.
- Healy, P. M., & Palepu, K. G. (2001). Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, 31(1- ), 405-440
- Lang, M. H., Lins, K. V., & Miller, D. (2003). ADRs, analysts, and accuracy: Does cross listing in the U.S. improve a firm's information environment and increase market value? *Journal of Accounting Research*, 41(2), 17-345..
- Yang Lan, Lili Wang, Xueyong Zhang (2013). " Determinants and features of voluntary disclosure in the Chinese stock market" , *China Journal of Accounting Research*. 265-285
- Mohammad Namazi (2013). " Role of the agency theory in implementing management's control" , *Journal of Accounting and Taxation*. 38-47
- Meriem Jouirou, Mohamed Bechir Chenguel, (2014). " The determinants of voluntary disclosure in Tunisia: A study of the firms listed in the Tunisian stock exchange" , *Journal of Business and Management Research*, 4 (2014) 86-97



The IISTE is a pioneer in the Open-Access hosting service and academic event management. The aim of the firm is Accelerating Global Knowledge Sharing.

More information about the firm can be found on the homepage:

<http://www.iiste.org>

### CALL FOR JOURNAL PAPERS

There are more than 30 peer-reviewed academic journals hosted under the hosting platform.

**Prospective authors of journals can find the submission instruction on the following page:** <http://www.iiste.org/journals/> All the journals articles are available online to the readers all over the world without financial, legal, or technical barriers other than those inseparable from gaining access to the internet itself. Paper version of the journals is also available upon request of readers and authors.

### MORE RESOURCES

Book publication information: <http://www.iiste.org/book/>

Academic conference: <http://www.iiste.org/conference/upcoming-conferences-call-for-paper/>

### IISTE Knowledge Sharing Partners

EBSCO, Index Copernicus, Ulrich's Periodicals Directory, JournalTOCS, PKP Open Archives Harvester, Bielefeld Academic Search Engine, Elektronische Zeitschriftenbibliothek EZB, Open J-Gate, OCLC WorldCat, Universe Digital Library, NewJour, Google Scholar

