

Determinants of Tax Compliance Behavior in Presumptive Taxation System. The Case of Dire Dawa Administration

MOHAMMED HAMZA ALI (Principal Author)
Department of Economics, Dire Dawa University, Ethiopia
PO box 1362, Dire Dawa city, Ethiopia

SIMACHEW MULUGETA
Department of Banking & Finance, Dire Dawa University, Ethiopia
PO box 1362, Dire Dawa city, Ethiopia

Department of Banking & Finance, Dire Dawa University, Ethiopia
Dire Dawa University, Dire Dawa, Ethiopia, 2017

The Research is financed by Dire Dawa University (DDU), No 25-2014/5
(DDU is a state university in Ethiopia and found in Eastern part of the country)

Abstract

In attempt to reverse the gap between public revenue and public good spendings, many researchers had identified multi-faceted factors using variety of tax compliance methods. However the issue is not yet clearly known in many countries including Ethiopia due to the limited and inconclusive results. To further the understanding of tax compliance behaviour in Ethiopia, this study examined the determinants of tax compliance behaviour found in Dire Dawa Administration using behavioral model. The information randomly collected from 299 was analysed using both descriptive statistics and multiple regression Model. In the study, we found that majority of the respondents have settled their tax liabilities without any penalty. However, poor services of tax authority, lower level of tax knowledge, and poor perception to government spendings were challenges to tax compliance behaviour. Thus we suggested improving tax knowledge and increasing the attitude of government spendings help to raise the tax compliance behaviour of individuals.

Keywords: Tax compliance; CDQ; Presumptive taxation; and Dire Dawa Administration

1. Introduction

In this study we adopted an indirectly phrased questions developed both from behavioural theories together with practical determinants factors. For the purpose of controlling the real behaviour of respondents, we also used the Choice Dilemma Questionary Approach (CDQ) during the process of measuring factors that affect the compliance behavior of small business tax payers. Because the CDQ do not allow respondents to think a lot and thereby mistakenly report (MOHD, 2010); Cartwright, 1971, and Nutt, 1986).

Since tax avoidance and tax evasion undermine the ability of developing countries to finance their public sectors, characterizing and explaining the observed patterns of compliance problem and ultimately finding ways to improve it are of obvious importance to the nations especially in developing countries (Asante and Baba, 2011).

However understanding of the factors underlying the individual tax payer's decision whether to comply with the rules or not comply are different and have unique nature across Sub-Saharan countries including Ethiopia. Measuring the magnitude of non-compliance behaviour especially in small business sectors is difficult because tax is collected based on the Assessment Approach within which estimating the levels of uncollected tax is complex or impossible (Asante and Baba, 2011). As a result of this, many tax authorities, including Ethiopia, throughout the world have become increasingly reliant on standard assessment system as a means of improving the administrative efficiency with regard to small business classes.

In Ethiopia more than 85% of the tax revenue is collected using the assessment approach from the small businesses (Mamo Abdi, 2012). All businesses with annual turnover of less than Birr 100,000 are grouped into Small business of category "C". Mamo also indicated that there was a rapid increase (7%) of formal and informal Small businesses in all spheres which they benefited with a reduced tax rate of 30%. This was true after the tax reform of 1992 which planned to raise tax revenue of the country. The reform makes paying taxes much easy for small business enterprises by avoiding a frequent filing requirements and book keepings. Though the government of Ethiopia set an increasing size of tax collection since 2010, its achievement was very small compares with sub-saharan countries. Werkinah, (2013) showed that the average tax revenue of Ethiopia during 1999/2000-2011/12 was 4.8% of GDP. But its income tax was 3.7% of GDP while the average income tax of Sub-saharan countries was 4.79 (International monetary Fund, 2013).

In Dire Dawa Administration, the tax revenue from small business also take the larger share (87%) out of

the total tax subjected business groups with annual mean contribution of 62% (Yohannes M & Zerihun T,2013).. This raises a question of why tax revenue is low-where its work and efficiency is determined by different socio-economic and behavioural factors. Therefore, examining determinants of tax compliance behaviour, depends on identifying factors that affect tax compliance behaviour and hence understanding the rationale for low level of tax revenue of the small business sector pose remedial mechanisms to correct the prevailing problems of tax revenue collection in Dire Dawa Administration.

Following the increasing of tax non-compliance in Sub-Saharan countries, including Ethiopia, has attracted many researchers and policy makers to deal with it (Indris et al, 2011). The tax compliance behavior of these small business sectors, which do not declare their income or keep book accounts, was examined by many researchers. For instance, in Sub-Saharan countries including Ethiopia, most tax compliance studies of small businesses have given less attention to the sector and capture the real behavior of tax payers that affect tax compliance behavior using comprehensive tax compliance measurements.

In Ethiopia little is known about the individual tax compliance behaviour to the small business in which the largest government revenue is based up on it. This is due to the fact that the existing few studies (Lemessa T. (2007), Zelalem B. (2011), and Selamawit W.(2012)) marginalized the issue of real behavior of tax payers using comprehensive technique of like Choice Dilemma Questionary approach and also most are descriptive/assessment studies. The inconsistent results forwarded by such few studies also hardly affect Policy makers in the understanding of individual tax compliance behavior in the sector.

Thus this study attempts to explore the tax compliance behavior of small businesses in which standard Assessment of presumptive taxation is applied as a method of tax collection in Dire Dawa City. The study examined what reasons motivate tax payers to comply & not to comply to the tax laws and what determinant factors are important in influencing their tax compliance behavior. To manage the real behavior of tax payers by minimizing the wrong doing responses, we framed our model using behavioral model of tax compliance and adopt *Choice Dilemma Questionary Approach* to control determinant factors. In the study, the attitude of tax payers' to government spendings, horizontal equity and service of tax authority are addressed using indirectly phrased questions.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Tax Compliance Models

In this study we attempted to use the Neoclassical Behavioural model of tax compliance variables such as institutional factors, Economic factors and Social factors. In Ethiopian context, institutional issues such as perceptions to government spending and services of tax authority have been missed by many researchers.

The models of tax payer behavior which explain the decision whether or no to pay taxes according to the tax laws and procedures reflect certain theories. Economic theories of tax compliance behavior which reflect tax payers' decision to settle tax liabilities are either the classical Economic deterrence or its extension of Behavioral tax compliance behavior model.

In the Classical Economic deterrence theory, tax payers behavior is influenced by economic factors (such as tax rate) that determine the benefit of evasion, probability of detection and penalties for fraud (Merima Ali et al.2012). The model assumes rational behavior among tax payers. The model predicts that an increase in probability of detection and penalty lead to higher level of tax compliance. Several studies including Alm et al (1992); Allingham, M. & Sandmo, A. (1972); Andreini, J., Erard, B. & Feinstein, J. (1998) and Olandipupo, A.O. & Obazee, U. (2006) showed that the tax rates, penalty and probability of detection affect tax payers' behaviour.

Despite the great contribution to the development of tax compliance literature, the model faces many critics; one it fails to address the level of tax compliance besides its assumption of rational utility maximizers; second Joana, M. (2014). The classical economic models generally conclude that most people are tax evaders. However, many empirical evidences suggest that many people are honest tax payers. Even with low level of deterrence some people will report the totality of their income. There are some people who never paying tax even then the risk is sufficiently low to encourage cheating behavior (Coricelli et al., (2003) and Merima Ali et al.2012)).

The study of Joana, M. (2014); Siqueira and Ramos (2005); Frey and Feld (2002) argue that tax evasion cannot be fully explained by financial determinants and economic incentives. Thus following the limitation of the classical's approach of tax compliance model, this study adopts the behavioral aspect of tax compliance decision model which it has gained ground in the literature.

This is because the Tax Compliance Behavioral model of Neoclassical, as it is explained by Jackson and Milliron, 1986; Bordignon, 1992; Wenzel, 2003; Mumford, 2001, is built based on the basis of sociological and psychological determinants. In the model tax payers are seen to no longer selfish utility maximizers like the classical Economic Deterrence of tax compliance behavior. Tax Payers act as human beings motivated to pay taxes on the basis of different attitudes, norms, beliefs, perceptions, feelings, social characteristics, cultural backgrounds like age, gender, race, religion, and etc.

The model is framed using socio-psychological determinants and works with "slippery slope" framework of

Kirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl (2008). Having two dimensions; trust in authorities and power of authorities. Trust in authorities is the opinion of individuals and social groups that the *tax authorities* benevolent and work beneficially for the common good without any kind of inequality. Whereas the power of authority is concerned with tax payer's perception of potential of tax officers to detect illegal tax evasion and to punish tax evasion.

Even though the behavioral model of tax compliance have received an increasing attention from researchers, there is still a lot to explore in order to develop a model that can fully explain tax compliance behavior in developing countries like Ethiopia. Based on the two dimensions, we identified important factors that affect tax payers' compliance behavior specially the socio-psychological determinants. Economic, social, demographic, institutional and individual factors are also involved using empirical evidences and contextual issues.

This study contribute to the development of tax compliance /behavioural model of tax compliance with its view of crucial behavioural policy variables such as tax payers' perceptions to government spendings, and change in governmental policies. It also adds knowledge on methodology of tax compliance study of Sub-Saharan countries by using Choice Dilemma Questionary Approach for the measurement/control of tax payers' influential factors and use of Behavioral Tax Compliance model.

2.2. Determinants of Tax Compliance in Ethiopia

Tax compliance behaviour is not simple phenomenon. It is affected by economic determinants, institutional factors, social factors, psychological factors and individual and demographic factors (MOHD (2010); Joana, M. (2014); and Alm, Jackson and McKee (1992)). The study of Kidist M. (2013) on "tax assessment problems and collection procedure in Category C tax payers of Addis Ababa Nifas Silk sub-city" was aimed to identify problems in the process of tax collection procedure. Using a descriptive method of analysis, the study found that the method of collection is too vulnerable to unfair treatment of tax payers and created a loophole for corruption. It also found that tax payers do not know the rules and regulations of different types of taxes they pay. This led them to delay in tax payments and evasion. Similarly the study of Selamawit W. et al. (2012) indicated that lack of awareness about tax procedures, problem of equity and simplicity of paying taxes and lack of objective tax estimation are the main problems happenings on collection of category C tax payers.

The study of Suresh V. and Sirinvas G. (2012) made on rental tax payers of Mekelle city aimed to identify the influential factors that affect tax compliance behaviour. Using a descriptive method, it indicated that lack of awareness and inability in capturing the tax laws & regulations arising from little education and lack of trainings to tax payers are main obstacles to comply positively to the tax laws. The study of Lemessa T. (2007) also aimed in assessing the factors that affect voluntary tax compliance behaviour in Dire Dawa City category C tax payers. Using purposive sampling and descriptive method, it found that fairness & equity, knowledge gap of tax payers and provision of social services by the governments were the main factors which influence tax compliance behaviour.

The study of Zelalem B. (2011) which targeted to examine whether education can influence respondents' compliance behavior in Addis Ababa city. Using both survey and experimental approach, the study found that tax compliance behaviour is influenced by education. On the other side Yohannes M. and Zerihun A. (2013) assessed challenges by business community tax payers of Dire Dawa Administration using qualitative information gathered through a survey and focus group discussions with the city's chamber of commerce and sectoral association, tax and revenue authority and federal custom and internal revenue authority. Using descriptive statistics, the study found that most C tax payers face problems related to taxation system, and tax rate is reported as it is beyond their ability to pay.

3. Materials and Method

3.1. Materials

3.1.1. Measuring of dependent variable: Tax Compliance behaviour

In measuring tax compliance behaviour /attitude, respondents were asked a variety of 26 questions if they have non-compliant behavior to pay taxes to the government during the period of payment. In general individuals are required to respond their perceptions using the five Likert scale choice, regarding the statements about the efficiency of tax authority, government's policy and spending pattern, and tax policy. However, many studies indicated that individuals tend to hide the truth when they are asked about some sensitive but important questions such as fairness of tax authority and perception about government spendings. Obtaining of valid quantitative information about tax compliance is practically impossible with such kind of direct method.

To solve the problem, other researchers like Kaufman (1997) and Reinikka (2006) adopt an indirectly phrased questions to measure tax compliance so as to avoid the direct implication of wrong doing by respondents. However, this method is limited to address the wider scope of individuals' behavior to the governments procedures.

We adopted the works of MOHD (2010), Cartwright (1971), and Nutt (1986) to measure tax compliance

attitude using a 5 likert –scale based on questions extracted from practical as well as theoretical frameworks. The questionnaire asks respondents to identify reasons/pushing factors that lead them to comply or/and not comply. We asked them 11 variety of questions to directly measure why they pay according to the rules. In this regard, they were asked to respond whether they think that government's spending pattern is not reasonable. They were also required to state whether there is vertical equity in paying taxes and no close friendship with tax experts. They were also required to state whether government public service providers are satisfactory. Finally they were required to state whether tax authority is capable of detecting fraud and punishing. In this regard, the high value represents implied that tax payers are more compliant. Because high value is given to strongly agree option.

On the other side, 14 questions were also provided to evaluate individual's response why they did not comply. In this part, we asked respondents to state whether lower penalty, lower earnings due to market condition, lower motivation of tax authority, priority is to personal liability before taxes led them for their non-compliant behaviour. They were also asked to respond whether observing of no individual is penalized not to comply.

The order value of questions were presented in such a way that they reflect tax compliant behaviour though the questions directly reflect why they became non-compliant.

In both parts of the questionnaire, respondents were asked to mark their opinion in the ranges provided from strongly disagree to strongly agree. This arrangement of scaling/measurement help respondents to immediately respond what they think without taking much time. If they moderately agree, it was scored four points and if they strongly disagree they scored 1. Once all the twenty five questions are measured and summed, the tax compliance score or behavior is known. Based on this, individuals are said to be compliant if their compliance score is above the mean of total compliance score (85 points) and non-compliant if their score falls below the total mean score.

3.1.2. Measuring of independent variables

The principal source of data for this study was the 2014/15 survey collected from small businesses or Schedule "C" tax payers registered in Dire Dawa city, Ethiopia. The survey was conducted using Chice Dilemma Questionary (CDQ) approach to collect information about tax payers' attitude on auditing/re-checking, governmental spending, equity & fairness, penalty, financial constraint, change in government policies, and referent groups. However, variables such as service of tax authority, ethics, and tax knowledge were measured using indices arising from 1 to 5 likert scales.

The variables were measured using CDQ approach was made in a way that the Yes/No was initially weighted as 40% ("yes" =1 mark, "No"=2 marks) while the PROB was weighted as 60% (1=5 marks and 5=1 mark). We adopt this technique because of its ability to control respondents' biases. Because the YN technique did not require respondents to think a lot rather to tick simply either "Yes" or "No". But the PROB part lead respondents to determine which scale (out of five scales) they were on. Here we prefer to use 40:60 weighting ratio instead of using other ratios like 70:30 due to the nature and different rigorousness of the questions we used.

During CDQ approach, first respondents were required to respond both to Yes/No (YN) and to "tick" a probability (PROB), had they been in place of others as a tax payer, from "very low probability" to "very high probability", using a likert scale of 1 to 5. For instance if the respondents answer "yes" and ticked "very high probability", it indicated that he/she was highly non-compliant. The score for him/her would be 1 ($(1*0.4 + 1*0.6)$). All the seven variables were measured with the same techniques of YN and PROB(CDQ).

Based on the score values of these variables, the high value the variable has the more non-compliance score of the tax payers. This is due to the fact that the variables were measured indirectly in a way that the high value was attached if tax payers strongly disagree and low value if they strongly agree.

Other factors such as ethics of tax payers, general service of tax authority and level of tax knowledge were measured using indices of likert scale of 1 to 5. The score value of each of these variables implied that the value above their respective mean is considered as high value and tax payers believed to be more tax compliant.

Because such variables were measured directly using likert scale of 1 to 5, strongly disagree (1point) to strongly agree (5points). Once important information was collected, the determinants factors for tax compliant behavior were explored using Simple Ordinary Least Square regression (OLS). But the objectives of examining reasons for compliance/ non-compliance attitude was addressed using descriptive statistics like ANOVA and T-test.

3.2. The Method

3.2.1. The Econometrics model of tax compliance

For the purpose of capturing the factors that influence tax compliance attitude, we framed our tax compliance study using *Behavior model of Tax compliance* adopted from Krichler, Hoelzl and Wahl (2008). The model gave attention to the sociological and psychological determinants due to the reason that tax payers are seen no longer as selfish utility maximizers (as of the classical view) but as human being motivated to pay tax on the

basis of different attitudes, norms, beliefs, perceptions, feelings, social characteristics, cultural backgrounds (Wenzel, 2003; Wenzel, 2004a; Wenzel, 2004b; Wenzel, 2005a; Wenzel 2005b). Based on this context, the tax compliance behavioural model was framed using Gujarati, D. (2004):

$$Y_i = \alpha_0 + \beta_i X_i + \gamma_i Z_i + \epsilon_i \dots \dots \dots 3.1$$

Where Y_i is the dependent variable which represents tax compliance behaviour. It is continuous as we measure in section 4 below. X is a vector of individual characteristics such as education, monthly income, and age of respondents; Z_i is a vector for variables that capture factors which affect tax compliance attitude. It includes factors such as economic, institutional, social, cultural and demographic issues. β_0 is the constant and γ & β_i are Regression parameters that is $i=1, 2, \dots, n$ whereas ϵ_i regression residuals.

The factors specified as determinants are grouped in Economic, social, demographic, institutional and individual factors.

Economic factors: These are factors related to the cost and benefit of performing the business. Tax payers attempt to minimize their tax liability by intentionally under reporting their income and enjoy tax saving if they were not detected by the tax authority. On the other hand, they are also willing to pay more, including penalty, if they were caught (Joana, M. (2014) ;and Alm, Jackson and Mckee (1992)). Thus we used perception of tax payers about probability of auditing/rechecking, income constraint or lower earnings, perception of equity & fairness and perception of government spending as factors that influence tax compliance attitude among the many economic factors. Since tax rate is common to all tax payers, we did not consider it in this study.

Social factors: These factors that help to examine individuals tax compliance behavior in view of others people's behavior and their social-environmental context tax payers including friends, family and others referent groups. The dimension of social factors as a determinants of tax compliance can be extended to the psychology of tax payers such as ethics and individual's attitude towards tax compliance. In this study referent group (family and friends), change in current government policy, and ethics were taken as social determinants of tax compliance.

Institutional factors; While tax payers are influenced by the economic and social issues to comply or not to comply to the tax rules, many studies suggest that institutional factors also play an important role in challenging tax compliance decision. Efficiency of tax authority, and simplicity of paying tax. In this study, we measured efficiency of tax authority using a variety of 10 questions. Since simplicity of taxation is assumed to be solved by the system of standard presumptive taxation, we only focused on efficiency of tax authority. During the measurement of efficiency of tax authority, we considered issues like awareness creation about the new procedures, provision of incentives and counsellings, solving complaints timely and justly, and equal service to customers.

Individual factors: Personal background about tax Knowledge and ethical manner of tax payers is believed to be important determinants factors. In this study, the knowledge base of tax payers is measured to assess whether tax payers know their duties and rights during the process of settling their tax liabilities. It incorporated issues about period of payment, punishment at time of delay, and system of appealing.

These are most critical to tax payers in the Ethiopian case study because most research studies recommend to measure the knowledge base of tax payers. For this we include the variable whether it is true to Dire Dawa tax payers compliance behaviour.

Ethics of tax payers are also included as a regressor. It is measured using tax payer's feeling about reporting of deducted income, hiding of selling commodities at time of assessment, perception about reporting actual/approximate income during assessments.

Demographic factors: These constitute essential elements that affect the tax compliance behavior of tax. As control variables, we used age, income, education and gender of respondents to capture issues emanating from personal demographic characteristics.

The major data limitation of this study was that we faced many incomplete questionnaires due to the sensitivity of the issue. However we attempted to manage the incomplete responses using respondents ID and their geographical units. On the other side, we did not use triangulation using experimental approaches due to budget constraint.

4. The Result

4.1. Descriptive Analysis

Reasons to comply and not comply;

The result of descriptive analysis showed (Seen table 1,2&3 in Appendix), that majority of the respondents, 90.66%, paid their taxes on time and also 71.24% of them did not pay penalty. We found that majority of tax payers have better education, low income, poor ethics and low level of tax knowledge. However, 38.46% of the respondents did not understand the tax laws and policies due to the fact that tax laws and policies did not written in local language such as Afan Oromo and Somali languages.

Tax payers' knowledge, ethics of tax payers and efficiency of Tax authority were among the motivating factors for compliance behaviour. The non-compliant behaviour of tax payers are due to the probability of being

auditing/rechecking, unfair treatment, reduction of business earnings, change in government policy, and efficiency of tax authority. Equally important, low level of penalty (78%), poor motivation of the tax authority (61%), and absence of penalty to friends when they do not pay (58%) are also challenges to their non-compliance behavior.

4.2. The Regression Result

4.2.1. Robustness of the model

As it can be seen from Prob < F test (0.000) indicate, the overall fit of the model is significant which implies that the variables included in the regression create a statistically significant improvement in the fit of the model. The R-square and adjusted R-square also supplements the good fit of our model with R-squared (0.4136) and Adj R-squared (0.3569).

We also conducted Post estimation of link test to check whether the dependent variable (tax compliance behavior) is specified correctly. Accordingly, we found that the *hat* is significant and the *hats square* is not which implies that the model is correctly specified -no omitted variable bias. To ensure the reliability and validity of the regression, some diagnostic test like heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity was conducted. While the issue of heteroscedasticity was found to be a problem (tested via white test) but the VIF test of multicollinearity was no problem to the model. To avoid the problem resulted from heteroscedasticity, we regressed our model with robust regression.

4.2.2. Determinants of tax compliance behavior

Source	SS	Df	MS	N.of obs.	
Model	11945.8824	15	796.392163	F (15 , 278)	11.98
Residual	18483.5636	278	66.4876387	Prob > F	0.0000
Total	30429.446	293	103.85476	R- squared	0.3926
				Adj R- squared	0.3598
				Root MSE	8.154

Total tax compliance score	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>t	[95% Conf. Interval]
GENDER OF TAX PAYER	-0.3171483	1.04329	-0.3	0.761	-2.3712 1.736904
EFFECT OF BEING AUDIT	-1.139405	1.652094	-0.69	0.491	-4.39208 2.113275
CHANGE GOV'T SPENDING	1.905595	1.109337	1.72	0.087**	-0.27849 4.089683
UNFAIR TREATMENT	1.513504	0.9626251	1.57	0.117	-0.38173 3.408741
EFFECT REFERENT GROUPS	1.759672	1.041425	1.69	0.092**	-0.29071 3.810053
BEING PENALIZED	-0.0249485	0.5636599	-0.04	0.965	-1.13469 1.084798
EFFECT REDUCTION INCOM	1.108012	0.5018964	2.21	0.028*	0.119867 2.096156
Efficiency of Tax Authority	1.004208	0.1003503	10.01	0.042**	0.806636 1.20178
ETHICS OF TAX PAYERS	0.9471375	0.2111585	4.49	0.024**	0.531404 1.362871
LEVEL OF TAX KNOWLEDGE	0.6063092	0.1947272	3.11	0.002***	0.222926 0.989692
_cons	45.10773	8.393501	5.37	0.000	28.58242 61.63304

N.B. *, ** and *** indicate the variable is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance

As it is shown from the regression result table, individual level of tax knowledge and efficiency of tax authority strongly and positively influence tax compliance behavior at 5% level of significance. A unit increase in these variables cause tax compliance behaviour to increase strongly by almost equal proportion, 1 by 1. The increase in tax knowledge enforce tax payer to comply strongly. Because these groups know the value being tax compliant. Similarly tax compliance behavior increases by 0.99 for a unit increase in the efficiency of tax authority. Tax payers comply more if they are satisfied with the efficiency/service of the authority including provision of trainings and advising, fair treatment, and increase in capacity of the authority to resolve appeals timely and fairly.

Ethical manner of tax payers (which indicate fraud is perceived as immoral or wrong) is another variable that positively affect tax compliance behavior. Those who have good tax ethics (those who are truthful in declaring their income, do not hide sales goods at time of assessment and those who shay when they evade) are more compliant than otherwise. This indicated that as tax payer's ethics increase by one unit their compliance score increase by 0.908.

Change in market condition (especially fall in income) also influence tax payer's compliance attitude. Because individuals try to compensate the reduction of their income by untruthfully declaring their income. The result of this study assure that tax payers who face reduction of income, as a result of market variation, tend to reduce their compliance behaviour by 1.108 for a one unit decrease in business income.

On the other side, referent groups strongly and positively influence compliance behaviors. Whenever tax payers get an increasing influenced from friends and family members, they surprisingly tend to increase their compliant behaviour. This could be due to low level of tax knowledge. Similarly auditing/re-checking, and change in government spending policies (observing of government spending to luxury products of government officials) have also a positive effect on compliance behavior. It could be due to the fact that tax payers believe

officials highly autocrat and have not excuse to the faluts.

5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1 Conclusion: The result of descriptive analysis showed that majority of the respondents, 90.66%, paid their taxes on time but significant number (38.46%) of the respondents did not understand tax laws and policies due to language problem. In the study, absence /low level of penalty is mentioned among the factors for non-compliant behaviour. But statistically insignificant for compliance behaviour.

The result of the econometrics model indicated that tax compliance behavior is significantly and positively influenced by tax payer's level of knowledge, referent group, ethics of tax payers, and change of market condition, unfair treatment and role of tax authority.

5.2. Recommendation and policy implication

Since tax payers level of knowledge affect tax compliance, the authority has to increase its awareness creation though public relation program. Individuals need to be informed about the advantage of paying taxes regardless of any out side pressures at society's institutional set ups like Edir, equip and reliogus organizations. Additionally, we advised the authority to aware potential tax payers at time of registration and assesment through leaf lets and trainings. If information centers are established at kebele level, no doubt , tax compliance behavior of in the admnstarion would improve.

- As others countries the simplicity and efficiency of tax authority has significant correlation/ effect with tax compliance behavior, we recommend dire dawa tax authority to improve its services at each department level through identifying which servuces of the tax authority are claimed by claints. We suggest the authority to increase its system of solving claims as it is now too poor. Equally important, the authority better design the assesmen system both in assigning ethical and profesional experts and increasing period of estimation. This is because un fair treatment is one factor fon non-compliance behaviour and business activities are now highly affected by fluctuation prices in the the economy.
- Though tax compliance behaviour is found to be negatively affected by spending pattern of the government , we believe that such spending pattern will no longer exist rather it will make tax payers non-compliant specially when they observe big inequality among residents. Thus we advised the authority to asure whether people's attension towards the government are positive . This could be done though arranging a media workes about short and long term governments public infrastructure undertakings /projects. People need to know what has beed done with their tax payments. The authority is expected to launch weekly regional media progrm together with tax experts and scholars.

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Appendices

Table 1. Profile of Respondants

	Option	Frequency	Percentage
Level of income	Below 1000 ETB	158	52.84
	1000-5000 ETB	114	38.13
	5000-10000ETB	23	7.69
	Above 10000	3	1.33
Year of experience	Below 1 year	78	26.09
	1-5 years	142	47.49
	5-10 years	53	17.73
	Above 10 years	26	8.7
<i>Did u pay tax on time?</i>	<i>Freq.</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Cum.</i>
Yes	270	90.66	90.64
No	28	9.36	100.00
Total	299	100.00	
<i>Did u paid penalty</i>	<i>Freq.</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Cum.</i>
Yes	86	28.76	28.76
No	213	71.24	100.00
Total	299	100.00	
Did you take training regarding tax	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Yes	118	39.46	39.46
No	181	60.54	100.00
Total	299	100.00	
<i>Did u audited by tax authority</i>	<i>Freq.</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Cum.</i>
Yes	70	23.41	23.41
No	229	76.59	100.00
Total	299	100.00	
<i>Is there tax laws that is written by your local language</i>	<i>Freq.</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Cum.</i>
Yes	184	61.54	61.54
No	115	38.46	100.00
Total	299	100.00	
<i>Did u visited by tax authority</i>	<i>Freq.</i>	<i>Percent</i>	
Yes	149	49.83	
No	150	50.17	
Total	299	100.00	

Table 2. Reasons motivate tax payers to comply to the tax laws.

<i>Reaons motivate tax payers to comply</i>	<i>Strongly disagree</i>	<i>Dis - agree</i>	<i>Not sure</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Strongly agree</i>	<i>Mean score</i>	<i>t-test Pr (T>t)</i>
Patience of tax office when they didn't comply	47.83	32.11	10.37	5.35	4.35	1.862	0.963
Ability to find mistake	17.39	35.79	24.41	15.72	6.69	2.585	1.0000
Reasonable gov't expenditure on poverty reduction	20.74	17.39	20.40	24.41	17.06	2.996	1.0000
Satisfaction on infrastructure provided by gov't	19.40	20.40	26.76	19.73	13.71	2.996	0.1235
Non extravagant government expenditure	18.73	27.42	29.43	15.72	8.70	2.682	1.0000
Horizontal equity	14.05	21.74	26.09	25.42	12.71	3.010	1.0000
Vertical equity	15.72	25.08	24.75	24.41	10.03	2.879	1.0000
Advantage of tax for the poor	20.07	23.75	22.74	24.75	8.70	2.78	1.0000
Low complexity of paying taxes in tax office	15.72	23.41	20.74	31.44	8.70	2.939	1.000
Expectation of high penalty	16.72	23.08	21.07	28.43	10.70	2.933	1.000
High intimacy of tax payers with tax office	23.08	19.06	30.43	21.07	6.35	2.686	1.00

Tabel 3: Reasons for non-compliant behaviour

<i>Factors which affects tax payers attitude</i>	<i>Strongly disagree</i>	<i>Dis-agree</i>	<i>Not sure</i>	<i>agree</i>	<i>Strongly agree</i>	Mean	t-test
Low level of penalty	37.73	39.93	9.89	7.69	4.76	2.018	1.000
Lower motivation of tax office	20.82	39.78	17.10	13.38	8.92	2.498	1.000
Lower amount of penalty compared with income generated from delayed tax	24.34	41.57	17.60	9.36	7.12	2.333	1.000
Lower level of income in comparison to expenditure	21.05	34.59	12.03	24.44	7.89	2.635	1.000
Increase in utility expense	18.15	30.37	13.33	25.93	12.22	2.844	1.000
Paying other debts prior to tax.	17.16	30.97	14.55	26.87	10.45	2.824	1.000