Is Ghana’s Democracy Counterproductive to Development? Democratic Short-Termism and the Politics of Development Planning in Ghana

Abstract

Research on the bi-directional relationship between political regimes and economic development has increased tremendously since Lipset’s (1959) seminal examination of the implications of economic development on political regimes. While some scholars oppose modernizationists who tie the prospects for democracy to economic growth, significant bodies of literature have argued that since democracies consistently outperform autocracies in growth and development indexes, democracy rather is a sine qua non for development. Others also highlight the counterproductive effect of democratic politics and judge it to be present-bias and unrepresentative of future interest. This article relooks at the conversation of whether the pursuit of long-term development policies is feasible under democracies, with an empirical focus on Ghana. Aside from its enviable democracy track record, Ghana is touted as the first country in the developing world to roll out a development plan. Using long term planning as a proxy for transformative development, I investigate how elected political elites in Ghana respond to the dilemma of choosing between winning the next election by pursuing voter-pleasing short-term policy goals, and embarking on long-term structural transformation with short-term electoral disadvantages. I argue that competitive elections and associational liberties affect the pursuit of long-term policy planning in Ghana. The incentive to implement or abandon long term plans is shaped by the rational calculations of the country’s political elites in response to the short-term preferences of electorates.

Keywords: Democracy, Development planning, Present-bias, Elections, Associational liberties, Ghana

DOI: 10.7176/DCS/12-2-01

Publication date: February 28^th 2022