The Power of Budget Actors of Regional Election from the Perspective of Dahrendorf’s Conflict Theory

Abstract

The purpose of the research is to reveal the power of budget actors of the 2013 Bali regional election. The data were collected through the participant observations and dialogues with participants. Data analysis was conducted using Dahrendorf’s conflict theory. Dahrendorf’s conflict theory perceives regularities in society as a result of tensions of power from super-ordinates to sub-ordinates. Power is a rare resource. The conflicts of authority emerge to maintain the legitimacy of authority.

The research finds out that the practice of elections cannot be separated from conflicts. Conflicts linger in the executive, legislative, and regional election authorities in Bali province. One of the main resources of power is a budget. Organizations experiencing conflicts can make use of budget to maintain authority. The conflict of budget planning of regional elections ends with the excessive power of budgeting team to cut the budget actors’ pay. The conflict of budget execution is shown by the power of the incumbent and commissioners. The conflict of budget accountability ends with the power of Financial Investigation Bureau of Indonesia to return the excess use of budget of regional elections to the local cash account.

The implications of this study are the changes in the regulation of budgetary resources of regional elections from local budget to state expenditure budget as well as the changes in the regulation of commissioners’ authority to replace the structural officials of the General Election Commission.

Keywords: power, budget, and power conflict.