Compliance Effectuality of International Sanctions: Subjectivity Versus Objectivity

Abstract

This article examines the problematic of international sanctions within the framework of international politics. Notwithstanding changes in global international relations, particularly in respect of international interdependence and the diffusion of power, there has remained at the heart of the UN, a good deal of “preservationist” or status quo fervour, based on a core of stabilising guardian powers. Politics of sanctions reflects the reality of “high ideals” compromised by what is achievable. The article examines sanctions problematic within the framework of mechanism to translate intentions into reality. The article argues that domestic problems and pre-occupation define the limit of expectations, the range of possibilities and the nature of constraints and leverages in the hands of those engaged in the conduct of foreign policy. One wonders whether the paramount of the “Big five” managers is not a conventional system of power politics thinly disguised, consisting of efforts to manipulate others to satisfy self-regarding interests. The paper further contends that efforts of states to enforce sanctions have always complicated their other policy goals in the target states. Finally, it suffices to say that because politics has to do with the set of institutions and rules by which social and economic interactions are governed, sanctions are eminently political and politics is obviously tied to the sanctions phenomena.

Keywords: Compliance Effectuality, Politics, Sovereignty, Sanctions, Diplomacy, Subjectivity, Objectivity.