Impact of Embedded Buyer-Seller Relationship in Auditing Apparatus on Auditors' Independence

Abstract

Buyer-Seller relationship is embedded in contemporary audit apparatus. Although auditors are engaged in quasi-judicial activities, controversy occurs as they are appointed and paid by the reporting entity. This scenario is further complicated when auditors are allowed to perform both attestation services and non-attestation services. In the face of such challenges auditors are more concerned with clientele retention and service continuation rather than independence. Moreover, auditors are paid by the clientele. In such a scenario achieving independence is a utopia. So this paper suggests that auditors should be appointed by regulators and same auditors/firms must not perform both audit and non-audit services. In formulating a roadmap to auditors' independence this commentary analyzes threats to independence from the Buyer-Seller perspective embedded in auditing.

Keywords: Buyer-Seller Relationship, Quasi-Judicial, Attestation Services, Non-Attestation Services